Event Notification Report for August 19, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/18/2011 - 08/19/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
47176471774717047172
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 47176
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: CALVIN PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: CALVIN PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/19/2011
Notification Time: 16:26 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2011
Event Time: 08:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2011
Notification Time: 16:26 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2011
Event Time: 08:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
KING STABLEIN (NMSS)
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
KING STABLEIN (NMSS)
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
24-HR LOSS OF CRITICALITY CONTROL REPORT REQUIRED UNDER BULLETIN 91-01, SUPPLEMENT 1
"At 0815 CDT on 08-19-11, a Chemical Operations First Line Manager discovered that during disassembly of a single Seal Exhaust/Wet Air (SX/WA) pump, pump housing subcomponents (i.e. two piston slides and a cam) were placed within 2 feet of the internal oil separators. Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) GEN-011 requires a minimum 2-foot edge-to-edge spacing between pump housing subcomponents and internal oil separators. The purpose of this control is to ensure interaction between grossly contaminated fissile items is minimized during movement and storage. The Plant Shift Superintendent and the NCS group were notified and access to the area was controlled.
"Since one leg of double contingency was lost, this is being reported to the NRC as a 24-hour Event Report in accordance with NRC BL 91-01, Supplement 1.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-11-2161
"PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2011-13
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: In order for a criticality to be possible, the components would have to be grossly contaminated and brought together in a geometry capable of supporting a criticality and an additional spacing violation would have to occur before a criticality is possible.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS: Double contingency is maintained by implementing controls on geometry and interaction.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL : Uranium contaminated oil. Product withdrawal assay at the time of the event was less than 4.95 wt% U235. The pump components were not grossly contaminated.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency relies on the geometry of the seal exhaust/wet air pump components. The pump components are controlled as safety related items. This control was not violated. Therefore, this leg of double contingency was maintained. The second leg of double contingency relies on minimizing interaction between internal oil separators and pump housing subcomponents. Interaction is controlled by maintaining a minimum 2-foot edge-to-edge spacing between pump internal oil separators and pump housing subcomponents. The pump housing subcomponents were placed within 2 feet of the internal oil separators in violation of this control. The interaction parameter was not maintained; therefore this leg of double contingency was not maintained. Double contingency was not maintained because the interaction parameter was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
1. Control Access to the area. This was completed at 0845 CDT on 08/19/11.
2. Move one item at a time such that the spacing between the pump housing subcomponents and the internal oil separators is always increasing until a minimum 2-foot edge-to-edge spacing has been established. This was completed at 1445 CDT on 08/19/11.
3. Upon establishing the proper spacing between the pump housing subcomponents and the internal oil separators, the exclusion zone may be removed. This was accomplished at 1450 CDT on 08/19/11."
"At 0815 CDT on 08-19-11, a Chemical Operations First Line Manager discovered that during disassembly of a single Seal Exhaust/Wet Air (SX/WA) pump, pump housing subcomponents (i.e. two piston slides and a cam) were placed within 2 feet of the internal oil separators. Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) GEN-011 requires a minimum 2-foot edge-to-edge spacing between pump housing subcomponents and internal oil separators. The purpose of this control is to ensure interaction between grossly contaminated fissile items is minimized during movement and storage. The Plant Shift Superintendent and the NCS group were notified and access to the area was controlled.
"Since one leg of double contingency was lost, this is being reported to the NRC as a 24-hour Event Report in accordance with NRC BL 91-01, Supplement 1.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-11-2161
"PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2011-13
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: In order for a criticality to be possible, the components would have to be grossly contaminated and brought together in a geometry capable of supporting a criticality and an additional spacing violation would have to occur before a criticality is possible.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS: Double contingency is maintained by implementing controls on geometry and interaction.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL : Uranium contaminated oil. Product withdrawal assay at the time of the event was less than 4.95 wt% U235. The pump components were not grossly contaminated.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency relies on the geometry of the seal exhaust/wet air pump components. The pump components are controlled as safety related items. This control was not violated. Therefore, this leg of double contingency was maintained. The second leg of double contingency relies on minimizing interaction between internal oil separators and pump housing subcomponents. Interaction is controlled by maintaining a minimum 2-foot edge-to-edge spacing between pump internal oil separators and pump housing subcomponents. The pump housing subcomponents were placed within 2 feet of the internal oil separators in violation of this control. The interaction parameter was not maintained; therefore this leg of double contingency was not maintained. Double contingency was not maintained because the interaction parameter was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
1. Control Access to the area. This was completed at 0845 CDT on 08/19/11.
2. Move one item at a time such that the spacing between the pump housing subcomponents and the internal oil separators is always increasing until a minimum 2-foot edge-to-edge spacing has been established. This was completed at 1445 CDT on 08/19/11.
3. Upon establishing the proper spacing between the pump housing subcomponents and the internal oil separators, the exclusion zone may be removed. This was accomplished at 1450 CDT on 08/19/11."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47177
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAVIER HERRERA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAVIER HERRERA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/19/2011
Notification Time: 23:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2011
Event Time: 18:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/20/2011
Notification Time: 23:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2011
Event Time: 18:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 75 | Power Operation |
PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER RESULTING IN EDG AUTOSTART
"At 1805 Indian Point Unit 3 experienced a loss of normal 138 KV Offsite Power (LOOP) during a thunderstorm in the area. The Station Auxiliary Transformer (SAT) protection circuitry actuated and de-energized 6.9 KV buses 5 and 6. Thirty two and 33 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) auto-started and loaded onto Safeguards buses 5A and 6A per plant design. The corresponding blackout logic resulted in an auto start of 32 and 33 Auxiliary Feed Water pumps (AFW). The plant remained in Mode 1; however, due to the loss of two 6.9 KV buses, three Circulating Water pumps (CW) tripped as designed, which caused main condenser backpressure to rise (i.e., vacuum degraded). As a result of rising condenser backpressure, a manual turbine load reduction to 75% power was performed. The reactor remains stable at 75% power and buses 5 and 6 have been manually re-energized from the alternate 13.8 KV offsite power source and the Emergency Diesel Generators have been unloaded, shutdown, and realigned for auto start capability.
"The only unusual system response was 32 Component Cooling Water (CCW) pump did not auto-start on a low pressure signal when the remaining pumps were stripped and re-loaded by the EDG sequencing logic due to a problem with the closing spring on the supply breaker. CCW system pressure was observed to be at normal levels when 31 and 33 CCW pumps were loaded on the EDGs. 32 CCW pump remains inoperable due to the breaker issue.
"There was no impact to the operation of Unit 2 during this event."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the New York State Public Service Commission.
"At 1805 Indian Point Unit 3 experienced a loss of normal 138 KV Offsite Power (LOOP) during a thunderstorm in the area. The Station Auxiliary Transformer (SAT) protection circuitry actuated and de-energized 6.9 KV buses 5 and 6. Thirty two and 33 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) auto-started and loaded onto Safeguards buses 5A and 6A per plant design. The corresponding blackout logic resulted in an auto start of 32 and 33 Auxiliary Feed Water pumps (AFW). The plant remained in Mode 1; however, due to the loss of two 6.9 KV buses, three Circulating Water pumps (CW) tripped as designed, which caused main condenser backpressure to rise (i.e., vacuum degraded). As a result of rising condenser backpressure, a manual turbine load reduction to 75% power was performed. The reactor remains stable at 75% power and buses 5 and 6 have been manually re-energized from the alternate 13.8 KV offsite power source and the Emergency Diesel Generators have been unloaded, shutdown, and realigned for auto start capability.
"The only unusual system response was 32 Component Cooling Water (CCW) pump did not auto-start on a low pressure signal when the remaining pumps were stripped and re-loaded by the EDG sequencing logic due to a problem with the closing spring on the supply breaker. CCW system pressure was observed to be at normal levels when 31 and 33 CCW pumps were loaded on the EDGs. 32 CCW pump remains inoperable due to the breaker issue.
