U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
08/16/2011 - 08/17/2011
** EVENT NUMBERS **
|
Agreement State |
Event Number: 47144 |
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: PAVEMENT ENGINEERING INC.
Region: 4
City: REDDING State: CA
County: SHASTA
License #: 4977-45
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 08/11/2011
Notification Time: 15:06 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/2011
Event Time: 04:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
DARYL JOHNSON (ILTA)
MEXICO VIA FAX/EMAIL () |
This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was received from the state of California via e-mail:
"On August 8, 2011, Mr. Todd Rucker, RSO from Pavement Engineering, Inc., notified RHB [Radiation Health Branch] Sacramento that one of their moisture-density gauge operators lost a gauge at their job site on August 6, 2011 at approximately 4:30 am. The gauge had been borrowed from A. Teicher & Son, Inc., License No 4030-34. The gauge was used on a job site on HWY 70 in Yuba County, near the town of Olivehurst, CA."
The lost gauge is a Troxler, Model 4640-B, Serial number T464 1793.
This model moisture density gauge has an 8 mCi Cs-137 source.
California event number: 080611
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
Agreement State |
Event Number: 47148 |
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: NUCLETRON CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: COLUMBIA State: MD
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA |
Notification Date: 08/12/2011
Notification Time: 13:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2009
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SOURCE
The following report was received via fax:
"The field service engineer was conducting the quarterly source exchange at the facility. While unloading the source into the transport container, the engineer received an error code indicating there were issues with the source side drive mechanism. The problem with the drive mechanism prohibited the source from fully deploying into the transport container or retracting back into the safe. The emergency motor was not able to retract the source. Following emergency procedures, the engineer tried to manually retract the source, however, the cable drum was locked-up and would not wind the source cable, He removed the unload transfer tube from the indexer, cut the exposed source cable and manually inserted the source in to the emergency container. The engineer disassembled the drive mechanism and collected the damaged parts. The unit was then cleaned and the cable drum and gear wheel were replaced. The system was tested repeatedly and found to be functioning properly.
"Initial calculations of 241 mR whole body dose were 'worst case scenario'. The dosimeter badge report indicated a whole body dose of 40 mR which does not exceed the regulatory limit for occupational exposure.
"The Root Cause Investigation was completed on 06-15-2009 by Nucletron B.V. in the Netherlands.
"For the investigation and analysis of the incident, the collected damaged parts were sent to Nucletron B.V. in the Netherlands where they were photographed and inspected. Additionally, the engineer was asked for his findings and the system logbook was scrutinized.
"According to the damage on the source cable drum, the drum had made at least 2.2 rotations before it got stuck (293 mm to move out of the indexer; 242 mm from where the source cable was cut off; source cable drum diameter is 80 mm). After examining the damaged parts, there was no visible cause as to why the drum became damaged. An obstruction at this position during the source exchange into the transport container is not expected since at this point it is a single straight tube; however, this cannot be ruled out as a possibility.
"The message logbook of the system was investigated and showed that during the source exchange, the engineer received seven error code 3's at 176 mm all within a six minute time frame. Error code 3 is a source obstruction which can happen when the bushing between the rigid and flexible part of the source cable cannot pass through the indexer clamp of the unload tube due to a misalignment of the clamping mechanism or damage to the source cable. The transfer tube was removed and a normal 'treatment' was performed without problem. The transfer tube was then reattached to exchange the source and four more error code 3's were received within two minutes at the same distance, thus indicating it was purely a container problem.
"There were no errors in the logbook that indicated the source remained outside the system. After the multiple tries with the error code 3, the system was switched off. Upon restart an hour later, two more attempts were made. However, the engineer now received error code 2 indicating the source would no longer come out of the safe. The system was turned back off again. Upon restart thirty minutes later, the unit had a dummy source in it; the source had apparently been unloaded by hand and replaced with a dummy. Later, the source exchange procedure was performed and a dummy source loaded properly; after which, the system worked normally again.
"According to the engineer, the system did not show any error or radiation/out-of-safe message when it was switched off following the problem with the container. When he entered the treatment room, he unexpectedly found the source to be outside the system, at which point he followed the emergency procedures in order to secure the source. Once the source was secure, the engineer forcibly pulled the remaining cable from the cable drum. He then proceeded to clean the system and assess the damaged parts.
"There is no logical explanation as to how the source got stuck outside the system. The logbook does not have any indication to this fact. The damage to the drum and cable may have occurred during the emergency procedure that was carried out to secure the source. Since operator error by the service engineer cannot be ruled out, a retraining on source exchange and handling is required. In addition, the transport container has been returned to Nucletron B.V. in the Netherlands for further investigation."
The source exchange was being conducted on a MicroSelectron HDR-V2, S/N 31526, TCS software version 1.50C, located at the Grant/Riverside Methodist Hospital in Columbus Ohio.
The field problem report number is FPR 252753. |
Agreement State |
Event Number: 47149 |
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND - COLLEGE PARK
Region: 1
City: COLLEGE PARK State: MD
County:
License #: MD-33-004-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 08/12/2011
Notification Time: 13:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2011
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
DARYL JOHNSON e-mail (ILTA) |
This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF MATERIAL
The following report was received from the state of Maryland via fax:
"The RSO of UMCP [University of Maryland - College Park] telephoned 8/11/11 at 3:00 p.m. to report the loss of a vial of 5 ÁCi [microCuries] C-14. [The RSO] indicated that they were in the process of cleaning out a lab and discovered the vial frozen inside of the lab freezer. The vial was removed and placed in a styrofoam cup and put on the counter for removal by the Radiation Safety Office. [At some time subsequent to placing the vial on the counter, the vial disappeared and is now presumed lost.] From the time of discovery of the vial to the response of the Radiation Safety Office was less than 3 hours. It is believed that the facility management personnel cleaning the office, picked up the cup, and disposed of it as regular trash. They looked through the trash and monitored, but couldn't find the vial."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
Agreement State |
Event Number: 47150 |
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL
Region: 4
City: Gonzales State: LA
County:
License #: LA-9098-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 08/12/2011
Notification Time: 16:31 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2011
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
DARYL JOHNSON e-mail (ILTA)
RICHARD TURTIL (FSME) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ATTEMPTED BREAK-IN ON TRUCK CONTAINING A RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The following report was received via e-mail:
"On July 22, 2011 at 3:00 p.m., [the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] received a call from Team Industrial, that there was an attempted break in on a radiography crew's truck, while staying at a hotel in Belle Chasse, LA. It was around 9:30 p.m. on July 21, 2011, when the crew heard the alarm on the truck go off. They came out to see what happened and saw two men take off. There was nothing taken and they called the local law enforcement. However, there was no video surveillance footage available. The crew moved to another hotel with video surveillance in the area of the IR [Industrial Radiography] truck."
The crew came from the Team office in Gonzales, LA. |
Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47156 |
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: SANDRA SEVERANCE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD |
Notification Date: 08/16/2011
Notification Time: 09:36 [ET]
Event Date: 08/16/2011
Event Time: 06:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO) |
Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
3 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO AN ON-SITE, NON-WORK RELATED, FATALITY
"The purpose of this report is to notify the NRC of a fatality involving a contract worker from Duke Energy's Oconee Nuclear Station. At approximately 0600 EDT, the control room was notified of an unconscious individual, located in a non-radiological area outside the protected area. The Medical Emergency Response Team was activated and dispatched to the scene. At 0640, the worker left the site in an ambulance. The individual was pronounced dead at the local hospital. This fatality was the result of a medical emergency and was not occupationally related.
"Duke Energy is making a notification to the South Carolina Department of Occupational Safety and Health Administration. This ENS notification is in response to a notification to another government agency in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi).
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47157 |
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ALTON DEWEESE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL |
Notification Date: 08/16/2011
Notification Time: 11:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/2011
Event Time: 10:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION |
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO) |
Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
INVALID ACTUATION OF MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP
"This telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written LER for an invalid actuation of the 1A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pump under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On August 6, 2011 at 1055 CDT, during the performance of surveillance testing on the 1A Containment Spray (CS) pump, an unexpected automatic start of the 1A MDAFW pump occurred. While installing jumpers in the B1F sequencer to cause an automatic start for the 1A CS pump per the test procedure, the jumpers were inadvertently connected to the wrong relay which started the 1A MDAFW pump instead. This automatic start was considered invalid since the start signal was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the safety function of the system. The 1A MDAFW pump was restored to a normal standby alignment at 1131 CDT.
"The following required information is being submitted per NUREG-1022, Rev. 2.
"(a) The 1A MDAFW pump is an 'A' train component.
"(b) The 1A MDAFW pump automatic start is considered a complete train actuation.
"(c) Once the 1A MDAFW pump inadvertently started, the system functioned per design."
The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47160 |
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY MEEKINS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL |
Notification Date: 08/16/2011
Notification Time: 22:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/16/2011
Event Time: 20:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/16/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO) |
Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO CHLORINE SPILL
A potential spill of 1 to 2 gallons of Chlorine was discharged to the Delaware River through a storm drain that had a piping leak. This discharge was reported to New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (case #: 11-08-16-2024-28). Chlorination was isolated and the storm drain plugged. Clean up is in progress.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify Lower Alloways Creek Township. |
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