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Event Notification Report for January 14, 2013

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/11/2013 - 01/14/2013

** EVENT NUMBERS **


48525 48647 48665 48666 48667 48668 48669

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 48525
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CREASY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 11/20/2012
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 11/20/2012
Event Time: 06:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/11/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Startup 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

CONDITION THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED AUTOMATIC ISOLATION OF REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM

"Susquehanna Unit 2 discovered a condition that could have prevented the primary containment isolation valves for the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system from automatically isolating on a high differential flow instrumentation signal.

"The RWCU system high differential flow signal was found to be indicating downscale due to an instrument failure. Both divisions of the RWCU high differential flow isolation logic utilize the same differential flow instrument loop. Thus, this single instrument failure would have prevented automatic isolation of the RWCU inboard and outboard primary containment isolation valves on a high differential flow signal.

"The other RWCU primary containment isolation instrumentation functions remained operable and the associated RWCU system primary containment isolation valves were capable of being remotely closed by the control room operators.

"At the time of discovery, Unit 2 was in Mode 2 due to an unplanned shutdown and all control rods had already been fully inserted as part of a soft shutdown sequence."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM DUTTRY TO KLCO ON 1/11/13 AT 2155 EST * * *

"Following the ENS report (EN 48525), Susquehanna determined that although the RWCU high differential flow isolation instrumentation would have prevented automatic isolation of the RWCU inboard and outboard primary containment isolation valves on a high differential flow signal, the RWCU high flow isolation instrumentation would detect a high flow condition and generate an isolation signal that would close the isolation valves.

"The RWCU high differential flow instrumentation is downstream of the RWCU pumps and it calculates the difference (delta) in flow between the inlet and the outlet of the RWCU heat exchangers. The SSES [Susquehanna Steam Electric Station] Technical Specification (TS) Bases Section 3.3.6.1 states that the RWCU Differential Flow signal is to detect a break in the RWCU system (pipe severance and separation). Engineering analysis determined that the RWCU pumps would run-out if a break occurs downstream of the pumps and the RWCU system flow rate would be approximately 1000 gpm, with one RWCU pump in operation. The flow rate would be higher for two RWCU pumps in operation.

"Therefore, RWCU isolation would occur from the RWCU Flow - High isolation signal due to a flow rate that is greater than 472 gpm (TS Table 3.3.6.1-1). This high flow isolation does not rely on the RWCU high differential flow instrumentation. The above analysis is consistent with the FSAR discussion in section 7.3.1.1a.2.4.1.9.3.

"Based on the above, Susquehanna has determined that the RWCU isolation function would still be completed if a pipe break occurred downstream of the RWCU heat exchangers and the RWCU high differential flow instrumentation is inoperable. Since there was no loss of safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material, this ENS report is retracted."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Non-Agreement State Event Number: 48647
Rep Org: RESEARCH MEDICAL CENTER
Licensee: RESEARCH MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 3
City: KANSAS CITY State: MO
County:
License #: 24-18625-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN SLACK
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 01/03/2013
Notification Time: 10:22 [ET]
Event Date: 01/02/2013
Event Time: 11:47 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/03/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(2) - DOSE > SPECIFIED EFF LIMITS
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

RADIOISOTOPE ADMINISTERED TO THE INCORRECT PATIENT

While conducting a radiopharmaceutical stress test the dose was administered to the incorrect patient. The isotope was 11 mCi of Tc-99m. The patient is not expected to experience any adverse effects as a result of this treatment.

* * * UPDATE AT 1440 EST ON 01/03/13 FROM STEPHEN SLACK TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report after a discussion with NRC Region III (Gattone) which concluded that the event did not meet the reporting criteria as a medical event.

Notified R3DO (Skokowski) and FSME Events Resource via email.

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48665
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ROBERT O'NEILL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/11/2013
Notification Time: 10:16 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2013
Event Time: 06:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/11/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM

"At 1534 EST on Thursday, January 10, Pilgrim Station operators initiated a manual shutdown of the power plant following a trip of the plant's recirculation pumps.

"The plant is in a safe condition and plant personnel are investigating the cause.

"The plant will be restarted after a thorough evaluation and any necessary repairs are completed. The plant had been online continuously for 230 days at the time of the shutdown.

"The NRC Resident Inspector staff has been informed of this press release and notification.

"This informational notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi).

"The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)."

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Part 21 Event Number: 48666
Rep Org: EMERSON PROCESS MANAGEMENT
Licensee: FISHER DIVISION
Region: 3
City: MARSHALLTOWN State: IA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS SWANSON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 01/11/2013
Notification Time: 12:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2013
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/11/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT (R1DO)
MARK FRANKE (R2DO)
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING TYPE 546NS TRANSDUCERS

The following report was received via fax:

"Fisher Information Notice: FIN 2013-01; 9 January 2013

"Subject: Type 546NS Transducers

"Equipment Affected By This Information Notice: Type 546NS Transducers shipped prior to 19 December 2012.

"Purpose:

The purpose of this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) is to alert users of the Type 546 and 546NS Transducers, shipped prior to 19 December 2012, that Fisher Controls International LLC (Fisher) was made aware of a situation which may affect the performance of the aforementioned equipment. We are informing you of this circumstance in accordance with Sections 21.21(b) and 50.55 (e) of 10CFR21.

"Applicability:

This notice applies only to Fisher Type 546 and 546NS Transducers shipped prior to 19 December 2012 that are not in operation, installed or in service.

"Discussion:

Recently, while a Fisher maintenance engineer was installing a Type 546NS Transducer in a non US customer's plant, the instrument did not perform as expected.

Upon investigation of the unit, it was determined that the vent hole to the relay was plugged which resulted in the build up of pressure inside the housing. This increased pressure will cause the output pressure to ramp up to supply pressure. In the event the relay is plugged, users will easily detect ramping up of the output pressure immediately after the sealed unit is put in service, which is why this FIN applies to units that are not yet in service.

"Action Required:

All Type 546 and 546NS Transducer units shipped to customers prior to 19 December 2012 and not already-in-service should be checked for this restriction of the case vent. Units in-service with the cover installed and properly working will not have a plugged case vent.

"10CFR21 Implications:

Fisher requests that the recipient of this notice review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10CFR21.

If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact:

George Baitinger
Manager; Quality
Fisher Controls International LLC
205 South Center Street
Marshalltown. IA 50158
Fax; (641) 754-2854
Phone: (641) 754-2026
George.Baitinger@Emerson.com"

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48667
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM MUFFLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 01/11/2013
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 11/14/2012
Event Time: 15:58 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/11/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

60 DAY TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION OF AN INVALID REACTOR TRIP ACTUATION IN MODE 4

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of a reactor trip while subcritical.

"On November 14, 2012 Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 4 performing unit startup activities during its 2012 Refueling outage. Rod Control system and Individual Rod Position Indication testing was in progress with the Reactor Trip breakers closed. Control Rod Banks were being withdrawn from the core in accordance with a testing procedure.

"At 1558 hours [EST], an Instrument and Controls technician removed control power fuses from the Nuclear Instrumentation System Intermediate Range Drawer 2N36, generating an invalid reactor trip. Affected equipment responded as designed. Both reactor trip breakers opened and all control rods dropped into the core.

"2N36 troubleshooting had been in progress. Repair or replacement options for a broken connector had been discussed between the technician and his supervisor. Concerned for his personal safety, the technician pulled the 2N36 control power fuses in order to perform a wiring inspection. The technician failed to apply human performance standards including written directions, pre-job briefing, and notifying control room personnel and supervision prior to work. The technician failed to recognize that he was working outside of the expectations of normal work processes and failed to properly evaluate the full consequences of his actions.

"There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48668
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: LUKE JENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 01/11/2013
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2013
Event Time: 09:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/11/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

FITNESS FOR DUTY - ACCESS TERMINATED

During a random screening, a non-licensed contract supervisor tested positive for a controlled substance. The individual's unescorted access has been terminated.

The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48669
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN COUTO
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/12/2013
Notification Time: 10:21 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2013
Event Time: 09:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT (R1DO)
JIM WIGGINS (NSIR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
BILL DEAN (RA)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
DAVID SKEEN (NRR)
GARY LANGLIE (ILTA)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO POTENTIAL SECURITY EVENT

"On Saturday, January 12, 2013 at 0925 hours [EST], with the reactor shutdown at 0% core thermal power, a security threat was reported. Security personnel took action to investigate the threat and implemented appropriate protective actions as required per security procedures.

"Based on this security event, the Shift Manager activated the Emergency Plan and made notification of an Unusual Event at 0950 hours. As a result, the Emergency Response organization was notified and activated. At 1001 hours, the NRC and applicable state and local authorities were notified via the Emergency Notification System (ENS).

"At 1050 hours, Security and applicable local law enforcement agency officials completed immediate investigations and determined that the security threat was not credible and was the result of local duck hunters on a small watercraft near the plant site. At 1105 hours, the Emergency Director terminated the Unusual Event.

"The Senior Resident Inspector was on-site and has been informed of this event and associated offsite notification. The licensee has notified appropriate state and local authorities as required per Emergency Planning and other site specific procedures. A press release was also issued.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."

Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA and DHS NICC.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021