"There was no impact to the operation of Unit 2 during this event."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the New York State Public Service Commission.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47170
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHUCK ENGLE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHUCK ENGLE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/19/2011
Notification Time: 12:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2011
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2011
Notification Time: 12:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2011
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INADVERTENT SOUNDING OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ZONE SIREN
"Limerick Generating Station Site EP [Emergency Preparedness] Manager was informed by Chester County 911 Dispatch Center that Limerick Emergency Preparedness Zone (EPZ) Siren #132, located at Pothouse Road West of Ridgeview Road in Chester County, was sounding. Notification occurred at 1030 hrs. [EDT] 8/19/11.
"The siren maintenance contractor was contacted, and the sounding was terminated at 1120 hrs. 8/19/11.
"No actual plant emergency exists. The siren activation was caused by equipment malfunction.
"[The] remaining 164 of 165 Limerick EPZ Sirens remain functional, no other reportability threshold(s) have been met or exceeded.
"An 'Event of Potential Public Interest' will be issued to the state and local agencies."
The maintenance contractor is currently troubleshooting the cause. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Limerick Generating Station Site EP [Emergency Preparedness] Manager was informed by Chester County 911 Dispatch Center that Limerick Emergency Preparedness Zone (EPZ) Siren #132, located at Pothouse Road West of Ridgeview Road in Chester County, was sounding. Notification occurred at 1030 hrs. [EDT] 8/19/11.
"The siren maintenance contractor was contacted, and the sounding was terminated at 1120 hrs. 8/19/11.
"No actual plant emergency exists. The siren activation was caused by equipment malfunction.
"[The] remaining 164 of 165 Limerick EPZ Sirens remain functional, no other reportability threshold(s) have been met or exceeded.
"An 'Event of Potential Public Interest' will be issued to the state and local agencies."
The maintenance contractor is currently troubleshooting the cause. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47172
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 08/19/2011
Notification Time: 14:06 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2011
Event Time: 10:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2011
Notification Time: 14:06 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2011
Event Time: 10:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
REACTOR SCRAM DURING QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE TEST
"At 1046 hours on August 19, 2011, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 reactor scrammed while [operators were] performing a quarterly functional test of reactor water high level trip channels for feedwater / main turbine. The main turbine tripped when a single channel high reactor water level signal was inserted, which was unexpected. Actual water level was within the normal band when the main turbine tripped. The main turbine trip resulted in a reactor scram. Reactor recirculation pump trips as designed and all control rods inserted. Reactor water level lowered to +2 inches causing Level 3 (+ 13 inches) isolations. Reactor water level was restored to the normal operating band using the feedwater system. Six main steam relief valves opened for a short duration, as expected, due to the turbine trip transient. Subsequently, reactor pressure was controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected. No ECCS or RCIC initiations occurred or were required.
"The reactor recirculation pumps were subsequently restarted to re-establish forced core circulation.
"The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation into the cause of the scram is underway.
"Unit 1 was unaffected and continued power operation.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A press release will occur."
"At 1046 hours on August 19, 2011, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 reactor scrammed while [operators were] performing a quarterly functional test of reactor water high level trip channels for feedwater / main turbine. The main turbine tripped when a single channel high reactor water level signal was inserted, which was unexpected. Actual water level was within the normal band when the main turbine tripped. The main turbine trip resulted in a reactor scram. Reactor recirculation pump trips as designed and all control rods inserted. Reactor water level lowered to +2 inches causing Level 3 (+ 13 inches) isolations. Reactor water level was restored to the normal operating band using the feedwater system. Six main steam relief valves opened for a short duration, as expected, due to the turbine trip transient. Subsequently, reactor pressure was controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected. No ECCS or RCIC initiations occurred or were required.
"The reactor recirculation pumps were subsequently restarted to re-establish forced core circulation.
"The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation into the cause of the scram is underway.
"Unit 1 was unaffected and continued power operation.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A press release will occur."