United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2013 > January 28

Event Notification Report for January 28, 2013

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/25/2013 - 01/28/2013

** EVENT NUMBERS **


48669 48682 48683 48698 48701

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 48669
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN COUTO
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/12/2013
Notification Time: 10:21 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2013
Event Time: 09:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2013
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT (R1DO)
JIM WIGGINS (NSIR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
BILL DEAN (RA)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
DAVID SKEEN (NRR)
GARY LANGLIE (ILTA)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO POTENTIAL SECURITY EVENT

"On Saturday, January 12, 2013 at 0925 hours [EST], with the reactor shutdown at 0% core thermal power, a security threat was reported. Security personnel took action to investigate the threat and implemented appropriate protective actions as required per security procedures.

"Based on this security event, the Shift Manager activated the Emergency Plan and made notification of an Unusual Event at 0950 hours. As a result, the Emergency Response organization was notified and activated. At 1001 hours, the NRC and applicable state and local authorities were notified via the Emergency Notification System (ENS).

"At 1050 hours, Security and applicable local law enforcement agency officials completed immediate investigations and determined that the security threat was not credible and was the result of local duck hunters on a small watercraft near the plant site. At 1105 hours, the Emergency Director terminated the Unusual Event.

"The Senior Resident Inspector was on-site and has been informed of this event and associated offsite notification. The licensee has notified appropriate state and local authorities as required per Emergency Planning and other site specific procedures. A press release was also issued.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."

Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA and DHS NICC.

* * * UPDATE FROM HETTWER TO S. SANDIN ON 01/25/13 AT 1101 EST * * *

"This is an informational update to notification EN# 48669 based on completion of the post event Emergency Planning review.

"Our initial notification contained the following documentation error: At 1001 hours, the NRC and applicable State and Local authorities were notified via the Emergency Notification System (ENS). This statement is corrected as follows: 'At 1001 hours, State and Local authorities were notified via the Dedicated Notification Network (DNN). At 1025 hours, the NRC was notified via the Emergency Notification System (ENS).'

"The Resident Inspector has been informed of this event update."

Notified R1DO (Ferdas).

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 48682
Rep Org: NORTH CAROLINA RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: VIDANT MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: GREENVILLE State: NC
County:
License #: 074-1457-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES ALBRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 01/18/2013
Notification Time: 15:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2012
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/18/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL EXPOSURE TO AN EMBRYO/FETUS

The following was received from the State of North Carolina via email:

"Vidant Medical Center, NC Radioactive Materials License 1457-1, has reported a possible dose to an embryo/fetus in excess of 5 rem (15A NCAC 11.0365(a)) and has made notification to the NC Radiation Protection Section within 24 hours of discovery of the event as required by 15A NCAC 11.0365(c)."

"The possible event is under investigation at this time and more information will be provided as it is discovered. The RSO, made the telephone notification at approximately 14:30 EST today, of the event discovered this morning.

"PRELIMINARY/TENTATIVE DETAILS (to be fully investigated): A female with a child reported for renal scan at Vidant Medical Center recently and complained that she thought that radiation she received from hypothyroid treatment in the Spring of last year (2012) had adversely affected her child. Attending Nuclear Medicine Tech notified the Nuclear Medicine supervisor, and the female patient's chart was reviewed and indicated that she had had approximately 19 mCi radioiodine administered in March 2012. Pregnancy test was reported as negative at time of administration and the woman answered that she had not had sex within ten (10) days prior to therapy. However, based upon the reported age of the child, it is possible that the female may have been newly pregnant at the time of administration."

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 48683
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH
Licensee: VALERO REFINING COMPANY
Region: 4
City: TEXAS CITY State: TX
County:
License #: 02578
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 01/19/2013
Notification Time: 10:11 [ET]
Event Date: 01/19/2013
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK IN OPEN POSITION

The following report was received from the State of Texas via email.

"On January 17, 2013, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that while performing preparations for maintenance the shutter on a Ronan model SH1 nuclear gauge was found stuck in the open position. The gauge contains 1,000 millicuries of cesium-137. The licensee stated that open is the normal operating position for the shutter and the gauge does not pose an exposure risk to any individual. The licensee stated that a service provider will remove the gauge and the manufacturer will be contacted to repair the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with [Reporting Materials Events] SA-300."

Texas incident # I-9033.

* * * UPDATE FROM TUCKER TO KLCO ON 1/22/13 AT 1615 EST * * *

The following information was received by email:

"On January 22, 2013, the Agency was informed by the service provider that on January 14, 2013, they were able to get the shutter to close. The shutter is operating normally. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer to perform preventive maintenance on the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Notified the R4DO (OKeefe) and FSME Events via email.

To top of page
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Event Number: 48698
Rep Org: PEACH BOTTOM
Licensee: EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC
Region: 1
City: PHILADELPHIA State: PA
County: YORK & LANCASTER
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket: 72-29
NRC Notified By: BARRY LEVINS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/25/2013
Notification Time: 09:43 [ET]
Event Date: 01/24/2013
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
ERIC THOMAS (NRR)

Event Text

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH STORAGE CASK TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS

"This report is being submitted pursuant to Transnuclear (TN)-68 Technical Specification (TS) Section 2.2, which requires reporting of non-compliances with the Functional and Operational limits of TS Section 2.1.1.

"A recent review of historical ISFSI [Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation] fuel characterization data found that in the ISFSI 2001 campaign, a total of four Unit 3 fuel assemblies were loaded into four dry cask storage casks (i.e., one assembly per cask) having been cooled for 9.8 years, with a decay heat value of 0.201 kW each, which is well below the 0.312 kW limit (TN-68 TS 2.1.1.). Therefore, it is not expected that there were any actual thermal related concerns with the fuel or the associated cask components. However, this was contrary to the Functional and Operational limits of TS Section 2.1.1 , Table 2.1.1-1, which requires the assemblies to have been cooled for 10 years. The decay heat of the assemblies has continued to decrease since their initial loading in 2001 and all assemblies currently meet the TS 2.2.1 limits. The fuel assemblies are in a safe condition as required by TS 2.2.1.

"These casks were loaded under TN-68 Certificate of Compliance (C of C) Amendment 0 (Certificate 1027). This notification is required pursuant to TN-68 TS Section 2.2.2. This issue has been entered into the Corrective Action Program.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 48701
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN DIGNAM
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 01/25/2013
Notification Time: 12:38 [ET]
Event Date: 01/24/2013
Event Time: 23:38 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
FSME RESOURCE ()

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

RADIAC CALIBRATION SOURCE WINDOW INTERLOCK FAILURE

"At 23:38 hours on January 24, 2013, while performing daily source checks on portable radiation meters, the Shepherd Model 78-2 Calibrator (Serial # 9047) failed a pre-operational source interlock check. The 130 mCi /130 Ci Cs-137 sources were able to be raised while the shield door was not fully shut.

"This is reportable under 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) since the interlock is required by license to prevent the accidental raising of the source with the door open. There is no equipment considered to be redundant to the interlock. The cause of the failure has not been determined at this time.

"No personnel were exposed to the sources. Sources were returned to the shielded position, the calibrator was locked and removed from service. A survey of the calibrator after securing the sources showed dose rates within expected ranges. The affected calibrator is not part of any installed plant equipment and has no impact on plant operation."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, January 28, 2013
Monday, January 28, 2013