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Event Notification Report for September 4, 2012

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
08/31/2012 - 09/04/2012

** EVENT NUMBERS **

 
48072 48155 48224 48225 48226 48227 48229 48235 48237 48247 48262 48263
48264 48265 48266 48267 48268 48269 48270

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 48072
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM STANG
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/05/2012
Notification Time: 21:24 [ET]
Event Date: 07/05/2012
Event Time: 12:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
 
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO BLOCKING BOTH REACTOR BUILDING RAILROAD BAY DOORS

"At 1258 CDT on 07/05/2012, Operations was notified that both panels of Door 45 (south doors for the reactor building railroad bay airlock) were blocked by a man lift. Blocking both doors represents an unanalyzed condition as a flow path through the door is assumed for pressure relief during postulated HELB events. The man lift was immediately removed correcting the situation and all work related to Door 45 was stopped. Door 45 was blocked for approximately 20 minutes.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."


* * * RETRACTION FROM BART BLAKESLEY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1605 EDT ON 8/31/2012 * * *

"The purpose of this notification is to retract the previous Event Notification Report (#48072) made by the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant on 7/5/2012. The initial report indicated that blocking both panels of the railroad bay doors by a man lift represented an unanalyzed condition, as a flow path through the door is assumed for pressure relief during postulated HELB events, and was reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition. Since the initial report, Engineering has completed an evaluation that demonstrates equipment supporting safe shutdown would have been capable of performing their specified design function during postulated HELB events. Based on this analysis, the condition initially reported in EN #48072 did not result in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety and is therefore retracted.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this retraction."

Notified R3DO (Cameron).

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Agreement State Event Number: 48155
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: DEL-TIN FIBER
Region: 4
City: El DORADO State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0874-0312
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT PEMBERTON
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 08/03/2012
Notification Time: 12:03 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2012
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON PROCESS GAUGE

The following was received from the State of Arkansas via email:

"On August 3, 2012, a licensee notified the Department (Arkansas Department of Health, Radioactive Materials) that the shutter mechanism on a RONAN Model# SA1-F37 gauge (SN# 6481GQ), mounted at the apex of a mixing bin, was stuck in the open position. This was discovered during routine maintenance. Since the shutter is in the open position and does not pose an immediate safety risk, the plant continues to operate. The Department was told that even though the gauge is only accessible via man-lift, the gauge has been tagged with a caution sign. The facility has sent email notifications to all personnel as well as posting notices in the plant. The gauge contains 100 mCi of Cs-137. The facility has contacted the manufacturer and the Department will make an onsite visit to coincide with the repair. Further information will be provided as it is obtained.

"Arkansas Incident # AR-2012-005"


* * * UPDATE VIA E-MAIL FROM ROBERT PEMBERTON TO DONALD NORWOOD ON 8/31/2012 AT 1139 EDT * * *

"On 8/9/12, a RONAN technician performed repairs on a RONAN Model SA1-F37, SN# 6481GQ fixed gauge at the Del-Tin facility in El Dorado, Arkansas to correct a stuck shutter. The device was removed from its mounting, disassembled, cleaned, reassembled and remounted. The shutter is now functional. A wipe test showed no leakage.

"The root cause was found to be a dry rotted seal that allowed moisture and debris into the mechanism.

"The Department considers this event closed."

Notified R4DO (Proulx) and E-mail to FSME Event Resource.

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Agreement State Event Number: 48224
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: BED BATH AND BEYOND
Region: 3
City: WAUSAU State: WI
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS TIMMERMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/23/2012
Notification Time: 13:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2012
Event Time: 13:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
 
This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TEN TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS DAMAGED

The following report was received from the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section via e-mail:

"On August 20, 2012, at 1:30 pm the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section, received a telephone notification from NRC Region III personnel that 10 tritium exit signs, that originally contained 7.5 Ci at the time of purchase 7-10 years ago, were placed in a compactor and damaged at a PSC Environmental Services, LLC facility in Detroit, Michigan (refer to NRC event notification #48205).

"The ten exit signs came from a Bed Bath & Beyond store in Wausau, WI. On August 20, 2012 at 2:00 pm, the Vice President of Loss Prevention and Safety was contacted and he informed the state that 14 tritium exit signs were being replaced with LED signs (this is being done nation-wide at all Bed Bath & Beyond stores) at the Wausau location and were intended to be returned to the manufacturer for disposal. The 4 remaining signs are in a secure location within the store.

"The Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section will be performing a site visit in Wausau to verify the four remaining signs are intact and will be performing an investigation into the root cause of this incident."

Wisconsin Report: WI120011

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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Agreement State Event Number: 48225
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: FRYE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: HICKORY State: NC
County:
License #: NC #018-0377-
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RANDY CROWE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/23/2012
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/2012
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POSSIBLE MEDICAL EVENT RELATED TO USE OF I-125 SEED MESH IMPLANT

The following report was received from the North Carolina Radiation Protection Section via e-mail:

"On August 6, 2012 [the North Carolina Radiation Protection Section, NC-DHHS, RPS] received notice of a possible device failure. [Follow-up by NC-DHHS, RPS was conducted on August 8, 2012, by contacting the Authorized Medical Physicist (AMP)].

"A patient was given an invasive procedure (to right lung) using a mesh that contained permanent I-125 seeds attached as an implant. The implant contained 50 seeds with 5 strands of 10 seeds per strand. The total activity was 16.4 mCi on May 31, 2012.

"The patient was discharged from hospital on June 9, 2012.

"[The] patient was readmitted to the hospital on July 4, 2012. On July 7, 2012, x-rays revealed an abscess in the right lung with approximately 38 notable seeds in place. On July 9, 2012, the radiation oncologist requested chest and abdomen films. At that time, 35 seeds were noted in the right lung with 3 located in the abdomen. Per the patient; he was coughing up phlegm and subsequently swallowing it. The patient was made aware of seed mobility.

"On July 18, 2012 (decayed to 0.187 mCi/seed), there were 13 seeds confirmed in the lung and 17 seeds in the abdomen (total 5.62 mCi).

"Upon out-patient visit on July 4, 2012, there were 6 seeds remaining in the chest and 8 in the abdomen; there were no appreciable side effects noted per the radiation oncologist.

"Nine seeds were recovered during the patient's hospitalization and placed in the Nuclear Medicine Hot Lab.

"The device manufacturer was notified by immediate supervisor.

"The above information was received August 6, 2012 via electronic mail and August 10, 2012 via letter.

"The below information was received August 20, 2012 via electronic mail.

'This is the follow-up letter as requested in our conversation on Aug 08, 2012. To review, on May 31, 2012, fifty Iodine-125 seeds were implanted in a patient as a permanent implant in the right lung. The activity was 16.4 mCi on that date. Upon re-admission into the hospital, a chest x-ray was done on July 07. Approximately 38 of the 50 original seeds were visible on that date. If one merely accounts for the change in seed count (38/50), the area of the right lung implant received 76% of its intended dose. Therefore, the total dose delivered differs from the prescribed dose by 20% or more.

'This describes a Medical Event, as defined by section 15A NCAC 11.0364 (1) (A).

'On August 08, the patient came to the Radiation Oncology department. Final x-rays revealed no seeds within the lungs or abdomen.

'As an additional note, the failure of the device has been reported to the FDA by our hospital administration and the company that manufactures the device.'

"(Intended dose appears to be 25 Sv/hr at .1 cm (contact) on June 9
50 seeds = 16.4 mCi = 25 Sv/hr@ .1 cm (contact)
.328 mCi/seed initial activity

"On day number 25 (July 4) 38 seeds remain in lung (.328 mCi/seed with 1/2 life factor = .245 mCi/seed)
38*.245 mCi= 9.31 mCi = 14.67 Sv/hr@ .1 cm (contact)

"If all seeds were intact the result would be 12.25 mCi -> resulting in a 9.31 mCi/12.25 mCi = 76%

"A device NMED notification maybe required and have requested such from the AMP. More to follow."


A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Agreement State Event Number: 48226
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: ASARCO, LLC
Region: 4
City: SAHUARITA State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ 10-017
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/24/2012
Notification Time: 13:15 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/2012
Event Time: 09:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
MATTHEW HAHN (ILTA)
MEXICO (EMAI)
 
This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING AMERICIUM-241 AND RADIUM-226 SOURCES

The following information was received from the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency via e-mail:

"At approximately 9:00 AM August 23, 2012, the Agency was informed that the licensee lost a 3 millicurie Americium-241 source and a 0.9 microcurie Radium-226 source.

"The licensee was performing a clean-up at their facility between the dates of February 15, 2012 and June 11, 2012. The licensee assumes during those dates is when the sources went missing. However, the radiation safety officer for the license left on October 21, 2011 and the licensee cannot verify the location of the sources after that date.

