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Event Notification Report for December 29, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/24/2008 - 12/29/2008

** EVENT NUMBERS **


44671 44711 44733 44734 44739 44740 44741 44742 44743 44744

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 44671
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RANDY KOUBA
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/20/2008
Notification Time: 18:24 [ET]
Event Date: 11/20/2008
Event Time: 12:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/24/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"On 20 Nov 08 at 1230, the Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) was declared inoperable due to a report that a non-running Control Room supply fan discharge damper was found partially open. Per the System Operating Procedure, the idle fan's discharge damper must be fully closed to assure operability. With the damper not closed, reasonable assurance that CREFS would fulfill its safety function could not be established.

"With the Idle Control Room supply fan discharge damper not in the closed position, some portion of the air discharged from the operating Control Room supply fan will go backwards through the idle supply fan to the suction side of both supply fans. The CREFS fan discharges to the Control Room supply fan suctions. With CREFS in this as-found line-up, there is no assurance that the flow through CREFS is high enough to meet the design requirements assumed in control room occupant dose calculations.

"The Control Room supply fans and discharge dampers are required support features for CREFS at CNS. This is a single train system and per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) an 8 hour report is required due to the fact that at the time of discovery this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of an SSC that is required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

"The damper was returned to a fully closed position at the time of discovery, and CREFS was returned to operable status."

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY DAVID VANDERKAMP TO JASON KOZAL AT 1054 ON 12/24/08 * * *

"This notification is being made to retract Event Notification EN# 44671 which reported a loss of safety function due to the unplanned inoperability of the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) system. The CREF system was declared inoperable due to the non-running control room supply fan discharge damper found partially open on November 20, 2008. Cooper Nuclear Station has determined through further evaluation that while the CREF system was procedurally required to be declared inoperable, the ability of the CREF system to perform its safety function was not lost.

"Testing was performed on December 19, 2008, with the non-running control room supply fan discharge damper aligned in the as-found condition (~25% open) of November 20, 2008 and again tested with the damper aligned to 50% open. Technical Specifications surveillance flow requirements were met in both tests. Using the results of the test and inspection of the discharge damper it has been concluded that during the ten days the damper was out of position, the CREF system was still capable of performing its safety function and satisfying Technical Specifications requirements."

Notified R4DO (Werner).

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 44711
Facility: BWX TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: BARRY COLE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 12/10/2008
Notification Time: 15:57 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2008
Event Time: 16:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
PETER HABIGHORST (NMSS)
FUELS GROUP (OUO) (E-MA)

Event Text

AS-BUILT DEPTH OF LOW LEVEL DISSOLVER SYSTEM DISSOLVER TRAYS EXCEEDED MAXIMUM DESIGN DEPTH

"Event Description: Planned upgrades to the Low Level Dissolver System in the BWXT's Uranium Recovery Facility were undergoing a safety review as part of the change management process. One of the upgrades involved replacement of the dissolver trays to utilize trays of the same length, width, and depth throughout the dissolution process. During the evaluation process a Recovery process engineer questioned differences between the tray heights in the current safety basis and the change review documentation. The ISA summary listed the tray geometry as an Item Relied on For Safety (IROFS). This limit was the same as that discussed in the text of the change management documentation.

"Once it was determined that the discrepancy in the documentation also represented an as-built condition in the field, the Low Level Dissolution process was immediately shutdown pending further evaluation of the safety concern. The IROFS tray geometry was degraded.

"Evaluation of the Event: A review of related safety release documentation indicated the original trays installed in 1999 met the NCS requirements. The requirements limited the tray or allowed modification of the tray (drilling holes, cutting slots) to limit the solution height. Due to the corrosive nature of the process, the trays degrade over time and are replaced when a minimum wall thickness is achieved. The replacement trays were intended to be of like kind. The current fabrication drawing attached to the change management documentation shows no additional features to limit the solution height.

"The initial review of the accident scenario for a geometry upset indicated that although an IROFS was degraded, other IROFS (operator control of mass, operator control of moderator, and poisoning by the tray materials of construction) remained available to assure double contingency. This is a qualitative evaluation that does not analyze the magnitude of the upset condition. The original NCS analysis of the Low Level Dissolver trays conducted in 1999 evaluated tray height; the impact of a range of tray heights was not considered.

"The as-found condition in the field, including tray height, was subsequently modeled using BWXT's validated NCS codes and approved methodology. The normal operating condition was determined to be within the k-effective limit of 0.92 in BWXT's NRC License SNM-42 for a high enriched uranium (HEU) system. When a fully flooded moderation upset condition was analyzed, although the resulting k-effective was shown to
be subcritical, it exceeded the safety limit of 0.95 in BWXT's license for a HEU system. This determination was reached at 4:30 pm on December 9, 2008.

