|
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
12/09/2011 - 12/12/2011
** EVENT NUMBERS **
|
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47501 |
Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: RAY BUZARD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 12/06/2011
Notification Time: 13:54 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2011
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE |
Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY
"At 0900 hours EST, on December 6, 2011, Emergency Preparedness personnel determined that the Unusual Event and Alert EAL criteria for the Liquid Waste Disposal Effluent could not be achieved due to the monitor range capability. Specifically, the R-18 effluent monitor instrument range has a maximum range of 1.0E+06 with the alarm set at 1.0E+06. The UE and Alert criteria, which are 2 times the alarm and 200 times the alarm respectively, both exceed the instrument range.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
This condition has existed for some time (at least three years) and was discovered during a review of the Operating Experience database involving a similar condition reported by Crystal River-3. The licensee maintains the ability to perform grab samples of the liquid effluent for assessment.
* * * UPDATE ON 12/08/11 AT 2330 EST FROM RAY BUZARD TO JOHN KNOKE * * *
As a follow-up to the condition reported above, the licensee inspected other discharge and effluent radiation monitors for similar conditions and provided the following update:
"At 2250 hours EST, on December 8, 2011, it was determined that the Alert EAL classification criteria for the Steam Generator Blowdown radiation monitors and the Condensate Polisher Sump discharge radiation monitor could not be achieved due to the monitors range capability. Specifically, the R-19 A, B, C and the R-37 monitors instrument range have a maximum range of 1.6E+06 which is less than the Alert EAL classification criteria. This information was validated as a follow-up to a similar event which was reported on December 6, 2011 in EN# 47501.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
R2DO (Musser) notified. |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 47503 |
Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: NEVADA HEART AND VASCULAR CENTER
Region: 4
City: LAS VEGAS State: NV
County:
License #: 03-12-0453-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SNEHA RAVIKUMAR
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 12/06/2011
Notification Time: 12:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/08/2011
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
JAMES DANNA (FSME) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL MEDICAL EVENTS INVOLVING CARDIOGEN-82 RADIOISOTOPE GENERATORS USED FOR CARDIAC STRESS TESTING
The following information was received from the State of Nevada via email:
"Description: A patient who received a Rubidium stress test on March 8th 2011 was detected at a security checkpoint upon reentry to the United States. The patient was determined to have higher than expected levels of strontium. The patient was referred to Oak Ridge National Laboratory to undergo sensitive whole body counting. The whole body counting indicated an expected dose of 4.9 rem. Additional testing conducted by the Nevada Radiation Control Program was performed on 203 patients. The result of each scan was compared to the patient who received the whole body counting at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The definition of a medical event is '[a] dose that differs from the prescribed dose or dose that would have resulted from the prescribed dosage by more than 0.05 Sv (5 rem)' and that 'differs from the prescribed dose by 20 percent or more.' [10 CFR º 35.3045]. Because the patient who received the whole body counting at Oak Ridge received 4.9 rem any patient who had more activity when compared to the Oak Ridge patient may qualify as a medical event. The analysis of the scans indicates 38 patients had an exposure that may constitute a medical event. The following table identifies the date, number of patients on a specific date, and the total number of patients that may have received Sr-82 and Sr-85 in sufficient quantities to constitute a medical event. The investigation is ongoing and includes the Nevada Radiation Control Program, Food and Drug Administration ('FDA'), BRACCO, and Nevada Heart and Vascular. As information becomes available the actual number of medical events may change and will be updated at that time.
"Date Of Injection # Of Patients
2/11/2011 6
3/7/2011 2
3/8/2011 5
3/9/2011 3
3/10/2011 5
3/11/2011 2
3/12/2011 3
3/13/2011 4
3/14/2011 1
3/15/2011 2
4/5/2011 1
4/7/2011 4
Total Patients 38
"Why The Event Occurred: The events are still under investigation. The events may be related to manufacturing defects, inadequate training procedures, or a combination of both. 'Based on further investigation, FDA has determined that the current CardioGen-82 manufacturing procedures are not sufficient to ensure reliable performance of the generator used to produce the Rb-82 chloride injection' (FDA, 7-26-2011).
"The Effect, if any, on the Individuals Who Received the Administration: The exposure is still under investigation. However, no deleterious effects are expected as a result to the exposure. Concerning this issue, 'Oak Ridge National Laboratory determined the estimated amount of unexpected radiation to be minimal and similar to what other patients may receive with cumulative exposure to certain other types of cardiac imaging procedures' (Giordano, K. & McDaniel, K., 2011).
"What Actions, if any, Have Been Taken, or are Planned to Prevent Recurrence: The FDA alerted healthcare professionals to stop use of CardioGen-82 for Cardiac PET scans and BRACCO decided to voluntarily recall CardioGen-82 and this will prevent recurrence. (FDA, 7-26-2011). In addition, all technologists have undergone retraining by BRACCO and shall adopt BRACCO's updated policy concerning breakthrough testing. An online worksheet has been constructed to simplify and monitor the breakthrough recording process.
"Additional actions may be implemented based on the investigation's findings.
"Certification that the licensee notified the individual (or the individual's responsible relative or guardian), and if not, why not.
"All patients who received studies on the dates referenced above have met with their referring physician concerning the elevated exposure to strontium. This is included in the patient's chart as part as their medical record. The Nevada Radiation Control Program has also contacted patients concerning the elevated strontium exposure.
"Event Cause: Equipment Failure
"Corrective Action: Reevaluation of CardioGen-82 design, training procedures and quality control.
"Device/Associated Equipment: CardioGen-82 manufactured by BRACCO Diagnostics."
NV Report No.: NV110023
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 47504 |
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES
Region: 4
City: LOS ANGELES State: CA
County:
License #: 1335-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 12/06/2011
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2011
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
JAMES DANNA (FSME)
ILTAB via email ()
MEXICO via fax/email () |
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING THORIUM-229 SOURCE
The following information was received from the State of California via email:
"UCLA notified RHB on December 5, 2011 that they discovered a single missing Thorium-229 source. Its activity is approximately 4.73 microcuries and is contained in a flame sealed ampoule. The responsible researcher claims that they transferred the source to EH&S for storage, but a search of EH&S records showed it was returned to the researcher in June 2011. A continued search of the Principal Investigator's lab and EH&S storage locations is ongoing.
"10 CFR 20 Appendix C for Th-229 = 0.001 uCi, and 10CFR 20. 2201(a) requires reporting losses that exceed 1000 times the Appendix C level. Activity of > 1 microcuries is a reportable quantity.
"No serial number was reported to RHB [Radiologic Health Branch]. Potential exposure to individuals is expected to be extremely low.
"This investigation is on-going."
CA 5010 Number: 120511
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source. |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 47506 |
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ALLEGHENY LUDLUM STEEL PLANT; BAGDAD PLANT
Region: 1
City: LEECHBURG State: PA
County:
License #: PA-G0114
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL |
Notification Date: 12/07/2011
Notification Time: 09:59 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2011
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE - SHUTTER FAILURE
The following was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via facsimile:
"On December 6, 2011, the Department's Southwest Regional Office [Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection (PBRP)] received notification via email about an event that took place on December 2, 2011. It is reportable within 24 hours under 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2).
"A radiological consultant was completing the six month leak testing and shutter checks of thickness gauges. During the testing, it was discovered that the pneumatic system for this gauge did not completely close the shutter. The device is identified as:
Manufacturer: DMC
Model: AM-5A
Serial #: 0404LV
Isotope: Am-241
Activity: 100 mCi
"CAUSE OF EVENT: Failure of the pneumatic system to completely close the shutter.
"ACTIONS: Maintenance personnel were able to drain the air line of accumulated moisture and close the shutter later that day. The Bagdad facility shall investigate this matter and determine what is necessary to prevent recurrence. The Department [PBRP] plans to conduct a reactive inspection."
Event Report ID No: PA11039 |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 47507 |
Rep Org: KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: TEMPLE-INLAND
Region: 1
City: MAYSVILLE State: KY
County:
License #: 401-531-10
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARRISA VELEZ
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 12/07/2011
Notification Time: 15:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2010
Event Time: 21:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
JAMES DANNA (FSME) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER SOLENOID FAILURE ON GAUGE
The following report was received from the Kentucky Department of Public Health - Radiation Health Branch via facsimile:
"The state (Kentucky Radiation Health Branch) was notified on 4/12/10, by a representative from Temple-Inland, of the failure in the shutter (in the closed position) on one of their gauges. The gauge is a Honeywell, Model 4000, scanner (Honeywell system number 8465) containing a 1 Ci Kr-85 source, model number 4201, serial number 4991BXV. This event occurred on the evening of 4/10/10 and a representative from Honeywell was called in for repair. The scanner was back online at 2349 CST on 4/10/10 for a total downtime of 2.25 hours."
Kentucky Report ID Number: KY1007 |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47508 |
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: THOMAS MORSE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 12/07/2011
Notification Time: 18:29 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2011
Event Time: 20:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION |
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
POSTULATED FLOODING SCENARIO RESULTS IN UNANALYZED CONDITION
"On November 16, 2011, at 2000 hours (EST), control room operators accepted the results of an immediate investigation related to the adequacy of a calculation related to the flooding analysis for service water piping in the control complex. The conclusions of the original analysis assumed operator actions to mitigate the flooding. The existing procedural guidance at that time lacked specificity for the required operator actions. This was identified as a non-conforming condition with respect to a USAR flooding analysis. The immediate investigation determined that significant margin exists for mitigation of the service water leakage crack compared to the 30 minute actions required in the original analysis. A preliminary strategy for flood mitigation was identified in the immediate investigation. Guidance was provided to the operators for a leak mitigation strategy in a night order, and a prompt functionality assessment was requested for the control complex building with respect to the flooding analysis. On November 22, 2011, at 1957 hours (EST), the prompt functionality assessment was accepted by the control room operators. The assessment included compensatory measures that simplified guidance for mitigating the flooding from the service water system. The compensatory measures were implemented. On December 2, 2011, the NRC Component Design Basis Inspection team debriefed that the condition identified should have been called in to the NRC Operations Center within eight hours and that missing the call was a violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). On December 7, 2011, at 1320 hours (EST), a call was received from the NRC Region III informing the compliance supervisor that the eight-hour notification should still be made.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM CHARLES ELBERFELD TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1412 EST ON 12/10/11 * * *
The licensee added further clarification to the event reported above as follows:
"Given that an unanalyzed condition existed until the appropriate measures were implemented, an eight-hour call in accordance with the aforementioned section of 10 CFR 50.72 should have been made. After further consideration, station management decided the eight-hour call was missed and it is being reported as required.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." R3DO (Skokowski) notified. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47512 |
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRIAN HAYDEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD |
Notification Date: 12/09/2011
Notification Time: 00:21 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2011
Event Time: 17:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/07/2012 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION |
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
UNANALYZED CONDITION POTENTIALLY COULD AFFECT THE COMMON CONTROL ROOM
"At 1755 on 12/8/11, it was determined that an unanalyzed condition existed for the common Control Room for both Units. A high energy line break (HELB) barrier issue was discovered while performing a fire barrier surveillance and the condition is believed to have existed from initial plant construction. A HELB barrier was found to have a significant breach in it that could allow steam from a HELB in the Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown system to potentially impact equipment in the Control Room. The Control Room is not analyzed for a steam environment. The degree of the impact could not be readily determined, but could likely affect the safety related equipment in the Control Room. At 1803 on 12/8/11, Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown was secured to eliminate the potential for a HELB in the affected area which eliminated the potential unanalyzed condition. Therefore, an 8 hour report to the NRC is required under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety' since there was not a reasonable expectation that the Control Room environment could support operation of safety related equipment with Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown in service. Further analysis is underway."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector
* * * RETRACTION AT 0059 EST ON 2/7/12 FROM KENT MILLS TO HUFFMAN * * *
"Engineering performed an evaluation to address the impact of the degraded condition on the barrier's design functions. The evaluation concluded that the barrier remained capable of performing its design function with the degraded seal present. Therefore, this condition does not represent an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Burritt) notified. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47513 |
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID SHARBAUGH
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL |
Notification Date: 12/05/2011
Notification Time: 09:35 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2011
Event Time: 09:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE |
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
ERDS-PM ALEMU (E-MA)
ERDS HELP DESK (E-MA) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
UNAVAILABILITY OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS) FOR SCHEDULED UPGRADE
"At approximately 0945 hours on December 5, 2011, the Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 & 2 (BVPS) Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) electronic data link to the NRC will be taken out of service to implement planned system upgrades which include the improvements requested by Regulatory Information Summary 2009-13. The duration of the upgrade work is expected to be approximately 5 days.
"During the upgrade, the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) data link to the NRC will not be available ERDS parameters will be available to be monitored by control board indications or plant computer systems. An emergency plan procedure has instructions for providing data to the NRC, if needed, when ERDS is out of service.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. An update will be provided when the ERDS data link to the NRC has been returned to service."
[The above report was originally logged by the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer at approximately 0935 on December 5, 2011 and was converted to an event report upon receipt of the updated information below]
* * * UPDATE FROM SHARBAUGH TO HUFFMAN ON 12/9/11 AT 0948 EST * * *
"Testing of the Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) upgrade has been completed and the ERDS data link to the NRC has been returned to service. The NRC Resident has been notified."
R1DO (Cahill) notified. NRC ERDS Program Manager (Alemu) and ERDS Help Desk informed via e-mail. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47514 |
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: GREG ELKINS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 12/09/2011
Notification Time: 13:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2011
Event Time: 10:46 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS |
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
50 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
UNIDENTIFIED RCS LEAKAGE GREATER THAN 2 GPM INCREASE WITHIN 24 HOURS
"At 0908 [EST] Nine Mile Point Unit 2 received alert alarms for containment monitoring particulate channels. These alarms were accompanied by a rise in drywell floor drain leakage and drywell pressure.
"At 0915 [EST] Nine Mile Point Unit 2 entered technical specification action statement (TS 3.4.5 B) due to unidentified leakage rise of greater than 2 gpm within 24 hours.
"At 1046 [EST] the control room commenced power reduction for shutdown of the plant.
"Peak drywell pressure was approximately 0.16 psig and is lowering since the commencement of plant shutdown. Peak drywell floor drain leakage was approximately 3.7 gpm and is also lowering since the commencement of the plant shutdown. The cause of the rise in unidentified drywell leakage is unknown at this time."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47515 |
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JAMES PRY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 12/09/2011
Notification Time: 22:41 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2011
Event Time: 18:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2012 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP |
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
PART 21 ISSUE WITH SEISMIC CLIPS ON RCIC SYSTEM CONTROLLERS RESULTS IN SYSTEM INOPERABILITY
"On December 7, 2011, a 10 CFR 21 report (reference NRC EN No. 47498) was received from a vendor for a defect with NUS Controllers. The defect involves spring clips that form part of the seismic restraints for the controllers. The controllers referenced in the report are installed for the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system in the control room and remote shutdown panel. Based on initial information provided by the vendor, it was determined that the RCIC system remained operable. On December 9, 2011, additional information provided by the vendor did not support the immediate operability determination and the RCIC system was declared inoperable for Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.3 Condition A at 1835 hours [EST]. At 1932 hours [EST], the High Pressure Core Spray system was verified operable per TS LCO 3.5.3 Required Action A.1. TS LCO 3.5.3 Required Action A2 requires restoration of the RCIC system to operable status within 14 days. Qualified spring clips have been obtained and will be installed on the controllers. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to remove residual heat.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM CHARLES ELBERFELD TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1415 EST ON 12/10/11 * * *
"As a follow-up to the condition reported above, we have replaced the affected seismic clips on the controllers and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system is now operable as of 0734 on December 10, 2011.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." R3DO (Skokowski) notified.
* * * RETRACTION FROM LLOYD ZERR TO CHARLES TEAL ON 2/6/12 AT 1504 EST * * *
"The vendor provided a seismic report to the station. This report showed that the seismic clips holding the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) controller meet the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) test requirements and design requirements for a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) for Perry. Based on this review, it was determined that the spring clips would function properly during and OBE and SSE. Because the condition reported in Event Number 47515 would not have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to remove residual heat, the condition is not reportable, and this notification is being retracted. The evaluation for this condition is documented in condition report 2011-06531. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
Notified R3DO (Giessner) and Part 21 Group via email. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47516 |
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DANNY STEPHENS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 12/10/2011
Notification Time: 14:36 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2011
Event Time: 04:56 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION |
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE DUE TO ICING OF REACTOR BUILDING INTAKE FILTERS
"Secondary containment pressure exceeded atmospheric pressure which does not meet the surveillance requirement to have secondary containment vacuum greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of water vacuum. Secondary containment was declared inoperable and the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action Statement was entered. Manual control of the reactor building pressure control system was taken. Vacuum was less than 0.25 inches of water for approximately 1 minute. Secondary containment is [now] operable.
"There were no actual radiological releases associated with the event.
"Actual secondary containment integrity was not challenged. The secondary containment pressure excursion was a result of icing of the reactor building intake filters which caused the automatic reactor building pressure control system to function improperly.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47517 |
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS BYYKKONEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 12/11/2011
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/11/2011
Event Time: 12:58 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD |
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT HIGH FLUX TRIP SET POINTS SET INCORRECTLY
"This 8 hour notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A).
"On November 24, 2011, 1N35 and 1N36 Intermediate Range Nuclear Instruments High Flux Trip set points were adjusted while Unit 1 was at approximately 55% reactor power following the 1R21 Refueling outage, On December 11, 2011, at 1258 EST Salem Unit 1 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3, after determining the set points were set incorrectly.
"A review of the Reactor Engineering Manual, which contains the trip set points, showed that the trip set points for 1N35 and 1N36 were 2.69E-4 and 2.37E-4 respectively. These values equate to approximately 125% thermal power. The Intermediate Range Trip set point is normally set to 25% thermal power. Both channels were declared inoperable and preparations were made to install the correct set points. At 1628 [EST] 1N35 was declared operable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited following installation of the correct set point and retest of the channel.
"There was no out-of-service safety related equipment that contributed to this event. No one was injured as a result of this event."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and local authorities. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47520 |
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: JIM RICHIE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 12/12/2011
Notification Time: 18:06 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2011
Event Time: 16:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO STATE OF NEW JERSEY DUE TO HIGH OPACITY OF DIESEL EXHAUST
"At 1447 [EST] Oyster Creek experienced a failure of a discharge flange on a fire protection pond pump. The fire system backup fire diesel started in response to low system pressure. At 1540 [EST], it was noted that the fire diesel had higher than expected opacity from its exhaust. High exhaust opacity (equal to or greater than 20% for more than 3 minutes in any consecutive 30 minute period) is reportable to the State of New Jersey in accordance with the Auxiliary Boiler Air Pollution Control Permit. At 1650 [EST], high opacity from the fire diesel was reported to the State of New Jersey via the NJ Department of Environmental Protection hotline.
"In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi) this event is being reported due to Offsite Notification."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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