| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/06/2012 - 12/07/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 48545 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: CONSOLIDATED ENGINEERING LABORATORIES
Region: 4
City: OAKLEY State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 11/28/2012
Notification Time: 20:40 [ET]
Event Date: 11/27/2012
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/28/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE ()
MEXICO (E-MA)
MATTHEW HAHN (ILTA)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN DENSITY GAUGE
The following is a summary of a report provided by the State of California:
On the morning of November 27, 2012 a licensee technician was retrieving a gauge from one of its storage locations when it was noticed that the unit had been broken into and a gauge was stolen. There were six gauges at this location and five of them are accounted for.
A review of the gauge locking system was checked / confirmed. The nuclear gauge had two locks with a third lock/cable around the box. The roll-up door was locked and the gate to the storage facility itself was locked. The lock latch to the storage facility was broken. This was the evidence of forced entry into the unit.
The police were notified right away and came out and took a report. The licensee will also be placing a local ad, reporting the stolen gauge and offering a reward for any lead information to the finding of this gauge.
The licensee was able to move to another storage unit to secure the remaining five gauges. The licensee also purchased heavy duty chains or cables to wrap through all gauges at this location and other storage locations.
Gauge Manufacturer: CPN
Model: MC1DR
S/N: MD70108564
Source: Cs-137 10 mCi
AM-241 50 mCi
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 48546 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: HOUSTON REFINING LP
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 00187
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 11/29/2012
Notification Time: 14:08 [ET]
Event Date: 11/29/2012
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
MEXICO (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST X-RAY FLUORESCENCE ANALYZER
The following was submitted by the State of Texas via email:
"On November 19, 2012, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee that they could not locate a Thermo Niton model number XL-II x-ray fluorescence analyzer. The device contains a 10 millicurie cadmium - 109 source and a 20 millicurie iron - 59 source. The radiation safety officer thought the device had been shipped to the manufacturer, but after he was unable to find any shipping papers for the device, he determined the device was missing. The licensee does not believe the lost device poses an exposure hazard to members of the general public. The investigation into this event is on going. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I - 9019
* * * UPDATE AT 1513 EST ON 12/4/12 FROM ART TUCKER TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following update was received from the State of Texas via email:
"The Agency [State of Texas] contacted the device manufacturer and was informed that the device requires a password to operate. The Agency [State of Texas] contacted the licensee who stated the password feature was active and that the password would not have been included in the container with the device.
"The device contains a 20 millicurie iron - 55 source and not a iron - 59 source as previously reported. The date of the event was November 29, 2012, not November 19, 2012 as stated in the Event Narrative."
Notified R4DO (Deese) and FSME Events Resource, ILTAB and MEXICO via email/fax.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48555 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JAMES HENDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 12/04/2012
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 12/04/2012
Event Time: 09:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LICENSEE NO LONGER HAS CONTROL OF EMERGENCY SIRENS
"At time 0942 [CST] telecommunications technicians reported to the Main Control Room that the site no longer has the ability to control offsite sirens. This was apparently caused by lightning strike in the area prohibiting the ability of the siren control computers to communicate with the sirens. This lost capability to alert a large segment of the population for one hour (by sirens and/or tone alert radios) requires a report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Technicians are currently attempting to repair and correct this issue by moving another computer to the affected radio repeater in an effort to reestablish control of offsite sirens.
"At time 1057 the station began contacting offsite sirens agencies including the Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Planning as well as all parishes within the 10 mile EPZ in order to initiate contingency actions for this issue. All agencies were notified as of time 1125. This constitutes a reportable notification of offsite agencies in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).
"Plant status remains Mode 1, 100% power, with no grid restrictions to report or radiological releases in progress. A follow up notification will be made to the NRC after the ability to control offsite sirens is restored."
Contingency actions are in place until the sirens are restored.
The licensee notified state and local governmental agencies as well as the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM JAMES HENDERSON TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2227 EST ON 12/6/12 * * *
"On 12/6/12 at time 0200, River Bend Station was able to restore control to offsite sirens. Silent testing was performed to ensure all necessary controls were regained for all 93 sirens. This testing was performed satisfactorily.
"Plant status remains Mode 1, 100% with no grid restrictions to report or radiological releases in progress."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Drake). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48563 | Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM HELSEL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 12/06/2012
Notification Time: 06:51 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2012
Event Time: 07:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text RADIATION MONITOR INOPERABLE FOR PRE-PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 0700 EST on December 6, 2012, radiation monitor RM-01TV-3536-1, Turbine Building Vent Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) was declared inoperable for pre-planned maintenance to perform surveillance testing. The surveillance test is scheduled to take approximately four hours.
