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Event Notification Report for March 1, 2013

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
02/28/2013 - 03/01/2013

** EVENT NUMBERS **


48726 48773 48774 48791 48792 48794 48795 48796

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 48726
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN STERMER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 02/06/2013
Notification Time: 21:23 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2013
Event Time: 15:24 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
DON ALLEN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION

"On February 06, 2012, at 1524 PST, engineers reviewing dose analyses for non-LOCA, non-fuel handling accident analyses identified deficiencies in the analyses. The analyses of concern include a locked reactor coolant pump rotor, a control rod ejection accident, main steam line break, and steam generator tube rupture. These deficiencies brought into question whether the 30 day control room operator dose received following one of these accidents would meet the station licensing basis limits of up to 5 rem whole body or its equivalent.

"In response to this concern, plant operators placed the control room ventilation system in its safeguards alignment, thereby ensuring the events would continue to be bounded by the analysis of the large break loss of coolant accident.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM DAVID BAHNER TO CHARLES TEAL ON 02/28/13 AT 1815 EST * * *

"Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) is correcting the event date in the above Description to February 06, 2013, and is retracting EN 48726 based on the results from reanalysis of each affected non-loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) event (i.e., steam generator tube rupture, main steam line break, control rod ejection, and reactor coolant pump locked rotor) for potential impact on control room operator dose. The new dose assessment determined that control room dose consequences from a large-break LOCA bound the non-LOCA events as assumed in the original analyses. Accordingly, PG&E concludes the Diablo Canyon Power Plant control room ventilation system remains capable of maintaining control room dose limits within General Design Criteria-19.

"Plant personnel notified the NRC resident inspector."

Notified R4DO (Allen).

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Agreement State Event Number: 48773
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: FORMOSA PLASTICS CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: POINT COMFORT State: TX
County:
License #: TX - 03893
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/20/2013
Notification Time: 16:07 [ET]
Event Date: 02/19/2013
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/20/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCES STUCK IN PROCESS GAUGES

The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services, Radiation Branch, via e-mail:

"On February 20, 2013, the Agency was notified by the licensee that on February 19, 2013, during routine maintenance checks the sources on two nuclear gauges were found stuck inside the dip tubes. Both gauges are Berthold model 21357 gauges each containing a 500 millicurie (original activity) cesium - 137 source. In this type gauge, the source is moved from the source housing inside a tube to the desired location. The sources are stuck in the normal operating position and do not pose an exposure risk to any individual. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer for repairs.

"[The Texas Radiation Branch classifies this report as a] 30.50(b)(2) event type involving equipment failure or disability to function as designed when equipment is required to be available and operable and no redundant equipment is available and operable, includes source disconnection and failure to retract source.

"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA - 300."

Texas Report I-9043

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Agreement State Event Number: 48774
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: STERIGENICS
Region: 4
City: FT. WORTH State: TX
County:
License #: L03851
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT FRESS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/20/2013
Notification Time: 17:01 [ET]
Event Date: 02/20/2013
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/20/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - IRRADIATOR SOURCE RETRACTION MALFUNCTION

The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services, Radiation Branch, via e-mail:

"The licensee RSO reported that, during securing the source rack [on a pool irradiator], a tote on the conveyor became lodged against the rack mechanism causing it to halt before being completely secured. The maintenance manager and an operation technician were able to dislodge the tote without receiving any additional exposure. They manually moved the conveyor belt dislodging the tote and allowing the rack to continue to its secure position in the irradiator pool. The licensee will submit a complete report within 30 days.

"[The Texas Radiation Branch classifies this report as a] 30.50(b)(2) event type involving equipment failure or disability to function as designed when equipment is required to be available and operable and no redundant equipment is available and operable, includes source disconnection and failure to retract source."

Texas Report I-9044

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48791
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: TOM DEAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/28/2013
Notification Time: 09:43 [ET]
Event Date: 02/28/2013
Event Time: 04:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DOOR INTERLOCK MALFUNCTION

"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. An employee entered a secondary containment interlock and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the main control room supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for approximately 10 seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor building differential pressure, as observed in the main control room, has remained less than -0.25" H2O at all times. Initial investigation determined that a mechanical interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the mechanical interlock."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48792
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID ORTIZ
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 02/28/2013
Notification Time: 15:34 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2013
Event Time: 15:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
DON ALLEN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

TEST LAB FAILED TO IDENTIFY POSITIVE SAMPLES

"Per 10 CFR 26.719 section (c)(2) the Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) is making this notification of an apparent false positive error that has occurred on a blind performance test sample submitted to the Health and Human Services (HHS)-certified laboratory used for drug testing.

"On February 27, 2013, OPPD was notified that two positive drug samples that were part of a blind performance test package provided by Professional Toxicology and submitted to Clinical Reference Laboratory tested negative. Currently Professional Toxicology indicates that the two positive samples were provided with the NRC required positive levels for the drug.

"OPPD will investigate the issue and report to the NRC as required by part 26.719(c)(1). Professional Toxicology and Clinical Reference Laboratory are contracted by OPPD as required by NRC regulations to provide fitness for duty services."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48794
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: CARL CRAWFORD
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 02/28/2013
Notification Time: 17:01 [ET]
Event Date: 02/28/2013
Event Time: 13:19 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY PUMP FAILURE

"On February 28, 2013, at 1319 EST, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) experienced a failure of 2CSH*P2, High Pressure Core Spray System Pressure Pump. The HPCS system was currently inoperable for planned maintenance for planned pump room unit cooler maintenance with a 14 day completion time per Technical Specification 3.5.1.

"Shortly after the starting of the HPCS pump as part of routine surveillance testing, the system pressure pump failed. Initial troubleshooting has found the pump motor windings to be shorted. Initial investigation identified smoke in the HPCS pump room, no indications of fire were identified. No breaker failures were identified. All other plant systems functioned as required."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48795
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JAMES ANDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 02/28/2013
Notification Time: 17:13 [ET]
Event Date: 02/28/2013
Event Time: 11:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

CLOSED COOLING WATER ISOLATION VALVE FAILS LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST

"On February 28, 2013, at 1155 EST, with the unit in Refueling Mode, a determination was made that reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) isolation valve (2P42-F051) exceeded its acceptance criteria for designed leakage when performing local leak rate testing. Diagnostic testing confirmed that all the leakage from its test boundary is going through this valve with an 'as found' leakage of >200,000 sccm at 32.87 psig. This valve is the outboard isolation barrier for that affected primary containment penetration with the inboard barrier being the RBCCW system itself as a 'closed' system.

"Previous practice is to conservatively include any leakage through this valve when performing as found leak rate tests as part of the primary containment leakage summary or as part of 0.6La. This is considered conservative since the RBCCW system inside containment is assumed to remain intact following a design basis accident (DBA) loss of coolant accident (LOCA). If the closed system remains intact there is no path for leakage to exit primary containment through this system.

"Since the past practice is to include the 'as found' leakage through this valve as part of 0.6La and since the 'as found' leakage would result in exceeding La, this condition is being considered a condition that results in the principal safety barriers being seriously degraded. This leakage would represent a loss of the containment function since the leak rate exceeded the Technical Specification limiting condition for operation (LCO) for primary containment. Further investigation is underway to determine if leakage through this single containment barrier is required to be included in the Appendix J primary containment leakage summary, since it is associated with a closed system."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48796
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY CHITWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/01/2013
Notification Time: 04:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/28/2013
Event Time: 21:54 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DON ALLEN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Defueled 0 Defueled

Event Text

EMERGENCY BUS INADVERTENTLY DE-ENERGIZED WITH UNIT DEFUELED

"On February 28, 2013, at 2154 PST, Unit 2 4kV ESF Bus G deenergized while attempting a repair to the bus automatic transfer circuitry. The deenergization of 4kV ESF Bus G initiated a start signal to Diesel Generator 2-1, which supplies emergency power to 4kV ESF Bus G. Diesel Generator 2-1 did not start due to being placed in manual control to prevent starting automatically during the repair. However, a valid actuation signal was generated to start Diesel Generator 2-1. As the Diesel Generator was shut down and in manual control, no actuation occurred.

"This is reportable as a valid system actuation that was not part of a pre-planned sequence during testing.

"Unit 2 is currently defueled, with the core offloaded into the spent fuel pool. No loss of cooling occurred as spent fuel pool cooling equipment had been selected to unaffected buses.

"The NRC resident has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 01, 2013
Friday, March 01, 2013