| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
01/13/2012 - 01/17/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 47448 | Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KEVIN HUBER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 11/16/2011
Notification Time: 19:04 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2011
Event Time: 16:22 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text RHR CAPABILITY AFFECTED DUE TO BOTH TRAINS OF RIVER WATER SUPPLY HVAC SYSTEMS INOPERABLE
"At 1622 [CST] on November 16, 2011, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold declared the 'A' River Water Supply inoperable following discovery that the HVAC damper controller was installed in reverse. This would have closed the HVAC intake dampers on high temperature instead of opening them. At this time, the 'B' River Water Supply system was already inoperable for HVAC damper maintenance. This resulted in entering TS 3.7.2 Condition B for both River Water Supply systems inoperable [required action to restore a train or be shutdown in 12 hours]. Both trains of River Water Supply inoperability potentially affect the plant capability to remove residual heat. Therefore, this event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B).
"At 1735 [CST] on November 16, 2011 Post Maintenance testing on the 'B' River Water Supply HVAC Dampers was completed and 'B' River Water Supply was declared operable, restoring the capability to remove residual heat.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE AT 1440 EST ON 01/16/12 FROM BOB MURRELL TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 11/16/2011 at 19:04 (ET) (EN 47448). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring both trains of the River Water Supply (RWS) system inoperable following the discovery that the HVAC damper controller was installed incorrectly.
"Subsequent to the initial report, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold (NextEra) has determined that the RWS system was capable of performing its safety function and was fully operable during the period that the HVAC controller was incorrectly configured. Specifically, based on the environmental conditions that existed during the period from November 8, 2011 to November 16, 2011, the non-TS RWS Intake HVAC system was Functional, but Degraded.
"This event is not considered a Safety System Functional Failure or a Condition Prohibited by TS and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LER) per 10 CFR 50.73.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R3DO (Orth). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 47449 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KEN GOODALL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 11/16/2011
Notification Time: 23:16 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2011
Event Time: 17:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JOHN CARUSO (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO DUAL POSITION INDICATION ON CLOSED STEAM ADMISSION ISOLATION VALVE
"On November 16, 2011, at 1600 hours [EST], with the reactor at 100% core thermal power and steady state conditions, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was removed from service for planned testing and the appropriate Limiting Condition for Operation was entered (14 days per TS 3.5.C.2). At 1700 hours during restoration from the testing, the normally closed HPCI steam admission isolation valve (HPCI-2301-3) displayed dual indication (not full closed). The HPCI-2301-3 is a motor-operated valve (MOV) whose safety function is to open upon a HPCI injection/actuation signal.
"The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) that had been entered in a planned manner was continued as of 1700 hours due to the apparent degraded performance of the HPCI-2301-3 valve. Currently, troubleshooting into the cause of the anomalous dual indication on HPCI-2301-3 is in progress. However, it is projected that the troubleshooting will not be complete within reportability assessment requirements. Therefore, in accordance with 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station is providing an 8 hour non-emergency notification that the HPCI System is inoperable.
"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE AT 1715 EST ON 01/16/12 FROM JOSEPH BRACKEN TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"Event Notification Number 47449 was conservatively made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were satisfied pending further evaluation of HPCI system operability due to dual valve position indication when the HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Valve (MO-2301-3) valve was taken to the fully closed position after HPCI system surveillance testing from the Alternate Shutdown Panel.
"Evaluation of the MO-2301-3 valve condition was performed. The dual position indication from the valve position instrumentation was determined to be valid based on the as-found valve position. The valve did not fully close because the torque switch opened prematurely due to high stem torque. The apparent cause evaluation identified that a lack of grease due to a tight stem to valve configuration and inadequate guidance to perform proper periodic stem lubrication were the apparent cause of the valve closure failure.
"The valve is limit switch controlled in the open direction and torque switch controlled in the closed direction. The valve is normally closed and has no automatic closing function necessary to ensure HPCI System safety functions are satisfied. The valve has an active safety function to open to allow steam to the HPCI Turbine. The surveillance test that was performed verified capability of the valve to open on demand. Based on the surveillance test, failure of the HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Valve to close would not have prevented the HPCI System from operating and meeting required safety functions.
"Therefore, the initial 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report is being retracted."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Trapp). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47577 | Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO
Region: 3
City: TOLEDO State: OH
County:
License #: 02110 49 0006
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KARL VON AHN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 01/06/2012
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2012
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A POTENTIAL MEDICAL EVENT DURING BRACHYTHERAPY
The following information was received from the State of Ohio via email:
"The Ohio Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Protection received a preliminary telephone report from the University of Toledo of a device malfunction with a Varian HDR with an Ir-192 source. A patient had received four treatments to the cervix. The physician noticed during examination reddening of the skin on the upper thigh. Upon reviewing the setup with the tandems, a constriction and blockage was identified in the catheters caused by wear debris. It is presumed at the time being that this caused the system to conclude the source had reached the end of the catheter when it had not. Dose calculations are in the process of being reviewed, however the licensee believes that the doses may be less than the quantities for a medical event.
"The licensee is The University of Toledo, Ohio license number 02110 49 0006.
"The licensee is preparing a written report. The Bureau will be sending an inspector to the site next week."
Ohio Report # OH-12-001
* * * UPDATE FROM KARL VON AHN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1101 EST ON 1/13/2012 * * *
The following information was received by email:
"The Ohio Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Protection is updating the event report to indicate that this is a medical event.
"An Ohio Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Protection inspector investigated the incident at the licensee facility on Thursday Jan. 12, 2012. The Varian HDR (model number AL19000001, SN VS0054) had 4.01 Ci of Ir-192 at the time of the incident and was using the Brachyvision treatment system.
"After the fourth of four fractions of 400 cGy each, the attending physician noticed an unusual skin reaction. After licensee was unable to find any errors in the treatment delivered, they began to investigate the hardware. The licensee found a 'corrosion' line in the entry of the Tandem used in the Fletcher Suite Device where the device narrows at is end. During the fourth fraction, apparently the catheter inserted into the tandem snagged on the 'corrosion' causing the starting point of fraction treatment to be misplaced 9 cm. The treatment began from this point, not at the intended treatment site. Preliminary dose calculations were made based on the assumption that the starting dwell position was at this point instead of being fully inserted.
"Preliminary dose calculations indicate a skin dose of 1251 cGy to the right thigh, and 1273.9 cGy to the left thigh when no skin dose was intended. The dose to the prescribed treatment point for that fraction was 194.2 cGy instead of 400 cGy. The total dose for all fractions to the prescribed treatment site was 1394.2 cGy instead of the intended 1600 cGy.
"The patient and the referring physician have been notified. The physician does not anticipate any adverse effects.
"The original catheter used is no longer made by Varian, and the licensee was using a replacement catheter that that is slightly larger in diameter and is thicker than the original. The original catheter did not get caught on the 'corrosion' in the Tandem. This issue was found with two Tandems in three Fletcher Suite Device sets. The new catheter fully inserts as intended into the other Tandems.
"The licensee's corrective action includes marking the new catheters to provide a visual indication that it has been fully inserted into the Tandem."
Notified R3DO (Orth) and FSME EO (Turtil).
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 47579 | Rep Org: BENEFIS HEALTH CARE
Licensee: BENEFIS HEALTH CARE
Region: 4
City: GREAT FALLS State: MT
County:
License #: 25-12710-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KARI CANN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 01/09/2012
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/2012
Event Time: [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/09/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
| Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
| Event Text MEDICAL UNDEREXPOSURE TO TARGET AREA USING HIGH DOSE RATE AFTERLOADER DEVICE
The licensee reported that a patient received only about 10% of the required dose to the target area during a treatment for esophageal cancer. The prescribed dose for the esophageal region was 700 centigray. The area was being treated with a Varian High Dose Rate Brachytherapy Afterloader device using a 6.344 Curie Ir-192 source. The location of the source is normally tracked by a radiographically opaque image near the source. In this case, the end of the catheter also appeared somewhat radiographically opaque and was mistaken for the source location. Consequently, the source was mispositioned about 4 cm back from the intended target area resulting in the underexposure.
The physician and patient have been notified and no health effects are anticipated from the area that was unintentionally exposed due to the mispositioning of the source.
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47584 | Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: STERIS, INC
Region: 3
City: LIBERTYVILLE State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01123-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 01/10/2012
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 01/04/2012
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
RICHARD TURTIL (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DOOR SAFETY INTERLOCK ON DRY IRRADIATOR FOUND TO BE NON-FUNCTIONAL
The following report was received via e-mail from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Radioactive Materials Section:
"The licensee's radiation safety officer called the Agency to advise of a failure of a safety feature associated with the operation of their self shielded dry storage irradiator. This irradiator is used to conduct testing of samples prior processing. During the performance of routine weekly safety checks of the irradiator, it was discovered that the device could be operated without closing both shielded collar doors that allow access to the sample chamber. Further investigation showed that a proximity sensor associated with one of the doors failed in the 'on' configuration which gave a false indication that the unit was ready for operation and the irradiation sequence could be initiated. No samples were being irradiated in the unit at the time of the safety check and there were no exposures of personnel as a result of the failure, nor were any elevated radiation levels detected from the device. The device was subsequently locked out of service pending repair. The next day, the licensee obtained the necessary replacement part and repairs were affected by their trained technical staff according to the manufacturer's instructions.
"The licensee has contacted the authorized service vendor, Best Industries, to discuss the matter as well as the irradiator manufacturer, MDS Nordion. This device contains an IAEA Category I quantity of radioactive material (Co-60) in a permanently shielded configuration."
Illinois Report Number IL12001 |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 47585 | Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNETH BRESLIN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 01/12/2012
Notification Time: 04:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2012
Event Time: 22:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On January 11, 2012 at 22:15 [EST], the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to a failure of the turbine governor valve to respond to demanded position. When demanded to travel to the full closed position, the governor valve remained full open rendering the speed and flow control system for the turbine inoperable. The failure was discovered as part of a planned maintenance evolution.
"All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. The unit remains at 100% power.
"The station has initiated an Event Response Team to identify and correct the cause of the failure. No personnel injuries resulted from the event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector [has been notified] and Lower Alloway Creek Township will be notified."
The unit is in a 14-day LCO for HPCI inoperability.
* * * RETRACTION FROM JAMES PRIEST TO VINCE KLCO ON 1/13/12 AT 1644 EST * * *
"The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #47585: On January 11, 2012, Hope Creek Generating Station reported to the NRC that High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to a failure of the turbine governor valve to respond to demanded position. This condition was discovered when obtaining an oil sample from the HPCI system. According to the procedure, the HPCI flow controller automatic setpoint was lowered to zero. The procedure set the manual controller setpoint by having the operator lower the demand for a time period rather than verifying the setpoint at zero. The HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump is then started. The governor valve was expected to start to open (intermediate position) and then close. Instead the valve went to the full open position and did not respond to attempts to close the valve from the flow controller. Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to the apparent loss of safety function for Unit 1.
"Subsequent technical evaluation concluded that the performance and response of the HPCI turbine governor control valve was as expected based on the manual controller demand being at 35% when the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump was started to collect a HPCI oil sample. The Engineering review concluded that there are no problems with the HPCI turbine governor control valve response to controller demand. Operating procedures have been revised to provide guidance on verifying manual controller demand at 0% before placing the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump in service under standby conditions for oil sampling or similar evolutions. Since January 11th, 2012, HPCI has remained available to perform its required safety functions and only became inoperable during planned evolutions to either obtain oil samples or to investigate HPCI turbine governor control valve performance. On this basis, the HPCI system was capable of performing its function to mitigate the consequences of an accident and the issue described in Event #47585 is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloway Creek Township will be notified of this retraction."
Notified R1DO (Trapp). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47586 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TERRACON CONSULTANTS INC
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: 05268
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 01/12/2012
Notification Time: 11:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2012
Event Time: 09:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
MATTHEW HAHN (ILTA)
MEXICO VIA EMAIL ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE
"On January 12, 2012, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that a Troxler Model 3430 moisture/density gauge (SN 39547) containing 40 millicuries of americium-241 and 8 millicuries of cesium-137 had been stolen that morning at approximately 0900 hrs. CST from one of its vehicles while it was parked at a convenience store in McKinney, Texas. The gauge was secured in the bed of the pickup truck with two chains. While the licensee's technician was inside the store, both chains were cut and the gauge removed. Local law enforcement was notified. The Agency notified the Texas Association of Pawnbrokers. More information will be provided as it is obtained."
Texas Incident # I-8918
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47590 | Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY DAMASHEK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 01/13/2012
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2012
Event Time: 14:03 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2012 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
ART HOWELL (R4RA)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
JANE MARSHALL (IRD)
JOHN THORP (NRR)
FRED HILL (DHS)
KEVIN BISCOE (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT AND REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
"At 1403 CST, Wolf Creek experienced a reactor trip due to loss of power in the switchyard. At 1415 CST, Wolf Creek declared a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) when it was determined that the switchyard would not be restored within 15 minutes.
"All systems functioned as expected in response to this event and both Emergency Diesel Generators started and energized the safety-related buses.
"The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 and investigation into the cause for loss of power in the switchyard is underway."
During the trip, all rods inserted into the core. No primary relief valves lifted as a result of the transient. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric steam dumps with auxiliary feedwater supplying the steam generators. The plant is stable at NOP/NOT. No safety significant equipment is reported out of service.
The licensee has notified state and local governments and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVE DEES TO VINCE KLCO AT 1851 EST ON 1/13/12 * * *
At 1709 CST, the licensee exited the NOUE when power was restored to the east bus from offsite. Additionally, the licensee is reporting a loss of safe shutdown capability in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) due to the initial loss of offsite power.
The licensee has notified state and local governments, the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be issuing a press release on the event.
Notified R4DO (Powers), IRD (Marshall), NRR (Cheok), FEMA (Burckart) and DHS (Hill). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47594 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK EGHIGIAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 01/14/2012
Notification Time: 10:18 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2012
Event Time: 07:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE
"At 0700 EST on January 14, 2012, Fermi 2 removed the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) from service to facilitate planned maintenance on the associated power bus. The Technical Support Center (TSC) will also be unavailable during the planned power outage. The duration of the outage is expected to be 11 hours. This loss in capability is being reported as a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Indications of related plant variables are available in the Main Control Center. The Visual Annunciator System (VAS) remains functional. Meteorological and process effluent radiological monitor indications are available and dose assessment capability is available. In the event TSC activation is required, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be used for the TSC function. Use of the EOF as the backup TSC is part of Fermi 2's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. The Emergency Callout System (ECOS) is designed to, facilitate contacting TSC personnel to respond directly to the EOF. Information normally provided by ERDS can be transmitted via the notification system as described in the Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan.
"In the event of a plant emergency, the Emergency Plan can be implemented as assessment capabilities are available under alternate means."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL HIMEBAUCH TO VINCE KLCO ON 1/14/12 AT 2245 EST * * *
"At 1835 EST, during restoration from planned maintenance, a failure of an electrical auto throwover device occurred, preventing restoration of power to ERDS and the TSC. Investigation of the failure and necessary repairs are in progress. At this time, it is unknown when availability of ERDS and the TSC will be restored. An update will be made to the NRC Operations Center when ERDS and the TSC are restored. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R3DO (Orth).
* * * UPDATE AT 0127 EST ON 1/16/2012 FROM MICHAEL HIMEBAUCH TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"At 0127 EST on January 16, 2012 the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) was restored and the Technical Support Center (TSC) is available as an emergency response facility, following restoration of the associated power bus."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R3DO (Orth). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47595 | Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN KONOVALCHICK
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 01/14/2012
Notification Time: 21:37 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2012
Event Time: 17:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO A CHLORINATED WATER DISCHARGE
"Salem Generating Station made a 15 minute notification of a chemical discharge to the State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection at 1806 [EST]. The Salem Non-Rad Waste Chemical Treatment Building sump overflowed out of the building to a catch basin that discharges to the Delaware River. Approximately 100 gallons of chlorinated water was reported to the State of New Jersey as being discharged, which was terminated at 1806 [EST]. There were no personnel injuries associated with this event. There was no impact to any Salem Station Safety-Related systems and all Safety-Related systems are available. Investigation into the cause of the event is in progress."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloways Township. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47596 | Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JORGE O'FARRILL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 01/16/2012
Notification Time: 08:30 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2012
Event Time: 03:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 88 | Power Operation | 88 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION DAMPER FAILURE
"At 0330 EST on 01/16/12, it was discovered that due to the failure of the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system to align during testing, the TSC was rendered non-functional. Repairs are underway. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the station Emergency Plant Manager will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures giving first consideration to the Control Room. TSC facility leads have been made aware of this contingency.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."
* * * UPDATE AT 1525 EST ON 01/16/12 FROM JORGE O'FARRILL TO S. SANDIN * * *
"Corrective maintenance was completed 01/16/2012 at 1042 EST to restore the TSC filtered ventilation capability. Post maintenance testing was completed satisfactorily [on] 01/16/2012 [at] 1335 EST. JAF's TSC has been restored and is now functional."
The licensee informed state/local agencies as a courtesy and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Trapp). | |