| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
01/21/2011 - 01/24/2011 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46542 | Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREG MERTA
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 01/14/2011
Notification Time: 14:31 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2011
Event Time: 08:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO MAINTENANCE
"At 0840 [CST] on Friday, January 14, 2011, a portion of the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation was removed from service to conduct maintenance on the charcoal filter medium. The TSC Stand-by Filter Unit (TSC-SFU) was found with deluge water in the bottom of the charcoal filtration bed, and is therefore non-functional.
"Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the ventilation system to maintain a habitable atmosphere.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (3) (xiii) due to a loss of emergency response facility."
* * * UPDATE AT 1105 ON 1/21/11 FROM ROB SPADING TO PETE SNYDER * * *
Maintenance has been completed and the TSC is returned to service as of 1005 CST.
Notified R3DO (Bloomer). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 46552 | Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: GENERAL MILLS CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: MOONACHIE State: NJ
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ALLEN JACOBSEN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 01/19/2011
Notification Time: 10:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/19/2011
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/19/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - INDUSTRIAL GAUGES INADVERTENTLY SENT TO SCRAP MATERIAL RECYCLER
General Mills Company in Moonachie, New Jersey notified Terrapin Recycling of Baltimore, Maryland that they inadvertently sent three industrial gauges to Terrapin in a load of scrap material. General Mills has contracted Clym Environmental Services, LLC of Frederick, MD to locate and recover the gauges.
The gauges are Peco Controls Corporation Industrial gauges and each of them contain 100 mCi of Am-241.
The State of Maryland has notified the State of New Jersey. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46557 | Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TERESA PUTNAM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 01/20/2011
Notification Time: 12:46 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2011
Event Time: 11:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
JOHN THORP (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN
"The 1B and 2B trains of Nuclear Service Water Systems (Raw Water Nuclear RN) were declared inoperable on 1/18/11 at 0423 EST due to fouling of the respective suction strainers when aligned to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP).
"Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 was entered at 1110 EST on 1/20/11 due to the lack of reasonable assurance of operability pertaining to 1A and 2A RN trains in the event of a potential realignment to the SNSWP due to a seismic event."
The licensee plans to reduce power and place both Units in Mode 5. Unit 1 has been reduced to 90% and Unit 2 is holding at 100% and will begin reducing power later. The fouling is being caused by fish being sucked into the RN train suction strainers. The licensee has been back-flushing the strainers to clear the fouling. The pond was chemically treated approximately 1 year ago to eliminate the fish.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM TERESA PUTNAM TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1313 EST ON 01/21/11 * * *
McGuire Units 1 & 2 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 with a requirement to be in Mode 5 in 37 hours. A Notification of Enforcement Discretion was verbally approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on 1/20/11 at 2336 EST, therefore both Unit 1 & 2 will remain in Mode 3.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sykes), NRR EO (Thomas), and IRD MOC (Gott) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46562 | Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE TERRY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 01/21/2011
Notification Time: 22:25 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2011
Event Time: 15:39 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text STEAM EXCLUSION DOOR DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On 1/21/2011 at 1539 CST, the NRC Resident Inspector informed the Control Room that the lower Cane bolt was disengaged on Steam Exclusion Door 3, between Emergency Diesel Generator Room B and the Cardox Room. While the Cane bolt was not engaged, the barrier was Non-Functional and, in accordance with TRM 3.0.9, all equipment supported by that steam exclusion barrier was immediately declared inoperable. This included both Emergency Diesel Generators A & 8, safety-related 4160 V Busses 5 & 6, Service Water Trains A & B, and safety-related 480 V Busses 51, 52, 61. & 62. In addition, with Service Water inoperable, the following equipment was also inoperable in accordance with TRM 3.3.1: Component Cooling Trains A & B, Safety Injection Trains A & B, Residual Heat Removal Trains A & B, Containment Spray and Cooling Trains A & B, Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps A & B, and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. With all three AFW pumps inoperable. TS 3 A.b.2 was entered to immediately initiate action to restore one AFW Train to operable status and suspend all LCOs requiring mode changes until one AFW Train is restored to operable status.
