Event Notification Report for January 06, 2014

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MAIN TRANSFORMER FAULT

"At 1659 EST hours on January 6, 2014, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 automatically tripped from 100% power. The cause of the reactor trip was a main transformer differential trip. All rods fully inserted into the core and the plant is stable in Mode 3. All three auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically started as expected. Normal and Emergency Busses are being powered by Offsite Power. The cause of the main transformer differential trip is being investigated. All other equipment functioned as expected. At 1757 EST hours the Emergency Operating Procedures were exited.

"Resident inspector has been notified."

Decay heat is being removed via the turbine bypass valves to the condenser. No primary or secondary safety valves lifted. Unit 2 was unaffected.

Licensee notified the States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia and the Counties of Beaver, PA, Hancock, OH, and Columbiana, OH.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL DUE TO A FAILED MAIN FEEDWATER REG VALVE

"On January 6th, 2014 at 2115 EST Indian Point Unit 3 experienced an Automatic Reactor Trip due to '33 Steam Generator Steam flow/Feed flow Mismatch.' Operators entered emergency procedure E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. All control rods fully inserted, all safety systems responded as expected, and off-site power remained in-service. No primary or secondary safety valves actuated due to the trip. This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The main condenser is being used for heat sink. Unit 2 remains stable at 100% power.

The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated following the automatic trip as expected. This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"Investigation is underway to determine the cause of the 33 Steam Generator Mismatch condition."

The licensee will inform local and other government agencies and issue a press release. The licensee has informed the State of New York and the NRC Resident Inspector.

LOSS OF THREE EMERGENCY PLAN SIRENS

"While operating in Mode 1 at 100% rated thermal power, the City of Burlington Kansas emergency dispatch center notified Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) Security that two emergency plan sirens in Burlington, Kansas and one emergency plan siren in New Strawn, Kansas failed to function when they were actuated to call out a local fire response . These three sirens also function as part of the Emergency Plan Alert and Notification System. WCNOC Emergency Plan personnel have been notified of the three siren failures and the cause is under investigation.

"Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) remains at 100% rated thermal power.

"The WCGS NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified and local government."

* * * UPDATE AT 1408 EST ON 01/06/14 FROM PIERCE MOORE III TO JEFF ROTTON * * *

"At 0922 CST, the three sirens were returned service.

"WCGS NRC Resident has been notified. "

Notified R4DO (Hagar).

RADIATION MONITOR TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"The Supplementary Leakage Collection and Release System ventilation process flow radiation monitor 3HVR*RE19A has been removed from service for pre-planned maintenance. The monitor will be returned to service after maintenance is complete."

The NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local agencies have been informed.

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE EXCEEDED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

"At 0245 CST secondary containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specifications limit due to a personnel error manipulating an incorrect component. This caused entry into LCO 3.6.4.1 for secondary containment inoperability. An event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function requires an 8 hour report per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) for Control of Rad Release and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for Accident Mitigation. The error was corrected and secondary containment pressure was restored to greater than or equal to 0.25 inch vacuum water gauge and secondary containment was declared operable at 0302 CST. The NRC Resident has been informed of this condition."

MOLLY-TECH GENERATOR LOST SOURCE DURING SHIPMENT

"The Mo-Tc Generator (Mallinckrodt Tracking number 2241132 on box and generator, and DU [Depleted Uranium] number 4283 stamped on DU shield) was offered for shipment on 27DEC13 to courier [common]. The generator was sent to customer Pharmalogic MT Inc in Missoula, Montana. The customer did not receive the generator and contacted Mallinckrodt [on December 28, 2013]. A search was conducted and on 06JAN14, [common carrier] informed Mallinckrodt that they believe they did not have the generator of concern at any of their sites. Typical shipment routing is from Maryland Heights, Missouri to St. Louis Lambert airport to Memphis, Tennessee. After Memphis we [Mallinckrodt] are not aware if a second stop occurs prior to arrival in Missoula, Montana. Mallinckrodt conducted an onsite search and was not successful at finding the generator.

"At time of shipment, the generator activity was 11 curie of Mo-99, and 8.1 mCi of depleted Uranium-238. The shipping box read 10.9 mR/hr on contact with the outer surface. Estimated on contact exposure rate levels on the outside of the generator at time of shipment was 180 mR/hr.

"At time (06JAN14) of declaration of the generator being lost, the activity levels were estimated to be 882 mCi of Mo-99, 882 mCi of Tc-99m, and 8.1 mCi of depleted U-238. Estimated exposure rate levels were 0.9 mR/hr on the outside surface of the shipping box, and 14 mR/hr on the outside surface of the generator.

"This event was also reported to Ken Lambert (Voice Mail), NRC Sr. Health Physicist in Region III."

During shipment pickup on December 27, 2013 by the common carrier , the package did not get properly scanned into the common carrier tracking system, and no shipping Bill of Lading, Air Way Bill number, or shipping documentation of any sort was provided to the shipper and was attributed to a new common carrier employee.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY GARY BOSGRAAF TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1027 EST ON JANUARY 14, 2014

"On 27DEC13 (Day of initial event), another generator that day was shipping to Cardinal Health in Pompano Beach, Florida. Numerous changes were made to generator orders over the holiday due to reduced pharmacy needs. This particular customer has their standing order for their generator flown on American Airlines on a standing order basis every Friday. Any other orders they want would ship [common carrier]. They made changes to their generator for the 27th which resulted in this particular order defaulting to their [common carrier] routing.

"When the generator for Pompano Beach was processed on the 27th their routing for this generator was [common carrier]. When a generator is routed [common carrier] the DG [Dangerous Goods] statement and the label will generate automatically when it is processed at the drop station which is what happened here. The technician noticed that this particular order goes American every Friday and changed the order to ship with the airline. The [common carrier] paperwork was not pulled and another technician mistakenly put the [common carrier] label on the Missoula, MT generator. We know this by looking at the history of the order for Pompano Beach. It shows it being processed as a [comon carrier] order but the route being changed to ship with American.

"The generator then shipped down to the [common carrier] facility in Pompano Beach where it remained until Friday 10JAN14 when it was reported to Mallinckrodt."

Notified R1DO (Rogge), R3DO (Skokowski), R4DO (Kellar) and FSME Events Resource via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf