| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/25/2012 - 05/29/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Part 21 | Event Number: 47895 | Rep Org: ENERGYSOLUTIONS
Licensee: ENERGYSOLUTIONS
Region: 4
City: SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN SHRUM
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 05/03/2012
Notification Time: 11:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2012
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
MARK RING (R3DO)
PART 21 REACTOR GRP (EMAI)
PART 21 MATERIALS GR (EMAI)
| Event Text SHIPPING CASKS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR ACCIDENT SCENARIO NOT PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED
"This serves as notification of a regulatory compliance issue with the 10-160B Type B Cask (Certificate of Compliance #9204) and the 8-120B Type B Cask (Certificate of Compliance #9168). This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.21(d)(3)(i). These casks have been administratively placed out of service as Type B Packages until a complete determination can be made by Energy Solutions and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
"As part of the relicensing of new 8-120B Casks, EnergySolutions identified a hypothetical accident scenario required by 10 CFR 71 which was not previously analyzed as part of the original or ongoing licensing activities. This analysis confirmed that the current cask design does not comply with the Type B package requirement for this specific accident scenario. The 10-160B has a similar design. As such, the casks have been placed out of service. EnergySolutions initiated Condition Report ENG-CR12-018 to track this issue.
"In accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.21(d)(4), EnergySolutions will provide written notification to the NRC within 30 days with additional information including corrective actions."
* * * UPDATE AT 1644 EDT ON 5/25/12 FROM SHRUM TO HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee provided a 30-day written follow-up report to the condition described above:
"Pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 21, EnergySolutions is providing this thirty day written report as required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii).
"On May 3, 2012, the Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, of EnergySolutions provided written notification to the NRC Operations Center of a regulatory compliance issue with the 10-160B Type B Cask (Certificate of Compliance #9204) and the 8-120B Type B Cask (Certificate of Compliance #9168) as required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i).
"Information required to be reported by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) is provided as follows:
(4) The written report required by this paragraph shall include, but need not be limited to, the following information, to the extent known:
(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
"Dan Shrum, EnergySolutions Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs
423 West 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"Model 8-120B Package, USA/9168B(U)
"Model 10-160B Package, USA/9204B(U)F-96
(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"The basic component is supplied by EnergySolutions
(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
"A Hypothetical Accident Condition was identified that had not been previously analyzed. Evaluation of this accident scenario found that during the thermal test the package secondary lid seals might reach a temperature exceeding the temperature limit for the seal material. If the temperature exceeds the limit, the seals may fail. Failure of the seals could result in a release of radioactive material exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 71.51.
(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
"Confirmatory calculations of the engineering analysis issue were completed on May 26, 2012.
(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
"The packages, as currently designed, meet the requirements of a Type A or IP-2 package and some are being used in that capacity. The package location listed below is as of 5/23/12.
MODEL NUMBER LOCATION(S)
8-120B 4 120B-1 Cooper Nuclear Station in Nebraska; 120B-2 in transit to Tennessee;
120B-1S in to transit to Tennessee; 120B-2S in transit to Tennessee
10-160B 6 160B-1 Bremerton, WA; 160B-2 Columbia, SC; 160B-3 Portsmouth, MA; 160B-4 Canada;
160B-5 Canada; 160B-6 Kittery, ME; 160B-7 Carlsbad, NM; 160B-8 Columbia, SC
(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will he taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action,
"EnergySolutions issued a Condition Report, ENG-CR12-018, on 4/26/12 identifying the issue and beginning the internal investigation process to determine the cause of the defect and identify corrective action(s); this internal investigation is in progress. The packages were taken out of service as of 4/27/12. EnergySolutions has submitted a request for NRC approval to continue use of the packages for a limited time. EnergySolutions will submit a request to the NRC before the end of May 2012 for approval of a change to the package design supported by a revision to the SAR demonstrating compliance with the requirements of Part 71.
(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
"Owners and users of the packages have been informed of the defect and have concurred with EnergySolution's action to remove the packages from service. Any action by the NRC on continued use will be communicated to the package users and owners. Once NRC has approved the design change, users and owners will be notified and modifications to the packages will be made to conform with the approved design.
(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.
"Not applicable"
The R1DO (Trapp), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Dailey); R4DO (Spitzburg) & NMSS EO (Smith) were notified. Copies of this report were sent to the Part 21 Reactors and Materials Group and FSME Event Resource via e-mail. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47925 | Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: BUDINGER AND ASSOCIATES
Region: 4
City: SPOKANE State: WA
County:
License #: I0139
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRANDY KETTER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 05/16/2012
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/11/2012
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FRONT END LOADER RAN OVER A PORTABLE NUCLEAR GAUGE
The following information was received from the State of Washington via email:
On 5/11/2012 a front end loader ran over a Troxler moisture density gauge. The gauge contained a 0.37 GBq Cs-137 source and a 1.85 GBq Am-241 source.
The cause was identified as inattention to detail.
WA Item: WA12034 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47931 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: NINYO AND MOORE GEOTECHNICAL
Region: 4
City: Moreno Valley State: CA
County:
License #: 7633-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 05/17/2012
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2012
Event Time: 11:26 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
MEXICO (FAX)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State of California submitted the following information via email:
"On May 17, 2012, at 1126 [PDT], [the licensee Assistant Radiation Safety Officer] ARSO of Ninyo and Moore, contacted the California Emergency Management Agency with a report of a theft of a Troxler Model 3430 moisture/density gauge, S/N 38771 (9 mCi Cs-137, 44 mCi Am:Be-241) in Moreno Valley, CA. This occurred between 1000 and 1030 [PDT]. The ASRO stated that the gauge operator arrived at the construction site and unlocked and opened the tailgage/hatch on their Nissan Armada SUV and then walked away approximately 15 feet to speak with the site manager to find out where to make the measurements. The gauge was still inside the gauge transport case with two locks and a trigger lock. The case was tied down to the inside of the vehicle, but was not secured to the frame of the vehicle. While the gauge operator was speaking with the site manager, an older model black sedan (make and model unknown and did not have a license plate) stopped next to SUV and an unknown individual exited the sedan, grabbed the gauge case out of the SUV, placed the gauge case in the sedan and then left the scene before anyone could stop the theft. The gauge operator then contacted their office to report the theft. The Moreno Valley Police and Cal EMA were also notified. The Moreno Valley Police then arrived to investigate (Police report #MZ121380120).
"At approximately 1215 [PDT], [the California State Department of Public Health, Senior Health Physicist] spoke with the ASRO about the incident. [The ASRO] confirmed the information in the previous paragraph. [The ASRO] also stated that the measurements were to be taken of the asphalt/concrete of the sidewalk on the side of the road, which allowed the public easy access to the vehicles at the site. When asked about the security of the gauge, [the ASRO] stated that the gauge case had two locks and a the gauge had a handle lock. The gauge case was tied down inside the vehicle, but was not locked or secured otherwise. During transport, the tailgate is locked, securing the gauge inside the SUV. When asked if the vehicle had an alarm, [the ASRO] stated that he was not sure, but the vehicle did have a Lojack tracking device installed. The ASRO was informed that a written report was required within 30 days and that a newspaper ad with a reward and description of the stolen item be placed in a local paper. The ASRO was also informed that the gauge operator should be writing a statement and that the most current leak test should be submitted to [State] office. [The ASRO] stated that his [Radiation Safety Officer] RSO was currently working on those items. When asked if anyone had attempted to search the immediate area in an attempt to locate the gauge or the vehicle, [the ASRO] stated that they were going to have some of their employees search the local neighborhood in the afternoon.
"The licensee will be cited for leaving the gauge unattended. Any other citations will be deferred until the licensee has submitted the 30-day report and the investigation has been completed by this office. As of the time of this report, the gauge has not been recovered."
California Incident 5010 Number - 051712
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 47932 | Rep Org: BOEING LTS
Licensee: BOEING LTS
Region: 4
City: HALEAKALA State: HI
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JACK SHOCKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 05/17/2012
Notification Time: 20:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2012
Event Time: 16:00 [HST]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST IONIZER DEVICES
During a review of records on May 10, 2012, the licensee was unable to account for 4 NRD Nuclecel In Line Ionizer model number P-2021 1000. A thorough sweep of the facilities was completed on May 16, 2012 at 1600 HST. The sweep failed to locate these devices and they were declared lost.
The materiel involved were four devices, each containing 10mCi of Polonium-210 and encased in a steel pressure welded cylindrical case, each approximately 2.3 inches long and .5 inches in diameter.
The circumstances under which the loss occurred were that one shipment of 2 devices (Serial Numbers: A2HE600A/A2HE601A) were last known to have been delivered to the licensee logistics center in August 2010 and there were no record of those two items having been returned to NRD, LLC. These two items were received from NRD on 7/8/2010. A second set of two devices (Serial Numbers: A2HT541/A2HT540) were last known to have been in a sealed package in the possession of a Boeing employee in March, 2012. These items were received from NRD on 7/14/2011.
All devices are presumed lost and potentially disposed of as ordinary waste. The casing of all devices were known to be intact at the time of loss and no exposure has occurred. A thorough review of shipping records and site wide physical search have been conducted and failed to account for the devices.
In the future, all such devices will be subject to the accountability rules, requirements, and procedures established by the USAF Bio-Environment office, Hickam Air Force Base, Honolulu, Hawaii. Internal company procedures will be updated to conform to the requirements of the USAF Bio-Environmental Office, Hickam Air Force Base.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47933 | Rep Org: ND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: MIDWEST INDUSTRIAL X-RAY, INC
Region: 4
City: DICKENSON State: ND
County:
License #: 33-14907-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LEWIS VIGEN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 05/18/2012
Notification Time: 10:19 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2012
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA CRANKOUT GEARS LOCKED WITH SOURCE EXPOSED
"On Wednesday May 16, 2012 at 1900 MDT, two Midwest Industrial X-Ray, Inc. radiographers had a reportable incident involving a radioactive material exposure device. The exposure device involved was a SPEC 150 SN:386 loaded with an Ir-192 sealed source model G-60 SN: TC1301. The activity level on 5/16/12 was 56 Ci (2072 GBqs). A SPEC Double Gear Control Assembly with red conduit was used for the drive cable.
"The radiographers had made previous exposures during the day without incurring any equipment malfunction. At approximately 1900, the radiographers had 'cranked out' the source to make an exposure and upon retraction were unable to retract the source. The radiographers removed the cover plate of the control assembly and manually pulled the drive cables in order to retract the source back into the locked and shielded position. The sealed source was exposed for approximately 3 minutes. Caution Radiation Area cones were posted at 95 ft. from the source and no persons were inside the 2mR/hr zone. The drive cable was disconnected and no further exposures were made that day. The exposure device was inspected and was found to be in good working condition.
"Corrective Actions: A set of SPEC single gear control assembly, yellow conduit drive cables were brought to the radiographers to replace the malfunctioning drive cables. The set of malfunctioning drive cables will be sent back to SPEC and traded in for a set of single gear control assembly/yellow conduit drive cables." |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47935 | Rep Org: NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BECTON, DICKERSON AND COMPANY
Region: 4
City: HOLDREGE State: NE
County:
License #: 37-03-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL PUTERA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 05/18/2012
Notification Time: 13:38 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2012
Event Time: 14:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - POOL IRRADIATOR ROOF PLUG SENSOR FAULT
"The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] for the licensee said that an Assistant RSO called him after a [pool irradiator] roof plug fault had occurred and the source rack dropped to the shielded position. It was confirmed that the roof plug and roof cap were still in place, but the plug sensor located between the cap and plug had failed. There are two sensors that alarm if the plug was removed. One sensor is located inside the vault and the second sensor is between the cap and plug. The second sensor is the one that failed. The plant is installing a new sensor, located on the cap of the roof plug that will alarm if the roof cover is removed dropping the source rack."
Nebraska State Report No. - NE-09-00X |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47967 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ANDREW MICHAUD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 05/25/2012
Notification Time: 21:17 [ET]
Event Date: 05/25/2012
Event Time: 13:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text DE-ENERGIZATION OF BOTH DIVISIONS OF RHR SUCTION LINE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATIONS VALVES DURING TESTING
"On Friday, May 25th 2012 at 1322 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced a loss of power to 600V 2EJS*US1 emergency load center while performing scheduled surveillance testing of the Division 1 Remote Shutdown System disconnect switches. Disconnect switch SW 1-2CESA20 was taken to the actuate position which isolated main control room control, bypassed the housing limit switches and aligned the trip test switch for local breaker control of 2EJS*US1 supply breaker 1-3B. Contacts in the trip test switch for 2EJS*US1 supply breaker 1-3B were found to be closed which energized its trip coil. This resulted in a loss of motive power to Division 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system primary containment isolation valve 2RHS*MOV113 on the shutdown cooling suction line from the reactor vessel. At the time of the event, the Division 1 RHR shutdown cooling system was in-service with the Division 2 shutdown cooling suction line primary containment isolation valve 2RHS*MOV112 de-energized open to prevent inadvertent or spurious closure, which would interrupt the shutdown cooling decay heat removal function.
"The result of the event was that both the Division 1 and Division 2 isolation valves on the common RHR shutdown cooling suction line (2RHS*MOV112 and 2RHS*MOV113) were open with no motive power. Thus, neither valve was capable of automatically closing in the event of a reactor level low (level 3) signal due to a leak in the RHR shutdown cooling system. The loss of this isolation function is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of a system that is needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 Condition G was entered and actions to restore the valves to operable status were immediately initiated in accordance with Required Action G.2. Power to 2RHS*MOV113 was restored at 1824 hrs, re-enabling its automatic isolation capability."
The licenses has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47968 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVE NOYES
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 05/26/2012
Notification Time: 02:28 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2012
Event Time: 02:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 42 | Power Operation | 42 | Power Operation | Event Text PRESS RELEASE REGARDING STATUS OF ONGOING LABOR NEGOTIATIONS
"On May 26, 2012, at 0200 EDT with the reactor at 42% core thermal power, the following press release is being issued by Entergy Nuclear regarding the status of the ongoing labor negotiations.
"Pilgrim Station Negotiation Team Agrees to Present Proposed Package to Union Membership for Ratification Vote.
"Plymouth, Mass. - Entergy Nuclear and the Utility Workers Union of America (UWUA), which have been negotiating a four-year Pilgrim Station labor contract, agreed early Saturday to present a proposed package of pay and benefits to the membership for a vote on Saturday, June 7.
"Additionally, the parties have agreed to a 10-day [contract] extension that will expire at midnight on Tuesday, June 5. The previous contract for the approximately 240 workers will remain in effect during the extension.
"Pilgrim's Site Vice President Robert Smith said, 'We appreciate the hard work of both parties to get to this point and believe this proposal represents fair and equitable terms both for our employees and the company.'
"Entergy owns and operates power plants with more than 30,000 megawatts of electrical generating capacity and has about 14,000 employees. Entergy's nuclear businesses comprise six reactors at five sites in Massachusetts, New York, Vermont and Michigan and five reactors at four locations in Arkansas, Mississippi and Louisiana. Entergy Nuclear also manages operations at a nuclear generating plant in Nebraska.
"The [NRC] Resident Inspector staff has been informed of this press release and notification.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47969 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL BODIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 05/27/2012
Notification Time: 14:24 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2012
Event Time: 11:22 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION CONCERNING LOSS OF AMERTAP BALLS
"At 1122 CDT, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant notified the Minnesota State Duty Officer that up to 1,500 Amertap balls were lost from the Unit 1 condenser tube cleaning system. Since the Minnesota State Duty Officer was contacted, this constitutes an 4 hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector in addition to state and local government agencies. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47970 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/27/2012
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2012
Event Time: 21:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY RULE NOT MET
"At 2130 EDT on 5/26/2012, a condition was reported identifying that the 10 CFR Part 26 requirement for performing waiver evaluations was not met for three security officers held over for compensatory measures after lightning strikes impacted security equipment at PPL Susquehanna, LLC.
"Granting a waiver under Subpart I, 'Managing Fatigue,' of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 26, 'Fitness for Duty Programs,' involves a process that, once completed, allows individuals who are subject to the Subpart I work hour controls to not meet one of the work hour requirements.
"Contrary to the above, waivers were not processed for three security officers as required by the regulation and the officers worked hours exceeding the 16 hour limit.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4) requiring a 24-hour ENS notification."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |