| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/20/2009 - 03/23/2009 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 44849 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: EDWIN URQUHART
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 02/12/2009
Notification Time: 16:56 [ET]
Event Date: 02/12/2009
Event Time: 12:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SUCTION SOURCE INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTION
"Unit 2 HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) system is being considered inoperable due to the following information: (Condition Report 2009101257) The instrumentation associated with the automatic suction swap for Unit 2 HPCI was reviewed as a result of CR 2009100480 to confirm the set points that determine the condensate storage tank (CST) level at which the suction swap would occur. During the course of this review, the corporate design engineer contacted the level switch vendor to review the configuration of the level switches and to confirm the expected operation of the switches (2E41-N002 & 2E41-N003) given their configuration. Based on the configuration of the instrument lines and physical location of the level switches, the vendor reported that either liquid or gas would most likely be entrapped in the external cage of the Magnetrol level switches. This would prevent the instruments from performing their automatic swap function. Based on this information the 'as found' condition of the switches indicate that this condition has been present since the installation of the switches when implementing the DCP in 1991 which affects the operability of this instrumentation.
"Even though the suction swap instrumentation on low CST level is considered inoperable, there is no apparent actual adverse impact on nuclear safety. However, the instrumentation is included in the Technical Specifications and its inoperability would make HPCI inoperable if it is aligned to the CST rather than being aligned to the suppression pool. The normal system alignment is with its suction source to the CST, therefore HPCI is being considered as inoperable.
"Until the configuration of the level switches has been addressed, these Magnetrol level switches must be considered inoperable, the appropriate Technical Specification RAS [Required Action Statement] will be entered and the suction source for HPCI should be aligned to the suppression pool when HPCI is required to be operable. This condition only applies to Unit 2."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATED AT 1648 EDT ON 03/20/2009 FROM EDWEN URQUHART TO V. KLCO * * *
Event Report 44849 Retraction:
"On February 12, 2009, a condition was discovered where the physical location of level switches relied upon for automatically transferring the suction of the Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system from the condensate storage tank (CST) to the suppression pool on low CST level did not meet the setpoints given in the Technical Specifications. Based on the information available at that time HPCI would have to be considered inoperable based on the fact that the affected instrumentation was inoperable and with HPCI aligned to the CST. Since the unit was shutdown HPCI was not required to be operable.
"After further review the determination has been made that at the time of discovery the 'as found' plant configuration associated with the suction swap setpoint for the Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system could NOT have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function since the unit was in Cold Shutdown, and HPCI was not required to be operable. Based on this information this condition did not require an NRC notification in accordance with I0CFR50.72 and as such is being retracted through this update response. The condition will be reported in accordance with I0CFR50.73(a)(2)(v),"
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Sykes) |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44911 | Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: PITTSBURGH State: PA
County:
License #: PA-0121
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JENNIFER KELLY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 03/17/2009
Notification Time: 09:05 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text PENNSYLVANIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT
The following information was received from the State of Pennsylvania via email:
"A female patient was to receive HDR twice a day for a total of 10 treatments with an expected dose of 34Gy via mammosite treatment. A dummy wire was inserted into the balloon to check and measure the tube length for dosage calculations. A CT scan was performed daily to verify the position of the treatment site. Treatment calculations were done, reviewed, approved, and treatment began Monday, February 23, 2009.
"[On] Friday, February 27, 2009, a different therapy physicist was checking the patients charts and thought that there may have been an error.
"[On] Monday, March 2, 2009, the original physicist checked the findings of the different therapy physicist and discovered that there had been an error in the placement of the source during the treatment. The source was not fully inserted into the balloon, but was 3cm from where it should have been, thereby resulting not only in a large difference in the tumor dose received (approx. 30% of intended) but also in a severe dosage to non-intended areas of the patient.
"The physicist, RSO and two licensee's radiation oncologist reviewed the situation once it was discovered. The patient is being followed for any sequelae (pathological conditions) to the event. It was reported that erythema (dilated capillaries) is developing consequential to the event. Follow ups are expected to occur weekly. The oncologist has discussed the event with the patient."
PA Case # PA090011
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44912 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: SEADRIFT State: TX
County:
License #: 00051
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 03/18/2009
Notification Time: 09:44 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2009
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/18/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PROCESS GAUGE SHUTTER HANDLE BROKE
"On the afternoon of 3/17/09, while closing the shutter of a Ohmart/Vega SH-F1 level detection gauge, the handle separated from the shutter closure device. The gauge contains a 10 milliCurie Cesium (Cs) - 137 source serial # 5747 GK. The license can not confirm the exact position of the shutter, but they are sure that it is not closed yet. Lubricants have been used on the shutter mechanism to aid in its operation. The licensee will continue their attempts to close the shutter on 3/18/09. If unable to close, they will request assistance from the manufacturer. Additional information will be provided as it is received."
Texas Event: I-8620
* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA EMAIL @1745 ON 3/18/09 * * *
"The Radiation Safety Officer notified the [State of Texas] that the gauge had not been fully closed yet, but area dose rates were normal therefore the gauge does not create additional risk of exposure to their workers."
Notified R4DO (Hay) and FSME EO (Camper). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44913 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: LANTHEUS MEDICAL IMAGING, INC.
Region: 1
City: BILLERICA State: MA
County:
License #: 60-0088
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LARRY HARRINGTON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 03/18/2009
Notification Time: 14:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/2009
Event Time: 10:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/18/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)
| Event Text MASSACHUSETTS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - HIGH RADIATION ON OUTSIDE OF A RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL PACK
The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via facsimile:
"Lantheus Medical Imaging was receiving a delivery from Cardinal Health Nuclear Pharmacy [MA License# 41-0366] of F-18 and found the dose rate on the outside of package to be 1.7 R/hr. Lantheus immediately contacted Cardinal Health and notified them of the dose rate. Cardinal Health believed the shielding somehow moved in route. Lantheus accepted the delivery and placed the package in a restricted room to check out later in the day." |
| Hospital | Event Number: 44918 | Rep Org: VIRTUA HEALTH SYSTEM
Licensee: VIRTUA HEALTH SYSTEM
Region: 1
City: MARLTON State: NJ
County:
License #: 29-01862
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN JANUSESKI
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 03/19/2009
Notification Time: 17:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2009
Event Time: 14:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
| Person (Organization):
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)
| Event Text MEDICAL BRACHYTHERAPY TO UNINTENDED SITE
"At approx. 1415 hrs. [3/19/09] the physicist was performing a post operative dosimetry analysis of the Iodine-125 prostate seed brachytherapy implant for [the patient] when it was discovered that none of the implanted seeds made it to their intended destination, and were, in fact, implanted outside the target organ. The seeds retained their planned pattern grouping, with the superior end of the seed cloud being about 2 cm from the apex of the prostate gland. A dosimetric analysis of the CT image revealed all 93 seeds accounted for, and a calculated dose to 90% of the target organ (prescription line) being 2.24 Gy. The prescribed dose in the Written Directive was 145 Gy.
"As the seeds appear distal to the target organ, the dose appears to be maximally confined to soft tissue including muscle and subcutaneous fat. A complete analysis was requested of the Radiation Oncologist who was immediately informed. A preliminary dose report was printed for review.
"Actions Taken: The attending Radiation Oncologist was immediately notified. It was also noted by the physicist/RSO that this event was reportable as a Medical Event under 10CFR35. [The] License Administrator, was notified at approximately 3:00 PM as was the Nuclear Medicine Manager. The preliminary dosimetry report was printed at 1632 hrs and the NRC Operations Center was notified at 1701 hrs by telephone. A follow-up notice will be emailed to the Ops Center within 1 hr.
"The involved individuals were notified of the NRC contact and a request was made for an investigation. Marlton Risk Management will also be informed."
Incident Number: 2009-03-19
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facilities use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44920 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN KEMPKES
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 03/19/2009
Notification Time: 21:39 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2009
Event Time: 15:32 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNPLANNED START OF A COOLING WATER PUMP DURING TESTING
"In preparation for planned maintenance of 12 Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump (Train A), 121 Cooling Water Pump was aligned as a safeguards replacement pump per plant procedures. Maintenance steps were then completed to a point allowing testing and 12 DDCLP was restored. The Operations procedure steps to enter the Cooling Water LCO 3.7.8 Condition A and realign 121 CL Pump away from being a safeguards replacement were missed and permission was granted to perform testing. 12 DDCLP was locally started per the PM and then tripped as directed from rated speed at 1513. The pump trip resulted in a cooling water pressure transient that automatically started 121 CLP and is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3) as an unplanned safety related system actuation. 121 CLP operated normally and there were no adverse plant effects from the transient.
