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Event Notification Report for April 25, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
04/22/2011 - 04/25/2011

** EVENT NUMBERS **


46725 46770 46776 46777 46780 46781

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 46725
Facility: B&W NUCLEAR OPERATING GROUP, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: BARRY COLE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/05/2011
Notification Time: 12:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2011
Event Time: 11:49 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/21/2011
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
70.32(i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
PART 70 APP A (c) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION/NEWS REL
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
ABY MOHSENI (NMSS)
VICTOR MCCREE (R2)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
VONNA ORDAZ (NMSS)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRM)
TAB BEACH (DHS)
ERWIN CASTO (FEMA)
NICK THREAT (EPA()
STU BAILEY (DOE)

Event Text

ALERT DECLARED DUE TO ACID LEAK GREATER THAN THE 40 CFR LIMIT

The licensee secured their process after an acid leak greater that the 40 CFR limit developed at a piping joint. The leak consisted of a mixture of hydrofluoric and nitric acid. A licensee response team was dispatched to the site of the leak to evaluate the condition.

No injuries resulted and there were no evacuations nor health and safety consequences at the site.

Additionally notified USDA (R. Jones), HHS (J. Dennis) and Fuels OUO Group.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM DONNA MILLER TO PETE SNYDER AT 1241 EDT ON 4/5/11 * * *

The licensee exited the emergency condition at 1237 EDT on 4/5/11. The spill is contained and no longer poses any threat to employees or the environment.

* * * UPDATE AT 1558 ON 4/21/2011 FROM KENNY KIRBY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"On April 5, 2011 during a line inspection at B&W NOG-L, a leak was discovered coming from a 6 inch waste acid line. The leak was in a location that the technician could visually inspect but with limited accessibility because of its proximity to an embankment obstruction. After finding a way to safely determine that waste was leaking from the line at a pH <2, the site Emergency Operation Center was activated and Emergency Team was notified to respond. It was determined that a Reportable Quantity (RQ) of an acidic waste solution (D002) had been released. Notifications were made to EPA Region III, VA DEQ, National Response Center, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and other Emergency Response organizations as required by the site Emergency Plan. Efforts were taken to ensure the spill was contained to the immediate paved and soil areas. The accumulating liquid was contained with absorbent booms and neutralized with soda ash . It is estimated that 200 gallons of waste solution leaked onto the ground. Approximately seven 55 gallon drums (@ 1500 Pounds) of clean up waste were generated and will be disposed of appropriately.

"There were no injuries during the spill or during the cleanup operations. The threat to the environment and human health was minimal due to the leak's isolated location . Access to the area was limited and air monitoring in the area did not show any concerns. All released material was contained to the spill area or the cleanup zone.

"Plant operations draining to this line were halted until the repair was completed . Restart of operations was authorized on April 6, 2011. An investigation of the incident to determine the root cause is in progress and corrective actions will be implemented to prevent reoccurrence ."

The licensee submitted a follow-up notification to the Virginia Department of Environmental Health, EPA Region III, and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified NMSS (Easton), R2DO (Bartley), and Fuels OUO Group.

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Agreement State Event Number: 46770
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA
Region: 4
City: TEXAS CITY State: TX
County:
License #: L00254
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 04/20/2011
Notification Time: 17:38 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2011
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
KEVIN O'SULLIVAN (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MALFUNCTIONING GAUGE INVOLVING A 2 CURIE CESIUM-137 SOURCE

The following was received from the state via fax:

"On April 18, 2011, a gauge malfunction occurred at the licensee's facility during a device installation on a process vessel. When the 2 Curie Cesium-137 source was inserted into the vessel, the chain connecting the source to the nuclear gauge broke allowing the source to travel to the bottom of the insertion tube. The source being at the bottom of the insertion tube is its normal operating position. A radiation survey was conducted by the licensee indicating radiation levels were normal. The device was removed from the vessel, [and] the source [was] retrieved from inside of the vessel. The device and the 2 sources were taken by the service company to their facility for repair. There was no additional radiation exposure to any members of the general public or radiation workers due to this incident. Gauge information: TFS model 5220 containing (2) 2-Ci Cesium-137 sources. Device SN: B-36. Source SNs: MB-3946 and MB 3956.

"Additional Information:

"The sources had been removed from the process vessel back in January 2011 and were put into storage while the unit was down for repairs (a 'turnaround'). There are 6 of these custom devices on 3 vessels. The insertion tube is a divided tube and one source is lowered down each side; 2 sources each tube. Five of the sources lowered with no problems. As they were lowering the 6th one down the insertion tube, the chain attached to the source broke and the source fell to the bottom of the tube (which is its normal position when unit is in operation, so no exposure to any individual resulted from it being there). The insertion tube is approximately 25 feet down to the bottom. They were able to 'fish' the top of the chain and pulled the chain with the source out of the tube and put the source directly into a pig. All other individuals had been moved back a safe distance for ALARA. The service company took the device and sources to their facility for repair. The unit will remain out of operation until device is repaired and installed."

Texas Incident #: I - 8836

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Part 21 Event Number: 46776
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Licensee: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Region: 1
City: HUNTSVILLE State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TONY GILL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/22/2011
Notification Time: 12:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/22/2011
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/22/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
PART 21 GROUP ()
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)

Event Text

POTENTIAL DEFECT IN SUBMERSIBLE VALVE POSITION SENSORS

"This letter is issued to provide notification of a potential defect in QualTech NP Top Potted Generation 3 Quick Disconnect Connector Pin Side assemblies installed on Topworx C7 and SV7 switches. All assemblies supplied prior to April 20, 2011 are potentially affected. These assemblies were supplied to Topworx [as] submergence qualified in accordance with our Test Report EGS-TR-23009-14. It was discovered during supplemental qualification testing that previously supplied assemblies may not properly seal against moisture intrusion if utilized in a submergence application.

"The recommended corrective action for existing assemblies is to pressure test and, if required, repair them. Corrective actions already implemented will be effective in preventing recurrence of this condition. Additionally, all future assemblies will be required to pass pressure testing prior to acceptance.

"It has been confirmed that all assemblies previously supplied are for use in Chinese Nuclear Power Plants and therefore, no US plants are affected." Most of the assemblies are still in this country and the remainder are in Switzerland awaiting shipment. All assemblies will be recalled and pressure tested.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 46777
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MARY SIPIORSKI
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 04/22/2011
Notification Time: 14:21 [ET]
Event Date: 04/21/2011
Event Time: 19:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/22/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A NON-LICENSED CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR

A non-licensed contractor supervisor tested positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 46780
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DONALD WISNEIWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/23/2011
Notification Time: 12:37 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2011
Event Time: 09:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

VALID AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP START WHILE COOLING DOWN REACTOR

"At 0921 [EDT] on 4/23/11, CNS Unit-1 received an auxiliary feedwater pump auto start due to low-low level in the 1B steam generator. The 1A auxiliary feedwater pump started and restored steam generator level to the normal operating band."

A cooldown was in progress at the time of the event and the tagout isolated feedwater flow to the 1B steam generator.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The states of North and South Carolina, and York, Gaston, and Mecklenburg Counties will be notified.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 46781
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
Comments: UF6 CONVERSION (DRY PROCESS)
Region: 2
City: METROPOLIS State: IL
County: MASSAC
License #: SUB-526
Agreement: Y
Docket: 04003392
NRC Notified By: BOB STOKES
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/23/2011
Notification Time: 22:08 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2011
Event Time: 17:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
EARL EASTON (NMSS)

Event Text

LOSS OF POWER SHUTS DOWN AIR MONITORING VACUUM PUMPS

"The air monitoring vacuum pumps were disabled for approximately 3 hours. A severe weather windstorm blew down an electrical power pole inside the plant property at 1700 CDT. Because of the electrical issue, it took approximately 3 hours to reestablish cooling water to the vacuum pumps. These pumps provide vacuum for the stack monitoring and personnel area monitoring systems in the Feed Materials Building. The pumps were restored to service at approximately 2000 CDT."

There was no damage, no release, and no exposure from this event.

The licensee notified the Fuel Facility Inspector (Hartland) in Region-2.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021