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Event Notification Report for August 14, 2014

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
08/13/2014 - 08/14/2014

** EVENT NUMBERS **


50210 50342 50344 50359 50360 50361 50362 50363

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 50210
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: HENK VERWEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 06/18/2014
Notification Time: 21:20 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2014
Event Time: 15:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 86 Power Operation 86 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF HPCI ROOM COOLING

"At 1545 [EDT], while testing of the Emergency Service Water system (ST-8Q) was being performed at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF), two of five unit coolers (66UC-22H and 66UC-22K) in the East Crescent were found with indicated flow of 0 gpm. The other three unit coolers in the East Crescent Area were found with sufficient flow. At least four unit coolers are required to support the functionality of the East Crescent Area Ventilation Subsystem (TRO 3.7.C). The East and West Crescent Area Ventilation Subsystems support the Operability of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system by removing heat from the areas, in the event that ECCS and RCIC were used to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"The West Crescent Area Ventilation Subsystem remained functional. The accident mitigating function of the division of ECCS and RCIC located in the West Crescent Area were unaffected by this condition. However, this condition could have prevented the function of one division of the ECCS, including the single train of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), located in the East Crescent. Therefore, this condition could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of HPCI and it is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"As part of the testing, the throttle valves to the unit coolers (66UC-22H and 66UC-22K) were cycled and normal flow was restored. This condition no longer exists."

The licensee is investigating the loss of flow to the "H" and "K" unit coolers and the restoration of flow by cycling the unit cooler supply throttle valves.

The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM DAVID CALLEN TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1506 EDT ON 8/13/2014 * * *

"FitzPatrick is retracting EN # 50210 made on June 18, 2014 at 2120 EDT. The plant was at 86% power at the time. The ENS notification was an 8-Hr non-emergency notification to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) when it was discovered that two of five unit coolers in the East Crescent (66UC-22H and 66UC-22K) were found with indicated flow of 0 gpm while testing. The other three unit coolers in the East Crescent (66UC-22B, 66UC-22D, 66UC-22F) were found with sufficient flow. At least four unit coolers are required to support the functionality of the East Crescent Area Ventilation subsystem (TRO 3.7.C). The East and West Crescent Area Ventilation subsystems support the Operability of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system by removing heat from these areas in the event that ECCS and RCIC are used to mitigate the consequences of an accident. As part of testing, throttle valves to unit coolers 66UC-22H and 66UC-22K were cycled and normal flow was restored.

"The West Crescent Area Ventilation subsystem remained functional. The accident mitigating function of the division of the ECCS and RCIC located in the West Crescent Area were unaffected by this condition. Initial review of this condition determined that it could have prevented the function of one division of the ECCS, including the single train of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), located in the East Crescent. Therefore, this condition was initially reported under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the Safety function of HPCI.

"This EN# 50210 is being retracted based upon a subsequent engineering analysis that determined that there is reasonable assurance that the three unit coolers with sufficient flow (66UC-22B, 66UC-22D, and 66UC-22F) would have been capable of removing accident heat loads as a function of time to maintain East Crescent area temperatures at a value which ensures operability of supported equipment. The analysis considered unit cooler heat transfer capability at the modified design condition flow of 22 gpm for historically observed lake temperatures and for flow at tested conditions. Additional margin in flow at the tested condition provided increased heat removal capability and provided added assurance that accident heat load would have been removed. The East Crescent Area Ventilation subsystem was, therefore, functional with three unit coolers (functionality never was lost) and the supported ECCS remained Operable. The Operability determination for the condition has subsequently been revised based upon the engineering analysis, to state the condition was not immediately reportable per 10 CFR 50.72."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector

Notified R1DO (Kennedy)

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Agreement State Event Number: 50342
Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP, INC.
Region: 4
City: NORTH SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #: UT0600485
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SPENCER WICKHAM
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 08/05/2014
Notification Time: 11:28 [ET]
Event Date: 05/29/2014
Event Time: 18:30 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILURE OF SOURCE TO RETRACT

The following information was received via E-mail:

"The Assistant Radiation Safety Officer (ARSO) of Mistras reported to the Division of Radiation Control (DRC) that a radioactive source could not be returned to the shielded position in a radiography camera. The radiography technician failed to connect the guide tube to the stiff extension they were using to make superimposed exposures. When the technician cranked out the source, he cranked the cable past the assembly gear and could not retrieve the source. The technician then roped off the area of the incident to ensure individuals did not enter a high radiation area, and informed personnel at the refinery that an incident had occurred. The ARSO was then contacted and informed of the situation. The ARSO arrived on the scene of the incident and performed surveys near the exposure device to determine what the high and low levels of radiation were. The ARSO selected a spot where he could reach the radiography camera's crank handle that was in an area with a dose rate of 4 mR/hr.

"The ARSO used a hack saw to cut the crank handle off of the guide tube. Once the crank handle was removed, the ARSO pulled the guide cable to retract the source back into the camera's shielded position. The camera was then surveyed and returned to the licensee's storage facility. No personnel involved in the incident received exposures in excess of the regulatory limits.

"On May 30, 2014, at approximately 5:00 pm [MDT] the DRC inspectors arrived at the Mistras's facility. The inspectors interviewed personnel involved in the event and collected statements. The inspectors took photographs of the exposure device, collimator, and performed surveys of the camera. The inspectors confirmed that the radioactive sealed source was stopped in the camera's shielded position.

"Radiography exposure device information: Model INC-100, S/N 4419."

The radiography camera contains a 68 Curie Ir-192 source. The event took place at the Chevron refinery located at 2351 North/1100 West, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Utah Event Report ID No.: UT140002.

* * * UPDATE FROM SPENCER WICKHAM TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1919 EDT ON 8/12/14 * * *

The following event update was received from the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Radiation Control via email:

"No personnel involved in the incident received exposures in excess of the regulatory limits. On May 30, 2014, the day after the incident, DRC inspectors interviewed personnel involved in the event and collected statements. The inspectors took photographs of the industrial radiography exposure device and performed surveys of the device. The inspectors confirmed that the radioactive sealed source was stopped in the device's shielded position."

Notified R4DO (Campbell) and FSME Events Resource via email.

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Agreement State Event Number: 50344
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: STRUCTURAL METALS, INC.
Region: 4
City: SEGUIN State: TX
County:
License #: 02188
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 08/05/2014
Notification Time: 18:06 [ET]
Event Date: 08/05/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/06/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER ON FIXED GAUGE

The following report was provided from the State of Texas via Email:

"On August 5, 2014, the licensee notified the [Texas Department of State Health Services, Investigation Unit, Radiation Branch] Agency that it had discovered it was unable to close the shutter on a Berthold model LB300ML fixed nuclear gauge that contains a 2.5 milliCurie cobalt-60 source. The licensee stated it had experienced a loss of power on August 3, 2014, that resulted in the loss of control of the flow of molten steel. The licensee stated when it was able to get to the gauge on August 5th and discovered that some steel had spilled onto the top of the gauge's knobs and prevented shutter closure. The licensee stated that the source housing was not damaged and the source had not been compromised. The licensee also reported it has not yet been able to get to the shutter on a second gauge (same model and source) due to the steel spillage. It is anticipating the steel will be cleared within the next 1-2 days so it can make a determination on the status of the shutter on the second gauge. The gauges normally operate with the shutter in the open position. There have been no overexposures as a result of this event. Due to the location of the gauges/sources and the steel spillage, there is no risk of overexposure. The licensee stated it had already scheduled a routine service call for August 7th, for its gauges. The licensee will have the technician make needed repairs to the disabled gauge(s) while they are at the facility. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I-9218

* * * UPDATE FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO JEFF ROTTON VIA EMAIL AT 1247 EDT ON 8/6/2014 * * *

"On August 6, 2014, the licensee notified the Agency that it was finally able to access the second gauge, Berthold LB300ML containing 2.5 milliCurie cobalt-60 source, referred to in the initial report. The licensee reported that the shutter on this second gauge was binding (cause unknown at this time) and they were unable to close it. The gauge normally operates with the shutter in the open position. There have been no overexposures as a result of this event. Due to the location of the gauges/sources and the steel spillage, there is no risk of overexposure. The licensee will include this shutter for evaluation/repair when the service technician comes to its facility on 08/07/2014. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."

Notified R4DO (Werner) and FSME Events Resource via email.

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Part 21 Event Number: 50359
Rep Org: NUTHERM INTERNATIONAL, INC
Licensee: NUTHERM INTERNATIONAL, INC
Region: 3
City: MOUNT VERNON State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ADRIENNE SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/01/2014
Notification Time: 15:16 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

POTENTIAL ISSUE REGARDING INCORRECT INDUSTRIAL IRRADIATION DOSE

The following information was received via facsimile:

Nutherm International, Inc. was notified by Steris Isomedix Services that the applied radiation dose reported on their Component Irradiation Certificates did not account for all uncertainties involved (i.e. density of unrelated products in carriers, off-carrier location within the irradiator and Cobalt-60 source decay). This issue was originally identified as part of NRC Inspection Report No. 99901445/2014-201.

"Nutherm International, Inc. is conducting an evaluation to determine whether a defect as defined by 10 CFR Part 21 exists. The impact of this failure to account for all uncertainties will be evaluated for all projects that required data from any sample irradiated by this supplier.

"At the conclusion of the evaluation, any customer impacted by this issue will be notified and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission will be notified in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.21.

"If you have any questions regarding this issue please do not hesitate to contact Adrienne Smith, Quality Assurance Manager at 618-244-6000, adrienne.smith@nutherm.com."

The supplier will update this report when the evaluation is complete. This event report was originally received by the NRC Operations Center on 08/01/2014

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50360
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ED SEACOR
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/13/2014
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

CONTROL ROOM BOUNDARY DOOR FAILED TO LATCH

"A Control Room Boundary Door failed to latch and maintain the Control Room boundary. This condition was reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The door was repaired and the Control Room boundary was restored on 8/13/14 at 0552 [EDT]."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State of Connecticut, and local agencies.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50361
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHUCK GUALDONI
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 08/13/2014
Notification Time: 13:06 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2014
Event Time: 11:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP

"On August 13, 2014 at 1157 EDT, the Indian Point Unit 3 Reactor Protection System automatically actuated at 100% power due to Over Temperature Delta Temperature logic. At the time of the trip, pressurizer pressure Channel 1 was in test for maintenance, though testing was suspended at this time for lunch. All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. All plant equipment responded normally to the unit trip. This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The plant is stable in Mode 3 at this time.

"The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated following the automatic trip as expected. This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The Emergency Diesel Generators did not start as offsite power remained available and stable. The unit remains on offsite power and all electrical loads are stable. No primary or secondary relief valves lifted. The plant is in Hot Standby at normal operating temperature and pressure with decay heat removal using auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators, and normal heat removal through the condenser via condenser steam dumps. There was no radiation released. Indian Point Unit 2 was not affected by this event and remains at 100% power.

"A post trip investigation is in progress.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50362
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: WAYNE EPPEN
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 08/13/2014
Notification Time: 17:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/08/2014
Event Time: 10:26 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO LACK OF APPROPRIATE FUSE PROTECTION

"Based on industry operating experience, a drawing review was performed and it was determined that the control circuits for the DC Emergency Turbine Oil Pumps for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are not fused properly. Therefore an overload within the control circuit could result in a fire that could propagate to multiple fire areas affecting safe shutdown equipment that could be compromised, which affects the Appendix R safe shutdown analysis. Based on this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with F5 Appendix K, Fire Protection system minimum requirements, for impaired fire protection equipment. Hourly fire watches are in place in the affected locations as a result of previous conditions. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensures the protection of the equipment.

"The protection of the health and safety of the public is not affected by this issue.

"The license has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50363
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ALAN TUBMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/14/2014
Notification Time: 01:16 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2014
Event Time: 23:18 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/14/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

MOMENTARY LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

"Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) had a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building Airlock doors being opened at the same time.

"At 2318 [EDT] on 8/13/2014, both Reactor Building Airlock doors at NMP1 were open simultaneously for less than 5 seconds. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored.

"Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material. '

"The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, August 14, 2014
Thursday, August 14, 2014