Event Notification Report for April 02, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/01/2012 - 04/02/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
478024779747798477994779548382
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 47802
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: LIDIA LIBINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: LIDIA LIBINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/03/2012
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2012
Event Time: 15:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/03/2012
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2012
Event Time: 15:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/03/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
ERIC BENNER (NMSS)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
ERIC BENNER (NMSS)
CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL TREATED IN THE ON-SITE DISPENSARY FOR INJURED FINGER
"On 4/2/12 approximately at 1520 CDT a person working in the Feed Materials Building injured his finger between a drum lid and drum ring. The employee received first aid treatment in the on-site dispensary. The individual was found to have contamination on his boots. The employee was not transported to an off-site facility. The employee was released to go home at the end of his shift and appropriately exit monitored. There was no detectable contamination on the employee when he left the site."
The contamination was uranium ore concentrates.
The licensee informed NRC Region II.
"On 4/2/12 approximately at 1520 CDT a person working in the Feed Materials Building injured his finger between a drum lid and drum ring. The employee received first aid treatment in the on-site dispensary. The individual was found to have contamination on his boots. The employee was not transported to an off-site facility. The employee was released to go home at the end of his shift and appropriately exit monitored. There was no detectable contamination on the employee when he left the site."
The contamination was uranium ore concentrates.
The licensee informed NRC Region II.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47797
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JOSE VASQUEZ
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JOSE VASQUEZ
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/02/2012
Notification Time: 20:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2012
Event Time: 19:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2012
Notification Time: 20:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2012
Event Time: 19:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2012
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
TIM McGINTY (NRR)
VICTOR MCCREE (R2)
DAN DORMAN (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
TIM McGINTY (NRR)
VICTOR MCCREE (R2)
DAN DORMAN (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
UNUSUAL EVENT - FIRE FROM HYDROGEN SUPPLY TO VOLUME CONTROL TANK
"At 1933 EDT on 4/2/12, a fire was discovered on top of the Auxiliary Building Roof coming from a one inch hydrogen supply header to the U-3 Volume Control Tank.
"At 1948 EDT [Turkey Point] declared an Unusual Event due to a fire greater than 15 minutes in the protected area (HU2).
"At 1949 EDT [operators] closed the hydrogen isolation valve and hydrogen header pressure began to lower.
"At 1956 EDT a second isolation valve was closed. Header pressure continued to lower.
"At 2018 EDT the fire is out. No damage to plant equipment or adverse effect to safe shutdown systems. [Turkey Point] is currently working on a de-escalation process."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and local agencies.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, NICC and Nuclear SSA.
* * * UPDATE FROM JOSE VASQUEZ TO PETE SNYDER T 2139 EDT ON 4/2/12 * * *
After the fire was out the pipe became cool to the touch. At 2110 EDT Turkey Point terminated the Unusual Event for Unit 3.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and local agencies.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, NICC and Nuclear SSA via email.
"At 1933 EDT on 4/2/12, a fire was discovered on top of the Auxiliary Building Roof coming from a one inch hydrogen supply header to the U-3 Volume Control Tank.
"At 1948 EDT [Turkey Point] declared an Unusual Event due to a fire greater than 15 minutes in the protected area (HU2).
"At 1949 EDT [operators] closed the hydrogen isolation valve and hydrogen header pressure began to lower.
"At 1956 EDT a second isolation valve was closed. Header pressure continued to lower.
"At 2018 EDT the fire is out. No damage to plant equipment or adverse effect to safe shutdown systems. [Turkey Point] is currently working on a de-escalation process."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and local agencies.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, NICC and Nuclear SSA.
* * * UPDATE FROM JOSE VASQUEZ TO PETE SNYDER T 2139 EDT ON 4/2/12 * * *
After the fire was out the pipe became cool to the touch. At 2110 EDT Turkey Point terminated the Unusual Event for Unit 3.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and local agencies.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, NICC and Nuclear SSA via email.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47798
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: FRANK WEAVER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: FRANK WEAVER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/02/2012
Notification Time: 22:56 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2012
Event Time: 15:11 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2012
Notification Time: 22:56 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2012
Event Time: 15:11 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
AUTOSTART OF DIVISION 3 DIESEL GENERATOR FOLLOWING 4160 VOLT LINE OUTAGE
"On 4/2/12 at 1511 [CDT], GGNS [Grand Gulf Nuclear Generating Station] received a valid ESF actuation for emergency AC power to Division 3 4160V bus due to degraded voltage.
"One of the two 500KV offsite feeders (Tech Spec Offsite Power Source) tripped causing a drop in grid voltage which resulted in a trip of the ESF feeder breaker for 4160 Volt Division 3 bus. The HPCS (High Pressure Core Spray) Diesel Generator automatically started and energized the bus. The HPCS system was not running and no ECCS initiation occurred during this event. The plant was in Mode 5 with RHR A in shutdown cooling. Divisions 1 and 2 ESF power monitoring instrumentation responded to the grid voltage transient but no actuation setpoints were reached. Division 1 and 2 ESF 4160V buses remained energized and shutdown cooling remained in service. The 500KV offsite feeder (Tech Spec Offsite Power Source) and additional 115 KV feeder (Tech Spec Offsite Power Source) remained in service. The 500KV feeder that tripped was restored by the dispatcher at approximately 1515 CDT. The Division 3 bus was subsequently transferred back to offsite power and the HPCS Diesel Generator was secured. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv).
"A lightning strike resulted in a voltage transient on the GGNS electrical distribution system. Due to this transient, the 'A' Control Room Air Conditioning Unit (CRAC 'A') tripped and had to be manually restarted. CRAC 'A' was not running for approximately two minutes. During this timeframe CRAC 'B' was tagged out of service. This was evaluated and determined to not be a loss of safety function."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 4/2/12 at 1511 [CDT], GGNS [Grand Gulf Nuclear Generating Station] received a valid ESF actuation for emergency AC power to Division 3 4160V bus due to degraded voltage.
"One of the two 500KV offsite feeders (Tech Spec Offsite Power Source) tripped causing a drop in grid voltage which resulted in a trip of the ESF feeder breaker for 4160 Volt Division 3 bus. The HPCS (High Pressure Core Spray) Diesel Generator automatically started and energized the bus. The HPCS system was not running and no ECCS initiation occurred during this event. The plant was in Mode 5 with RHR A in shutdown cooling. Divisions 1 and 2 ESF power monitoring instrumentation responded to the grid voltage transient but no actuation setpoints were reached. Division 1 and 2 ESF 4160V buses remained energized and shutdown cooling remained in service. The 500KV offsite feeder (Tech Spec Offsite Power Source) and additional 115 KV feeder (Tech Spec Offsite Power Source) remained in service. The 500KV feeder that tripped was restored by the dispatcher at approximately 1515 CDT. The Division 3 bus was subsequently transferred back to offsite power and the HPCS Diesel Generator was secured. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv).
"A lightning strike resulted in a voltage transient on the GGNS electrical distribution system. Due to this transient, the 'A' Control Room Air Conditioning Unit (CRAC 'A') tripped and had to be manually restarted. CRAC 'A' was not running for approximately two minutes. During this timeframe CRAC 'B' was tagged out of service. This was evaluated and determined to not be a loss of safety function."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47799
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRIAN MAGNUSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRIAN MAGNUSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 04/02/2012
Notification Time: 23:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2012
Event Time: 14:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2012
Notification Time: 23:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2012
Event Time: 14:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation |
INITIATION OF REACTOR SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TS) 3.8.1.F
"On April 2, 2012, at 1452 hours, Unit 1 received Panel 901-8 A7 U1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Trouble alarm. Equipment Operators were dispatched and the Unit 1 EDG was found running unloaded, without a generator field flash, and no auto start signal received. Troubleshooting identified that a 125 VDC ground had caused the Unit 1 EDG to start. As a result, the Unit 1 EDG was declared inoperable.
"At this time Unit 2 is in a refueling outage and the Unit 2 EDG is currently inoperable for repairs. Due to the inoperability of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 EDGs, at 2000 hours a Reactor Shutdown was initiated on Unit 1 in accordance with TS 3.8.1.F.
"In addition, since the EDGs supply emergency power to both Unit's Standby Gas Treatment Systems (SBGTS), emergency power was unavailable to SBGTS; however, normal power supplies remained available.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"At 2151 hours, the Unit 1 EDG was declared operable following repairs and successful operability testing."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
"On April 2, 2012, at 1452 hours, Unit 1 received Panel 901-8 A7 U1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Trouble alarm. Equipment Operators were dispatched and the Unit 1 EDG was found running unloaded, without a generator field flash, and no auto start signal received. Troubleshooting identified that a 125 VDC ground had caused the Unit 1 EDG to start. As a result, the Unit 1 EDG was declared inoperable.
"At this time Unit 2 is in a refueling outage and the Unit 2 EDG is currently inoperable for repairs. Due to the inoperability of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 EDGs, at 2000 hours a Reactor Shutdown was initiated on Unit 1 in accordance with TS 3.8.1.F.
"In addition, since the EDGs supply emergency power to both Unit's Standby Gas Treatment Systems (SBGTS), emergency power was unavailable to SBGTS; however, normal power supplies remained available.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"At 2151 hours, the Unit 1 EDG was declared operable following repairs and successful operability testing."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47795
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GARRISON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GARRISON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/02/2012
Notification Time: 11:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2012
Event Time: 06:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2012
Notification Time: 11:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2012
Event Time: 06:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INFORMATION ONLY - FIRE IN PLANT VITAL BATTERY ROOM AREA
"At 0624 EDT on 04/02/2012 the control room was notified by a plant operator that there was a fire in the plant vital battery room area on Unit 2. The fire was located in the lower compartment of inverter 2KUI. This equipment supplies power to 120V AC non-safety related components. The fire brigade captain was dispatched along with the site fire brigade. When the fire brigade captain arrived the operator was staged near the inverter with a CO2 [carbon dioxide] fire extinguisher. The fire brigade captain instructed the NLO [non-licensed operator] to extinguish the fire with the extinguisher. The fire was immediately extinguished once the CO2 was applied from the extinguisher. At 0633 EDT the fire brigade captain reported to the control room that the fire was extinguished. Upon further investigation it appears that transformer in the lower compartment of the inverter had caught fire. The fire was confined to the lower compartment of the inverter and did not affect any other components in the area. Due to the loss of the inverter the loads automatically swapped to the alternate AC source as designed and no indications or equipment were lost due to the loss of the inverter.
"At the time of this event Unit 1 was at 100% power and Unit 2 was shutdown in Mode 6 with reactor coolant system drained to 8% level with 2B Residual Heat Removal pump supplying core cooling. There was no impact to either unit as a result of this event. All equipment required to maintain core cooling, AC and DC power, and reactor coolant inventory on Unit 2 was maintained during this event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0624 EDT on 04/02/2012 the control room was notified by a plant operator that there was a fire in the plant vital battery room area on Unit 2. The fire was located in the lower compartment of inverter 2KUI. This equipment supplies power to 120V AC non-safety related components. The fire brigade captain was dispatched along with the site fire brigade. When the fire brigade captain arrived the operator was staged near the inverter with a CO2 [carbon dioxide] fire extinguisher. The fire brigade captain instructed the NLO [non-licensed operator] to extinguish the fire with the extinguisher. The fire was immediately extinguished once the CO2 was applied from the extinguisher. At 0633 EDT the fire brigade captain reported to the control room that the fire was extinguished. Upon further investigation it appears that transformer in the lower compartment of the inverter had caught fire. The fire was confined to the lower compartment of the inverter and did not affect any other components in the area. Due to the loss of the inverter the loads automatically swapped to the alternate AC source as designed and no indications or equipment were lost due to the loss of the inverter.
"At the time of this event Unit 1 was at 100% power and Unit 2 was shutdown in Mode 6 with reactor coolant system drained to 8% level with 2B Residual Heat Removal pump supplying core cooling. There was no impact to either unit as a result of this event. All equipment required to maintain core cooling, AC and DC power, and reactor coolant inventory on Unit 2 was maintained during this event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Part 21
Event Number: 48382
Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: DETROIT SWITCH
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HORNER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: DETROIT SWITCH
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HORNER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/05/2012
Notification Time: 10:33 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2012
Notification Time: 10:33 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
PART 21 - TEMPERATURE SWITCH POTENTIALLY SHIPPED WITHOUT SET SCREW
"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 9/18/2012 after an ESI test technician found a set screw in one of the oil bath stations of the temperature test fixture. After evaluating all components that were tested on the fixture, it was determined that this set screw is the same length, thread size and style as the set screw utilized in the EMD/Detroit temperature switches to lock the differential adjustment screw. The other components tested on the fixture did not contain such a set screw. Either an extra set screw was inside a temperature switch and it fell into the test fixture oil bath when the test technician removed the switch cover; or, the test technician dropped the set screw after removing it from a temperature switch to adjust the differential setting of the switch. If the latter occurred, then the potential exists that a temperature switch was shipped without the differential adjustment screw locked and therefore the switch settings could drift over-time from exposure to vibration on the EDG skid. ESI has identified the time period in which this could have occurred to be 4/2/2012 to 9/18/2012. The suspect temperature switches are EMD parts manufactured by Detroit Switch. These are located in the engine cooling water and lube oil systems for low standby lube oil temperature alarm, high coolant temperature alarm/shutdown and coolant immersion heater control applications.
"The evaluation was concluded on 10/3/2012 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR21. If a switch applied in the immersion heater control application experiences significant setpoint drift, it is possible that the standby temperatures of the lube oil and coolant systems may be degraded enough to affect the start time of the diesel generator.
"All affected users should inspect the suspect switches for presence of the set screw at their earliest convenience. If the set screw is missing, the temperature switch should be returned to ESI for rework."
"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 9/18/2012 after an ESI test technician found a set screw in one of the oil bath stations of the temperature test fixture. After evaluating all components that were tested on the fixture, it was determined that this set screw is the same length, thread size and style as the set screw utilized in the EMD/Detroit temperature switches to lock the differential adjustment screw. The other components tested on the fixture did not contain such a set screw. Either an extra set screw was inside a temperature switch and it fell into the test fixture oil bath when the test technician removed the switch cover; or, the test technician dropped the set screw after removing it from a temperature switch to adjust the differential setting of the switch. If the latter occurred, then the potential exists that a temperature switch was shipped without the differential adjustment screw locked and therefore the switch settings could drift over-time from exposure to vibration on the EDG skid. ESI has identified the time period in which this could have occurred to be 4/2/2012 to 9/18/2012. The suspect temperature switches are EMD parts manufactured by Detroit Switch. These are located in the engine cooling water and lube oil systems for low standby lube oil temperature alarm, high coolant temperature alarm/shutdown and coolant immersion heater control applications.
"The evaluation was concluded on 10/3/2012 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR21. If a switch applied in the immersion heater control application experiences significant setpoint drift, it is possible that the standby temperatures of the lube oil and coolant systems may be degraded enough to affect the start time of the diesel generator.
"All affected users should inspect the suspect switches for presence of the set screw at their earliest convenience. If the set screw is missing, the temperature switch should be returned to ESI for rework."