| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
08/21/2013 - 08/22/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Part 21 | Event Number: 48863 | Rep Org: INTEGRATED RESOURCES, INC.
Licensee: INVENSYS (FOXBORO METER CO.)
Region: 4
City: NEBRASKA CITY State: NE
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN F. BROSEMER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 03/28/2013
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2013
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT - FOXBORO POWER SUPPLY POTENTIAL FAILURES DUE TO DEFECTIVE TIE WRAPS AND HOLDERS
Mr. John F. Brosemer, President of Integrated Resources, Inc., reported discovery of repeated defects in Foxboro Meter Company's N-2ARPS-A6, Style D power supplies. When manufactured, the power supplies utilized Thomas and Betts TC105A aluminum wire tie holders in random numbers and placements. As the power supplies age, the tie wrap holder adhesive degrades and the tie wraps embrittle resulting in the separation of the tie wraps and loss of holder adhesion to the power supply enclosure. This causes the wraps and holders to fall to the bottom of the enclosure which could result in shorts when the aluminum comes in contact with electronic components. In one particular power supply, all tie wrap holders in use failed and separated from the enclosure.
The power supplies are used in Foxboro SPEC-200 cabinetry that are used throughout the industry. At the time of this notification, Integrated Resources has one power supply from Three Mile Island and two power supplies from Ft. Calhoun undergoing refurbishment. Integrated Resources will be following up this telephonic notification with a written report once their internal investigation is done.
Recommended corrective actions are for affected facilities to open and inspect all power supplies and remove the aluminum tie wrap holders and replace the tie wraps and holders with Teflon types.
* * * UPDATE FROM BROSEMER TO SNYDER AT 1530 EDT ON 4/1/13 * * *
"Suspecting this to be a common mode failure IRI [Integrated Resources, Inc.] opened and inspected two Foxboro N-2ARPS-A6 power supplies which were sent to IRI for refurbishment by Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station. Examination revealed that both of the power supplies have the same failures of the tie wrap aluminum mounting plates adhesive with the majority of the plates being held on the wire bundles by age embrittled nylon wire ties.
"Confirmation of the common mode failure by inspection of the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Stations was on or about 1530 CDT on March 27, 2013.
"IRI is not the OEM or Original supplier for this power supply and cannot provide the number nor locations of these components. However, by searching the RAPID database IRI has found the power supplies at the following:
"Arizona Public Service - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station; Constellation Energy - Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant; Detroit Edison - Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant; Dominion Nuclear - Millstone Nuclear Power Plant; Dominion Nuclear - Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant; Eletronnuclear - Angra Nuclear Power Plant; Entergy Nuclear - Arkansas Nuclear One; Entergy Nuclear - Indian Point Energy Center; Entergy Nuclear - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant; Entergy Nuclear - J. A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Exelon Corporation - Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant; Exelon Corporation - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station; NextEra Energy - Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant; Progress Energy Florida - Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant; Southern California Edison - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.
"IRI suspects several other utilities and units are affected by this report.
Corrective action taken: "IRI's preliminary suggestion is inspection and removal of failed tie wrap mounting plates which are being held on to wire bundles by aging nylon tie wraps. IRI also suggests replacement of age embrittled nylon tie wraps with Tefzel tie wraps."
Contact Information:
John F. Brosemer; President
Integrated Resources, Inc.
113 South 9th Street
Nebraska City, NE 68410
Notified R1DO (Dwyer), R2DO (Seymour), R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21 Reactors (Email).
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN BROSEMER (VIA EMAIL) ON 8/21/13 AT 1628 EDT * * *
"IRI's final recommendations are to remove all Thomas and Betts Co. model TC105A wire tie holders and to replace any embrittled wire ties with TEFZEL wire ties in all of the affected Foxboro Co. power supplies.
"IRI also discovered during the course of the investigation that Thomas and Betts Co. supplied these wire tie holders through normal distribution to all of the manufacturers. IRI recommends that the industry, during normal inspections, inspect for the these types of wire tie holders in all other installed equipment and to remove the failed wire tie holders."
Notified R1DO (Schmidt), R2DO (Haag), R3DO (Kozak), R4DO (Werner) and Part 21 Reactors (via email). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49273 | Rep Org: MAINE RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: RUMFORD PAPER COMPANY
Region: 1
City: RUMFORD State: ME
County:
License #: ME-17203
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEAN GESLIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 08/13/2013
Notification Time: 09:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/25/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (E-MA)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER STUCK ON FIXED PROCESS GAUGE
The following event report was received from the State of Maine Radiation Control Program via e-mail:
"Rumford Paper Company reported that the shutter on a fixed nuclear gauge (Ohmart model SH-F1-A45, serial #13520085) was stuck in the open position on 3/25/2013. The gauge contained a 370 MBq (10 mCi) Cs-137 source (model A-2100, serial #3133CM). Restrictions were put into place so no personnel could enter the vessel until repairs could be completed. The manufacturer was contacted and performed the necessary repairs and the shutter now operates properly."
Maine Report Number: ME130002 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49274 | Rep Org: OR DEPT OF HEALTH RAD PROTECTION
Licensee: ACS TESTING, INC.
Region: 4
City: SHERWOOD State: OR
County:
License #: ORE 90987
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SIEBERT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 08/13/2013
Notification Time: 14:22 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2013
Event Time: 02:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN AND RECOVERED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was obtained from the State of Oregon via email:
"A Troxler portable moisture density gauge was stolen out of the back of a worker's truck around 2:30 AM [PDT] on August 2nd, 2013. The gauge was recovered by the Sherwood police within the hour and returned to worker. The gauge handle and case remained locked. The only locks breached were the locks securing the device in the back of the truck. The licensee was just informed of the theft and reported it to Oregon RPS [Radiation Protection Services] at 10:00 AM on August 13th, 2013. The licensee will conduct further investigation and develop corrective actions. This information will be reported to Oregon RPS within 30 days.
"Device: Troxler 3430
SN: 38580
Sources: 9 mCi Cs-137 and 44 mCi Am-241/Be"
Oregon Incident #: 13-0029 |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 49277 | Rep Org: R&M ENGINEERING - KETCHIKAN
Licensee: R&M ENGINEERING - KETCHIKAN
Region: 4
City: KETCHIKAN State: AK
County:
License #: 50-29259-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GUY OWEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 08/13/2013
Notification Time: 20:03 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2013
Event Time: 08:15 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text TROXLER 3450 MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED DURING ROAD CONSTRUCTION
The licensee reports that a Troxler 3450 moisture density gauge was damaged at a construction site on Prince Wales Island, Alaska. The gauge had been left at the side of a road and was run over by a pickup truck. The operating handle and source rod were bent, however the gauge sources were in the safe position. The gauge was surveyed by the licensee and there is no indication of leakage or personnel exposure. The licensee has stored the gauge in a secure location until the gauge can be returned to the manufacturer for repair.
The Troxler 3450 gauge is serial #540 and contains a 8 mCi Cs-137 and a 40 mCi Am-241/Be source. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49278 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: STANFORD State: CA
County:
License #: NOT PROVIDED
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 08/13/2013
Notification Time: 21:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2013
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATION LIMITS ON PACKAGE EXCEEDED
The following Agreement State report was received via email.
"[The California Department of Public Health / Radiation Health Branch was notified that Stanford University received a package containing Radium 223 from Cardinal Health in Denver, Colorado and the package indicated removable contamination of 400 DPM of technetium 99 on the package. The following information was provided:
"The caller stated, that a package was received at the Nuclear Medicine Department and the package had a reading of 400 DPM which exceeds the Dept. of Transportation limits. Caller stated the package has been isolated and secured in the appropriate area and the carrier notified. Caller stated that the package will be at normal readings tomorrow.
