Event Notification Report for December 9, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/08/2011 - 12/09/2011

** EVENT NUMBERS **


47501 47504 47510 47511 47512

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47501
Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: RAY BUZARD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 12/06/2011
Notification Time: 13:54 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2011
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY

"At 0900 hours EST, on December 6, 2011, Emergency Preparedness personnel determined that the Unusual Event and Alert EAL criteria for the Liquid Waste Disposal Effluent could not be achieved due to the monitor range capability. Specifically, the R-18 effluent monitor instrument range has a maximum range of 1.0E+06 with the alarm set at 1.0E+06. The UE and Alert criteria, which are 2 times the alarm and 200 times the alarm respectively, both exceed the instrument range.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

This condition has existed for some time (at least three years) and was discovered during a review of the Operating Experience database involving a similar condition reported by Crystal River-3. The licensee maintains the ability to perform grab samples of the liquid effluent for assessment.

* * * UPDATE ON 12/08/11 AT 2330 EST FROM RAY BUZARD TO JOHN KNOKE * * *

As a follow-up to the condition reported above, the licensee inspected other discharge and effluent radiation monitors for similar conditions and provided the following update:

"At 22:50 hours EST, on December 8, 2011, it was determined that the Alert EAL classification criteria for the Steam Generator Blowdown radiation monitors and the Condensate Polisher Sump discharge radiation monitor could not be achieved due to the monitors range capability. Specifically, the R-19 A, B, C and the R-37 monitors instrument range have a maximum range of 1.6E+06 which is less than the Alert EAL classification criteria. This information was validated as a follow-up to a similar event which was reported on December 6, 2011 in EN# 47501.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

R2DO (Musser) notified.

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Agreement State Event Number: 47504
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES
Region: 4
City: LOS ANGELES State: CA
County:
License #: 1335-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 12/06/2011
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2011
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
JAMES DANNA (FSME)
ILTAB via email ()
MEXICO via fax/email ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING THORIUM-229 SOURCE

The following information was received from the State of California via email:

"UCLA notified RHB on December 5, 2011 that they discovered a single missing Thorium-229 source. Its activity is approximately 4.73 microcuries and is contained in a flame sealed ampoule. The responsible researcher claims that they transferred the source to EH&S for storage, but a search of EH&S records showed it was returned to the researcher in June 2011. A continued search of the Principal Investigator's lab and EH&S storage locations is ongoing.

"10 CFR 20 Appendix C for Th-229 = 0.001 uCi, and 10CFR 20. 2201(a) requires reporting losses that exceed 1000 times the Appendix C level. Activity of > 1 microcuries is a reportable quantity.

"No serial number was reported to RHB [Radiologic Health Branch]. Potential exposure to individuals is expected to be extremely low.

"This investigation is on-going."

CA 5010 Number: 120511

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47510
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ED TIEDENMANN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 12/08/2011
Notification Time: 13:30 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2011
Event Time: 05:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/08/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION - NON FUSED DC BUS AMMETERS COULD SHORT AND CAUSE A FIRE

"During Operating Experience (OPEX) review of Browns Ferry Fire Protection ENS 47374, 'Deficiency Identified in Transition to Performance Based Standard for Fire Protection,' a similar condition was identified at Clinton Power Station.

"During site review, it was determined that original plant wiring design for the station battery ammeter contains a 'shunt' in the current flow from each direct current (DC) battery. Bolted on the shunt bar are two IEEE 383 qualified leads to a current meter in the main control room (MCR). The small difference in voltage between the two taps on the shunt is enough to deflect the current gauge in the MCR when current flows from the battery through the shunt. The ammeter wiring attached to the shunt does not have fuses, and if one of these ammeter wires shorts to ground at the same time another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery also shorts to ground, a ground loop through the unfused ammeter cable could occur. With enough current going through the cable, the potential exists that a fire in the raceway system or MCR could occur wherever the cable is routed.

"This design condition exists in Divisions 1, 2, 3, and 4. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.' Compensatory fire watch measures have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47511
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BOB MURRELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 12/08/2011
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 12/02/2011
Event Time: 13:11 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/08/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE

"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

"On 12/02/2011 at 1311 CST, the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) was declared inoperable when voiding was discovered in the 'B' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) inject vent line.

"Initial review of this condition for immediate reportability under 50.72(b)(3)(v), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, concluded the condition was not reportable based on the availability of other Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). Specifically, Core Spray and HPCI were both available to perform the function of emergency core cooling. On 12/03/2011 at 1650 CST, LPCI was declared operable based on further examinations to determine extent of voiding, system filling and venting and completion of supporting engineering evaluations. Subsequent reviews determined that the reportability decision under 50.72(b)(3)(v) as a event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function should be based on safety function at the system level, rather than at the ECCS function level. The decision to report the inoperability of LPCI under 50.72(b)(3)(v) was made at 1319 CST on 12/08/2011.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47512
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRIAN HAYDEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 12/09/2011
Notification Time: 00:21 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2011
Event Time: 17:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION POTENTIALLY COULD AFFECT THE COMMON CONTROL ROOM

"At 1755 on 12/8/11, it was determined that an unanalyzed condition existed for the common Control Room for both Units. A high energy line break (HELB) barrier issue was discovered while performing a fire barrier surveillance and the condition is believed to have existed from initial plant construction. A HELB barrier was found to have a significant breach in it that could allow steam from a high energy line break in the Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown system to potentially impact equipment in the Control Room. The Control Room is not analyzed for a steam environment. The degree of the impact could not be readily determined, but could likely affect the safety related equipment in the Control Room. At 1803 on 12/8/11, Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown was secured to eliminate the potential for a HELB in the affected area which eliminated the potential unanalyzed condition. Therefore, an 8 hour report to the NRC is required under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety' since there was not a reasonable expectation that the Control Room environment could support operation of safety related equipment with Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown in service. Further analysis is underway."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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