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Event Notification Report for November 1, 2013

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/31/2013 - 11/01/2013

** EVENT NUMBERS **


49324 49355 49371 49447 49466 49470 49489 49490 49491

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 49324
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID SPARGO
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/05/2013
Notification Time: 17:31 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2013
Event Time: 08:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

POTENTIAL LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PUMP RUN OUT CONDITION

"Current design basis calculations indicate the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pumps could potentially operate in a run-out condition under certain worst case design basis conditions. The LPSI pumps could operate in a run-out condition beyond the analyzed time by 20 minutes. Current design basis calculation assumes LPSI Pump would be shutdown by [the] RAS [Recirculation Actuation Signal] in less than one hour, however due to past changes to Containment Spray Pump Start Logic, the time was lengthened to 80 minutes which is beyond the one hour analyzed. This represents a reportable unanalyzed condition."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM LUKE JENSEN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1722 EDT ON 10/31/13 * * *

"Fort Calhoun completed additional analysis which verified that the LPSI pumps will not go into run-out as previously reported. Therefore Fort Calhoun is withdrawing the event notification."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Drake).

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 49355
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JAMES KRITZER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/18/2013
Notification Time: 18:48 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2013
Event Time: 12:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO STEAM LEAK

"On 9/18/13, during performance of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) pump operability surveillance, a minor steam leak was discovered on the governor valve inspection cover flange. Due to the leak, HPCI was declared inoperable.

"Actions taken: A 14-day LCO per TS 3.5.E.2 has been entered and corrective actions are in progress."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM BENJAMIN EGNEW TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1341 EDT ON 10/31/13 * * *

"After further evaluation, the gasket leak at the flange was determined to have no impact on the operability of the HPCI system, and therefore the HPCI system was able to perform all safety functions with the identified condition. The immediate determination, made on September 18, 2013, that the HPCI system was inoperable was revised based on the results of an analysis of the HPCI room heat up rate. The heat up rate was modeled using a calculated steam leak rate based on actual measurements of the damaged gasket after removal from the HPCI turbine flange. The time to heat up was based on the first set point at which isolation due to a temperature increase would occur. It was determined that the existing gap in the gasket represented approximately one-tenth of the approximate size of a steam leak that would be expected to result in an isolation, therefore the existing flange leak had no impact on operability of the HPCI system or its ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"The licensee has notified the NRC site Resident Inspector."

Notified R1DO (Krohn).

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 49371
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOE KLEVORN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 09/20/2013
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2013
Event Time: 17:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

UNANALYZED LEAKAGE OF CONTAINMENT SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVE CONTROLLED LEAKAGE DEVICES

"On September 9, 2013, during the A1R17 Braidwood Station Unit 1 refueling outage, the as-found leakage of the controlled leakage devices (1RH01SA and 1RH01SB) for the safety injection (SI) system ECCS sump containment isolation valves (1SI8811A and 1SI8811B) were determined to not be 'leak tight' as described in the UFSAR. Since there was only minor leakage from the isolation valves or the associated residual heat (RH) system piping (1-2 drops/month from 1SI8811A and no leakage from 1SI8811B), there was no actual impact on offsite dose or long-term ECCS operation. However, further evaluation has concluded that there was a potential to exceed the assumed leakage limits of the Alternate Source Term (AST) calculation.

"The RH system is classified as a closed system outside containment meaning the system is designed to accommodate a single active failure (i.e., the failure of the 1SI8811B valve to close) and still maintain an adequate isolation barrier to release recirculation water outside containment. The encapsulation device is intended to capture and limit leakage from a potential leak in the 1SI8811A/B or piping. The controlled leakage device is built to the same standards as the remainder of the RH system recirculation water outside containment. The design function is to limit potential offsite dose due to leakage of recirculation water outside containment. This is not a specified safety function and there are no Technical Specification requirements for these devices. The encapsulation devices do not perform a containment function and are not a principle safety barrier. As there was only minor ECCS system leakage at the time of discovery, there was no impact on past offsite dose or long-term ECCS operation.

"This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) since the as-found leakage of the controlled leakage devices could have allowed RH leakage to exceed the calculated limits for ECCS systems outside containment.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

* * * RETRACTION FROM RANDY RAHRIG TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1556 EDT ON 10/31/13 * * *

"Retraction of ENS 49371 dated 9/09/2013:

"The purpose of this report is to retract ENS report #49371 (September 9, 2013). This report was made during Braidwood's refueling outage (A1R17) for the as-found leakage on the controlled leakage devices (1RH01SA and 1RH01SB) for the safety injection (SI) system ECCS sump containment isolation valves (1SI8811A and 1SI8811B) that were determined not to be 'leak tight' as described in the UFSAR. When the ENS notification was made on 9/9/2013, the station determined that there was a potential to exceed the assumed leakage limits of the alternate source term (AST) calculation. The ENS notification was made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.

"At 1500 CDT on Thursday, October 17, 2013, the Braidwood Generating Station concluded that the prior ENS notification could be retracted based on the completion of Revision 2 of calculation BRW-13-0135-M, '1/2RH01SA/B Leak Rate Conversion and Test Pressure Determination'.

"The as-found pressure test results for the 1RH01SA and 1RH01SB valve containment assemblies would not have resulted in a total ECCS leakage outside containment in excess of that assumed in the AST dose calculation BRW-04-0038-M, 'Re-Analysis of Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Using Alternate Source Terms (AST)'.

"The as-found valve containment assembly (VCA) pressure test results did not result in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Notified R3DO (Daley).

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Agreement State Event Number: 49447
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: NMG GEOTECHNICAL INC
Region: 4
City: IRVINE State: CA
County:
License #: 6052-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 10/18/2013
Notification Time: 00:19 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2013
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
BARRY WRAY (ILTA)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
MEXICO (FAX)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

"On October 17, 2013 ICE-RAM [Inspections Compliance and Enforcement - Radioactive Materials Branch] received a letter dated October 14, 2013, from the RSO at NMG Geotechnical, Inc. (NMG), reporting that, on October 9, 2013, one of their moisture density gauge (CPN MC-1DRP, S/N M60408283, 10 mCi Cs-137, 50 mCi Am:Be-241) was discovered to be lost or stolen at an apartment complex at 1601 W. MacArthur Blvd., Santa Ana, CA, after the gauge operator was on a lunch break. The gauge was placed in the vehicle after using the gauge at the apartment complex just prior to starting lunch. The gauge operator discovered that the gauge and transport box were missing from the rear of the Jeep Cherokee SUV. There were no indications that the vehicle was broke into, making it most likely that the gauge and case were left in the vehicle while it was unlocked and the gauge case was not secured to the frame of the vehicle. The operator contacted the RSO and then filed a report with the Santa Ana Police and notified the Irvine Police afterwards.

"On October 17, 2013, an ICE RAM-South inspector contacted the RSO to confirm the information in the letter. The inspector inquired if the operator had searched the complex for the gauge prior to reporting the gauge stolen and the RSO confirmed that they had. The RSO also noted that the operator returned to the complex later to give the apartment management fliers to distribute to residents. The gauge has not been recovered to date. This RSO was informed that they will be cited for loss of control of the gauge and failure to immediately report the loss of the gauge as required. The investigation will continue to determine if any other items of non-compliance are identified."

California 5010 Number: 101713

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 49466
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTION INC.
Region: 4
City: LA PORTE State: TX
County:
License #: 01774
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/23/2013
Notification Time: 12:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILURE OF RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE TO FULLY RETRACT

The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services, Radiation Branch, via e-mail:

"On October 23, 2013, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of Health] that one of its radiography crews had been unable to retract an iridium-192 source back into a QSA 880D exposure device at a temporary work site in Baytown, Texas. Following an exposure, the source pigtail would not retract fully into the device. An authorized person, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), performed the source retrieval. He received an estimated 600 millirem dose. No member of the public received any exposure as a result of this event. The RSO reported that he had to disconnect the crank handle from the drive cables to pull the source back into the camera. The cause was an equipment failure of the drive cable which was binding. A new set of drive cables was attached to the camera and the source moved in and out freely about 10 times. The drive cables were only 3 weeks old. They will be returned to the manufacturer for inspection. An investigation into this event is ongoing. Information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300.

"Camera and source information: QSA 880D camera, serial number D4621, source model number 424-9, source serial number 98960B."

Texas Incident Number: I-9130

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Agreement State Event Number: 49470
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: LARRY M. JACOBS AND ASSOCIATES, INC.
Region: 1
City: PENSACOLA State: FL
County:
License #: 1508-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/23/2013
Notification Time: 21:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED SOIL MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received from the Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control, via e-mail:

"A soil moisture density gauge was damaged by heavy construction equipment. The source was reported to be retracted and not exposed. The electronics panel and housing was reported to be damaged. A Bureau of Radiation Control Inspector is en route.

"The incident occurred at a temporary work site in Walnut Hill, Florida. The gauge contained a 10 mCi Cesium 137 source and a 50 mCi Americium241/Beryllium source."

The State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control will update the report as more information is known.

Verbal information from the State indicated that the licensee could not verify the integrity of the source because the company does not have access to a radiation detector.

Florida Incident Number: FL13-074

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Power Reactor Event Number: 49489
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/31/2013
Notification Time: 05:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2013
Event Time: 02:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE NOT WITHIN LIMITS FOLLOWING TRIP OF EXHAUST FAN

"On October 31, 2013 at 0251, Secondary Containment Zone I (Unit 1 Reactor Building) differential pressure was lost following a routine transfer of Reactor Protection System Power supplies. Upon restoration from the power supply transfer, one of the Reactor Building Equipment Compartment Exhaust Fans tripped. There were no obvious malfunctions associated with the equipment and fan was able to be restarted. Zone II (Unit 2 Reactor Building) and III (Common Refuel Floor Area) ventilation remained in service and stable.

"Zone I differential pressure recovered within a few minutes and was verified to be stable. LCO 3.6.4.1 was entered for both units at 0251 and exited at 0255. Tech Spec Secondary Containment Operability requires a negative pressure of at least 0.25 inches water gauge.

"There have been no further perturbations in differential pressure and secondary containment remains operable.

"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 49490
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILLY HERZOG
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/31/2013
Notification Time: 19:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2013
Event Time: 17:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

POSTULATED FIRE EVENT COULD RESULT IN A HOT SHORT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"While performing a review of industry OE [operating experience] concerning unfused ammeter circuits on station batteries, it was discovered that the ammeter circuits for all of the non-1E batteries are of a similar design to that described in the OE. Also, while reviewing additional DC circuits, it was discovered that the control circuit for the Turbine Generator Emergency Lube Oil pump is unfused, protected only by the motor circuit breaker with a trip setting of 350 amps. The concern is that under the fire safe shutdown rules it is postulated that a fire in one fire area can damage these circuits and cause short circuits without protection that would overheat the cables and possibly result in secondary fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10CFR50 Appendix R. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.

"Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 49491
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE RICHARDSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/31/2013
Notification Time: 20:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2013
Event Time: 17:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

POSTULATED FIRE EVENT COULD RESULT IN A HOT SHORT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

"Per review of OE INPO ICES-305419, 'Unfused remote DC ammeter circuit could result in a secondary fire due to multiple fire induced faults' from Davis-Besse and Cooper Condition Report CR CNS-2013-07413; it has been determined that JAF [James A. Fitzpatrick] is potentially susceptible to the same condition.

"The condition in the Davis-Besse OE is described as follows:

"The wiring design for the ammeters contains a shunt in the current flow from each direct current (DC) battery or charger. Bolted on the shunt bar are two IEEE 383 qualified leads to a current meter in the main control room (MCR). The small difference in voltage between the two taps on the shunt is enough to deflect the current gauge in the MCR when current flows from the battery or charger through the shunt. The ammeter wiring attached to the shunt does not have fuses. It is postulated that a fire could cause one of these ammeter wires to short to ground at the same time the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also short to ground. This would cause a ground loop through the unfused ammeter cable. With enough current going through the cable, the potential exists that the cable could self-heat to the point of causing a secondary fire in the electrical tray at some point along the path of the cable (including the Control Room) or possibly heat up to the point of causing damage to adjacent cables that may be required for safe shutdown.

"TRM 3.7.M, Fire Barrier Penetrations, is applicable. The functional integrity of the fire barrier penetration seals ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment. The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections. The issue identified is with the potential of a fire starting in another location other than the original fire location bypassing fire barriers due to a fire induced electrical short. Per engineering, the areas with the deficient fire barriers are the DC Switchgear Rooms A and B, Cable Spreading Room, Relay Room and Control Room. An active LCO will track the TRM action for the non-functionality of those fire barriers.

"This condition is being reported under 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that results in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition which significantly degrades plant safety.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, November 01, 2013
Friday, November 01, 2013