"Cardinal Health, in Denver, was notified and will investigate this issue. RHB California will report additional information." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49290 | Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL STODICK
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 08/19/2013
Notification Time: 17:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2013
Event Time: 10:13 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INCREASING BACKGROUND NOISE IN STACK RADIATION MONITOR RENDERS IT NON-FUNCTIONAL
"At 1013 hours PDT on August 19, 2013 the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor High Range Detector was declared nonfunctional due to increasing background noise. The Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor Intermediate Range Detector remains functional and shows no increase in effluent radioactivity.
"To compensate for the loss of assessment capability due to the nonfunctioning radiation monitoring equipment, an additional Health Physics (HP) Technician trained to acquire offsite dose assessment information on offsite releases will be available. The additional personnel will be pre-staged in support of the Radiation Monitoring System outage and will be mobilized in accordance with guidance in the compensatory measure instructions.
"This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). A follow-up notification will be made when the equipment has been returned to service.
"The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL STODICK TO PETE SNYDER AT 2028 EDT ON 8/19/13 * * *
"Initial investigation into the cause of the malfunction of the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor High Range Detector revealed that the condition also affected the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor Intermediate Range Detector. Therefore, this monitor has also been declared non-functional as of 1633 hours PDT on August 19, 2013. Compensatory measures remain in effect to provide emergency response capability for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological release through this pathway. Corrective actions are being pursued to restore the affected monitors to functional status."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Werner).
* * * UPDATE FROM MOT HEDGES TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1236 EDT ON 8/21/13 * * *
"The cause of the increased background noise for the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor-High Range was due to failing cooling components for the instrumentation, resulting in increased electronic background noise in the instrumentation. There has been no change in the radiation levels at the plant.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R4DO (Werner).
* * * UPDATE FROM MOT HEDGES TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ ON 8/22/2013 AT 1630 EDT * * *
"Repairs have been completed and both the Intermediate and High Range Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitors have been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified the R4DO (Werner). |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 49292 | Facility: WESTINGHOUSE HEMATITE
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 3
City: HEMATITE State: MO
County: JEFFERSON
License #: SNM-33
Agreement: N
Docket: 07000036
NRC Notified By: KEVIN DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 08/20/2013
Notification Time: 17:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2013
Event Time: 11:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
| Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
ANTHONY HSIA (NMSS)
| Event Text 24 HOUR REPORT RELATED TO CRITICALITY CONTROL BULLETIN 91-01
"The Hematite Decommissioning Project (HDP) is excavating burial pits containing enriched uranium. HDP has established criticality safety controls to ensure the safe handling of the buried waste as it is excavated. These controls involve redundant surveys and visual inspections at the time of excavation. These controls failed to identify an item upon excavation that was 400,000 ncpm [net counts per minute] on contact and had dimensions of 6 inches or greater. Instead, the item was identified and placed in criticality safety controls (collared drum) after it had reached the Waste Holding Area.
"The item appeared to be a crushed container, estimated at 10 gal. in original size, and had contents primarily consisting of gloves and plastic. After the contents were removed, the empty container was confirmed to have only contamination that was below the threshold of criticality safety controls. The detailed assay of the contents was 22 g of U-235, which does require criticality safety controls.
"Work in the burial pit areas was stopped pending retraining of those workers on the requirements and criticality safety controls regarding survey and visual inspection during excavation. Excavated burial pit area waste that has not reached the Waste Holding Area will be resurveyed and inspected prior to proceeding to the Waste Holding Area."
The licensee notified NRC R3 (Tapp).
* * * UPDATE FROM KEVIN DAVIS TO PETE SNYDER ON 8/22/13 AT 1054 EDT * * *
"[HDP's] controls failed to identify and control an item upon excavation that was 100,000 ncpm on contact had dimension 6 inches or greater. Instead, the item was identified to require and be placed in criticality safety controls (collared drum) after it had been counted at the Material Assay Area.
"The item appeared to be the mangled remnant of a container. There were no contents, but there was soil-like material adhering to the surfaces. The soil-like material was separated from the remnant for detailed assay. Detailed assay identified the remnant contained 3 g of U-235 and the soil like material contained 21 g of U-235, which requires criticality safety controls.
"Work in the burial pit areas was stopped pending retraining of those workers on the requirements and criticality safety controls regarding survey and visual inspection during excavation, and pending development of additional engineered measures. In addition, shipment of railcars has been suspended pending additional evaluation.
"Excavated burial pit area waste that has not reached the Waste Holding Area will be resurveyed and inspected prior to proceeding to the Waste Holding Area."
The licensee notified the NRC R3. Notified R3DO (Kozak) and NMSS (Hsia). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49293 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LT CHRISTOS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 08/21/2013
Notification Time: 22:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2013
Event Time: 20:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL PUMPS TRAIN SEPARATION
"On August 21, 2013 at 2000 CDT, it was determined following receipt and review of an NRC position document, that the design of the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant diesel fuel oil supply system is not consistent with current and historical licensing and design basis documents. This condition affects fuel oil supply from the diesel fuel oil storage tank to both emergency diesel generators and is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an unanalyzed condition that could significantly degrade plant safety.
"Actions are in progress to address the unanalyzed condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49294 | Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: SCOTT CIESLEWICZ
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 08/22/2013
Notification Time: 01:11 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2013
Event Time: 21:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled | Event Text INADVERTENT SIREN ACTUATION
"On 08/21/2013, the Kewaunee Power Station was notified by Kewaunee County Emergency Management of the inadvertent actuation of siren K-005 at 2100 [CDT]. At the time of the actuation, there was severe weather in the area. The siren stopped actuating at 2125. Kewaunee Power Station requested maintenance crews remove power from the siren to prevent additional actuation until repairs can be made. The resulting loss of siren coverage is 4%. Siren K-005 is a shared siren with Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant. Point Beach control room has been notified."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49295 | Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KILE HESS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 08/22/2013
Notification Time: 01:28 [ET]
Event Date: 08/21/2013
Event Time: 21:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INADVERTENT SIREN ACTUATION
"Point Beach was notified via our EP [emergency plan] manager that emergency plan siren K 5 actuated inadvertently at 2100 [CDT] on 8/21/13, during severe weather. Initial notification of this occurrence was made by Kewaunee County Emergency Management to the Kewaunee Nuclear Plant EP manager. The Kewaunee EP manager in turn notified the Point Beach EP manager. The siren stopped sounding at 2125 on 8/21/13, and was removed from service to prevent additional inadvertent actuations before it is repaired. The loss of coverage for siren K-5, which is the only Point Beach siren out of service at this time, is 1.9%, which is below the 50% loss of coverage requiring additional notifications."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49296 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ROBERT ONEILL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 08/22/2013
Notification Time: 11:39 [ET]
Event Date: 08/22/2013
Event Time: 07:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text REACTOR PROTECTION ACTUATION (SCRAM)
"On Thursday, August 22, 2013 at 0755 hours [EDT], with the reactor critical at approximately 98% core thermal power, and the mode switch in RUN, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to lowering reactor water level. The cause of the lowering reactor water level was due to the trip of all three Feedwater Pumps. The cause of the Feedwater Pump trip event is currently under investigation.
"Following the reactor scram, all control rods were verified to be fully inserted. All 4kV busses transferred to the Startup Transformer as designed. Following the scram the reactor water level lowered to +12 inches initiating the Primary Containment Isolation System (Group II, Reactor Building Isolation System (RBIS); and Group VI - Reactor Water Cleanup System) automatically as per design.
"Reactor water level lowered to -46 inches initiating Primary Containment Isolation System Group I - Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs); Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) actuated which included automatic start and injection of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System and an automatic start of the Emergency Diesel Generators as designed. Reactor water level was promptly restored to normal level.