"There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. A fully flooded condition in the Low Level Dissolver is extremely unlikely. The equipment is located on a mezzanine, well above the main process area.

"There are no water sources (e.g., sprinklers) in the area, and the dissolvers are not contained in water tight enclosures. However, with the degradation of the IROFS of tray height, and demonstration that the as-found condition exceeded the license limit for a single upset condition, double contingency could no longer be assured.

"Notification Requirements: BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(2) loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that results in failure to meet the performance requirement of 70.61.

"Status of Corrective Actions: An investigation of the root causes of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation."

The Low Level Dissolution process remains shutdown.

The licensee documented this event in their condition report CR#1027010.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM BARRY COLE TO KARL DIEDERICH ON 12/11/2008 AT 1013 EST * * *

The analysis of a fully flooded moderation upset condition showed the resulting k-effective exceeded the safety limit of 0.95 in BWXT's license for a HEU system showed a k-effective of 0.96.

Notified R2DO (Ernstes), NMSS (Habighorst), and Fuels Group (via e-mail).

* * * RETRACTION @ 1234 EST ON 12/23/08 FROM BARRY COLE TO RYAN ALEXANDER * * *

"This report was made based on the assumption that the tray dimensions on the drawing were representative of as-built tray dimensions in the field. Subsequent to the report, measurements were taken of the Low Level Dissolver trays in use at the time of discovery. Using the same methodology used to determine the initial reportability of the event, the moderation upset was reevaluated for the as-built tray dimensions. The resulting k-effective was 0.94, which is below the safety limit of 0.95 in BWXT's license for a HEU system. Evaluation of the as-built tray dimensions demonstrated although there was a loss or degradation of Items Relied On For Safety, BWXT did not fail to meet the performance requirement of 10 CFR 70.61. BWXT is therefore withdrawing the 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(2) notification, #44711."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Hopper), NMSS EO (Benner), and Fuels OUO Group (via email).

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Hospital Event Number: 44733
Rep Org: TRINITAS HOSPITAL
Licensee: TRINITAS HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: ELIZABETH State: NJ
County:
License #: 29-04333-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LINDA VELDKAMP
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/18/2008
Notification Time: 17:41 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2008
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
JIM LUEHMAN (FSME)

Event Text

MEDICAL DOSE LESS THAN 50 PERCENT OF PRESCRIBED DOSE

"Suspected movement of catheter during endobronchial high dose rate remote afterloading treatment procedure may have resulted in a single fraction of a multifraction treatment to differ from the prescribed dose by more than 50%. [35.3045(a)(1)(iii)].

"The intended dose was 500cGy to the Rt Bronchus (lung).

"Both the patient and the referring physician were notified by the authorized user of the possibility the intended treatment site did not receive full dose.

"1. Patient had endobronchial catheter placed in Rt Bronchus in the endoscopy department. Catheter was taped in place and position was marked.

"2. Patient was scanned in CT simulation room by therapist to determine catheter location and treatment dwell positions.

"3. Patient treatment plan was created by physicist and approved by the authorized user. Second calculation check was performed.

"4. Patient was monitored by nursing during the treatment planning process.

"5. Patient was brought into HDR treatment room by therapist.

"6. Authorized physicist and authorized user connected the treatment applicator to the HDR unit.

"7. Technologist monitored patient on the camera system.

"8. Treatment was administered as planned.

"9. Patient was disconnected from the HDR unit.

"10. Technologist removed catheter post treatment, noted the catheter she pulled out was relatively short compared to the planning scan.

"11. Technologist notified the authorized user and authorized physicist.

"12. Both individuals notified the RSO.

"13. RSO investigated and interviewed individuals involved.

"14. AU not sure at what point the catheter moved.

"Patient may have dislodged catheter when coughing or wiping mouth secretions.

"Actions to prevent re-occurrence:

"1. Authorized user will remove all endobronchial catheters post treatment in the future to prevent any ambiguity with regard to length of catheter in patient.

"2. Check marked position of the catheter at CT and both pre and post treatment prior to catheter removal.

"3. Measure catheter length outside the naries prior to planning CT, prior to treatment, and post treatment as a second check to the marked position.

"The Pulmonologist and Authorized user will perform a bronchoscopy in about 2 weeks [to determine if misadministration occurred]. Treatment reactions outside the planned treatment site will be evaluated and determination of treatment in an unintended area will be determined."

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facilities use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44734
Rep Org: IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Licensee: AGRI INDUSTRIAL PLASTICS CO
Region: 3
City: FAIRFIELD State: IA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RANDAL DAHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 12/19/2008
Notification Time: 10:23 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2008
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)
CHRIS EINBERG (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-AMIL ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

MISSING NRD STATIC ELIMINATOR

"The Agency [Iowa Department of Public Health] was notified by the General License Registrant of a missing NRD Static Eliminator, model P-2021-8201, serial number A2FY911. The discovery was made during the annual renewal of the registration. The RSO for the company stated that the device was used to eliminate static on a part they were molding. The operators had the device hanging over a barrel and apparently the device became unscrewed from the gun and was disposed of in the trash. The registrant has developed a sleeve to assist in holding the device on the guns. In addition, the RSO instructed the shift foremen to check the devices to ensure they are properly secured to the guns. The Agency [Iowa Department of Public Health] called NRD. Inc. to verify that the device was not returned to the manufacturer. NRD Inc. stated they did not receive the device.

"Corrective Action: (1) Sleeve used to help hold the device on the gun, and (2) Additional oversight to ensure devices are properly secured to guns."

The Po-210 source activity is 10 milliCuries. The state considers the material to be lost not recoverable, and the event is closed.

Iowa Report: IA080003.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44739
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: DELEK REFINING LIMITED
Region: 4
City: TYLER State: TX
County:
License #: L02289
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 12/22/2008
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 11/26/2008
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/22/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4)
ROBERT LEWIS (FSME)

Event Text

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT

The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:

"While removing gauges from the vessels they were attached to, in response to an investigation into a source disconnect on a different gauge [see EN #44609], the licensee found that a second source had separated from its operating rod and was located inside the insertion well. The source will remain in the well until its removal can be scheduled. The area has been isolated. Since the source separated inside the insertion well near its normal operating position, there was no additional exposures to members of the public. Two similar gauges were closed, removed from their mountings, and placed in storage. Four other devices containing radioactive sources have been closed and the shutters locked. Surveys have been completed to verify the sources are inside these gauges.

"The gauge involved is a Thermo Measure Tech Model 5191 level measurement gauge serial number B45, containing a 253.4 milliCuries (decay corrected) Cesium (Cs) - 137 source serial number B45.

"The licensee stated that they had informed the State of the event on 11/26/08."

Texas Report No. I-8594

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 44740
Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
                   NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
                   LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
Region: 2
City: ERWIN State: TN
County: UNICOI
License #: SNM-124
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07000143
NRC Notified By: MIKE TESTER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 12/23/2008
Notification Time: 10:36 [ET]
Event Date: 12/23/2008
Event Time: 07:49 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
ERIC BENNER (NMSS)
FUELS OUO EMAIL ()

Event Text

DEGRADED SAFETY EQUIPMENT

"Area 600 uses a flammable gas as part of its operation. IROFS [Items Relied On For Safety] FIRE6-6 is a control that prevents the flammable gas from exiting the main process equipment and being released into an attached glovebox. FIRE6-6 makes use of a dual door system in which only one (1) door is allowed to be open at a time and the chamber between the doors is purged when both doors are closed. The accident scenario of concern is release of the flammable gas into the glovebox where it could mix with oxygen, creating a potential for an explosion inside Building 302. Additionally, IROFS FIRE6-8, 6-1 and 6-9 ensure an inert gas purge occurs prior to opening the main process equipment to the glovebox and are also credited as IROFS.

"The equipment associated with FIRE6-6 is designated as Safety Related Equipment (SRE) and is functionally tested annually. The regularly scheduled SRE Test was performed on December 23, 2008, and the purpose of the test is to demonstrate that each door remains closed while the other door is opened. The test failed because when the first door was opened, the second door also opened slightly (approximately one (1) inch). Though there are mitigating factors such as potential dilution of the flammable gas through the glovebox ventilation system, it was determined that IROFS FIRE6-6 was degraded and that the performance criteria of 10CFR70.61 were not met.

"A similar event was reported to the NRC (#44584) on October 21, 2008 for similar equipment in Bldg 302. However, the cause of the previous IROFS failure was due to a blocked speed controller which failed to bleed off air. The blocked speed controlled is unrelated to the current IROFS failure.

"POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES: Potential explosion in a glovebox and release of radiological material and exposure to the worker. No actual explosion or radiological exposure occurred.

"SEQUENCE OF OCCURRENCES: The event occurred due a degraded IROFS that was discovered during a periodic functional test. Initial investigation indicates an airline solenoid valve is leaking by.

"ACTIONS TAKEN: Operations has closed the flammable gas supply for Area 600 Bldg 303 until the equipment associated with FIRE6-6 is fixed and the SRE test passes."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44741
Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: CHEVRON USA, INC.
Region: 4
City: SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #: UT-1800057
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID HOGGE
HQ OPS Officer: RYAN ALEXANDER
Notification Date: 12/23/2008
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 12/22/2008
Event Time: 15:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4)
ROBERT LEWIS (FSME)

Event Text

UTAH AGREEMENT STATE REPORT

The State of Utah reported that one of their licensees, Chevron USA, Inc., reported a source disconnect on a custom made Ronan level density gauge at their refinery. The gauge was located in a dry storage tank with two pressure vessels inside. The source was inside the storage tank and was retrieved by a health physics contractor. The source is currently stored at the licensee's facility in a locked storage shed, surrounded by lead bricks. The licensee is awaiting the arrival of the Ronan representative on-site. There were no excessive exposures to either workers or the public.

The source was 100 mCi of Cs-137 and is a Model SA-4.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 44742
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/27/2008
Notification Time: 14:19 [ET]
Event Date: 12/26/2008
Event Time: 20:43 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/27/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2)
ERIC BENNER (NMSS)

Event Text

PROCESS GAS LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"At 2043 CST, on 12-26-08 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that C-337 Unit 6 Cell 9 was above atmospheric pressure and the UF6 Release Detection (PGLD) System was inoperable. The cell had been running below atmosphere earlier in the day but a new gradient was put in and load movement caused pressure to go above atmosphere. The PGLD System for Unit 6 Cell 9 had been inoperable for an extended period of time due to wiring problems. TSR 2.4.4.1 requires that at least the minimum number of detector heads in the cell are operable during steady state operations above atmospheric pressure. Even though the increase in cell pressure was due to load movement which is transient in nature, it was determined that the pressure had been above atmosphere for about four and a half hours, which is longer than the typical transient. With the Unit 6 Cell 9 PGLD system inoperable, none of the required cell heads were operable. TSR LCO 2.4.4.1.B.1 was entered and a continuous smoke watch was put in place within one hour. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44743
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE DEBOARD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/27/2008
Notification Time: 18:36 [ET]
Event Date: 12/27/2008
Event Time: 14:18 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/27/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP AS A RESULT OF A GENERATOR TRIP

"At 1418 on 12-27-08 Braidwood Unit 2 experienced an automatic Reactor Trip. The Reactor Trip red first out annunciator was Turb[ine] Trip above P8 Rx Trip. At the time of the trip the Unit Aux Transformer [UAT] 241-1 sudden pressure relay actuated causing a main generator trip which resulted in a main turbine trip which resulted in a Reactor Trip. Also at the same time as the Reactor Trip, the 2C Heater Drain Pump tripped on phase A over current. Damage was subsequently noted on the pump motor terminal box. No fire or smoke was observed at UAT 241-1 or the 2C Heater Drain Pump.

"After the Reactor Trip occurred, all four steam generators reached their low-2 Reactor Trip setpoints and the pressurizer reached its low pressure Reactor Trip setpoint all of which is an expected response on a trip from full power. Steam generator levels and pressurizer pressure have been restored. Both the 2A and the 2B Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps auto started on the low-2 steam generator levels as expected. All control rods fully inserted into the core.

"No secondary relief valves lifted and no secondary steam was released as a result of the Reactor Trip. Steam generators are now being filled by the Startup Feedwater Pump and the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps have been placed in standby. The main steam dumps are in service to the main condenser to provide heat sink cooling. The plant is being maintained at normal operating pressure and temperature.

"This report is being made per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for RPS actuation, 4 hr [notification], and per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, 8 hr [notification]."

The electrical line up transferred to the normal shutdown configuration with standby diesel generators and safety systems available. There was no impact on Unit 1.

The licensee plans on issuing a press release and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 44744
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 12/28/2008
Notification Time: 13:59 [ET]
Event Date: 12/28/2008
Event Time: 04:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/28/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2)
ERIC BENNER (NMSS)

Event Text

24 HOUR REPORT - ACTUATION OF LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM DUE TO MINOR PROCESS GAS LEAK

"On 12/28/2008 at 0445 the C-337 unit 5 cell 3 PGLD (process gas leak detection) head located on stage 8 actuated. Operators responded to the alarm and performed sampling in the area. The sample result indicated 3 ppm of HF at the stage 8 compressor. To stop the release the cell was taken off-stream and the pressure was reduced to below atmosphere. Investigation indicated that a UF6 release had occurred. The amount of material released has not been determined.

"The actuated PGLD head is Q safety system component. At the time of the incident the cell was operating in a mode which required the system to be operable. This is being reported based on SAR 6.9 Table 1, J.2 as an Unplanned Actuation of a Q Safety System.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

The licensee states that a compressor seal appears to have failed. The amount of material released is characterized as on the order of a few grams. Material release was only in the vicinity of the compressor. There was nothing unusual or not understood and all systems functioned as required. There was no offsite release or personnel contamination resulted from this event.

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Thursday, March 29, 2012