"The licensee is currently interviewing employees involved in the cleanup to attempt to determine the location of the missing sources.

"The Arizona Regulatory Agency continues to investigate the event.

"The states of CA, NV, CO, UT, and NM and Mexico and U.S. NRC and FBI are being notified of this event."

AZ Report Number 12-014

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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Agreement State Event Number: 48227
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: TLS SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 4
City: TUCSON State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ 10-086
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/24/2012
Notification Time: 13:17 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/2012
Event Time: 08:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
 
This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED AND UNACCOUNTED FOR TRITIUM LIGHT SOURCES

The following information was received from the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency via e-mail:

"At approximately 8:00 AM on August 23, 2012, the Agency was informed that the Licensee had one damaged light source, two light sources unaccounted for, and identification of an intake of radioactive material by two TLS Systems employees.

"The Licensee was taking back 148 drogue light assemblies for disposal/recycling. After receiving the sources, the Licensee noticed minute fragments of a light source on a stainless steel bench top on which the sources were being examined. The fragments were placed in empty liquid scintillation vials and an initial decontamination of the workbench was performed. In addition, an inventory of the sources was performed and 297 intact sources were counted. A total of 298 sources implied 149 drogue light assemblies, not 148 as indicated by the company who returned the sources. Also, 150 radiation labels, stainless steel housings, and Lucite inserts were counted, which would indicate 300 light sources.

"Each drogue light assembly contained two mb-Microtec Model T-4376-1 tritium light sources. The sources had an initial activity of 450 millicuries each. The drogue lights are approximately 4 years old.

"Bioassays were given to individuals present in the lab and are currently awaiting results.

"The investigation into this event is ongoing. The U.S. NRC and AZ governor's office have been notified."

AZ Report Number: 12-013


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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Agreement State Event Number: 48229
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Region: 1
City: PHILADELPHIA State: PA
County:
License #: PA-0131
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/24/2012
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/2012
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PATIENT UNDEREXPOSURE USING YTTRIUM-90 SIR-SPHERES TREATMENT

The following event was received from the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection via facsimile:

"Event type: A medical event (ME) involving the administration of yttrium-90 SIR-Spheres which is reportable under 10 CFR 35.3045(a)(1)(i).

"Notifications: On August 24,2012, the Department's Southeast Regional Office received notification via a phone call and follow-up electronic correspondence about this ME.

"Event Description: The patient was being treated for disease of the liver and received 71% of the intended dose as identified by post treatment measurements. The treating physician, who also is the referring physician, notified the patient.

"Cause of the Event: Currently under investigation and unknown at this time.

"Actions: No harm to the patient is expected. The Department plans to do a reactive
inspection"

PA Report Number: 120026

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Agreement State Event Number: 48235
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TRINITY MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 3
City: STEUBENVILLE State: OH
County:
License #: 02120-42-0003
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK LIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/27/2012
Notification Time: 14:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2012
Event Time: 16:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/27/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (E-MA)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - IODINE-125 SEALED SOURCE SEED FAILURE

The following information was supplied by the State of Ohio Department of Health via e-mail:

"RE: Leaking I-125 prostate sealed source

"Date: August 24, 2012

"Source Type: I-125 Prostate Seed, Model STM1251, distributed by Bard

"Activity: 0.334 mCi/seed on 8/24/12

"During a prostate seed implant a seed became jammed in the Mick gun. The gun was placed on sterilization table and examined. It was found that the seed was lodged in the Mick cartridge. The cartridge that held the seed was removed from the gun over a basin full of water and the end result was the seed broke into two pieces. One piece was recovered in the water and the second was still lodged in the end of the Mick cartridge. The area was surveyed for any additional contamination and none was found. All personnel involved in the case were surveyed and no additional contamination was found.

"The broken I-125 seed was wiped and analyzed with the equipment below:

"Well Chamber- Captus 3000 s/n CNV-376 (located in Nuclear Medicine)

"Background- 339 cpm

"Wipe- 17.63 Mcpm = 21.24 Mdpm = 9.6 ÁCi

"The wipe test revealed that the removable contamination exceeds the 0.005 ÁCi.

"Bard, the company that supplied the seeds was contacted. The leaking I-125 seed and contaminated water was sealed and placed in the radiation waste storage area."

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 48237
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MYERS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/27/2012
Notification Time: 20:48 [ET]
Event Date: 08/27/2012
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
 
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE

"At 12:00 CDT maintenance personnel identified a pinhole leak from the Division 1 Service Water System piping in the Service Water Pump Room. Division 1 Service Water [SW] was declared inoperable and LCO 3.7.2 Condition A was entered due to a potential loss of structural integrity. This directs entry into LCO 3.8.1 for Diesel Generator #1 made inoperable by SW. DG 2 was previously made inoperable at 05:39 CDT on 8/25/2012 due to an unrelated issue regarding rain water inleakage into the DG 2 Room. Control Room Emergency Filtration system [CREFs] is aligned to Div 1 power. LCO 3.7.4 Condition A is applicable, requiring restoration of CREFs to operable status within 7 days. TRM LCO 3.6.1 condition A and B also apply, requiring (A) Restoration of containment spray subsystem A to OPERABLE status within 7 days and (B) Restore one RHR containment spray subsystem to operable status within 8 hours.

"DG 1 and DG 2 comprise the onsite emergency power systems. Both DGs inoperable is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could prevent fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Actions were taken to expedite repairs of the DG 2 roof leak and to further characterize the Division 1 SW piping leak. LCO 3.8.1 Condition E allows 2 hours to restore one DG to operable status or enter Condition F, to be in Mode 3 in 12 hours, which was entered at 14:00. Repairs to the roof leak on the DG 2 room were completed, after which DG 2 was declared Operable at 18:30. LCO 3.8.1 Conditions E and F required shutdown were exited at this time. LCO 3.8.1 Condition B for DG 1, and 3.7.2 for SW Loop A, continue to be active. Planning to repair the SW piping pinhole leak is continuing. There were no adverse grid conditions during the period both DGs were inoperable.

"The NRC Resident has been informed of the condition. No media or press release is planned at this time."


* * * RETRACTION FROM FRED SCHIZAS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1802 EDT ON 8/31/12 * * *

"This notification is being made to retract Event Notification EN #48237 which reported a loss of safety function due to both onsite Emergency Diesel Generators (DGs) being simultaneously INOPERABLE. On 8/25/12 at 0539 CDT, DG#2 was declared INOPERABLE due to rain water in-leakage into the DG#2 room. Condition B of LCO 3.8.1 was entered. and Required Actions were being taken to restore the INOPERABLE DG within 7 days. Subsequently, on 8/27/12 at 1200 CDT Maintenance personnel identified a pinhole leak from the Division I Service Water System piping in the Service Water Pump Room. Division I Service Water was declared INOPERABLE and LCO 3.7.2 Condition A was entered due to a potential loss of structural integrity. This prompted entry into LCO 3.8.1 Conditions E and F which require shutdown, because DG#1 was made INOPERABLE by SW. Both DG's INOPERABLE is reportable per 10CFR50.72.b.3.v.D as a condition that could prevent fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Repairs to the roof leak on the DG#2 room were completed, after which DG#2 was declared Operable at 1830 CDT on 8/27/2012. LCO 3.8.1 Conditions E and F were exited at the time. LCO 3.8.1 Condition B for DG#1, and 3.7.2 for SW Loop A, continued to be active, and planning to repair the pin-hole leak continued.

"Subsequent investigation and UT examinations provided data which enabled SW Division 1 and DG#1 to be declared OPERABLE on 8/30/2012 at 0528 CDT. An evaluation of this condition concluded that further characterization of the SW Piping Pin-Hole leak enabled ASME Code Case N-513-3 to be applied to determine piping structural integrity was maintained. SW ability to supply required flows to its loads is not adversely diminished, because the flaw is small. Water leaking from the flaw will not adversely affect any other equipment important to safety by spray or flooding. The piping is compliant with ASME code. Based on this evaluation, the Division 1 SW system can perform its safety function and is OPERABLE.

"With Division 1 SW subsystem capable of fulfilling its safety function, DG#1 was therefore also capable of fulfilling its safety function during the period of SW subsystem INOPERABILITY. Consequently, during the period of DG#2 INOPERABILITY, DG#1 was capable of fulfilling the safety function of the onsite emergency power system. NPPD therefore retracts Event Notification EN 48237.

"The NRC Resident has been informed of this retraction."

Notified R4DO (Azua).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48247
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: D. W. MCGAUGHEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 08/29/2012
Notification Time: 10:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2012
Event Time: 08:57 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
 
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

PARTIAL LOSS OF PLANT RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM REMOTE READOUT

"On August 29, 2012, power was removed from SCADA B of the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) to perform a planned system modification. During this period, data for most Unit 2 radiation monitors will not be electronically available in the emergency response facilities and will not be supplied to the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), if activated. System alarms and data displays will still be available to the plant operators in the Control Room. The expected duration of RMS remote data partial inoperability is approximately 72 hours. The loss of Unit 2 remote readout capability requires compensatory measures to be used for the acquisition of radiological data in the emergency response facilities. These compensatory measures have been communicated to the emergency response organization. Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the portions of the RMS are inoperable. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. An update message will be provided when the RMS is restored.

"The NRC Resident and Region IV EP Inspectors have been notified."


* * * UPDATE FROM ALAN MARZLOFF TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1921 EDT ON 8/31/2012 * * *

"This is a follow-up to ENS report number 48247. The Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) alarms and data displays have been restored to the Comanche Peak emergency response facilities (ERFs) following completion of planned system modifications. The emergency assessment capability of the Comanche Peak emergency response facilities have been re-established [as of 1821 CDT]. The NRC Resident has been notified."

Notified R4DO (Azua).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48262
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: CHRISTINA PERINO
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 08/31/2012
Notification Time: 17:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2012
Event Time: 15:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
 
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 98 Power Operation 98 Power Operation

Event Text

CONFIRMED POSITIVE FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST

A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48263
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RUDY CAPUTO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/31/2012
Notification Time: 17:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2012
Event Time: 09:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
 
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DIESEL GENERATOR DECLARED INOPERABLE

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. During the conduct of the Unit 2 Division 3 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Diesel Generator (DG) air start system receiver blowdown, a low air pressure system alarm was received. Starting air pressure in one of 2 redundant air receiver banks lowered to the point requiring the DG to be declared inoperable per Technical Specifications. This event appears to have been caused by a degraded receiver drain valve. The air system degraded equipment condition has cleared and the DG has been restored to operable status following 42 minutes of inoperability. Although a redundant air bank was fully available and charged, during this time of inoperability the DG was at reduced margin to successfully start if required. Due to this loss of margin and inoperable condition, it has been determined that this failure could potentially affect the safety function of this system, and is being reported as an 8 hour ENS notification."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48264
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF HRYNDA
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/02/2012
Notification Time: 06:22 [ET]
Event Date: 09/01/2012
Event Time: 22:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
 
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

RADIATION MONITOR DECLARED INOPERABLE

"This is a non-emergency report. No actual event has occurred.

"At 2230 hours EDT, on September 01, 2012, Oconee Nuclear Station Operations determined that the radiation monitor for Low Gas Unit Vent monitoring failed its check source and was declared inoperable. This monitor is used for determination of Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in ALL Modes. Specifically, the criterion states that an Unusual Event should be declared if this radiation monitoring reading reaches 9.35E5 for greater than 60 minutes. This condition was discovered during weekly radiation monitor setpoint determinations.

"There is no adverse impact on nuclear safety. A redundant method for sampling and determination of activity levels has been implemented per SLC 16.11.3. The same EAL criterion has a redundant determination of Unusual Event classification based on these activity levels.

"This report is submitted based upon a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48265
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF HRYNDA
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/02/2012
Notification Time: 08:35 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/2012
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
 
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

PLANNED OUTAGE OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY

"As part of preparation for the upcoming Democratic National Convention (DNC), contingencies are in place associated with the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Stations. The common EOF is located in Charlotte, NC. Because of the potential for event security to delay staffing of the facility within the prescribed time frame, Duke Energy is implementing its business continuity plan for the EOF during the period from 12:00 PM (noon) on September 2nd until 24:00 (midnight) on September 6th.

"If a declared emergency were to occur at Oconee Nuclear Station, the EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location. This facility is used as a backup location for the Catawba TSC as specified in station procedures.

"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii), and in accordance with NUREG-1022, Revision 2, as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility."

The licensee notified the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Pickens County, and Oconee County. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48266
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOSH STROUPE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/02/2012
Notification Time: 08:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/2012
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
 
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

PLANNED OUTAGE OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY

"As part of preparation for the upcoming Democratic National Convention (DNC), contingencies are in place associated with the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Stations. The common EOF is located in Charlotte, NC. Because of the potential for event security to delay staffing of the facility within the prescribed time frame, Duke Energy is implementing its business continuity plan for the EOF during the period from 12:00 PM (noon) on September 2nd until 24:00 (midnight) on September 6th.

"If a declared emergency were to occur at McGuire Nuclear Station, the EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location. This facility is used as a backup location for the Catawba TSC as specified in station procedures.

"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii), and in accordance with NUREG-1022, Revision 2, as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48267
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: AARON MICHALSKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/02/2012
Notification Time: 09:21 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/2012
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
 
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

PLANNED OUTAGE OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY

"As part of preparation for the upcoming Democratic National Convention (DNC), contingencies are in place associated with the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Stations. The common EOF is located in Charlotte, NC. Because of the potential for event security to delay staffing of the facility within the prescribed time frame, Duke Energy is implementing its business continuity plan for the EOF during the period from 12:00 PM (noon) on September 2nd until 24:00 (midnight) on September 6th.

"If a declared emergency were to occur at Catawba Nuclear Station, the EOF would be set up in the McGuire Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location. This facility is used as a backup location for the McGuire TSC as specified in station procedures.

"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii), and in accordance with NUREG-1022, Revision 2, as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility."

The licensee will notify the State of North Carolina, State of South Carolina, York County, Gaston County, and Mecklenburg County. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48268
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID BONVILLIAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 09/02/2012
Notification Time: 14:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/2012
Event Time: 10:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
 
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO NON-RADIOLOGICAL LEAKAGE FROM THE NEUTRALIZATION TANK

"In response to identification of a non-radiological leak from the Neutralization Tank at Callaway Plant today (9/2/2012), notification was made to the EPA National Spill Response Center at 1031 CDT and to the Missouri Department of Natural Resources at 1043 CDT. The leak was initially identified at 0926 CDT. From testing of a sample taken from the tank, the pH of the tank fluid was reported to be 1.9. Initially, the leak was to the ground and into a ditch that is part of a flow path that ultimately leads off site via a storm sewer. However, there is no indication of any of the leakage flowing beyond the site boundary via that pathway since action was promptly taken to divert the leakage to the sump area of the equalization tank (on site). The leakage will thus be collected there until it terminates. At 0926 CDT, the leakage rate was estimated to be approximately 20 gpm; at 1025 CDT the leakage was estimated to be approximately 50 gpm. The leak is at the bottom of the Neutralization Tank, and thus will terminate when the tank is emptied. At 1218 CDT, the fluid level in the Neutralization Tank was at 17%. The initial quantity of fluid in the tank (at the onset of the leak) was approximately 110000 gallons.

"This spill was reported to offsite organizations, as noted. This event is reportable to the NRC pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi).

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of the event and this ENS notification."

17% tank fluid level corresponds to approximately 25000 gallons.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48269
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DANIEL HUNT
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/03/2012
Notification Time: 05:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/2012
Event Time: 22:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
 
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 97 Power Operation 97 Power Operation

Event Text

TRANSFER OF EMERGENCY RESERVE AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER ISOLATING FUEL POOL COOLING AND CLEANUP SYSTEM, AND FUEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM

"At 22:04 CDT on 9/02/2012, the Emergency Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (ERAT) transferred unexpectedly to the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT). During this transfer, the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (FC) system pump 'A' tripped and the Fuel Building Ventilation (VF) system isolated. Upper containment pool level dropped below the minimum required level per Technical Specifications (TS) 3.6.2.4 and Secondary Containment differential pressure increased above 0.25 inches vacuum per TS 3.6.4.1. Upper Containment Pool level was restored above the minimum level at 01:27 CDT on 9/3/2012 within the 4 hour completion time. The Upper Containment Pool is a part of the suppression pool makeup system used to ensure the Primary Containment function. Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored at 22:19 on 9/2/2012 when the Standby Gas Treatment System was started. Maintaining secondary containment differential pressure helps to control the release of radioactive material.

"This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The station is currently in a 72-hour action to restore the ERAT to an operable status per TS LCO 3.8.1 Required Action A.2. Plant conditions are stable and actions are underway to repair the ERAT.

"The NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48270
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN WALKOWIAK
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/03/2012
Notification Time: 07:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/03/2012
Event Time: 02:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
 
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 93 Power Operation 93 Power Operation

Event Text

HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO ERRONEOUS INDICATION ON FLOW INDICATING CONTROLLER

"At 0225 EDT on September 3, 2012, with the James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) operating at 93% reactor power, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to abnormal indication on the HPCI Flow Indicating Controller (FIC). The FIC was found to be indicating a HPCI System flow rate of 700 gpm while the system was in the standby lineup. Under these conditions, the capability of the system to achieve the required flow rate cannot be assured.

"This failure meets NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) and other Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) remain operable.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021