"Currently a cooldown is in progress with reactor pressure is being maintained by the HPCI System operating in the pressure control mode and reactor water level is being maintained by the RCIC System. Reactor Water Clean-up System and normal reactor building ventilation have been restored. Off-site power is being supplied to the station by the Start-up Transformer (normal power supply for shutdown operations).
"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. This 4-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(A) and (B)."
The plant is transferring from decay heat removal to the torus to decay heat removal to the main condenser. Reactor pressure is 371 psig.
Initial indications are that a main feedwater power supply breaker tripped. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49298 | Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: TERRY DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 08/22/2013
Notification Time: 15:05 [ET]
Event Date: 08/22/2013
Event Time: 10:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text VIOLATION OF THE FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAM
A licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and will inform stakeholders at their scheduled meeting. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49299 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM MCGUIRE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 08/22/2013
Notification Time: 16:09 [ET]
Event Date: 08/22/2013
Event Time: 14:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF A FATALITY AT MILLSTONE UNIT 3
"On August 22, 2013, a contract worker was discovered unresponsive at Millstone Power Station in the plant's condensate polishing facility. The worker was transported offsite to a local hospital. At 1450 [EDT], the Millstone Power Station Unit 3 Shift Manager was informed the individual had been pronounced dead at the hospital.
"The cause of the fatality is under investigation. The injury does not appear to be related to industrial work activities. The person was not contaminated. Local law enforcement and other government agencies have been notified.
"OSHA is being notified of the event under the requirements of 29 CFR 1904.
"No press release is planned. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The woman was found at the bottom of a staircase at 1258 EDT. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49300 | Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATT MOG
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 08/22/2013
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 08/22/2013
Event Time: 16:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 81 | Power Operation | Event Text UNIT 1 COMMENCED A TS REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO UNIDENTIFIED RCS LEAKAGE > 1 GPM
"Salem Unit 1 has initiated a unit shutdown in accordance with TS (Technical Specification) Action Statement 3.4.6.2(b) for unidentified leakage greater than 1 gpm [gallon per minute] (Entered on 8/22/13 at 1029 EDT). TS 3.4.6.2 Action Statement (b) requires a reduction of leakage rate to within limits within 4 hrs. or be in at least Hot Standby within the following 6 hours. Initial investigation has indicated that the leakage source is from packing on Pressurizer Spray Valve 1PS1 located in the RCS [Reactor Coolant System] Pressurizer shroud area inside Containment. Unidentified leakage is currently indicating 4 gpm. NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified. Manual isolation is in progress.
"Additionally, TS Action Statement 3.6.1.4 Primary Containment Internal Pressure was entered at 1510 [EDT] for exceeding 0.3 psig. Action requires restoration of containment pressure to within specification in 1 hour or be in hot standby within the next 6 hours. Containment pressure was restored to less than 0.3 psig at 1647 [EDT] and TS 3.6.1.4 was exited. Peak containment pressure reached [was] 0.33 psig.
"Location of leak: Unit 1 RCS (containment), Pressurizer, 1PS1 Pressurizer Spray Valve Packing
"Time & date leak started: 1019 [EDT] on 08/22/2013
"Leak rate: 4 gpm, T/S leak limits: 1 gpm
"Last known coolant activity: Primary (DEI [Dose Equivalent Iodine]-microCuries/cc) 5.973E-5 microCuries/cc
"Secondary (gbg [Gross Beta Gamma]-microcuries/cc) < LLD [Lower Limit of Detectability]
"Was this leak a sudden or long-term development? Sudden"
The licensee is reducing power at 30%/hour and anticipates entering Mode 3 in approximately 3 hours. The 1PS1 Pressurizer Spray Valve was replaced and the air operator rebuilt during the last refueling outage in April/May of 2013.
The licensee informed the State of New Jersey and will 9inform the Lower Alloways Creek [LAC] Township. | |