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Event Notification Report for October 14, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/10/2008 - 10/14/2008

** EVENT NUMBERS **


44547 44548 44551 44552 44553 44555 44557 44558 44560 44561 44562 44563
44564

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 44547
Rep Org: WAL-MART
Licensee: WAL-MART
Region: 4
City: BENTONVILLE State: AR
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICH DAILEY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/07/2008
Notification Time: 16:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
MARK DELLIGATTI (FSME)
ILTAB (e-mail) ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

Wal-Mart is conducting a worldwide audit of their tritium exit signs. This morning they discovered three missing signs.

The first missing sign was located at the store in Noblesville, Indiana. The serial number is 301651, manufacturer unknown. Curie content unknown. The sign was last inventoried in the spring of 2008.

The second sign was located at the store in Charlotte, Michigan. The serial number and manufacturer were unknown. Curie content unknown. The sign was last inventoried in the spring of 2008.

The third sign was located at the store in Yankton, South Dakota. The serial number is 293214, manufacturer unknown. Curie content unknown. The sign was last inventoried in the spring of 2008.

All three stores were searched for the signs without success.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY RICHARD DALEY TO JASON KOZAL ON 10/09/08 AT 1308 * * *

Three additional signs were discovered missing in the state of Michigan:

1. At a store located at 995 Razorback Dr., Houghton, MI 49931. The serial number is unknown, the manufacturer is Isolite (11.5 Ci of tritium).

2. At a store located at 10772 West Carson City Rd., Greenville, MI 48838. The serial number is unknown, the manufacturer is Isolite (11.5 Ci of tritium).

3. At a store located at 7021 SW Nedge Ave, Portage, MI 49002. The serial number is 357889, the manufacturer is Isolite (11.5 Ci of tritium).

All three stores were searched for the signs without success.

Notified R3DO (Lara), and FSME (Burgess).

* * * UPDATE AT 1400 EDT ON 10/10/08 FROM RICH DAILEY TO S. SANDIN * * *

An additional missing exit sign was identified during the on-going inventory. The exit sign was manufactured by SRB and contained 20 Ci of tritium, S/N 280802. It was last inventoried in Spring 2008 at Wal-Mart Store #5039 which is located in Camden, DE.

Notified R3DO (Lara), FSME (Einberg) and ILTAB via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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Hospital Event Number: 44548
Rep Org: VA NATIONAL HEALTH PHYSICS PROGRAM
Licensee: VA MEDICAL CENTER - CINCINNATI
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI State: OH
County:
License #: 03-23853-01VA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/07/2008
Notification Time: 19:59 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2008
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
MARK DELLIGATTI (FSME)

Event Text

MEDICAL EVENTS DUE TO DOSE RECEIVED LESS THAN PRESCRIBED DOSE

"In response to medical events discovered at the VA Medical Center Philadelphia, which have been reported under Event Number 44219, reviews are ongoing of samples of patient charts from other VA facilities with permanent prostate iodine-125 seed implant brachytherapy programs.

"As the result of these ongoing reviews, medical events were discovered on October 7, 2008, for 6 patients treated at the VA Medical Center in Cincinnati, Ohio.

"These 6 medical events involved seed distributions in the patients that resulted in D90 doses less than 80% of the prescribed doses. These circumstances were interpreted to meet the definition of a medical event under 10 CFR 35.3045.

"A 15-day written report on these 6 medical events will be submitted to NRC Region III. We have notified our NRC Project Manager, Cassandra Frazier (NRC Region III), of these medical events."

A "Medical Event" may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44551
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: WAL-MART
Region: 4
City: AURORA State: CO
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GREG STASINOS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/08/2008
Notification Time: 11:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2008
Event Time: 14:27 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
MARK DELLIGATTI (FSME)
ILTAB (via e-mail) ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGNS CONTAINING TRITIUM

"I [state] received a call from a Wal-Mart Representative on 10/7/08 at 2:27pm on the Colorado Emergency Response and Incident Reporting Line to report three (3) exit signs containing tritium have been lost from two different Wal-Mart locations in the Denver area. Wal-Mart is in the midst of a nationwide effort to replace old tritium containing signs and its believed these signs have been removed but not accounted for during this process.