"Steam Exclusion Door 3 was properly secured at 1545 CST on 1/21/2011, and LCO 3.O.c and TS 3 A.b.2 were exited at that time. All equipment affected by the steam exclusion barrier is operable.
"This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(B), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function,' and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) 'any event or condition that results in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46563 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MYERS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 01/21/2011
Notification Time: 23:00 [ET]
Event Date: 01/18/2011
Event Time: 17:31 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text BOTH LOOPS OF LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE
"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
"On 1/18/2011 at 1731 CST, it was discovered that the open position indication light for RR-MO-53A, Reactor Recirculation [RR] Pump A discharge valve operator, was de-energized. The RR-MO-53A operator is powered by a 250 VDC motor with 125VDC control power. Investigations revealed that the 125 VDC control power circuit fuses for the valve operator were open. RR-MO-53A must close at a reactor pressure of 199 to 221 psig to allow Residual Heat Removal [RHR] Loop A to inject to the reactor during a LOCA involving Reactor Recirculation Loop B. This condition rendered RHR Loop A Low Pressure Coolant Injection [LPCI] function inoperable. At the time of discovery, RHR Loop B LPCI function was inoperable for planned maintenance. This maintenance was being performed on the service water side of the RHR heat exchanger, RHR-MO-25B, RHR Loop B Injection Outboard Isolation valve operator, RHR pump B motor, and RHR-MO-39B, Suppression Chamber Cooling Loop B Outboard Isolation valve operator. As specified by the Required Action for LCO 3.5.1 Condition H, two or more low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable, LCO 3.0.3 was immediately entered. LCO 3.0.3 requires the plant to be shutdown to Mode 2 within 7 hours. Preparations to commence plant shutdown were initiated in parallel with investigations to determine the cause of the open control power fuses. Subsequent troubleshooting revealed a failed light socket caused the fuses to open. The fuses were replaced and the circuit tested satisfactorily. At 1915 CST on 1/18/2011, RHR Loop A LPCI was declared Operable and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. The plant shutdown procedure was terminated prior to any power reduction occurring.
"Initial review of this condition for immediate reportability under 50.72(b)(3)(v), Condition that Prevents Fulfillment of a Safety Function, concluded the condition was not reportable based on the availability of Core Spray Pump A [CS-P-A], Core Spray Pump B [CS-P-B ], and RHR Pump D [RHR-P-D]. Procedure 2.0.11.1, Safety Function Determination Program, states that Emergency Core Cooling System [ECCS] Safety Function is maintained if three low pressure ECCS Injection/Spray pumps remain operable. CS-P-A, CS-P-B and RHR-P-D all were operable at the time of discovery of the condition. RHR Pump B was restored to available at 1510. The maintenance on RHR Loop B did not remove RHR-P-D from service and an injection path was available at time of discovery of LPCI Loop A inoperable as RHR-MO-25B, RHR Loop B Injection Outboard Isolation valve, post work testing had been completed and the injection capability restored at 1701. Subsequent review determined that the reportability decision under 50.72(b)(3)(v) as a Condition that Prevents Fulfillment of a Safety Function should be based on safety function at the system level, rather than at the ECCS function level. The decision to report the simultaneous inoperability of both RHR LPCI Loops under 50.72(b)(3)(v) was made at 1549 on 1/21/2011."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46564 | Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: GREG SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 01/22/2011
Notification Time: 18:24 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/2011
Event Time: 17:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF GENERATOR LOAD
The licensee reported a loss of main generator load at full power resulting in a generator trip, turbine trip, and reactor trip. All rods fully inserted. All safety systems functioned as required. The reactor is stable at no-load temperature and pressure in Hot Standby. Auxiliary feedwater started as expected and is currently supplying cooling water to the steam generators. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric steam dumps because the turbine bypass system did not respond as expected. There is no known primary to secondary generator leakage The grid is stable and the plant is in a normal post-trip electrical lineup. The reactor trip was characterized as uncomplicated.
The cause of the loss of generator load is not yet know and under investigation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The local County Sheriff was notified of the use of the atmospheric steam dumps to alleviate any concern from local population in the vicinity of the plant. | |