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Event Notification Report for May 17, 2010

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/14/2010 - 05/17/2010

** EVENT NUMBERS **


45915 45926 45927 45929 45930

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45915
Rep Org: NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: T & K INSPECTIONS INC.
Region: 4
City: WILLISTON State: ND
County: WILLIAMS
License #: ND33-22313-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LOUISE ROERICH
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 05/11/2010
Notification Time: 12:15 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2010
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE

The following information was obtained from the State of North Dakota via email:

"T&K Inspections, Inc., reported the inability to retract a 3.55 TBq (96 Ci ) Ir-192 radiography source into the exposure device (Source Production & Equipment Company Model SPEC 150, serial number 295) on May 10, 2010. Operations were being performed approximately 2 miles south of Highway 2, on 94th street, south of Ross, ND about 9:00 am CDT.

"After completing the exposure, the radiographer and assistant radiographer performed the routine procedure to retract the source into the camera. The survey meter registered no activity above background, so they believed the source had retracted. As the radiographer approached the camera, the survey meter registered off-scale. He immediately stepped away from the camera and attempted to check the cable and retract the source. At this time, his pocket dosimeter registered 3mR/hr. With the survey meter continuing to register activity, the President and assistant RSO of T&K Inspections, Inc. was contacted. He suggested working with the crank and they were able to retract the source into the camera. The camera was located near the vehicle. As the radiography crew placed the camera onto the end gate of the truck, the survey meter and his pocket dosimeter were off-scale. They immediately moved away from the camera and called the assistant RSO again. The cables were still connected to the camera, so the assistant RSO had the radiographer straighten the cable and try to retract the source. The source was successfully retracted into the camera housing. The camera was secured in the vehicle and the crew returned to the shop.

"Prior to this incident, T&K Inspections, Inc. believed they had trouble with the lock mechanism on this camera. April 28, 2010, the camera was sent to SPEC for inspection and maintenance. Maintenance and inspection was performed on the camera May 3, 2010. SPEC replaced parts of the camera and returned it to T&K Inspection with a certification document. The camera was placed back into service and has been used prior to the incident. T&K Inspections, Inc. believes when the camera was returned to the vehicle the lock mechanism was not functioning properly.

"The assistant RSO has sent the film badges overnight delivery to be evaluated. The radiographer and assistant radiographer will not perform radiography until return of the dosimetry reports. The assistant RSO will follow-up with a report of the incident, copy of the camera certification, copy of the film badge reports and any other pertinent information as needed.

"The camera has been taken out of service and will be returned to SPEC. It will be determined if the camera or parts will be replaced."

Camera source information: "Ir-192 SPEC G-60 Source, S/N RE0304, 96 Ci

"State Action:
"1. The North Dakota Department of Health (NDDOH) will maintain contact with T&K Inspections, Inc. to determine the root cause of the incident.
"2. The NDDOH will receive a copy of the dosimetry reports and a copy of the certificate from SPEC from the camera maintenance and inspection that was performed prior to the incident.
"3. The NDDOH will follow-up with the camera inspection that will be performed at this time."

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 45926
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
                   COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: COLUMBIA State: SC
County: RICHLAND
License #: SNM-1107
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001151
NRC Notified By: GERARD COUTURE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/14/2010
Notification Time: 10:54 [ET]
Event Date: 05/13/2010
Event Time: 12:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
KING STABLEIN (NMSS)

Event Text

A VALVE CLASSIFIED AS AN ITEM RELIED ON FOR SAFETY FOUND CLOSED WHILE POSITION INDICATOR SHOWED OPEN

"It was reported to EH&S [Environmental Health & Safety] Management that on May 13, 2010 that the XV-202-I valve actuator was showing open when the valve was closed. This valve is the Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) eduction back-up emergency shut off valve and is credited as a protective feature for a high level condition in the hydrolysis column. This valve is a key component of an Item Relied On for Safety (IROFS) and is identified in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary for the conversion area of the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility. This IROFS designation is ADUVAP-110. No process upset occurred and the condition was discovered by the production staff during normal operation.

"This notification is made based on 10CFR70 Appendix A (b) (2), 'Loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.' The performance requirements for this accident sequence require the Overall Likelihood Index (OLI) be a -4, which corresponds to Highly Unlikely. With this control failure the sequence OLI is a -3 which corresponds to Unlikely.

"Immediate Corrective Actions:
- Upon identification of the issue on May 13, production shut down conversion line 2 and generated a 'red book' to inform EH&S.
- Maintenance determined the valve actuator had been installed incorrectly.
- Maintenance properly installed the actuator on the valve and demonstrated proper performance.
- The event has been entered into the Corrective Action Process IR# 10-134-C001.
- Conversion line 2 remains shutdown pending staff management authorization for restart.
- For all modifications/maintenance activity on IROFS in safety significant systems, staff management approval is required for restart of the system."

The licensee believes that the valve mis-position and indication issues occurred during maintenance on the valve approximately one week prior to discovery of the condition.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45927
Rep Org: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Licensee: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DALE PORTER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/14/2010
Notification Time: 14:11 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

BENT FUEL SPACER FLOW WING

"During inspection of GNF2 reload fuel, a spacer flow wing on the corner rod position was discovered to be deformed (bent). A review of this condition and the associated root cause evaluation has determined that it could be present in previously manufactured GNF2 fuel that has been shipped for Fitzpatrick Cycle 19, Pilgrim Cycle 18, Vermont Yankee Cycle 28, Vermont Yankee GNF2 Lead Use Assemblies and Grand Gulf Cycle 18. It is not known that this condition exists in the GNF2 fuel for these plants, but it cannot be ruled out. A conservative assessment of thermal hydraulic impact of this condition resulted in a 0.01 OLMCPR [Operating Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio] impact for these plants. An OLMCPR impact of 0.01 is at the threshold for reportability."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45929
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS HAAF
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/14/2010
Notification Time: 17:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2010
Event Time: 15:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER NONFUNCTIONAL

"At 1530 on May 14th, 2010, Three Mile Islands Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation, filtration and climate control system was identified as nonfunctional. Site emergency implementation procedures provide direction for performance of TSC functions in alternate locations. This failure affects the ability of the TSC ventilation to maintain adequate radiological habitability in the event of an emergency with an airborne radiological release. All other capabilities of the TSC are unaffected by this emergent condition. This condition is considered a major loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45930
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CREASY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/15/2010
Notification Time: 01:17 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2010
Event Time: 23:01 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 94 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO INCREASING REACTOR WATER LEVEL

"At approximately 2301 hours EDT on May 14, 2010, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit One reactor scrammed while performing a condensate pump trip test. The reactor operator placed the mode switch in shutdown when reactor water level reached +51 inches and rising. The main turbine tripped due to high reactor water level. All control rods inserted and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped. Reactor water level lowered to -30 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. The Operations crew restored reactor water level to the normal operating band using RCIC [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling] and subsequently the feedwater system. All isolations at this level occurred as expected. No steam relief valves opened. Pressure was controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected.

"The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation into the cause of the shutdown is underway. Unit Two continued power operation.

"The NRC Resident Inspectors were notified. A press release will occur."

The licensee was performing testing on the digital feedwater control system which was installed during their recent refueling outage when the loss of level control occurred. It appears that the control system did not respond fast enough to control water level. This resulted in the reactor operator inserting a manual scram at +51 inches prior to reaching the reactor automatic scram setpoint of +54 inches for water level.

Currently, the plant is removing decay heat via main steam line drains to the condenser. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup with all safety equipment available. The licensee has notified the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.

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Thursday, March 29, 2012