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Event Notification Report for December 8, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 12/07/2011 - 12/08/2011 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 47499 47508 47509 Power Reactor Event Number: 47499 Facility: TURKEY POINT Region: 2 State: FL Unit: [3] [4] [ ] RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: ROBERT STRUSINSKI HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ Notification Date: 12/06/2011 Notification Time: 09:51 [ET] Event Date: 12/06/2011 Event Time: 09:30 [EST] Last Update Date: 12/07/2011 Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE Person (Organization): BINOY DESAI (R2DO) Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode 3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation 4 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER NON-FUNCTIONAL DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE "Between December 6, 2011 and January 13, 2012, a sequence of activities are planned that will render the Technical Support Center (TSC) non-functional at times by removing the emergency ventilation system from service. These activities are being performed in support of planned preventive maintenance and extended power uprate facility upgrades. In preparation for these emergency ventilation system outages, the TSC emergency responders were notified that if an emergency occurred during these outages the Emergency Coordinator and the TSC staff involved with classification, notification and PARS should report to the control room. All other TSC personnel should report to the Operational Support Center. The duration for each of these TSC outages is expected to be less than 24 hours. The NRC Operations Center will be provided an update to this notification when the TSC emergency ventilation has been removed from service and following restoration for each time period. This 8 hour notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and State and local governments. * * * UPDATE FROM CHRISTOPHER TRENT TO JOE O'HARA AT 1900 EST ON 12/7/11 * * * The TSC is functional at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Power Reactor Event Number: 47508 Facility: PERRY Region: 3 State: OH Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-6 NRC Notified By: THOMAS MORSE HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE Notification Date: 12/07/2011 Notification Time: 18:29 [ET] Event Date: 11/16/2011 Event Time: 20:00 [EST] Last Update Date: 12/07/2011 Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION Person (Organization): RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO) Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode 1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation Event Text POSTULATED FLOODING SCENARIO RESULTS IN UNANALYZED CONDITION "On November 16, 2011, at 2000 hours (EST), control room operators accepted the results of an immediate investigation related to the adequacy of a calculation related to the flooding analysis for service water piping in the control complex. The conclusions of the original analysis assumed operator actions to mitigate the flooding. The existing procedural guidance at that time lacked specificity for the required operator actions. This was identified as a non-conforming condition with respect to a USAR flooding analysis. The immediate investigation determined that significant margin exists for mitigation of the service water leakage crack compared to the 30 minute actions required in the original analysis. A preliminary strategy for flood mitigation was identified in the immediate investigation. Guidance was provided to the operators for a leak mitigation strategy in a night order, and a prompt functionality assessment was requested for the control complex building with respect to the flooding analysis. On November 22, 2011, at 1957 hours (EST), the prompt functionality assessment was accepted by the control room operators. The assessment included compensatory measures that simplified guidance for mitigating the flooding from the service water system. The compensatory measures were implemented. On December 2, 2011, the NRC Component Design Basis Inspection team debriefed that the condition identified should have been called in to the NRC Operations Center within eight hours and that missing the call was a violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). On December 7, 2011, at 1320 hours (EST), a call was received from the NRC Region III informing the compliance supervisor that the eight-hour notification should still be made. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." Power Reactor Event Number: 47509 Facility: LASALLE Region: 3 State: IL Unit: [1] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5 NRC Notified By: ALAN MCLAUGHLIN HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE Notification Date: 12/07/2011 Notification Time: 20:40 [ET] Event Date: 12/07/2011 Event Time: 14:58 [CST] Last Update Date: 12/07/2011 Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION Person (Organization): RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO) Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode 1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation 2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation Event Text REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ABOVE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS "This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Following initial troubleshooting of the reactor building ventilation (VR) differential pressure (DP) control loop, the Unit 1 VR DP controller was left in manual per the troubleshooting steps. It was noted at 1458 [CST, on] 12/7/11, that building DP was above the TS SR 3.6.4.1.1 required value of -0.25" H20. This rendered the secondary containment inoperable. Reactor building DP was returned to within the TS requirements within 14 minutes, and following system walkdowns, secondary containment was declared operable at 1615 [CST, on] 12/7/11. Troubleshooting will continue with other excursions above -0.25" H2O possible until repairs are complete (anticipated being complete week of 12/12/11)." This condition requires the licensee to comply with technical specifications values within 4 hours or be in Mode 3 within 12 hours. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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