"During the investigation of the automatic start, it was recognized that with 121 CLP still aligned as a safeguards replacement and 12 DDCLP running locally, a Safety Injection signal and start of 22 Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump (Train B) would result in 121 CLP trip. LCO 3.7.8 Condition A was entered for one safeguards pump OOS and 121 CLP was returned to OPERABLE status at 1613. 121 Cooling Water Pump was shut down and returned to standby at 1936.
"Maintenance activities and testing for 12 DDCLP have been suspended pending investigation and corrective actions. 121 CLP remains aligned as a safeguards replacement and both cooling water headers have operable safeguards pumps."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * * UPDATE AT 1700 EDT ON 03/20/09 FROM TYLER GREENFIELD TO S. SANDIN * * *
"The licensee has completed its initial investigation and corrective actions. Maintenance and testing activities for 12 Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump has resumed.
"There was an error in the text of the initial notification, the time of the autostart of 121 Motor Driven Cooing Water Pump was 1532 not 1513."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Ring). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44921 | Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVE LANYI
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 03/20/2009
Notification Time: 14:13 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/2009
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)
BRIAN HOLIAN (NRR)
ILTAB via email ()
| | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. |
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text MISSING NICKEL-63 LICENSED RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
"On February 18, 2009, during a scheduled radioactive material inventory activity, a personnel explosive detection device containing 15 mCi of Nickel-63 was discovered missing. A search of the facility has not located the licensed material at this time.
"This is being reported under 10 CFR 20.2201 (a)(ii), Loss of licensed material greater than 10 times the quantity specified in Appendix C to 20.1001 - 20.2401 {20.2201(a)}."
The personnel explosive detection model information is: Smiths Detection; Ionscan Sentinel II; Instrument Serial Number - 213028; Sealed Source Serial Number (from the manufacturer) - MY 636.
The Licensee suspects that this material was disposed as trash.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44922 | Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DARRELL CORBIN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 03/20/2009
Notification Time: 22:56 [ET]
Event Date: 03/20/2009
Event Time: 20:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation | Event Text STATE OF MICHIGAN NOTIFIED OF ONSITE SEWAGE SPILL
"At 2030 hours on March 20, 2009 it was determined that sewage from the onsite sewage system had exited the system through a manhole on the 590 foot elevation of the site. This discharge, a clear odorless water, then flowed along the asphalt roadway to a storm drain which ultimately discharges to the beach of Lake Michigan (no fluid reached Lake Michigan waters). The State of Michigan, via the Pollution Emergency Alert System (PEAS), was notified as required by the Site Spill Plan by the Site Environmental Coordinator at 2207 hours. The local government (Van Buren County) was notified at 2220 hours via 911."
The licensee informed both state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44923 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JERRY HELKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 03/21/2009
Notification Time: 07:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2009
Event Time: 01:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 18 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INITIATION FOLLOWING PLANNED MANUAL SCRAM
"At 0121 on Saturday, March 21, 2009, Nine Mile Point Unit One was manually scrammed from approximately 18% rated power in preparation for Refueling Outage 20. The plant scram was a planned evolution. Following the manual scram insertion at 0121, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level. At 0123, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation setpoint, and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. At Nine Mile Point Unit One the HPCI system is a mode of operation of the feedwater and condensate system. It is not an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). A HPCI System actuation signal on low RPV level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink.
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires reporting within 8 hours when a valid actuation of the feedwater coolant injection system occurs. The event has been entered into the corrective action program. There are no other adverse impacts to the station based on this event."
All control rods fully inserted. Electrical lineup is normal and there are no safety equipment out of service.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44924 | Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JAMES BLAZEK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 03/21/2009
Notification Time: 11:53 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2009
Event Time: 09:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4)
BRIAN HOLIAN (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text VARIOUS CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS AND ALARMS OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO MAINTENANCE ON POWER SUPPLY
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On March 21, 2009, from approximately 09:00 Mountain Standard Time (MST) until 14:00 MST, Palo Verde maintenance personnel will be performing scheduled maintenance to repair one of two redundant 120 VAC power supplies in Unit 2 that provides power to various alarms in the main control room. This work will require both power supplies to be de-energized resulting in approximately 50 percent of the Unit 2 plant annunciators being unavailable.
"The following compensatory measures will be in place for the duration of the scheduled work:
Other assessment indications will remain available:
Plant Monitoring System
Qualified Safety Parameter Display System
Emergency Response Facility Data Acquisition System
No changes in plant power or operating mode are planned.
A third licensed operator will be in the control room.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the scheduled outage and this ENS call."
* * * UPDATE FROM JAMES BLAZEK TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1821 EDT ON MARCH 21, 2009 * * *
The power supply was successfully repaired and all annunciators were restored to normal as of 1515 MST.
The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Hay) and NRR EO (Holian). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44925 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL D. HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 03/21/2009
Notification Time: 11:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2009
Event Time: 04:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNEXPECTED LOGIC LOCKOUT OF DIVISION I RHR DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"Operations was performing 1-SR-3.3.5.1.6(BI), Functional Testing of RHR Loop I Pump and Minimum Flow Valve Logic, which rendered Division I of RHR INOPERABLE. While placing a jumper in accordance with procedural direction. Unit 1 received RHR Pump Initiate Lockout amber lights 1-IL-74-28 and 1-IL-74-39 for 1B and 1D RHR pumps (Division II). This was immediately recognized as being unexpected and action was taken to restore the 1B and 1D RHR pump auto start capability. The 1B and 1D RHR pumps were prevented from auto starting for approximately 1 minute. The Logic functioned as designed; however, this condition was caused by a procedure error. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3 based on TS LCO 3.5.1 Condition H - Two or more Low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition A. TS 3.0.3 was exited after approximately one minute when the auto start capability of 1B and 1D RHR pumps was restored. 1B and 1D RHR pumps were available for manual initiation and remained OPERABLE for Containment Cooling and Shut Down Cooling Functions.
"This event is reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
"At 0407, the condition requiring this report was removed and safety function capability was restored." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44926 | Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRIS LALLY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 03/21/2009
Notification Time: 18:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2009
Event Time: 12:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE FOLLOWING FAILURE OF VALVE TO FULLY OPEN DURING SURVEILLANCE TEST
"The Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable at 12:07 on March 21. 2009 when HPCI Outboard Suppression Pool Suction Valve, MO-3-23-057, failed to fully open during testing. At this time the cause of the failure of MO-3-23-057 to stroke fully open is unknown. Investigation is in progress."
This places Unit 3 in two (2) Tech Spec LCO Action Statements; 3.5.1 (14 day restoration with HPCI inop) and 3.6.1.3, Condition A (4 hour immediate action with verification every 31 days of Primary Containment Isolation Valves). Actions required by both have been completed.
The failure occurred during performance of the quarterly surveillance test.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44927 | Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MURRELL EVANS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 03/22/2009
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2009
Event Time: 13:34 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
NEIL O'KEEFE (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text UNIT 1 STEAM GENERATOR FOUND IN AN UNANALYZED CONDITION RELATED TO GAPS ON SEISMIC WASHER PLATES
"At 1334 on March 22, 2009, while Unit 1 was in Mode 3, replacement steam generator (RSG) 1-3 was conservatively determined to be in an unanalyzed condition in that seismic washer plates were found to have nonconforming gaps on two of the four steam generator support columns. A plant walk down discovered that the two washer plates were not seated in the column adapter due to an interfering weld on the interior recess of the column adapter. Because of this condition, Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered for Unit 1.
"At 1536 on March 22, 2009, a shim was installed between the washer plate and the column adapter at each of the two non-conforming locations on RSG 1-3 of sufficient thickness to clear the weld metal interfering with washers. This action brought the support columns for RSG 1-3, support foot joints into compliance with the full design capacity. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited for Unit 1 at that time.
"This issue was discussed with US NRC DCPP Senior Resident." | |