"This radiation monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. This condition does not affect the health or safety of the public or the operation of the facility.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 48564 | Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HORNER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 12/06/2012
Notification Time: 11:01 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2012
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (E-MA)
| Event Text ESI REFURBISHED EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR CYLINDER HEAD WITH FOREIGN MATERIAL IN INTAKE PORT
The following information is a summary of a Part 21 Report from Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) concerning a condition reportable under 10 CFR 21.
ESI reports that they received notification about foreign material found within a refurbished cylinder head supplied to the Cooper Nuclear Station by ESI. Specifically, Cooper discovered two hand tools (picks) within the intake port on the cylinder head. The tools were discovered by Cooper after installation of the head onto the diesel engine and while attempting to adjust the intake valve backlash.
ESI supplied the refurbished cylinder head for a Cooper-Bessemer KSV engine to Cooper Nuclear Station (Part Number 13-KSV-11-6, Serial Number 6K2201) in August 2010. The refurbishment activity was performed at the Cameron Compression (OEM) facility in Casper, Wyoming.
The most likely scenario is that the cylinder head was oriented with the inlet port facing up during installation of the valve spring keeper seals. After installation of the seals, the tools were placed on top of the cylinder head. It is presumed the tools fell into the inlet port and settled in the intake valve seating area. The tools are small in size (approximately 5 inches long with a 5/8 inch handle) and were not visible from the exterior of the head.
ESI considers this occurrence to be an isolated incident and that Cooper Nuclear Station is the only affected customer. Previous shipments of similar cylinder heads are not suspect. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48565 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNY HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 12/06/2012
Notification Time: 16:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2012
Event Time: 17:09 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation | Event Text 60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
"On October 8, 2012, at 1709 EDT, Unit 2 received a Reactor Auto SCRAM System 'B' Trip signal in the main control room. The power monitoring breaker in RPS panel 2C71P003D tripped, causing a half-SCRAM in conjunction with the automatic actuation of the Unit 2 standby gas treatment system (SGT) and isolation of CIVs [Containment Isolation Valves] in multiple systems, both of which are normal responses to this loss of the 'B' RPS bus. The crew entered the appropriate abnormal operating procedures and confirmed the actuations automatically occurred as required given the loss of the RPS bus. They investigated the 'B' RPS Motor/Generator (M/G) set, placed the 'B' RPS bus on its alternate supply, reset the SGT and CIV actuation logic, and returned the CIVs to their normal position.
"Upon investigation, the 'B' RPS M/G set was found running with a steady output of 120 VAC. The breaker in RPS panel 2C71P003B stayed closed in. Further troubleshooting did not identify a cause for the failure of RPS breaker 2C71B003D. The breaker was replaced and the power monitoring relays were rebuilt. The 'B' MG Set was left running unloaded for 8 days with no trips observed.
"On October 26, 2012, approximately 20 seconds after returning the RPS 'B' M/G Set to service, RPS breaker 2C71B003D tripped again. At this time, investigators determined that 2C71B003B had no output voltage present when load was increased to 25 amps or greater. 2C71B003D tripped because 2C71B003B was not supplying load to it. A lug mounting screw was subsequently found to be loose on 2C71B003B. After tightening the screw, maintenance personnel determined that continuity existed and the 2C71B003B indicated closed with output voltage present as expected.
"Review of the six-month surveillances on 2C71B003B and the more-detailed 5-year surveillance that took place in August 2010 revealed no previous problems with the breaker. It is unknown when the lug mounting screw became loose or if repeated cycles of operation caused it to loosen. For broadness, thermography testing is being completed on 2C71P003 A, C, D, E, F and 1C71P003 A, B, C, D, E, F.
"When the second trip of 2C71B003D occurred on October 26, 2012, U1 SGT trains started and CIVs in multiple systems closed. This was an expected actuation with radiation monitor 2D11K634C already out of service and in the tripped condition at the time of the RPS 'B' trip. The RPS 'B' trip caused radiation monitor 2D11K634D to also trip thereby completing the logic to start U1 SGT trains and to close associated CIVs. The second event is included in this report since the failures are related as a result of having the same general cause and since they occurred over a reasonably short period of time.
"Because a malfunctioning subcomponent caused the loss of RPS 'B' rather than a valid CIV actuation signal, the resulting isolation of CIVs in multiple systems is considered an invalid actuation in both cases. Based on that information 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) allows these events to be reported via a telephone notification within 60 days instead of submitting a written LER."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | |