| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/26/2008 - 06/27/2008 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 44281 | Rep Org: NATIONAL INST OF STANDARDS & TECH
Licensee: NATIONAL INST OF STANDARDS & TECH
Region: 4
City: BOULDER State: CO
County: BOULDER
License #: 0500316605
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LARRY GRIMM
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 06/10/2008
Notification Time: 15:11 [ET]
Event Date: 06/09/2008
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 06/26/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
| Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
| Event Text UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
On June 9, 2008, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was notified that a vial containing standard reference material was discovered broken in one of the research laboratories. The reference material contained numerous isotopes of plutonium. It has not been determined how or when the breakage occurred.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Health Physics personnel responded to the area and determined that low levels of contamination were spread outside of the laboratory into the adjoining hallway. At this time, the hallway has be decontaminated. The lab is isolated and will be undergoing decontamination.
The two researchers who discovered the broken vial were contaminated on their hands and were properly decontaminated. They will be undergoing bioassay and urinalysis to determine if an uptake occurred. Air samples were taken in the lab and are in the process of being counted to determine if an airborne problem existed.
The NIST RSO contacted NRC Region IV (Cain and Campbell).
* * * UPDATE AT 0038 ON 6/26/2008 FROM LARRY GRIMM TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
Received from the National Institute of Standards and Technology via e-mail.
"Since the initial incident report, NIST has done the following to mitigate the incident.
"1. NIST Boulder requested assistance from NIST Gaithersburg. Management sent expert Health Physics and Occupational Health and Safety personnel, as well as radiation detection equipment to Boulder.
"2. Hallways and areas potentially affected by the spill were again thoroughly surveyed to assure that no contamination existed outside the affected, sealed laboratory. This survey found two minor contamination spots in a stairwell, which easily cleaned up with soap and water. One office, which had contamination known from the earliest survey (Tuesday morning 6/10/08) was sealed pending future decontamination.
"3. Air monitoring equipment was installed in the adjacent hallway as a precaution in the unlikely event of air leakage from the contaminated laboratory. To date, airborne contamination has not been detected by this equipment nor has any airborne contamination been detected by other subsequently installed air monitoring equipment outside of the contaminated laboratory.
"4. Bioassay tests were initiated on personnel either known to have trace external contamination or determined to be potentially contaminated. Small sample bioassay tests have shown no internal contamination of individuals; however NIST is awaiting the results of more sophisticated bioassay tests.
"5. Using personal protective equipment, NIST Health Physicists made entries to the contaminated laboratory on 6/14/08 and 6/15/08 to investigate the cause and extent of the spill. They found contamination in the laboratory sink and subsequently learned that a researcher who worked directly with the plutonium sample had used that sink to wash his hands during the incident. This prompted NIST to alert city wastewater officials of a potential discharge of plutonium from the sink to the sanitary sewer system.
"6. For help in determining what might have been released to the sanitary sewer NIST requested help from the National Nuclear Security Administration's Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) on 6/16/08. RAP and its associated Department of Energy TRIAGE team have the ability to determine radioactive material activity quantities by taking radiation measurements with sophisticated equipment and computer programs.
"7. Further bioassays samples were collected from individuals and sent out for analysis. NIST is awaiting the results of these tests. Some individuals have also received additional medical tests on the advice of physicians specializing in exposure to plutonium.
"8. Planning with RAP personnel for entry to the laboratory ensued and the RAP team arrived 6/20/08. Entry occurred the same day and the RAP team collected the necessary data. The subsequent report of the RAP/TRIAGE analysis as well as NIST radiation measurements and calculations on dose rate data indicates that at least 76% - 87% of the spilled material can be accounted for. As many smaller areas of contamination have not been analyzed, NIST expects that more of the material will be accounted for during future entries and testing.
"9. Prior to entering the contaminated laboratory, air sampling had not shown airborne contamination. In the course of repeated entries to the contaminated lab room, air sampling equipment placed by the RAP team detected airborne contamination, likely as a result of the team's activities. The team ceased operations and subsequent air sampling showed that radiation readings had returned to normal background levels in the spill room laboratory. Since responding to the incident, NIST Health Physicists have monitored and found no evidence of any releases of contaminated air to the atmosphere."
Notified the R4DO (Proulx) and FSME (Camper). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44315 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: UNITED INSPECTION AND TESTING CO.
Region: 4
City: MORENO VALLEY State: CA
County:
License #: 4788-33
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BARBARA HAMRICK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 06/24/2008
Notification Time: 13:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/1993
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
ILTAB (via email) ()
MEXICO (via fax) ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING DISCOVERY OF A MISSING SOURCE AT A SCRAP YARD
The following information was received from the State of California via email:
"At approximately 1400 hours on Friday, June 20th, Adams Steel reported that a truck from Ecology Auto Parts had alarmed their gate radiation monitors. The truck read 2 millirem per hour at 5 feet away, and about 30 microrem per hour at 20 feet away. The South RM ICE office dispatched an inspector to identify the isotope and assist in isolating the source. The inspector identified the isotope as Cs-137 (nominally 8 mCi), in one of the shrink-wrapped pallets of recyclable metals. Upon removing the shrink wrap, the source rod, index rod, and handle of a moisture-density gauge was identified. The inspector placed the source end of the device in a lead pig, secured the pig in another container, and transferred the device to the radiation control program's southern radioactive materials storage area. Wipes of the other materials on the pallet showed no contamination, and a leak test of the source showed no leakage.
"The device is part of a Troxler 3430 moisture-density gauge. The americium source was not found. The serial number is 20007. The device originally belonged to United Testing and Inspection, who had reported it stolen March 5, 1993. At that time, the licensee offered a reward for the device, filed a police report, investigated the incident, and took corrective actions (review of all security procedures with employees, upgraded locks on storage area, and limited direct access to the storage area)."
CA 5010 Number (Date Notified) - 062008.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44318 | Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THAD REAMES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 06/26/2008
Notification Time: 18:10 [ET]
Event Date: 06/26/2008
Event Time: 17:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/26/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF 1B REACTOR COOLANT PUMP
"Loss of 1B Reactor Coolant Pump caused Reactor Trip from 100%. 50G (Overcurrent relays) were picked up on the Safety Breaker and the 6900V supply breaker. Automatic actuation of the motor driven [and turbine driven] Auxiliary Feed Pumps occurred as expected."
All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. The steam generators water level is being maintained by the AFW system. Decay heat is being removed to the main condenser via the turbine dump valves. RCS PORV lifted and reseated. The electrical plant is in a normal shutdown lineup and the EDGs are available. There is no affect on Unit 2 due to this event.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44319 | Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS JESSESSKY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 06/26/2008
Notification Time: 21:34 [ET]
Event Date: 06/26/2008
Event Time: 11:33 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/26/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 10 CFR 26.719 FITNESS-FOR-DUTY - SITE ACCESS SUSPENDED
A random FFD drug and alcohol test on a licensee supervisor indicated the presence of alcohol, although the blood alcohol content was below the limit of a positive test. As a prudent measure the Medical Review Officer recommended that the individual be further evaluated. The individual's site access to the plant has been suspended pending completion of that evaluation. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | |