| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
01/29/2015 - 01/30/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 50747 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: CHEVRON PHILLIPS CHEMICAL COMPANY LP
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: L00230
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 01/21/2015
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2015
Event Time: 15:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
NMSS EVENTS (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK GAUGE SHUTTER
The following information was received by email:
"On January 21, 2015, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that on January 20, 2015, during the process of closing fixed nuclear gauge shutters at its facility in order to perform detector calibrations, it discovered that the shutter on one of its Ohmart-Vega SH-F2 gauges, containing a 500 millicurie cesium-137 source, would not close. The gauge normally operates with the shutter in the open position and the failure does not pose a risk of exposure to any person. The licensee is coordinating to have repairs made. Further information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident: I 9269 |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 50750 | Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 01/22/2015
Notification Time: 14:44 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2015
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
TIM MCCARTIN (NMSS)
| Event Text DRY CONVERSION PROCESS IMPROPERLY ANALYZED IN THE CURRENT INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS
"During a GNF-A review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), it was determined at approximately 3:00 PM (EST) yesterday (1/21/15) that a quantitative risk assessment associated with the Dry Conversion Process (DCP) cylinder cold trap operation was improperly analyzed in the current ISA. The item relied on for safety (IROFS) and other controls associated with preventing overfilling the cold trap system remained available and reliable. However, the initiating event frequency for a particular accident sequence was determined to be higher than that documented resulting in a failure to meet performance requirements.
"At no time was the postulated condition present; therefore no potential unsafe condition occurred. The affected equipment has been shut down and an investigation is underway to provide additional corrective actions and determine extent of condition.
"While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery."
The licensee will be notifying the State of North Carolina Radiation Protection Division and the New Hanover City of Environmental Management.
The NRC Region II office and NRC Project Manager will be notified. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 50776 | Facility: B&W NUCLEAR OPERATING GROUP, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: KENNY KIRBY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 01/28/2015
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 01/09/2015
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO)
JACK GUTTMANN (NMSS)
FUELS GROUP (OUO) (EMAI)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION WHILE CLEANING THE CATCH TRAY
"I. EVENT DESCRIPTION
"Scrap material resulting from various operations at B&W NOG-L's facilities is processed in the Low Level Dissolver (LLD) to reclaim as much of the uranium as possible. Since the material is scrap (e.g., filters, vacuum cleaner bags, etc.), it contains only small amounts of uranium bearing materials. On occasion during processing a slight amount of material will spill over the edge of the dissolver trays, filter bowls, or when hand-transferring material between the trays and filter bowls. These small spills collect on a large catch tray in the bottom of the enclosure. Periodically the catch tray is cleaned to limit the amount of material buildup. By procedure the solid material is to be scraped up and collected in a [less than or equal to] 2.5 liter container. During the cleanout the LLD process is shutdown.
"On January 9, 2015, the LLD process was shutdown and the enclosure was undergoing a routine cleanout. However on this occasion the operators scraped the material on the tray into several piles for subsequent collection into containers. The volume of most of the piles exceeded the 2.5 liter limit. However, the spacing between the piles was greater than the 15 inch limit, and the net weight of any single pile was less than the 7 kg limit for a 2.5 liter volume containing an unknown amount of U-235 . NDA [Non-Destructive Assay] measurements later determined the U-235 content of the piles ranged from 6.5 to 20.8 grams. There was no risk of a criticality accident. The accident scenarios for [less than or equal to] 2.5 liter containers of an unknown amount of U-235 were reviewed to analyze the event. At that point in time it was concluded the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 were maintained.
"At 0900 EST on January 28, 2015, during discussion with the NRC as part of a regularly scheduled NCS inspection the applicability of these scenarios to the event came into question. The scenarios assume the material is containerized rather than in piles. Some of the IROFS [item relied on for safety] were therefore considered not available in this particular situation.
"II. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT
"The cleanup process as analyzed assumed the material was scraped up and collected in [less than or equal to] 2.5 liter containers. The scraping of the material into piles for subsequent collection into containers is a different process than what had been analyzed. The scenarios for the handling of materials containing an unknown amount of U-235 assume the material is containerized rather than in piles. Some of the IROFS credited in these scenarios were therefore not available for the collection of the material in piles. Although the as-found condition presented no safety concern, the scenarios as documented in the ISA [Integrated Safety Analysis] did not demonstrate the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 were maintained.
"There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event.
"Ill. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
"B&W is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1) - Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61.
"IV. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
"An investigation of the root causes of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |