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Event Notification Report for August 19, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
08/18/2011 - 08/19/2011

** EVENT NUMBERS **


47120 47153 47155 47159 47166 47167 47169

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 47120
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ALBERT MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/02/2011
Notification Time: 21:27 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2011
Event Time: 13:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

VULNERABILITY FROM A POTENTIAL HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK

"The following condition is being reported by Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed Condition' and in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'A Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function.' On 08/02/2011 at 1346 CDT, the ANO Unit 2 Control Room was notified by Engineering that a postulated High Energy Line Break (HELB) could potentially cause both the Red and Green Train Emergency Safeguard Features (ESF) Rooms to exceed their environmentally qualified temperature limits. This postulated condition would be possible due to normally open room purge dampers exposing ESF equipment in these rooms to a common area impacted by HELB conditions. The ESF Rooms contain the Red and Green Trains of High Pressure Safely Injection Pumps, Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps, Containment Spray Pumps, and Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers. Until further Engineering evaluation can be performed to validate this postulated scenario, ANO-2 has closed ESF room purge dampers to provide Red and Green ESF train separation during a potential HELB event.

"Refer to [ANO-2] Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2011-02772 for further information. The NRC Resident has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM STEVE COFFMAN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1514 EDT ON 8/18/11 * * *

"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made by Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) on 08/02/2011 at 2127 [EDT] (EN# 47120). The initial report documented that a postulated High Energy Line Break (HELB) could potentially cause rooms containing both trains of Emergency Safeguard Features (ESF) equipment to exceed their environmentally qualified temperature limits. The ESF rooms contain the High Pressure Safely Injection Pumps, Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps, Containment Spray Pumps, and Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers. Specifically, normally open ESF room purge dampers exposing both trains of ESF equipment to a common area impacted by postulated HELB conditions were not modeled in the ANO-2 HELB analysis. This condition was reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed Condition' and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'A Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function'.

"Since the initial report, Engineering has revised the ANO-2 HELB model to include the effects of the open ESF room purge dampers. The resulting analysis shows that a HELB event will not cause the required ESF equipment to exceed analyzed temperature limits with the room purge dampers in the open configuration. Therefore, the condition did not result in 'a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function' and did not result in an 'unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety'. Based on the revised HELB analysis, the previous report (EN#47120) describes a condition that does not meet the reporting requirements of 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) or 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and is therefore retracted.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of the retraction."

Notified R4DO (Hay).

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Agreement State Event Number: 47153
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER
Region: 1
City: CLEVELAND State: VA
County:
License #: GL-2266
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/15/2011
Notification Time: 10:51 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK IN OPEN POSITION

The following report was received from the Virginia Department of Health via facsimile:

"On August 12, 2011, the Radiation Safety Officer of American Electric Power, Clinch River Plant, reported a fixed gauge shutter stuck in the open position. The gauge is a Thermo MeasureTech Model 5197 containing 100 millicuries of cesium-137. It is a general license device used to measure levels in a fly ash precipitator hopper. Based on the licensee's lock-out procedures for entry into the hopper, the licensee has been authorized to continue operations. The licensee has contracted a licensed service provider to repair or replace the gauge. The malfunction does not pose a risk of additional radiation exposure to personnel.

VA report ID: VA-11-0007

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Agreement State Event Number: 47155
Rep Org: OR DEPT OF HEALTH RAD PROTECTION
Licensee: HRK SERVICES
Region: 4
City: HOOD RIVER State: OR
County:
License #: ORE-91120
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SIEBERT
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 08/15/2011
Notification Time: 19:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
RICHARD TURTIL (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received via email:

"On Friday August 12, 2011, the gauge owned by the licensee had been run over by a roller. The licensee reported that the gauge was in the shielded position and there were no elevated readings on the gauge. The gauge was placed into the shipping case and returned to the office for disposal."

The device was a CPN MC moisture density gauge serial number M390104801 containing 10 milliCuries Cs-137, Am-241/Be 50 milliCuries.

Incident #: 11-0028

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Agreement State Event Number: 47159
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: SCRUBGRASS GENERATING PLANT
Region: 1
City: KENNERDELL State: PA
County:
License #: PA-1047
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 08/16/2011
Notification Time: 15:01 [ET]
Event Date: 08/16/2011
Event Time: 13:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
BRUCE WATSON (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER

The following was received via fax:

The state reported that their licensee has a gauge with a shutter is in the stuck position. The device contains 300 mCi of Cs-137. The device is secured and no one was exposed during this event. The licensee has contacted the vendor for repairs and will notify the department (Pennsylvania Department of Radiation Protection) when repairs have been made. The department (Pennsylvania Department of Radiation Protection) plans to do a reactive inspection."

PA Report #: PA110021

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47166
Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: CHANTELLE HURST
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/18/2011
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2011
Event Time: 18:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

FITNESS FOR DUTY - PRESENCE OF ALCOHOL IN THE PROTECTED AREA

A non-licensed contract employee was determined to have alcohol in his possession while in the Protected Area. The contractor's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47167
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL DEAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/18/2011
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2011
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION THAT COULD POTENTIALLY IMPACT BOTH TRAINS OF 480V SAFEGUARDS BUSES

"During NFPA-805 Fire PRA [Probabilistic Risk Assessment] model development, Ginna Station identified a non-compliance with the Appendix R requirement to maintain one train of systems that are necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown and remain free from fire damage. A fire in the Turbine Building could cause a loss of 4160V power to the 480V safeguards buses while disabling control power to the 480V bus normal supply breakers and preventing both diesel generator output breakers from closing. Since the non-safety related 4160V buses are located in the same area of the turbine building, this could potentially impact both trains of AC power. This was determined to be an unanalyzed condition reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures have been established to provide interim guidance to identify the condition and locally trip the bus supply breaker prior to closing the diesel generator output breaker."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47169
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARLIN QUARBERG
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/19/2011
Notification Time: 01:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2011
Event Time: 22:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP BUS UNDERVOLTAGE

"At 2250 EDT on 8/18/2011, Unit 1 Reactor/Turbine automatically tripped on RCP [Reactor Coolant Pump] Busses UV [Under-Voltage] trip.

"Following the reactor trip, all safety-related equipment operated as designed. Auxiliary Feedwater automatically actuated as expected from the Feedwater Isolation Signal. No primary PORVs and/or Safety Valves opened during or after this trip.

"Unit 1 is currently being maintained in Mode 3 at NOT/NOP, approximately 548 F [degrees] and 2233 psig, with Auxiliary Feedwater supplying the Steam Generators.

"At the time of the trip, a 50G (instantaneous overcurrent ground) relay flag was found dropped on the '1A' 6.9 KV unit board. Subsequently, the '1A' 6.9 KV start bus was found to have transferred to its alternate supply, 'B' CSST [Common Station Service Transformer]. 1A condenser circulating water pump motor trip out was also received in the MCR [Main Control Room].

"The method of decay heat removal is via steam dumps to the condenser with MSIVs open. The current temperature and pressure is stable. There is no indications of any primary/secondary leakage. All control rods inserted. The electrical alignment is normal with the exception of the above mentioned items, supplied from off-site power. There is no impact to Unit 2. Unit 2 is operating at 100% power/ Mode 1."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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