U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 07/19/2012 - 07/20/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | Power Reactor | Event Number: 47949 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND Region: 3 State: MN Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP NRC Notified By: JOHN KEMPKES HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 05/22/2012 Notification Time: 22:29 [ET] Event Date: 05/22/2012 Event Time: 16:30 [CDT] Last Update Date: 07/19/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION | Person (Organization): BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION IDENTIFIED DURING A FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW "During a review of non-compliances with Appendix R that are being resolved as part of the NFPA 805, Risk Informed Fire Protection Transition, it was identified that a non-compliant operator manual action to manually backwash the cooling water strainers was identified in several fire areas, but the need to manually backwash the strainers may be required in other fire areas not previously identified. For Fire Areas 25, 30, 31, 38, 66, 109, and 117 power to the cooling water strainer central control panel could be affected which could require the need to perform a manual backwash of the strainers. Manual backwash of the cooling water strainers has not been established as an alternate compensatory measure for Fire Area 25, 30, 31, 38, 66, 109 and 117. "Manual operator actions that are required to recover functionality of a system that is credited to achieve and maintain hot safe shutdown for a fire in a III.G.1 or III.G.2 fire area are indicative of a missing fire barrier. "The lack of established alternate compensatory measures is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii). "Compensatory measures have been established by verifying fire detection in the affected areas is functional with an hourly fire watch established in accordance with site procedures." The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * UPDATE AT 1708 EDT ON 7/19/12 FROM STEVE SCHMIDT TO HUFFMAN * * * "An eight hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) was reported on May 22, 2012 for a non-Compliant manual operator action to backwash the cooling water strainers in several fire areas not previously identified. "Subsequent analysis determined that the process of removing sufficient decay heat to achieve and maintain cold shutdown does allow the use of repair actions. Since Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) can be in the process of removing sufficient decay heat to reach cold shutdown conditions in much less than 15 hours there is significant margin to show this action is acceptable as a cold shutdown action and is in compliance with the requirements of Appendix R, Section III.G. "Therefore, the action is not a non-compliant operator manual action and EN 47949 is retracted. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed." R3DO (Kozak) notified. | Agreement State | Event Number: 48088 | Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH Licensee: BUILDING AND EARTH SCIENCES Region: 1 City: SERIERVILLE State: TN County: License #: R-A1024-B22 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: BETH SHELTON HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 07/11/2012 Notification Time: 10:02 [ET] Event Date: 06/15/2012 Event Time: [EDT] Last Update Date: 07/11/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): ART BURRITT (R1DO) FSME EVENTS RESOURCE () | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER The following information was obtained from the State of Tennessee via Email: "On June 15, 2012, Building and Earth Sciences contacted the Division of Radiological Health to report that their Troxler Moisture Density Gauge model 3430 (SN#37366) which contains 8 mCi of Cesium-137 and 40 mCi Americium-241:Beryllium had been hit by a bull dozer at a jobsite in Sevierville, TN. The gauge was visually inspected, and it was determined that the source rod was retracted and inside the gauge but the sliding block was not in place. The survey meter indicated an exposure level of 100 mRem/hr within 1 meter of the base of the gauge in its case. After speaking with Troxler, the RSO replaced the sliding door and held it in place with duct tape. This reduced the dose rate to 18 mR/hr. The gauge was secured into a truck bed and was returned to their licensed facility in Birmingham, AL. Upon arrival in Birmingham, a leak test was conducted and sent for analysis. Once the results were returned, they obtained a return authorization to ship the gauge to Troxler." Tennessee Event: TN-12-164 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf | Agreement State | Event Number: 48090 | Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH Licensee: JAMES HARDIE BUILDING PRODUCTS Region: 4 City: SPARKS State: NV County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: SNEHA RAVIKUMAR HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 07/11/2012 Notification Time: 11:36 [ET] Event Date: 01/01/2005 Event Time: [PDT] Last Update Date: 07/11/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): MARK HAIRE (R4DO) FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI) DENNIS ALLSTON (ILTA) | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST CS-137 SOURCE USED IN DENSITY METER The following information was provided by the State of Nevada via email: "The licensee issued a report of a lost radioactive source previously in service at James Hardie's McCarran, NV manufacturing facility. The missing source material in question was a component of a Thermo Measuretech density meter, Model 5201. The radiation source housing has the serial # B4106. The source's serial # is GV-9532. The isotope is Cesium-137, and the activity is 50 mCi. "This unit was received on site in July, 2004 and put into commission in December of 2004. This particular unit was installed on the agitator feed line (a process line that transfers feed material in a mixing vessel to a production machine). At some time in 2005, the density meter in question was removed from service and replaced with an inline flow meter. "Thermo Scientific was contacted to determine if the source material in question had ever been sent back to them for recycling or disposal. They have no record of receiving the material in question. In early 2012, the McCarran facility executed a major site clean-up effort. This included taking inventory of all spare parts in the warehouse and cleaning up the 'bone yard'. "Western Metals Recycling was contacted prior to this clean-up initiative and asked if they had ever found radioactive material in a scrap metal load from James Hardie. They said that they had not. They also stated that all inbound loads are screened for the presence of radioactive material, and that they would have located the lost device had it come into their yard. No scrap metal shipments generated from the 'bone yard' clean-up initiative were found to contain radioactive material. "At this time James Hardie believes that it has done all that can be done to locate the lost source material. The facility is now easily inspected due to recent clean-up efforts, and effort will continue to be made to locate the lost radiological material. In the event that the lost material is located, the licensee will notify the State of Nevada immediately and initiate action to return the source material to Thermo Scientific for recycling or disposal. "There is currently one Thermo Measuretech density meter in service at this facility. The device is operated under a General License. In accordance with license requirements, annual training is provided to all site personnel." THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf | Agreement State | Event Number: 48098 | Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION Licensee: UNIVERSITIES HOSPITAL OF CLEVELAND Region: 3 City: CLEVELAND State: OH County: License #: 02110180007 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: KARL VON AHN HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 07/12/2012 Notification Time: 13:10 [ET] Event Date: 07/10/2012 Event Time: 17:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 07/12/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO) FSME RESOURCES (EMAI) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNDERDOSE DURING A YTTRIUM-90 THERASPHERE TREATMENT The following information was provided by the Ohio Bureau of Radiation Protection via e-mail: "A written directive was given for a patient to receive 115 mCi of Y-90 TheraSpheres microspheres. "During the delivery of the microspheres, stasis occurred before the full quantity of the written directive delivered. The licensee did not expect to reach stasis, and will be sending the delivery system to the manufacturer after the remaining Y-90 decays to verify that there was not an equipment malfunction. The licensee calculates that the patient received 68.6 mCi, which is only 60% of the written directive (a 40% underdose). The written directive did not indicate include the phrase 'or until stasis'. "The licensee has notified the attending physician. The licensee will be contacting the patient's physician prior to contacting the patient. "The licensee states that there are no adverse effects to the patient. No corrective action is planned at this time. "Event Discovered: July 11, 2012 at 11:00 am Event Date: July 10, 2012 at 5:00 pm "Reporting criteria - medical event OAC 3701:1-58-101(a)(1)(a) 10 CFR 35.3045(a)(1)(i) " Ohio Event Report #2012-017 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48120 | Facility: COOK Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: KURT BERAN HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 07/19/2012 Notification Time: 18:28 [ET] Event Date: 07/19/2012 Event Time: 15:30 [EDT] Last Update Date: 07/19/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | Person (Organization): LAURA KOZAK (R3DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 50 | Power Operation | Event Text TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INABILITY TO RESTORE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION AUTOMATIC ACTUATION LOGIC AND ACTUATION RELAYS WITHIN THE REQUIRED TIME "At 1530 on July 19, 2012, operators commenced shutdown of DC Cook Unit 1 to comply with LCO 3.3.2, Condition I when the 6 hour time limit to complete Condition C Required Action could not be completed. "At 0734 on July 19, 2012, operators identified that power had been lost to two of four Steam Generator Stop Valve Dump Valves (Dump Valves) on one of the two trains. DC Cook entered LCO 3.3.2 Condition B for Function 4a, manual initiation: 'restore required channel or train to operable within 48 hours.' DC Cook also entered LCO 3.3.2 Condition C for Function 4b, automatic actuation logic and actuation relays: 'restore required channel or train to operable within 6 hours.' Power was restored to one Dump Valve which was then declared operable at 1030. Efforts continue to restore power to the remaining Dump Valve. "Enforcement Discretion was verbally granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 1736 on July 19, 2012 to begin at 1934 and end at 1934 on July 20, 2012. Upon receiving the Enforcement Discretion, the power reduction was stopped at 1738 at 50% power. "This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications,' as a four (4) hour report. The DC Cook Sr. Resident NRC Inspector has been notified." | Power Reactor | Event Number: 48121 | Facility: LIMERICK Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: JOHN WEISSINGER HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 07/19/2012 Notification Time: 21:56 [ET] Event Date: 07/19/2012 Event Time: 15:37 [EDT] Last Update Date: 07/19/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION | Person (Organization): ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | A | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text REACTOR PROTECTION SIGNAL ACTUATION DUE TO CHANGING MODE SWITCH POSITION DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING "During surveillance testing, the reactor mode switch was moved from the locked shutdown position and placed in the refuel position without the minimum required operable source range monitors per Limerick Generating Station Technical Specifications. "Upon discovery of the issue, the reactor mode switch was returned to the locked shutdown position causing an expected but valid RPS actuation. "No control rod motion occurred because all control rods were already inserted at the time of the event." The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |