| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/01/2011 - 04/04/2011 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information | Event Number: 45459 | Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL STEPANTSCHENKO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
J.THORP (e-mail) (NRR)
O.TABATABAI (e-mail) (NRO)
| Event Text INTERIM REPORT ON THERMOSTATIC VALVE FAILURE ON PALO VERDE EDG
"This interim report is being issued because Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) is not able to complete an evaluation of an identified deviation within the 60 day requirement of 10CFR21.21. The evaluation is expected to be completed no later than November 30, 2009.
"ESI began an evaluation of a thermostatic valve element failure on August 24, 2009. Palo Verde Nuclear Plant notified ESI of the failure as a result of a failure analysis they were performing on a thermostatic valve that had been removed from the lube oil system of their 2A-EDG. The element was in service since April 2008 and Palo Verde verified operation of the element prior to installation.
"The Palo Verde failure analysis determined that one of two elements within the valve was defective. The element failure was attributed to wax leakage past the diaphragm seal on one of two power pills within the element. Evidence of mechanical binding of the piston is believed to have caused the wax leakage. If the piston was jammed, the expanding wax could have over pressurized the diaphragm seal leading to wax leakage. The failure analysis noted the following to support piston binding:
- The piston was initially difficult to remove from its guide tube.
- A gouge was observed on the piston surface.
- The rubber plug within the power pill exhibited brass machining chip debris.
"ESI has been coordinating with Palo Verde and the manufacturer (AMOT) to complete our evaluation and to determine if this is a generic issue or if it is an isolated incident.
"To date, no other similar failures with AMOT thermostatic valves have been reported to ESI."
Palo Verde has Cooper Bessemer KSV-20T diesel engines that use one 6" thermostatic valve in the engine jacket water system and one in the engine lube oil system to regulate system temperatures during engine operation. The thermostatic valve is an AMOT model 6HAS. The AMOT thermostatic valve element (P/N 9760X) is the defective part. ESI did not provide any information on other nuclear power plants that have EDGs that utilize this model thermostatic valve.
* * * UPDATE RECEIVED VIA EMAIL FROM PAUL STEPANTSCHENKO TO DONG PARK AT 1642 EST ON 12/01/09 * * *
"This report is a follow-up to an interim report (10CFR21-0098-INT) issued by Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) on 10/23/09 which identified a deviation with an Amot thermostatic valve element. The interim report was issued because ESI was not able to complete the evaluation within the 60 day requirement of 10CFR21. The evaluation was completed on 11/30/09 and the deviation was determined be a reportable defect as by defined by 10CFR21.
"The Exelon analysis also reports that similar brass machining debris was observed on the plugs from the other three power pills to varying degrees. None of the stems of these pills displayed evidence of gouging or binding.
"To date, no other similar failures with Amot thermostatic valves have been reported to ESI.
"ESI has contacted the valve manufacturer (Amot) to discuss these findings. A copy of the Palo Verde failure analysis and eleven (11) element assemblies from ESI inventory were sent to Amot for evaluation. The following elements were sent to Amot for evaluation:
"Qty. 8: PIN 9760 X-170' (CES PIN 2-05V-419-107)
"Qty. 3: PIN 9760 X-160' (CES PIN 2-05V-419-109)
"Both part number elements are the same except for the temperature setting ('-170' indicates 170?F nominal and '-160' indicates 160?F nominal).
"Upon completion of their evaluation, Amot has reported the following:
"Fine shavings/powder of brass was observed in some of the element pills.
"None of the pill stems had any evidence of gouging.
"The pills used in the 9760X elements are made by converting another part number pill. This conversion consists of removing the stem from the pill and performing some machining. Amot believes the brass debris may have entered the pill as a result of this conversion process.
"Amot has not made any changes to this conversion process in recent history and has not had reports of similar problems with these elements.
"Machining debris, while undesirable, was evident in other pills which did not exhibit any operability issues; therefore this is not believed to be the cause of the pill failure.
"The primary cause of the failure is believed to be the gouge found in the pill stem. The gouge could have occurred during the conversion process as the stem is removed and handled at that time.
"As a precaution, Amot has made changes to their conversion process for this pill. The drilling fixture was modified to eliminate the possibility of chips entering the pill during the machining operation. This change was made effective 10/22/09.
"A listing of users with the thermostatic valves that contain the Amot 9760X element is provided in the table below.
"Site - Thermostatic Valve - System:
"Braidwood - 6HAS - Lube
"Byron - 6HAS - Lube
"Nine Mile Point - 6HAS- Lube
"Oconee - 4HAS & 6HAS - Water
"Palo Verde - 6HAS - Lube & Water
"South Texas Project - 6HAS - Lube & Water
"Susquehanna - 6HAS - Lube & Water
"Waterford - 5HAS & 6HAS - Lube & Water
"Corrective Action: The element failure at Palo Verde is considered to be an isolated incident related to a gouge in the pill stem. Thus, there is no recommended corrective action for users of the Amot 9760X element. The evaluation also indicated a weakness in Amot's manufacturing process for the element pill which introduced machining debris. While not believed to be the cause of the Palo Verde element failure, machining debris within the element pill is undesirable and increases the potential for failure in the future. Users with thermostatic valves containing Amot PIN 9760X elements should be aware of this issue so that they can monitor their systems for any indications of thermostat element problems.
Notified R1DO (Holody), R2DO (Guthrie), R3DO (Riemer), R4DO (Deese), NRR (Thorp) via e-mail, NRO (Tabatabai) via email.
* * * UPDATE RECEIVED VIA FAX FROM TOM HORNER TO DONG PARK AT 1613 EST ON 04/01/11 * * *
Two sentences were added to address the safety hazard which is created or could be created by this defect.
"This defect could affect operability of the thermostatic valve within the diesel engine cooling water and/or lube oil system, resulting in elevated fluid system temperatures during engine operation. Engine performance and/or load carrying capability could be impacted with the possibility of eventual engine failure, thereby preventing the emergency diesel generator from performing its safety related function."
Notified R1DO (Powell), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Peterson), R4DO (Lantz), PART 21 GROUP via e-mail. |
| General Information | Event Number: 45875 | Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC.
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC.
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL STEPANTSCHENKO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 04/26/2010
Notification Time: 17:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/23/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
PART 21 COORDINATOR (NRR)
| Event Text EMD JACKET WATER PUMP WITH INCORRECT IMPELLER ORIENTATION
The following is a summary of a report received from Engine Systems, Inc. via facsimile:
"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 03/23/10 following a corrective action request from Entergy - Grand Gulf. The request was written as the result of Grand Gulf having an EMD jacket water pump with an incorrect impeller. Specifically, the impeller installed in the pump was for rotation opposite of the pump housing. The evaluation was concluded on 04/26/10 and was determined to be a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR21.
"EMD diesel engines utilized for emergency diesel generator sets use two engine jacket water centrifugal pumps (one for each bank) to circulate fluid throughout the engine for cooling. Each pump is mounted on the front of the engine and rotates in the opposite direction of the engine crankshaft. For single engine generator set applications (i.e. left hand rotation engine, viewed from the rear of the engine), the pumps used on each bank contain identical components; the only difference is the position of the impeller housing in relation to the pump shaft housing. When viewed from the front of the engine, these water pumps rotate counterclockwise (see Figure 1 below).
"For tandem generator set applications, one engine is left hand rotation and the other is right hand rotation. For each engine, the pumps used on each bank contain identical components and the only difference is the position of the impeller housing in relation to the pump shaft housing. However, for a right hand rotation engine the water pumps rotate clockwise when viewed from the front of the engine
In summary, because these pumps use impellers that rotate in both clockwise and counter-clockwise directions, it is possible that an impeller could be installed with a design rotation opposite that required for the associated pump housing.
"A review has been performed to evaluate the impact on past supply of EMD water pumps. Historically, ESI has supplied a quantity of over 280 water pumps under 17 different EMD part numbers dating back to 1988. The pump returned by the customer [Grand Gulf] was supplied in January 1997. After reviewing the history of dedication activities performed on the water pumps it was found that dedication reports for EMD water pumps have always contained an inspection requirement to verify the correct operational rotation; however reports written prior to 2000 did not include a clear visual depiction of what the correct operational rotation is. It appears that this was an isolated incident where the inspector made an error when performing the inspection. Since April 2000, all EMD water pumps shipped were inspected to a dedication report that included a clear visual depiction of proper impeller geometry. This one incident is the only known instance of an EMD water pump with the incorrect impeller.
"ESI recommends that as a precaution, all customers with an EMD water pump in stock which was supplied by ESI prior to April 2000 should perform a visual inspection to ensure the correct impeller is installed. A pump which has been installed on the diesel engine is considered acceptable based on successful operation of the diesel engine. The impeller inspection is easily performed, without disassembly, by looking into the inlet port of the pump to confirm the orientation of the impeller matches the pump housing. A listing of the various part numbers supplied prior to April 2000 is included in Table [below].
Listing of Water Pump P/Ns Supplied Prior to April 2000
Part Number Rotation Bank Type of Engine
40004235 LH RIGHT 16 & 20-645E4 & E4B
40004234 LH LEFT 16 & 20-645E4 & E4B
8347607 LH LEFT 16 & 20-645E4 & E4B
8364236 RH RIGHT 16 & 20-645E4 & E4B
8364237 RH LEFT 16 & 20-645E4 & E4B
8269664 LH RIGHT 12-645E4 & E4B
9336390 LH LEFT 12-645E4 & E4B
8269638 LH LEFT 12-645E4 & E4B
8324588 RH RIGHT 12-645E4 & E4B
8324589 RH LEFT 12-645E4 & E4B
NOTE: The ESI report did not provide an information on specific nuclear power plant licensees that may possess these components.
* * * UPDATE RECEIVED VIA FAX FROM TOM HORNER TO DONG PARK AT 1614 EST ON 04/01/11 * * *
Two sentences were added to address the safety hazard which is created or could be created by this defect.
"Installation of the incorrect impeller would result in considerable loss of engine cooling water flow. This would cause elevated engine cooling water temperature that could impact engine performance and/or load carrying capability with the possibility of eventual engine failure, thereby preventing the emergency diesel generator from performing its safety related function."
Notified R1DO (Powell), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Peterson), R4DO (Lantz), PART 21 GROUP via e-mail. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 46705 | Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: MACTEC ENGINEERING & CONSULTING
Region: 4
City: PHOENIX State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ 7-326
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 03/29/2011
Notification Time: 13:58 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2011
Event Time: 14:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)
LAURA PEARSON (ILTA)
MEXICO - VIA FAX ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE
The following information was received via fax:
"This First Notice constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received WITHOUT verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Agency [Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency] Staff at this time.
"At approximately 1000 MDT, March 28, 2011, the Agency was informed that the Licensee had a Troxler Model 3241-C, SN 1884, asphalt content gauge stolen from the F & F construction trailer at the Casa Grande job site. The theft occurred over the weekend. The gauge was locked with a chain in the construction trailer which was parked in a locked, fenced construction job site. The gauge contains 100 mCi Am-241:Be.
"Casa Grande PD is investigating. The Agency continues to look for the source. The states of CA, NV, CO, UT, and NM and Mexico and U.S. NRC and FBI are being notified of this event."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 46706 | Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL
Licensee: ASTEN JOHNSON
Region: 1
City: CHAPIN State: SC
County:
License #: SC-534
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK WINDHAM
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 03/29/2011
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)
LAURA PEARSON (ILTA)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN NDC DRAIN PROFILE GAUGE
An NDC Model 104-P drainage profile gauge, serial number 1282, was stolen from a licensee vehicle. The box containing the gauge was chained to the floor of the vehicle which was also locked. The gauge contains an 80 mCi Am-241 source. A report was filed with the Chapin, SC police department.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46717 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: FRANK GORLEY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 04/01/2011
Notification Time: 06:12 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2011
Event Time: 04:04 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text AREA TELEPHONE OUTAGE AFFECTS EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM PHONE
"Baxley phone lines were discovered out of service. [This affects the] 366 and 367 [prefix] exchange. Upon further investigation, [it was] determined that Emergency Notification System phone in the Main Control Room was out of service."
According to the licensee, and AT&T circuit in the Baxley Central Office was disabled, possibly due to a fiber cable cut.
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46720 | Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK JENKINS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 04/04/2011
Notification Time: 01:51 [ET]
Event Date: 04/04/2011
Event Time: 00:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text EMERGENCY SIRENS OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO SEVERE WEATHER
"[Three] of the [eleven] emergency notification sirens became non functional when a severe thunderstorm passed through the area. The Coffey County Sheriffs office reported that they received telemetry notifications that the sirens were out of service. Pursuant to 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), the loss of alert systems (sirens) greater than one hour require an 8-hour notification. The exact cause of the siren loss (i.e. power outage, downed pole, etc) is not known and, as of the time of reporting, the duration of the siren outage cannot be determined.
"No damage to plant equipment or structures was identified from the severe weather and all outside work activities has resumed.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." | |