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Event Notification Report for April 9, 2013

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
04/08/2013 - 04/09/2013

** EVENT NUMBERS **


48223 48866 48867 48896 48897 48898

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Part 21 Event Number: 48223
Rep Org: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Region: 1
City: CRANBERRY TOWNSHIP State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 08/23/2012
Notification Time: 09:21 [ET]
Event Date: 08/22/2012
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (Emai)

Event Text

PART 21 - DEFECT DUE TO CHANGE IN MANUFACTURING PROCESS CAUSING RELAY FAILURE IN SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS

The following is summary of the information received from the licensee:

"The basic component is an Eaton-Cutler Hammer Type ARD660UR DC relay that is commercially dedicated by Westinghouse for use in safety related systems at Palo Verde Units 1, 2 and 3. Except for the Palo Verde plants, Westinghouse is not aware of any other plant that uses this relay as a safety-related component in normally energized applications.

"The relay contacts failed to change state when required to do so during postulated events and/or surveillance testing. Westinghouse has identified the kick-out spring as a possible contributing factor for the relay failure due to stress corrosion cracking. Other anomalies such as relay core barrel tolerance and potential material deficiencies are currently under review. Based upon testing at APS, the relay failure rate is low and non-reproducible. This indicates that a combination of factors could be resulting in the failures with different causes for each failure. Results of testing do not identify a common cause for the failures. For ARD660UR relays used in normally de-energized applications, the kick-out spring will be compressed for only a short period of time and exposure to additional heat generated by intermittent coil energization will be minimal. For relays in normally de-energized applications, it is not expected that the force provided by the kick-out spring will decrease significantly over time and the contacts will change position when the relay coil is de-energized. Westinghouse has not received any reports to date of relay contacts failing to properly change position when the relay goes from a de-energized to an energized state. Because of the kick-out spring's limited exposure to compression and heat generated by the relay coil, it is expected that the springs will perform as intended in normally de-energized applications for the qualified life of the relay.

"Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contain a defect.

"Westinghouse Electric Company
"1000 Westinghouse Drive
"Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania 16066"

* * * UPDATE AT 1445 EDT ON 04/08/13 FROM JAMES A. GRESHAM TO S. SANDIN * * *

The following update was received via fax and is summarized below:

"During the investigation into the cause of the ARD660UR relay sticking, many physical and performance aspects and components of the relay were analyzed, as well as the entire manufacturing process. This investigation uncovered several issues that contributed, or could contribute, to the failure of the relay to release when de-energized.

"Based on analysis by Westinghouse, with support from Eaton Corporation, it was determined that the primary cause of the relay failure was a change in the manufacturing process in the plastics molding operation of this relay. This manufacturing change caused the moving cores to adhere to the inner diameter of the relay coil spool when a relay was continuously energized during testing by Westinghouse for longer than 21 days. This change in the manufacturing process began in May 2008 and continued until it was terminated in December 2012. Relay coils manufactured during this time may develop an adhesive like residue in the relay coil spools when energized for an extended period of time. This residue was found on the moving cores of relays which stuck during testing at a Westinghouse facility and relays returned from the customer. This residue was determined to be the primary cause of the relay issue.

"Westinghouse shipped Palo Verde a total of 374 potentially affected Eaton-Cutler Hammer Type ARD660UR DC relays.

"As a result of the investigation, Westinghouse recommended several manufacturing process improvements that are designed to prevent the reoccurrence of the issue. Eaton has agreed to implement these improvements prior to restarting the manufacture of these relays. Westinghouse is revising its commercial grade dedication process for these relays. This action ensures that the commercial grade dedication criteria include replacing the relay kick-out spring in each relay and verifies other relay enhancements have been implemented before future relays are shipped to the customer as safety related components.

"Westinghouse recommends that each plant review the application requirements of each affected relay. If an ARD660UR relay is used in a normally energized application or is required to change state after being energized for at least 21 consecutive days and was manufactured between May 1, 2008 and December 31, 2012, Westinghouse recommends replacing the relay at the next convenient opportunity.

"If an ARD relay manufactured during the May 1, 2008 and December 31, 2012 time frame is successfully, periodically cycle tested, this relay may be less susceptible to sticking."

Notified R4DO (Deese) and NRR Part 21 Group via email.

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Agreement State Event Number: 48866
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: FELINE HEALTH, INC.
Region: 1
City: WESTFIELD State: MA
County:
License #: 48-0316
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE WHALEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/29/2013
Notification Time: 13:46 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - VETERINARY TECHNICIAN POSSIBLE OVEREXPOSURE

The following information was received via facsimile:

"The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) called to report that the quarterly whole body dosimeter for her technician recorded 993 mrem deep, 21,900 mrem to the lens, and 58,000 mrem shallow dose. The technician's finger ring dose was negligible.

"The technician & RSO have worked for years injecting three to ten cats with I-131 on a monthly basis (approximately 3 mCi per cat) and neither have ever approached such high radiation doses.

"It is suspected that the dosimeter has malfunctioned or was inadvertently contaminated with I-131. The licensee has requested that the dosimeter manufacturer re-analyze the dosimeter.

"The Massachusetts Radiation Control Program is investigating."

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Agreement State Event Number: 48867
Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: AMERICAN SOIL TESTING
Region: 4
City: SPARKS State: NV
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ERIC MATUS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/29/2013
Notification Time: 17:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2013
Event Time: 08:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DENSITY GAUGE FOUND

An auction lot of industrial equipment was purchased by West Tech, Inc., an electronics recycling company, at an auction in Milpitas, California. The auction lot was subsequently delivered to West Tech, Inc. in Sparks, Nevada. A CPN density gauge, s/n M17031878, manufactured 1/1/1976, originally containing 50 mCi Americium-241/Be and 10 mCi Cs-137, was found in the auction lot. After discovering the gauge, West Tech, Inc. notified InstroTek, Inc. (parent company of CPN) which notified the State of Nevada Radiation Control Program.

The State of Nevada Radiation Control Program dispatched inspectors. The gauge was found to be in its shipping container. The gauge appeared to be undamaged and intact. Swipes were taken and no contamination was found. The State of Nevada Radiation Control Program has impounded the gauge.

The State of Nevada will provide more information as it becomes available.

* * * UPDATE AT 1601 EDT ON 04/08/13 FROM GENE FORRER (STATE OF CALIFORNIA) TO S. SANDIN * * *

The State of Nevada informed the State of California that after checking with the manufacturer, the recovered CPN Moisture Density gauge, S/N M17031878 was registered to American Soil Testing, Licensee # CA5059-43. The gauge will be returned to the manufacturer for disposal.

HOO Note: See EN #48895 for report of stolen gauges.

Notified R4DO (Deese), FSME Events Resource via email and Mexico via fax.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48896
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY MEEKINS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 04/08/2013
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/08/2013
Event Time: 12:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

CONTROL ROOM ENS PHONE OUT OF SERVICE FOR GREATER THAN ONE HOUR

"The Salem Generating Unit 1 and 2 control room ENS phone system was down for greater than one hour from 1140EDT to 1240EDT."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48897
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNETH P. BRESLIN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/08/2013
Notification Time: 16:09 [ET]
Event Date: 04/08/2013
Event Time: 11:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING

"On April 8, 2013 at 0908 [EDT], the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable as part of planned Controls Functional Testing. At 1115 [EDT], during the performance of scheduled testing, an initiation signal for the HPCI system was provided and the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump failed to start as expected. The HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump provides the motive force to open the HPCI Turbine Stop and Governor valves during system startup. The inability of the HPCI Turbine Stop and Governor valves to open prevents the HPCI system from fulfilling its design safety function. The HPCI system will remain inoperable until the cause of the failure has been corrected.

"All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable.

"The unit remains at 100% power.

"The station has initiated an Event Response Team to identify and correct the cause of the failure.

"No personnel injuries resulted from the event.

"The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified."

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Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Event Number: 48898
Rep Org: MAINE YANKEE
Licensee: MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
Region: 1
City: WISCASSET State: ME
County: LINCOLN
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket: 72-30
NRC Notified By: JOSH MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/08/2013
Notification Time: 16:56 [ET]
Event Date: 04/08/2013
Event Time: 14:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
72.75(b)(2) - PRESS RELEASE/OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO THE MAINE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

"A sewage line has been found broken and leaking. The area of the leak is on Maine Yankee property but outside the licensed area. Repairs are scheduled for 04/09/13."

No radioactive material is involved.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021