Event Notification Report for October 14, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/13/2008 - 10/14/2008
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44565
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID DUNCAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID DUNCAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/14/2008
Notification Time: 05:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2008
Event Time: 05:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2008
Notification Time: 05:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2008
Event Time: 05:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
JULIO LARA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER REMOVED FROM OPERATION FOR MAINTENANCE
"Fermi 2 is removing, on October 14, 2008, the Technical Support Center (TSC) heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system from operation to facilitate maintenance activities. During this work, the facility will not be available for emergency use. Fermi is making this notification in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). In the event TSC activation is necessary, the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) will be utilized. Activation and use of the EOF as a backup for the TSC is included in Fermi's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan, and drills have been held performing both the TSC and EOF functions from the EOF. Fermi will notify the NRC upon completion of this work which is expected to be approximately one day. The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE FROM G. MILLER TO JOE O'HARA AT 1616 EDT ON 10/14/08 * * *
"Preventative Maintenance Activities on the TSC HVAC system have been completed. The TSC is now available for use."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO(Phillips).
"Fermi 2 is removing, on October 14, 2008, the Technical Support Center (TSC) heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system from operation to facilitate maintenance activities. During this work, the facility will not be available for emergency use. Fermi is making this notification in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). In the event TSC activation is necessary, the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) will be utilized. Activation and use of the EOF as a backup for the TSC is included in Fermi's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan, and drills have been held performing both the TSC and EOF functions from the EOF. Fermi will notify the NRC upon completion of this work which is expected to be approximately one day. The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE FROM G. MILLER TO JOE O'HARA AT 1616 EDT ON 10/14/08 * * *
"Preventative Maintenance Activities on the TSC HVAC system have been completed. The TSC is now available for use."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO(Phillips).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44674
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GENE DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GENE DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/21/2008
Notification Time: 11:42 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2008
Event Time: 11:06 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/21/2008
Notification Time: 11:42 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2008
Event Time: 11:06 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/21/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1)
JAMES DWYER (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
FAULTY VOLTAGE REGULATOR CAUSES HALF SCRAM
"On 10/14/2008 at approximately 1106 [EDT], the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant was operating at approximately 99% power in Mode 1. The 'A' Reactor Protective System (RPS) Motor-Generator (MG) Set tripped. This resulted in a half-scram signal and Group II Primary Containment Isolation System [PCIS] actuation. The Group II PCIS isolation actuated valves in multiple systems.
"During the event all systems operated as designed.
"Power was restored to 'A' RPS using the alternate power supply and the Group II PCIS isolation was reset.
"The cause of the event was determined to be a failure of the 'A' RPS MG Set voltage regulator. The voltage regulator was replaced and the RPS System was returned to its normal line-up. Initial troubleshooting on the failed voltage regulator determined that a Silicone Control Rectifier failed. The voltage regulator was sent off-site for further analysis to determine the cause of failure. The event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of ...(B)(2) general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system'. A telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(1) as an invalid signal."
The voltage regulator had been replaced approximately three weeks before this failure. (See EN #44673)
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 10/14/2008 at approximately 1106 [EDT], the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant was operating at approximately 99% power in Mode 1. The 'A' Reactor Protective System (RPS) Motor-Generator (MG) Set tripped. This resulted in a half-scram signal and Group II Primary Containment Isolation System [PCIS] actuation. The Group II PCIS isolation actuated valves in multiple systems.
"During the event all systems operated as designed.
"Power was restored to 'A' RPS using the alternate power supply and the Group II PCIS isolation was reset.
"The cause of the event was determined to be a failure of the 'A' RPS MG Set voltage regulator. The voltage regulator was replaced and the RPS System was returned to its normal line-up. Initial troubleshooting on the failed voltage regulator determined that a Silicone Control Rectifier failed. The voltage regulator was sent off-site for further analysis to determine the cause of failure. The event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of ...(B)(2) general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system'. A telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(1) as an invalid signal."
The voltage regulator had been replaced approximately three weeks before this failure. (See EN #44673)
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.