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Event Notification Report for January 10, 2013

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/09/2013 - 01/10/2013

** EVENT NUMBERS **


47283 47991 48609 48640 48641 48642 48643 48657 48660

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Agreement State Event Number: 47283
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: CARIBBEAN INSPECTION & NDT SERVICES INC
Region: 4
City: PORT LAVACA State: TX
County:
License #: 06420
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 09/20/2011
Notification Time: 16:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2011
Event Time: 19:43 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 01/09/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
KEVIN O'SULLIVAN (FSME)

Event Text

POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE DUE TO FAULTY RADIOGRAPHY DEVICE

The following was received via e-mail:

"On September 19, 2011, at 1943 hours, the Agency [state] received an email stating that a radiography trainee may have received an over exposure to his right hand and was seeking medical attention. The email stated that the overexposure occurred because the radiography device used on the job was faulty, but did not provide any information on when or how the possible overexposure occurred.

"On September 20, 2011, the Agency received an email from a licensee Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) stating that an overexposure may have occurred to an employee's hands. The email stated that the licensee had not received any information from the individual who was reported to have received the exposure. The RSO was in route to a hospital in Houston, Texas where the radiographer trainee was reported to have gone for treatment. The employee's film badge has been sent for processing, but no results are available at this time. The licensee is reviewing records to determine where and when the trainee worked during the two months he has been employed. Individuals that worked with the trainee are being interviewed.

"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident # I-8886

* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO VINCE KLCO ON 9/21/2011 AT 1820 EDT* * *

The following information was received by facsimile:

"The licensee has reported that the trainee stated that on September 12, 2011, while conducting radiography operations in the field, he removed the guide tube from an Amersham 660 D radiography camera containing [an Iridium - 192 source] and saw that the source was protruding out of the camera. The licensee stated that they did not know how far the source was protruding or how it was returned to the fully shielded position. The Agency [state] has contacted the trainee and conducted an interviewed with him over the phone.

"The licensee stated that the results of the trainee's film badge indicated that he received 1,410 millirem on the film badge he was wearing at the time of the event. The trainee is in a Houston, Texas hospital. His doctors are conferring with [the] Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) regarding his medical treatment. An on-site investigation will be performed by the Agency at the licensee's location on September 22, 2011."

Notified the R4DO (Walker) and FSME (O'Sullivan).

* * * UPDATE AT 1806 EST ON 1/9/13 FROM ART TUCKER TO HUFFMAN * * *

The following update was received from the State of Texas Radiation Branch Investigation Unit via e-mail:

"This Agency has closed the investigation into this event, but due to the unique nature of this event this update is being provided.

"On January 2, 2013, the Agency was contacted by the mother of the individual injured in this event. She stated that his right hand was worse than before and they were concerned. She stated they had sought medical help from two health care providers in the Houston, Texas, area, but neither could provide assistance. She asked if the Agency had any recommendations. The Agency suggested that she contact a physician who works at REAC/TS and provided the contact information. She stated that she would contact him. She provided the Agency with pictures of the individual's hand which have been sent to the NRC Region IV Headquarters.

"On January 2, 2013, the Agency contacted the physician. He stated he had received copies of the radiographer trainee's medical records and a few recent pictures of his hand. The physician expressed concerns over the condition of the radiographer trainee's hand based on the pictures he had seen. He stated he would like to see the individual, but could provide the contact information for a physician he had trained and who practiced medicine in the Houston area. On January 8, 2013, the mother notified the Agency that she had been in contact with the REAC/TS physician and were working to get in contact with the physician in the Houston area recommended by REAC/TS. She stated that her son was in a lot of pain and his hand was getting worse each day.

"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Notified R4DO (Gaddy) and e-mailed a copy to FSME Events Resource.

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Agreement State Event Number: 47991
Rep Org: OR DEPT OF HEALTH RAD PROTECTION
Licensee: TESTAMERICA ANALYTICAL TESTING CORP.
Region: 4
City: BEAVERTON State: OR
County:
License #: ORE-90559
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DARYL LEON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/04/2012
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/01/2012
Event Time: 08:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 01/09/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS EMAIL ()
ILTAB VIA EMAIL ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST NI-63 ELECTRON CAPTURE DETECTOR

On June 1, 2012, the licensee reported a lost Ni-63 electron capture detector (ECD) to the state of Oregon. The source is an Agilent Technology model 19233, serial number L5286 and was used in a gas chromatograph (GC) device. The source was obtained in April of 2006. The last time the source was known to be in possession of the licensee was during a 6-month wipe test performed on November 1, 2011.

The gas chromatograph was sent to Far West Fiber Metal Recycling around the first of the year and it is possible the source was in the machine at the time of disposal. The licensee will continue to search for the source. The state of Oregon will follow-up with the licensee.

* * * UPDATE ON 1/9/13 AT 1218 EST FROM DARYL LEON TO HUFFMAN * * *

The following update was received from the State of Oregon Radiation Protection Services via facsimile:

"Inspection/investigation at TestAmerica Analytical Testing Corporation (TAATC) site performed on June 14, 2012. Missing ECD device not located, believe to have been housed inside a gas chromatograph (Hewlett-Packard model 5890, serial number 3033A30613) that was turned over to Far West Fiber Metal Recycling on December 5, 2011. All other ECD devices (25) were accounted for during the inspection.

"Discussion with Far West on June 4, 2012 indicates that metal items received are held for downstream customers for two weeks and then turned over to them for stripping/smelting. Far West had no record of receipt of the GC/ECD or which customer it may have gone to. Checks were made with local firms (Schnitzer Steel and Metro Metals) but no record of the GC/ECD unit receipt was located. TAATC continued to search for ECD unit for several months but it was not found. Believe ECD was smelted with GC at this time.

"Cause of this event due to management deficiency. RSO was moved to new position in November 2011 and out of room where ECD unit located and was training replacement person to perform some R50 duties (6-month leak testing/inventory) for ECD's. Missing ECD was housed in GC unit that was not used for 4 years and GC was used for spare parts. An employee of TAATC not listed on the materials license and unfamiliar with GC/ECD's removed 3 GC units from the room on December 5th and delivered to Far West Fiber for recycling, including the GC unit that normally housed the ECD in question. The other GC's did not house ECD's. The RSO and his trainee were unaware of the missing ECD until June 1, 2012 during routine 6-month leak testing nor was the RSO aware of the GC transfer since RSO works in a different area on site and do not routinely monitor ECD locations anymore.

"No other actions available at this time. The State of Oregon is closing this event."

Notified the R4DO (Gaddy) and e-mailed FSME Events Resource.

OREGON NMED REPORT NUMBER 120345


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 48609
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: VARIOUS
Region: 4
City:  State: CO
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LINDA BARTISH
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/19/2012
Notification Time: 11:31 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2006
Event Time: [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
FSME RESOURCES (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- COMPOSITE LISTING OF MISSING GENERAL LICENSED DEVICES

The following fifty-four (54) lost licensee tritium signs were submitted by the State of Colorado via email:

1. American Soda LLP; (2) Isolite; Model 2040; S/N A081034 and A081076; H-3; 11500 mCi/each
2. Beaudrey American Services; (2) Isolite; Model SLX60; S/N Unknown; H-3; 6200 mCi/each
3. Boulder Manor; (8) SRB Technologies; Model BR20BK; S/N 659038 to 659039 and 659066 to 659067; H-3; 17800 mCi/each
4. Carquest; (4) Best Lighting Products; Model SLXTU1RW10; S/N Unknown; H-3; 7030 mCi/each
5. GE Johnson; (1) Safety Light; Model 880-12-6; C27200; H-3; 7500 mCi
6. Grace Management; (2) Isolite Corporation; Model SLX60; S/N 14610; H-3; 3750 mCi/each
7. Hampton Inn; ; (14) SRB Technologies; Model BXU10GS; S/N Unknown; H-3; 9210 mCi/each
8. Industrialex MFG Co; (1) NRD Inc.; Model P-2021; S/N A2HL117; PO-210; 10 mCi
9. Kinder Morgan; (4) Isolite; Model SLX60; S/N Y24490-Y24493; H-3; 7500 mCi/each
10. New Belgium Brewing; (1) Shield Source Inc.; Model SLX; S/N10-29211; H-3; 6200 mCi
11. Old West Management; (1) Isolite; Model 2040; S/N Unknown; ; H-3; 7000 mCi
12. Platt River Power Authority; (4) SRB Technologies; Model BX15WH; S/N CO12440-12443; H-3; 9210 mCi/each
13. Sisters of St. Francis; (1) Isolite; Model 2040; S/N Unknown; H-3; 7500 mCi
14. Wild Oats Markets Inc.; (1) NRD Inc.; Model T-4001; S/N Unknown; H-3; 6700 mCi
15. Wynkoop Building LLC; (8) Safety Light; Model 8801206; S/N 432968 to 432975; H-3; 7500 mCi/each


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 48640
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: THE METHODIST HOSPITAL
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 00457
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 01/02/2013
Notification Time: 09:44 [ET]
Event Date: 12/04/2012
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/02/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

THERAPY SOURCE JAMMED AT THE DEVICE ENTRY PORT

"On January 2, 2013, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that on December 4, 2012, a medical event had occurred. The licensee reported that while performing a therapy procedure using a Novoste Beta-Cath IVB device the last strontium-90 source in the ribbon of sources could not be retracted into the device. The source was jammed at the device entry port. All of the sources had been removed from the patient, therefore the patient did not receive any additional exposure. The device was placed into an emergency safety box designed for such events and the box was then covered with a lead apron. No one in the treatment room received any additional exposure form the event. The licensee will return the device to their supplier. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas State Report # I-9029

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Agreement State Event Number: 48641
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: ROCK-TENN COMPANY
Region: 1
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #: 1699
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 01/02/2013
Notification Time: 11:18 [ET]
Event Date: 11/29/2012
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/02/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
FSME RESOURCES ()

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER FAILURE

"On December 26, 2012 the licensee reported that the shutter of one of its fixed gauges could not be closed as designed. The gauge is a Metso Automation, Inc., Model BWM-T (Serial Number 21136049). The gauge contains 400 mCi of Kr-85. The gauge is mounted on a scanning platform that traverses a paper web and is used as a sensor. The problem was noted by the on-site technician of Hoosier Technical Services Company, service provider on November 29, 2012.

"Metso Automation, Inc. was contacted and the following actions were taken: The scanning platform containing the gauge was placed in the home position and removed from the process, power was removed from the equipment, and finally the old shutter mechanism was removed and replaced with a new part.

"A radiation survey was performed and found to be within design parameters and regulatory limits. The Virginia Radioactive Material Program is not performing a site visit or follow-up as the shutter was repaired, all radiation levels are normal, and there was no public health or environmental concerns."

Virginia Report: VA-13-001

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Agreement State Event Number: 48642
Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: NEWMONT MINING CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: ELKO State: NV
County:
License #: 05-11-0041-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SNEHA RAVIKUMAR
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 01/02/2013
Notification Time: 14:19 [ET]
Event Date: 12/24/2012
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/02/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER MECHANISM FAILURE

The following report information was received from the State of Nevada Dept of Health via e-mail:

"The handle of a Berthold source, SN: 0448/09, Model No.: LB 7440, Activity: 30 mCi, Isotope: Cs-137, separated from the shutter mechanism. The shutter is closed and was verified with survey instrument RadEye B20 SN: 0515. This source will be kept in storage until the shutter can be fixed."

Nevada Event Report - NV130001

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Agreement State Event Number: 48643
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: RONE ENGINEERING SERVICES LTD
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: 02356
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 01/02/2013
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 01/02/2013
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/02/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
MEXICO (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TROXLER

The following was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On January 2, 2013, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) that a Troxler model 3430 containing an 8 millicurie cesium - 137 source and a 40 millicurie americium - 241/beryllium source could not be located. The licensee's records indicated that the gauge had been returned by their technician and locked in the storage area on December 31, 2012. The licensee's tracking system, which tracks the location of their vehicles, confirmed that the truck used by the technician had been returned to the licensee's location at the close of business on December 31. The licensee conducted an inventory of all of its gauges and this was the only gauge missing. The RSO stated that the storage area had no signs of tampering. The RSO stated that they had interviewed the technician assigned to use the gauge, but the technician did not provide any information useful to recover the gauge. The RSO stated that they were in the process of notifying the police of the theft. The RSO stated that the offering of a reward would be discussed with company management. The RSO stated that the gauge was locked inside of a transportation case and that the operating rod was locked in the shielded position. The RSO stated that he did not believe there was any risk of exposure to a member of the general public. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300.

"Texas Incident Number: I-9030"

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48657
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: ANDREW ZUCHOWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 01/08/2013
Notification Time: 07:05 [ET]
Event Date: 01/08/2013
Event Time: 05:05 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/09/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

PLANNED TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION MAINTENANCE

"A planned maintenance evolution at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station has removed the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system from service. The TSC ventilation system will be rendered non-functional during the course of the work activities. The TSC ventilation is expected to be out of service for approximately thirty six hours from 0505 [EST] to 1700, tomorrow, Jan 9, 2013.

"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR 5O.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to potential loss of the TSC. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation. The NRC resident has been notified."

* * * UPDATE AT 0258 ON 1/9/2013 FROM JIM RITCHIE TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

TSC ventilation was returned to service at 0230 EST. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R1DO (Newport).

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Part 21 Event Number: 48660
Rep Org: MPR ASSOCIATES, INC ENGINEERS
Licensee: BASLER ELECTRIC
Region: 1
City: ALEXANDRIA State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL DAMERELL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 01/09/2013
Notification Time: 18:09 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2012
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/09/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT (R1DO)
MARK FRANKE (R2DO)
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
PART 21 REACTORS GRP (E-MA)

Event Text

PART 21 INTERIM REPORT ON THE FAILURE OF AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR EXCITATION SYSTEM

The following report was received from MPR Associates via facsimile:

"MPR Associates (MPR) is investigating the failure of a replacement emergency diesel generator excitation system that MPR supplied to Cooper Nuclear Station. The root cause investigation is still in-process and will not be completed within 60 days of discovery as defined by 10 CFR Part 21.

"The 10 CFR Part 21 Interim Report [below] provides the information known at this time. An updated report will be provided once the root cause investigation is completed.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE BASIC COMPONENT THAT FAILED

"The basic component is a Basler Electric SBSR emergency diesel generator (EDG) excitation system that was supplied as a replacement system to Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS). The replacement system included design changes relative to the original CNS excitation system, which is also a Basler Electric SBSR design. The design changes included larger magnetic components, which were intended to allow for continuous operation of the new exciter at the EDG overload rating.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE SUPPLIER

"The excitation system was supplied by MPR Associates (headquarters in Alexandria, VA).

"Basler Electric (headquarters in Highland, IL) designed and fabricated the system under a commercial grade program certified to ISO 9001:2008. MPR Associates dedicated the commercial grade item for nuclear use under the MPR Nuclear QA Program, which complies with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B and ASME NQA-1.

NATURE OF THE FAILURE

"CNS installed the replacement excitation system in the Division 1 EDG system during refueling outage RE27. Prior to declaring the EDG operable, CNS manually terminated an EDG maintenance run due to erratic EDG reactive power indication, which was followed by a sudden drop of EDG reactive load and an indication of negative reactive power.

"Several rounds of troubleshooting and surveillance testing were performed unsuccessfully. The surveillance testing resulted in faults to ground and overheating and failure of components in the excitation system. Some of the failed equipment included the automatic voltage regulator (AVR), manual voltage control autotransformer (T60), rectifier power diode failure indication resistors and light-emitting diodes (LEDs), insulation on the control windings of two saturable transformers, and elements of the data acquisition equipment used to record data during the testing.

"The root cause of the failure has not yet been determined. However, on-site troubleshooting efforts at CNS by MPR and Basler Electric identified unexpected high voltages across the direct current (DC) control winding of the saturable transformers. These voltages are likely the cause of the failures experienced in-situ at CNS.

"Follow-up tests at Basler Electric on a similar replacement system designed for the Hatch Plant (but not yet installed in the plant) also identified higher than expected voltages across the DC control windings of the saturable transformers. MPR and Basler Electric recommended postponement of the Hatch Plant installation until the impact of this condition (i.e., the higher than expected voltages) is evaluated. Note that the testing on the Hatch replacement system to date did not result in failure of the system or abnormal function of components external to the saturable transformers.

NATURE OF THE FAILURE

"Testing of the replacement excitation system began on October 27, 2012. The maintenance run resulting in erratic EDG reactive power indication was performed on October 30, 2012. CNS, MPR, and Basler Electric discontinued troubleshooting efforts for the replacement excitation system on November 9, 2012.

"The replacement system was removed, and the original Basler Electric SBSR excitation system was re-installed. CNS declared the re-installed system operable on November 14, 2012.

"MPR formally documented the issue in the MPR corrective action program on November 13, 2012.

NUMBER AND LOCATION OF THE AFFECTED BASIC COMPONENTS

"Based on the information known to date, this 10 CFR Part 21 Interim Report affects the following SBSR type excitation systems that were dedicated and supplied by MPR.

Nuclear Plant Date Equipment Provided Items Supplied
Cooper Nuclear 2012 1 Systems (failed during installation)
Hatch 2012 5 Systems (not yet installed)

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN

"MPR is performing a failure analysis and root cause investigation to determine the extent of the condition, corrective actions, and actions to prevent recurrence. The root cause investigation is scheduled for completion by March 29, 2013.

ADVICE GIVEN TO PURCHASERS OR LICENSEES

"There are numerous Basler Electric SBSR type excitation systems in service at multiple plants throughout the nuclear industry. In addition to CNS and Hatch, MPR has dedicated and supplied SBSR excitation systems to the Beaver Valley, Davis-Besse, and Robinson plants. Each system supplied is custom designed for the generator that it is slated to control. Basler Electric SBSR excitation systems have demonstrated reliable service for many years.

"The replacement SBSR excitation system supplied to CNS was not identical to the original system. Specifically, there were design differences in some of the components, including larger transformers, which were intended to allow for continuous operation of the new exciter at the EDG overload rating. Although it was not foreseen (and not revealed by factory acceptance testing), it seems that the design changes in the replacement system led to its maloperation and failure when it was initially installed at CNS. This faulty operation and failure were readily observed as part of normal EDG surveillance testing. Upon re-installation, the original SBSR excitation system functioned properly. Hence, it appears that:

" - Differences between the replacement system and original system lead to the problem, and

" - The problem is readily detectable in normal surveillance testing.

"For these reasons, SBSR excitation systems installed at plants that have shown reliable operation during surveillance testing are in a satisfactory state and condition. MPR has no evidence that the mechanism or conditions that led to the failure at CNS will lead to failures at other installations. Therefore, plants with SBSR excitation systems installed should continue to use them and conduct normal surveillance testing."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, January 10, 2013
Thursday, January 10, 2013