United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2009 > April 22

Event Notification Report for April 22, 2009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
04/21/2009 - 04/22/2009

** EVENT NUMBERS **


44933 45004 45006

To top of page
General Information or Other Event Number: 44933
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: WELD SPEC, INC
Region: 4
City: BEAUMONT State: TX
County:
License #: 05426
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 03/25/2009
Notification Time: 12:05 [ET]
Event Date: 03/25/2009
Event Time: 09:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/21/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POSSIBLE OVEREXPOSURE OF EMPLOYEE

"On March 25, 2009, at 0940, the State of Texas was notified by a licensee that they had received a report from their dosimetry processor indicating that one of their employees had received greater than 1000 rad exposure for the month of February, 2009. The exposure record provided did not indicate whether the exposure was static or dynamic. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), who started this position in the first part of March, 2009, contacted the radiographer. The radiographer stated that she had not performed any operations with a radiography camera because she had hurt her knee. The radiographer stated that she had worked nine jobs, and all her work was done in the dark room. The RSO has made arrangements for the radiographer to have blood work done today, 3/25/09. The RSO stated that she had two other individuals who had received higher than normal readings but had not exceeded any limits. These individuals were reassigned to duties that will limit their exposure.

"An Agency (state) investigator contacted the radiographer and asked her when in the month of February she had started wearing her badge. She stated that she began wearing the badge in the middle of February. She stated that she picked it up from a mail box at the company's office. She stated that she carried the badge with her in [her] lunch box when she was not wearing it and that no one else would have had access to the badge from this point on.

"She stated that no source disconnects had occurred at any of the work sites she was at in the month of February. She stated that she does not know how her badge could have received that much exposure, but she is sure she had not received that much exposure. She stated that she felt fine. Additional information will follow as it is received."

Texas Incident Number: I-8622

* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO PETE SNYDER AT 1218 ON 3/27/09 * * *

"The state received a fax which contained a copy of the blood work done on 3/26/09 for the individual involved from the licensee. Also included in the fax was a copy of blood work that was done on the individual on 2/25/09 prior to a medical procedure. Both samples returned very similar results and were considered normal by her physician."

Notified R4DO (O'Keefe) and FSME (McIntosh).

* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER VIA E-MAIL TO KARL DIEDERICH AT 1239 ON 4/21/09 * * *

"The licensee has removed the exposure recorded on the individual's dosimeter and assigned a dose of 416 millirem for the exposure period. The licensee provided a copy of the dosimetry processor's report indicating the change in exposure."

Notified R4DO (Gaddy) and FSME (McIntosh).

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 45004
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID KARST
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 04/21/2009
Notification Time: 07:53 [ET]
Event Date: 04/21/2009
Event Time: 03:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/21/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 96 Power Operation 96 Power Operation

Event Text

INADVERTENT ACTIVATION OF ONE EMERGENCY SIREN

"At 0300 on 4/21/09, Emergency Siren K-008, which had a population coverage of 1%, inadvertently actuated and required Emergency Planning Personnel to deactivate [it]. Currently Siren K-008 is non-functional and required population coverage of KPS [Kewaunee Power Station] emergency sirens is acceptable. Due to Siren Activation, local offsite agencies have been notified of the failure as follows:

"Kewaunee Sheriff Department and Kewaunee EOC are aware of the local activation and disconnect so compensatory measures can be initiated if required.

"Point Beach has been notified.

"Manitowoc EOC has been notified."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 45006
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WAYNE HOYLE
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 04/21/2009
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2009
Event Time: 04:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/21/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 85 Power Operation

Event Text

INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF TURBINE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP

"On February 23, 2009 at 0406, with Unit 1 at 100% power level, McGuire Nuclear Station experienced an inadvertent actuation of the Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump. This event occurred when power was removed to the steam admittance solenoid valves for the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump prior to isolating the steam supply to the pump. Removing power to the steam admittance valves caused them to fail open, starting the pump and injecting water into all four Unit 1 Steam Generators (S/Gs). Flow to the S/Gs was isolated by manually closing the Unit 1 TDAFW discharge isolation valve to each S/G. During recovery from the event, power was restored to the steam admittance solenoid valves for the running Unit 1 TDAFW Pump. Restoration of power generated a pump auto start signal which resulted in inadvertent automatic closure of both trains of blowdown containment isolation valves and both trains of sample containment isolation valves for each Unit 1 S/G.

"Subsequent evaluation of the event concluded that the actuation of the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump, S/G blowdown containment isolation valves, and S/G sample containment isolation valves was not the result of a valid signal initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the safety function provided by the respective component. In addition, the actuation of these components was not the result of an intentional manual initiation. Therefore, actuation of the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump, S/G blowdown containment isolation valves, and S/G sample containment isolation valves represented invalid actuations which are not reportable per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Although the actuation of these components represented invalid actuations, they were not pre-planned, the systems were not removed from service, and the safety function provided by the components had not already been completed. Therefore, McGuire is reporting actuation of the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump, S/G blowdown containment isolation valves, and S/G sample containment isolation valves in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). Note that closing the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump discharge isolation valve to each S/G to isolate flow rendered the Unit 1 TDAFW inoperable. However, these valves were opened and the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump was restored to an operable status within the required completion time specified in the Auxiliary Feedwater System Technical Specification.

"As indicated in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) other than actuation of the Reactor Protection System when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. In these cases the telephone report is not considered an LER. McGuire is exercising this option by providing this telephone notification. The following additional information is being provided as part of the telephone notification of this event:

"The Unit 1 TDAFW Pump injected water into all four Unit 1 S/Gs for approximately 3 and 1/2, minutes before flow was isolated by manually closing the Unit 1 TDAFW discharge isolation valve to each S/G. Subsequent evaluation determined that Unit 1 reactor power did not exceed 100% during the event. The actuation of the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump was complete and successful.

"This event actuated both trains of blowdown containment isolation valves and both trains of sample containment isolation valves for each Unit 1 S/G. Each train's actuation was complete and successful.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

The TDAFW pump was being removed from service, and the steam admittance solenoid valves should have been isolated prior to removing power to them.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012