Event Notification Report for August 09, 2012

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON GAUGE

The following information was provided by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via facsimile:

"On Thursday, August 9, 2012, the licensee informed the Department's [Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)] Southwest Regional Office about the discovery of a shutter failure. It is reportable within 24- hours under 10CFR 30.50(b)(2).

"During a semi-annual leak test being performed by a consultant, the shutter was found inoperable and stuck in the open position. No dose is believed to have been received by any personnel.

"The device is identified as: Manufacturer: LFE, Model #: SS-3A, Device Serial #: 300-483L, Sealed Source Model #: SS-3A, Sealed Source SN: 02311, Isotope: Am-241, Activity: (1 Ci).

"The cause of the event was equipment malfunction. Licensee continued running the mill with permission granted by DEP until the consultant arrived later that same day. Repairs were made to the shutter mechanism, followed by a radiation survey, wipe test, and function check of the gauge. The gauge is now operating properly. DEP scheduled a reactive inspection for August 10, 2012."

PA Event Report No. PA120024

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY DATA NETWORK MAINTENANCE

"At about 1000 PDT on August 9, 2012, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) will disconnect the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Plant Data Network to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and redirect the data via the Utility Data Network for hosting the emergency facility data systems. These systems include the Safety Parameter Display System, Plant Process Computer, Emergency Response Facility Display System, and Emergency Assessment and Response System in the EOF.

"PG&E expects to have the Emergency Response Data System and the EOF data network unavailable for about 8 hours. During this time, if needed, the TSC will have command and control once staffed, and will have classification, notification and dose assessment responsibility until the display systems are restored to the EOF. Also, if required, a dedicated licensed operator will be available in the control room to provide plant data to the NRC's Emergency Operations Center.

"DCPP is making this 8-hour, non-emergency notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

CONFIRMED POSITIVE FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST

A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness for duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been denied. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - NON WORK RELATED ON-SITE FATALITY

"This is a non-emergency 4 hour informational notification to the NRC in accordance with the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

"On August 9, 2012 at approximately 1510 hours [EDT], a contract employee suffered a non-work related personal medical event while in an office environment that was located outside of the protected area. The individual was transported offsite and was pronounced deceased at a local hospital.

"OSHA is being notified pursuant to the requirements of 29 CFR 1904.39. There was no radioactive contamination involved in this event. Duke Energy has not observed any heightened media interest as a result of the fatality. No other notifications to government agencies are expected and no press releases are intended to be made at this time.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

CONTROL BUILDING A/C UNIT MAY NOT PERFORM DESIGN FUNCTION ON LOSS OF REDUNDANT A/C UNIT

"Affected equipment includes two 4160 volt safety buses, four 480 volt safety buses, four 120 volt AC safety trains, and four 125 volt DC safety trains.

"Following an accident Class 1E AC Unit SGK05B may not be able to perform is design safety function if a single failure causes a loss of redundant Class 1E AC unit SGK05A. This is due to continued latent heat input from A train Control Room Pressurization Fan which continues to operate. SGK05A and B provide room cooling for all safety related electrical busses.

"Action Taken: Established the following compensatory measure - During accident conditions with both trains of CRVIS [Control Room Ventilation Isolation System] actuated if at any time SGKO5A trips then following completion of immediate actions Control Room pressurization fan CGK04A will be secured to reduce latent heat removal requirements for SGK05B."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM MOORE TO KLCO ON 8/11/2012 AT 1058 EDT * * *

"[On August 11, 2012 at 1845 CDT, the licensee identified] this condition applies to SGK05A. Action taken: Established compensatory measures that during an accident condition with both trains of CRVIS actuated, if at any time SGK05A or SGK05B trips for any reason then, following completion of immediate actions, Control Room pressurization fan on the same train with the tripped A/C unit will be secured if the other pressurization fan is running."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R4DO (Drake).

* * * RETRACTION FROM MARCY BLOW TO DONG PARK ON 09/19/12 AT 1520 EDT * * *

"Further engineering evaluation determined that the Class 1E AC unit SGK05A and SGK05B have the ability to remove the heat addition of the Control Room Pressurization Fans. As a result, the condition has been determined to not be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Miller).