Event Notification Report for June 05, 2008

STOLEN TROXLER DENSITY GAUGE

The licensee reported that a Troxler Moisture Density Gauge Model 3430, S/N 23648, was stolen. The gauge contains 8 mCuries Cs-137, 40mCuries Am-241/Be. The gauge was secured in a Toyota Tacoma Pickup Truck, New Jersey Tag # KV128K parked in front of the employees residence at 77 Williams Avenue in Jersey City , New Jersey. When the employee went to the vehicle this morning, he noticed the vehicle had been stolen. The employee reported it to the Jersey City Police Department (Case #17076-08). The company is requesting assistance from LLEA to aid in recovery of the vehicle and gauge.


* * * UPDATE FROM TOM CHAPMAN TO JOE O'HARA AT 0915 ON 6/6/08 * * *

The LLEA recovered the gauge and vehicle this morning and placed two individuals under arrest as suspects in the theft. The licensee has custody of the gauge and it appears to be intact with no damage. It will be sent off for formal leak testing/inspection.

The licensee has notified Region I (J.Joustra).

Notified R1DO(Henderson), FSME(Zelac), and ILTAB via e-mail.


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

NEWS INQUIRY FROM LOCAL MEDIA OUTLET

"Below are the responses to questions BWXT received from [a reporter] at the News & Advance of Lynchburg, VA, regarding the closure of the Barnwell Facility in South Carolina.

"Q: I understand that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has announced new guidelines for the storage of low-level radioactive material since the disposal site in Barnwell, S.C. plans to close. Does B&W ever use the Barnwell Facility for any disposal needs, or will that facility's closure affect B&W operations here in any way? If so, I'd like to discuss those potential effects and perhaps write an article about the issue."

"A: Annually, the B&W Lynchburg facility generates approximately 15 to 20 cubic feet of Class B and C waste, which was disposed of at the Barnwell site in South Carolina. However, the Lynchburg facility has not been significantly impacted by Barnwell's closure."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SEALED SOURCE

The licensee discovered a leaking sealed source while performing a routine leak check. The source, a Ni-63 used in a Gas Chromatograph (SN U0915), was discovered to have loose surface contamination in the area around the source. The licensee discovered .006 microCuries of contamination in the area with a limit of .005 microCuries. There was no additional contamination found. The licensee decontaminated the device and is prepping it for disposal.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PACKAGE EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION LIMITS EXCEEDED

The State provided the following information via email:

"On June 5, 2008, Thomas Gray and Associates (TGA), a California licensee, contacted the [California Radiologic Health Branch] office to report the receipt of a package containing H-3 and C-14, which exceeded the external contamination limits in 10 CFR 71.87(i). TGA received 8 drums of waste from Metabasis Therapeutics in La Jolla California on May 31, 2008, at just after 1700 hours, as TGA was closing up for the weekend. On Monday, June 2, 2008, TGA wiped the incoming shipment, and after reviewing the results of the LSC analysis on June 3, 2008, found approximately 100,000 per 100 sq-cm H-3 contamination on the external surface of one drum. There were lesser amounts of external contamination on two of the other drums. The three drums were immediately overpacked and isolated at TGA's facility, and the carrier was notified the next day, on June 4, 2008 at about 1300-1400 hours. This incident is being investigated by the San Diego County office that contracts with RHB for inspection and compliance.

CA Report 060508

REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW COOLING FLOW TO MAIN GENERATOR RECTIFIER

"During the performance of stator water low flow testing a turbine trip and subsequent Reactor trip occurred on low cooling flow to the main generator rectifier. An Automatic Emergency Feedwater actuation signal occurred on low steam generator level due to unit trip. This is an expected actuation for a turbine/reactor trip from 100% power. The Engineered Safety Function Actuation operated as designed.

"On the Unit trip, the main feedwater pumps exhibited large rpm oscillations. Operators tripped one of the non-safety related main feed pumps, and placed the second in manual which stabilized the main feedwater system. When conditions allowed, operators placed the operating main feed pump in automatic control."

All rods fully inserted successfully. All emergency systems operated as required. No PORV's or Safety valves lifted during this event. Auxiliary Feedwater system is available, but not in use at this time. RCPs are in operation transferring decay heat to steam generators. Main steam is being directed to main condenser via bypass.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO LEAK IN SAFETY INJECTION TANK VENT LINE

"On Thursday June 5, 2008 at 2356 MST Palo Verde Nuclear Station Unit 1 initiated a normal reactor shutdown to comply with condition C of Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.5.1 and to facilitate a weld repair on a nitrogen leak found on the Safety Injection Tank (SIT) 1A vent line.

"LCO 3.5.1 requires that all four SITs be operable in Modes 1 and 2. On June 5, 2008, at 0225 hours MST, Unit 1 entered Condition B which provides allowance for one SIT to be inoperable for a 24 hour period. The SIT will not be restored to operable status within the TS required 24 hour period, therefore, Condition C will be applicable at 0225 MST on June 6 2008. Condition C requires shutdown to Mode 3 in six hours and to reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1837 psia within 12 hours.

"On June 06 at 0148 hours MST, Unit 1 was manually tripped from approximately 20% power. The shutdown did not result in a release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public. The primary plant is being stabilized in Mode 3 in forced circulation with both steam generators used for heat removal. Unit 1 is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in Mode 3."

S/G's are being feed via main feed. All other safety related systems are operable. Decay heat is via SBC system to the condenser. There is no impact on the other units.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.