"One sign is missing from a Wal-Mart store in Aurora located at 5650 S. Chambers Rd. Serial number of the sign is 274282.

"Two signs are missing from a Wal-Mart store in Lakewood located at 7455 W. Colfax. Ave. Serial numbers of signs from that store are 280691 and 280712.

"Each sign is believed to have contained 10.5 - 11.0 curies of tritium."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44552
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: NORTHWEST INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: KENNEWICK State: WA
County:
License #: IR065
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/08/2008
Notification Time: 11:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2008
Event Time: 07:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
MARK DELLIGATTI (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE DISCONNECTED FROM CONTROL CABLE

Washington state submitted the following report via e-mail:

"A licensee reported to the Department of Health (DOH) that an industrial radiography (IR) source had become disconnected from the control cable that prevented the retrieval of the source back into its safe shielded position. The exposure device is a QSA Global Sigma 880 with a 97 Curie Iridium-192 source. The source disconnect occurred at 7:00 AM 9/30/08 at a construction site three miles northeast of Moses Lake, Washington. The President and Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) of the licensed IR company are on scene with 12 company employees to correct the situation. The radiographer had previously made several exposures on pipe welds earlier in the day before the disconnect occurred. The source remained at the end of the guide tube, in the collimator, when the radiographer tried to retract it into the device. The radiographer tried this several times. A large area at the construction site has been secured by barricades and the IR personnel are guarding the radiation area. At present, it appears that personnel have not received any elevated or unusual exposure as a result of the disconnect. The IR company is working with the Office of Radiation Protection and the radiography device manufacturer to develop a plan to retrieve the source. DOH staff were sent to the location to assure radiation safety procedures are followed and independent measurements are made."

Washington Report: WA080073

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44553
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: WAL-MART
Region: 1
City: NORTH READING State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WHALEN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/08/2008
Notification Time: 14:36 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2008
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
CHRIS EINBERG (FSME)
ILTAB (via e-mail) ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM SIGN

The state submitted the following report via e-mail:

"Received notification on 10/8/2008 that an 'Ice Light' tritium exit sign was discovered lost by the Wal-Mart store located in North Reading, Massachusetts. The exit sign either contained 11 or 20 Curies of H-3."


Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44555
Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: WAL-MART
Region: 1
City: RIVERDALE State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ERIC JAMESON
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 10/09/2008
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2008
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
SAM HANSELL (R1)
MARK DELLIGATTI (FSME)
ILTAB (E-MAIL) ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

Wal-mart stores notified the state of Georgia of two missing exit tritium exit signs discovered during a world wide inventory of their stores. The following devices were reported missing:

1. Exit sign from a store (#787) located at 7050 HW 85, Riverdale, GA. Serial number - 269198, manufacturer - Safetylite, activity - 11.5 Ci of tritium.

2. Exit sign from a store (#787) located at 7050 HW 85, Riverdale, GA. Serial number - unknown, manufacturer - unknown, activity - unknown.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44557
Rep Org: CARBOLINE COMPANY
Licensee: CARBOLINE COMPANY
Region: 3
City: BRENTWOOD State: MO
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARIKAY SPECKERT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/10/2008
Notification Time: 10:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
SAM HANSELL (R1)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2)
DALE POWERS (R4)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
OMID TABATABAI (NRO)

Event Text

PART 21 - BATCH OF CARBOZINC 11 SG IS NONCOMPLIANT IN CURE ISSUES

"Carboline Company is notifying certain companies that a potential safety related noncompliance deviation in a basic component as defined in 10 CFR Part 21. The noncompliance involves a batch of Carbozine 11 SG Base that is not curing properly. It forms a poor quality film.

"A customer notified Carboline of concerns regarding the cure of a particular batch of Carbozine 11 SG. Technical Service originally felt it was application related and worked with the customer. An internal report was opened once cure issues remained after working with their technical department. An analysis of the batch by our plant Quality Control was requested; the results did not confirm the problem. Material was then sent into Saint Louis R&D for additional analysis. On Tuesday, October 8, 2008 the analytical evaluation was reviewed by the product chemist and the batch cure issues were confirmed.

"The batch was placed on hold and reports have been run to determine where the batch has been shipped. Carboline is requesting that the affected companies review their stock of Carbozine 11 SG and return any material with the batch number of 8G9892L. Further work is being done to determine the cause of cure issues with this batch of Carbozine 11 SG. At this time, Carboline has confirmed that this material is not curing properly and forms a poor quality film."

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 44558
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: BILLY WALLACE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/10/2008
Notification Time: 14:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2008
Event Time: 15:37 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2)
TIM MCCARTIN (NMSS)

Event Text

24-HOURS BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING FAILURE TO VISUALLY INSPECT STORAGE CYLINDERS

The following information is provided without quotation for readability:

DESCRIPTION: On 10/09/08 at 1537 hours it was determined that procedure CP4-CU-CH6430, "In Storage Fissile Cylinder Inspection", does not fully meet the periodic inspection requirements of NCSA GEN-003. GEN-003 requires inspection every four years of all thick wall cylinders that contained fissile material since they were last washed on the inside of the cylinder. Only cylinders that were filled with fissile material on their last fill have been identified for inspection. Cylinders filled with fissile material, emptied and subsequently filled with non-fissile material and emptied, have not been inspected as required. Approximately 73 Cylinders that have contained fissile material since their last washing have not been inspected in violation of the requirement of NCSA GEN-003, these cylinders could contain residual nonvolatile material referred to as heel. Potentially the residual heel could contain fissile material.

Double contingency is maintained by implementing two independent controls on one parameter (moderation). The first leg of double contingency relies on the design of the cylinder to ensure moderation control. Cylinders are designed to the requirements of ANSI N14.1 and ensure that it is unlikely for the cylinder wall to breach and allow water intrusion. This control on moderation was not violated.

The second leg of double contingency relied on inspections every 4 years of the cylinder wall, valve, and plug for abnormal corrosion. This control ensures that in the event of a cylinder breach, it is unlikely that sufficient moderation to cause a criticality will enter the cylinder before it is identified and mitigated. Since the cylinders were not inspected within the 4 year time frame as required, this control on moderation was violated.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-08-2918; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2008-31; NRC Worksheet No. 44558.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Although a control requiring inspection of the cylinders every 4 years was violated, no cylinder breaches occurred. Later inspections identified no cylinder integrity issues, moderation control was lost and double contingency was not maintained.

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): In order for a criticality to be possible, more than 10kgs of water would have to enter a breach in a cylinder which contains more than a critical mass of material enriched to greater than 1.0 wt% 235U.

CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): Moderation.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS) : There were 73 cylinders which were not inspected as required. These cylinders had at one time held fissile material. The cylinders were emptied except for a small residual heel and then filled with non-fissile material. The non-fissile material was then emptied leaving only the residual heel in the cylinder. Cylinder heels are typically less than 50 pounds. Assay is always less than 5.5% enrichment.

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: NCSA GEN-003 requires cylinders containing material enriched to greater than or equal to 1.0 wt % 235U to be inspected every 4 years to identify significant signs of degraded cylinder wall, valve and plug. These cylinders were filled with fissile material, emptied and then subsequently filled with non-fissile material and then emptied again, but were not inspected within the four year requirement.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED : Cylinders have been inspected per the CP4-CU-CH6430 and the identified cylinders were found to comply with NCSA GEN-003.

* * * UPDATE AT 1750 EDT ON 10/10/08 FROM BILLY WALLACE TO STEVE SANDIN VIA FAX * * *

On 10/10/08 at 1500 CDT, an additional 8 cylinders were discovered which had not been properly inspected. The additional cylinders were of a different size than the initial cylinders found, but fall under the same requirement. The additional cylinders have been inspected and all met the NCSA requirements.

Notified R2DO (Shaeffer) and NMSS (McCartin).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44560
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE KOCHERT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/11/2008
Notification Time: 02:47 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2008
Event Time: 00:49 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/11/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
SAMSON LEE (NRR)
ANTHONY McMURTRAY (IRD)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

DISCOVERY OF AN AFTER-THE-FACT NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

"At 0049 on 10/11/08 Letdown Relief valve BG8117 lifted prior to set point, resulting in Pressurizer water inventory being diverted the Pressurizer Relief Tank. Letdown was isolated within 13 minutes, isolating the leakage. Upon review of the level trends of the Pressurizer Relief Tank level changes, approximately 574 gallons were diverted from the Reactor Coolant system. This would result in an RCS leakage rate of 44 gpm of RCS Identified Leakage. At the time that the calculation of leakage rate was discovered, it was immediately recognized that this met the requirements for EAL 4R, 'RCS Identified Leakage greater than 25 gpm'. As a result of identification that the criteria of an EAL was exceeded, and no longer existed, a notification was made to the NRC Operation Center in accordance with 10 CFR50.72(a)(1)(i)."


Licensee has notified NRC Resident Inspector and will notify state and local agencies on the next business day.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44561
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: J.R.WEEKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/11/2008
Notification Time: 10:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2008
Event Time: 05:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL TRIP ACTUATION INITIATED REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM

"During plant shutdown to begin a scheduled refueling outage, with the plant at 0% power in Mode 3, an actuation of the reactor trip system (RTS) occurred when a steam generator (S/G) Low-Low water level trip inadvertently occurred during recovery from a feedwater isolation actuation that had previously occurred in response to a steam generator high water level trip condition.

"At approximately 0500 hours, plant operators were closing the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) for plant shutdown. Once the MSIVs were closed, the reactor coolant system (RCS) cooldown rate decreased significantly. The 'A' atmosphere steam dump valve (ASD) was then opened. Shortly after the ASD was opened, the MSIV was also opened. With both the MSIV and ASD open, however, the 'A' S/G water level swelled until the P-14 S/G Hi Level protective interlock setpoint was reached, resulting in a feedwater isolation (FWIS) actuation at 0505 hours.

"Subsequent to the FWIS actuation, plant operators took action to recover from the FWIS in accordance with off-normal operating procedure OTO-SA-00001, 'Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Verification and Restoration.' The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps were started to restore S/G water level. However, S/G water level lowered rapidly in response to the cold auxiliary feedwater flow to the S/G. A S/G Low-Low water level trip signal was then reached on the 'A' S/G, thus resulting in a reactor trip system actuation at 0508 hours. All systems functioned normally in response to plant conditions."

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.

* * * UPDATE AT 0239 EDT ON 10/12/08 FROM FRED BIANCO TO VINCE KLCO * * *

"This report is an update to information reported under ENS notification 44561. The original notification reported a valid reactor trip system actuation as a 4-hour notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The correct reporting requirement is 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), an 8-hour notification, as the plant was in Mode 4 with the reactor subcritical at the time of the event.

"The [NRC] Resident Inspector will be notified."

Notified R4DO (Powers).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44562
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DEWEY BARROW
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 10/11/2008
Notification Time: 10:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2008
Event Time: 05:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/11/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
4 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO VENDOR CALCULATION ERROR

"Turkey Point received notification of an error in a vendor calculation methodology regarding the containment building heat transfer. This calculation is used to support containment temperature and pressure as well as heat input to the Component Cooling Water system under design basis accident conditions.

"While validating a new analysis model, it was discovered that the Turkey Point containment steel liner was not included in the analysis of record. This is a non-conservative error in that less heat would be expected to be transferred to the external environment with the presence of the liner. The initial evaluation of the error indicates that at the maximum allowable Ultimate Heat Sink (Intake) temperature, Containment pressure, long-term Containment temperature and Component Cooling Water return temperature could exceed licensing basis limits during a design basis accident.

"Preliminary analysis indicates that under current Ultimate Heat Sink conditions, operability requirements are met."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44563
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RUSSELL SEARS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/11/2008
Notification Time: 16:31 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2008
Event Time: 11:51 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/11/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOUND IN THE PROTECTED AREA

Licensee personnel found an unattended controlled substance inside the protected area. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44564
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEN HAJNAL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/11/2008
Notification Time: 23:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/11/2008
Event Time: 22:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SAM HANSELL (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 A/R Y 33 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

TURBINE TRIP/ AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL

At 2236 on 10/11/08 while reducing power for a planned refueling outage, "C" Steam Generator water level decreased and the turbine tripped. The reactor tripped on the turbine trip. Auxiliary feedwater initiated as expected and decay heat is being removed via the condenser steam dumps. All control rods fully inserted.

No significant safety equipment is out of service and all safety buses are being supplied by offsite power. Emergency Diesel generators are available if needed. No PORVs or primary/secondary relief valves lifted.

The licensee is evaluating cause of steam generator level excursion. Unit 2 is unaffected.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021