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Event Notification Report for July 15, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/14/2008 - 07/15/2008

** EVENT NUMBERS **


44340 44341 44344 44345

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44340
Rep Org: NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: MIDWEST INDUSTRIAL X-RAY, INC.
Region: 4
City: CASSELTON State: ND
County: CASS
License #: 33-14907-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN HARMAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/09/2008
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 07/09/2008
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4)
ROBERT LEWIS (FSME)

Event Text

NORTH DAKOTA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE FROM RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

The following information was obtained from the North Dakota Department of Health via telephone:

Midwest Industrial X-ray, Inc. was performing radiography at an ethanol plant in Casselton County, ND. After taking a shot, the radiographer was retracting the source when it became detached. The radiographer covered the source with a lead blanket and contacted the company Radiation Safety Officer. The camera contained a 24.5 Ci Ir-192 source.

The licensee transported the source back to their facility. The licensee performed calculations that indicated the radiographer received approximately 4 Rem exposure while securing the source. No calculations were reported concerning the assistant radiographer. The calculations performed by the State of North Dakota indicate that the radiographer received greater than 5 Rem. Both individual's film badges were sent to Landauer laboratories for processing.

The State of North Dakota will be investigating this incident.


* * * UPDATE FROM DAN HARMAN VIA EMAIL TO J. KNOKE AT 1725 EDT ON 07/10/08 * * *

"The doses for the lead radiographer are as follows:
The badge reading for this monitoring period (June 20 - Jul 8) 575 mR. The yearly total deep dose is 827 mR."

Notified FSME (Lewis) and R4DO (Hay)

* * * UPDATE ON 7/14/2008 AT 1900 FROM DANIEL HARMON TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

This agreement state report update was received via e-mail:

"Initial Assumption: the source was full exposed in the source tube between the camera and the columnator; the exposure time estimate was 2 minutes; estimated average distance to source was 0.3 meters; gamma constant = 0.59; source strength = 24.5 Ci; and estimated exposure was 5.3 mR.

"Investigation Results - Hardware: The camera was a QSA 660B. Maintenance had been performed on this camera two days prior to this event. The source became detached from the wire and lodged inside the camera at or near the connection between the camera and the guide tube. The survey meters used were NDS-2000. Both had recently been calibrated. The one that failed had been sent in for repair in November 2007. The RA-500 worn by [the assistant radiographer] had been sent in twice for repair. We will follow up with asking the company to review the maintenance records for these two devices to determine if they should be replaced ahead of schedule.

"Investigation Results - Personnel and Dose update: the primary person exposed was [the assistant radiographer]. By Thursday afternoon his annual badge exposure data had been compiled, including the expose for this event. This data is as follows: deep total - 825 mR, lens - 839 mR and Shallow - 835 mR. The badge for the period June 20 - July 19 was read by Landauer on July 11, 2008, and indicated 575 mR. Dosimeter data for the badge period showed a dose of 88 mR. The badge reading - the badge period dosimeter data shows an exposure of 487 mR for this event.

"There were four other personnel involved in the actual event and source retrieval. They are (job lead radiographer, dose: 40 mR); (radiographer, dose: 40 mR), (intern, dose: 32 mR) and (RSO, dose: 55 mR). These data were taken from the pocket dosimeters.

"Investigation Results - Source Recovery: There are some inconsistencies between what was stated to have happened and what the investigators believe could have happened. Most relate to positions with respect to the camera/source. We expect to have these resolved by Friday, July 18, 2008."

Notified FSME (Lewis) and R4DO (Johnson).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44341
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: GEO ENVIRON
Region: 4
City: ANAHEIM State: CA
County:
License #: 6636-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BARBARA HAMRICK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 07/10/2008
Notification Time: 15:44 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2007
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4)
ROBERT LEWIS (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE

Received report via email:

"On November 8, 2007, the licensee left a voice-mail message stating a moisture density gauge (Troxler Model 3430, S/N 29865), with a nominal 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241, had been run over the night before at a construction site. The cesium source was originally reported to be locked in its shielded position, although it was later discovered that the source was shielded, but not lockable. The electronics were severely damaged. While the gauge was being used at the construction site, the user stepped away, and the gauge was run over by a piece of heavy machinery."

California Event # 110807

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 44344
Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
                   NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
                   LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
Region: 2
City: ERWIN State: TN
County: UNICOI
License #: SNM-124
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07000143
NRC Notified By: MIKE TESTER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 07/11/2008
Notification Time: 15:54 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2008
Event Time: 11:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2)
DENNIS DAMON (NMSS)
FUELS OUO VIA EMAIL ()

Event Text

ITEM RELIED ON FOR SAFETY DISCOVERED INOPERABLE

"NOX (nitrogen dioxide, nitric oxide, etc) detection is IROFS [Item Relied On For Safety] BPF-43 for the BPF facility. This IROFS is one of the two controls used to prevent chemical occupational exposure to NOX emissions due to the U-Aluminum Bowl Cleaning operations. The NOX detector alarms prior to exceeding 5 ppm NOX to allow Operations to perform monitoring and/or evacuation actions. On July 11, 2008 it was identified that the calibration gas used to functionally test the NOX detector has expired. The calibration expiration date was September 2007. The prior functional test of the NOX detector was performed on January 24, 2008. Due to use of expired calibration gas, it was determined that the NOX detector (IROFS BPF-43) has been in a degraded condition since the last functional test (January 2008).

"The other IROFS credited in the ISA Summary for this accident is BUA-43, (power is automatically removed from caustic pumps securing sodium hydroxide flow to U-Aluminum dissolvers upon low sodium nitrate flow as detected by flow switches). From late May until early July of 2008, these flow switches were not functioning correctly, so written and approved compensatory measures were implemented. However, per NFS procedure, these temporary compensatory measures were not incorporated into the ISA Summary so were not available to help meet the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61. Since IROFS BPF-43 was in a degraded condition during this time period, performance criteria were not met."

The licensee has ceased operations in the affected building. The functional test performed in January 2008 utilized the out-of-date calibration gas. The functional test previous to the functional test performed in January 2008 was performed in July 2007. The licensee has had no indication or evidence that NOX emissions occurred during the degraded condition period. The licensee is investigating this incident to determine further controls required to prevent reoccurrence.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 44345
Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
                   NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
                   LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
Region: 2
City: ERWIN State: TN
County: UNICOI
License #: SNM-124
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07000143
NRC Notified By: MIKE TESTER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/14/2008
Notification Time: 13:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/14/2008
Event Time: 08:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2)
DENNIS DAMON (NMSS)
FUELS OUO VIA E-MAIL ()

Event Text

ITEM RELIED ON FOR SAFETY (IROFS) DISCOVERED INOPERABLE

"NOX (nitrogen dioxide, nitric oxide, etc) detection is IROFS BUND-17 for the LEU [Low Enriched Uranium] portion of the BPF facility. This IROFS is one of the two controls used to prevent chemical occupational exposure to NOX emissions due to the U-natural dissolution operation. The NOX detector alarms prior to exceeding 5 ppm NOX to allow operations to perform monitoring and/or evacuation actions. On July 11, 2008, it was identified that the calibration gas used to functionally test the NOX detector has expired. The calibration expiration date was September 2007. The prior functional test of the NOX detector was performed on January 11, 2008. Due to use of expired calibration gas, it was determined that the NOX detector (IROFS BPF-43) has been in a degraded condition since the last functional test (January 2008).

"A 2nd IROFS is credited in the NOX accident sequence but, with degradation of IROFS BUND-17, the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61 were not met.

"No actual emissions have been identified.

"The event occurred due to a degraded management measure, specifically a periodic function test. Improved calibration verifications have recently been implemented; this improved check identified the problem of the expired calibration gas."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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