Event Notification Report for April 15, 2011

RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA LOST DURING SHIPPING

On 4/13/11, two radiography cameras were picked up by the shipper from the licensee facility in Hammond, IN. The cameras were being sent to QSA in Baton Rouge, LA. On 4/14/11, one camera arrived at QSA while the other was still shown in the shipper's hub in Memphis, TN. On 4/15/11, the licensee contacted the shipper when tracking indicated that the camera was still in Memphis. The shipper could not find the package and is conducting a search of the facility at this time.

The missing camera is a QSA 8880D, serial no. D4264 and contains a 15.9 Ci Ir-192 source, serial no. 66411B.

* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID TEBO TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1545 EDT ON 04/15/11 * * *

At 1540 EDT, the licensee was notified by the shipper that the missing camera was returned to the licensee's office in Hammond, IN. The licensee confirmed that the missing camera is now at their office, the source is in the camera, and the serial number matches. Licensee is investigating this matter further.

Notified R2DO (O'Donohue), R3DO (Orth), ILTAB (Pearson), IRD MOC (Gott), and FSME EO (Giantelli)


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

Although IAEA categorization of this event is typically based on device type, the staff has been made aware of the actual activity of the source, and after calculation determines that it is a Category 3 event.

Note: the value assigned by device type "Category 2" is different than the calculated value "Category 3"

POTENTIAL DEVIATION IN SEISMIC RATINGS OF ABB, INC. KF RELAY FAMILY

ABB, during an internal review, discovered that their KF family of relays were originally qualified to meet IEEE-STD-344 (1971) but were incorrectly certified to meet IEEE-STD-344 (1975/1987), which requires different testing.

Relay samples have been sent to an independent lab to determine if the subject relays would meet IEEE-STD-344 (1975/1987). Expected date of the final engineering evaluation is July 1, 2011.

POTENTIAL DEFECT IN MAGNETROL LEVEL SWITCH FROM ENGINE SYSTEMS INCORPORATED

"Engine Systems, Incorporated (ESI) began an evaluation of a level switch on February 16, 2011. Monticello Nuclear Plant returned a level switch for failure evaluation. The reported condition was that the switch mechanism would not actuate throughout the entire level range. ESI supplied the level switch in July, 2008. The switch was functionally tested prior to shipment and it worked properly at that time. It remained in customer inventory until recently when it was tested and the problem was identified.

"This level switch is used in the fuel oil day tank of some EMD 999 emergency diesel generators and controls the fuel transfer pump. Malfunctioning of this switch could prevent the fuel transfer pump from operating and therefore the diesel generator could shut down due to insufficient fuel supply; thus preventing the diesel generator from performing its safety related function. The EMD 999 fuel system also incorporates a backup fuel transfer pump that is controlled by the level alarm switch within the day tank. The backup transfer pump turns on when the low level alarm is actuated and turns off when the high level alarm actuates.

"ESI has been conducting tests and inspections of the returned level switch and will be coordinating with the manufacturer (Magnetrol) to complete our evaluation. To date, no other similar failures with this Magnetrol level switch have been reported to ESI."

Component: Magnetrol level switch, ESI P/N: 8277780-ESI, Magnetrol type A10

Report No: 10CFR21-0101-INT

* * * RETRACTION FROM TOM HORNER TO DONG PARK ON 5/13/11 AT 1146 * * *

The following information was received by facsimile:

"COMPONENT: Magnetrol level switch
ESI P/N: 8277780-ESI
Magnetrol type A 10

"PURPOSE: This report is a follow-up to an interim report (10CFR21-0101-INT) issued by Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) on 04/15/11 which identified a deviation with a Magnetrol level switch. The interim report was issued because ESI was not able to complete the evaluation within the 60 day requirement of 10CFR21.

"SUMMARY: Evaluation of the level switch failure at Monticello was completed on 5/12/11 and it has been determined that the deviation is not a reportable defect as by defined by 10CFR21. Based on the data collected by ESI and through evaluation by and discussion with Magnetrol (manufacturer of the level switch), it is ESI's conclusion that the level switch was delivered to the customer in working order and that it must have been damaged subsequent to ESI's involvement. Furthermore, within the fuel oil system in which the level switch is installed, there is an inherent redundancy whereby the high/low level alarm switch will actuate to turn on or turn off a secondary fuel transfer pump in the event this level switch (or its associated fuel transfer pump) does not function properly. Therefore, ESI does not consider this as a reportable defect.

Notified R2DO (Guthrie), R3DO (Passehl), and Part 21 group via email.