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Event Notification Report for May 20, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/19/2008 - 05/20/2008

** EVENT NUMBERS **


44159 44212 44214 44215 44218 44223

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 44159
Rep Org: LOUISIANA GLOBAL XRAY AND TESTING
Licensee: LOUISIANA GLOBAL XRAY AND TESTING
Region: 4
City:  State: LA
County:
License #: LA-0577-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM JOHNSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 04/23/2008
Notification Time: 10:51 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/19/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(a)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 25 REM
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
DUNCAN WHITE (FSME)

Event Text

POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE GREATER THAN 1000 RADS

Louisiana Global X-ray and Testing called to report a potential overexposure after consulting with Region IV. Apparently, Landauer notified them that a dosimetry badge worn by one of their employees in the month of March 2008 read greater than 1000 Rads. The licensee is launching an investigation as to where the potential overexposure may have occurred. The affected employee worked both in the State of Louisiana and offshore.

The licensee notified Region IV (Leonard Wert) and the State of Louisiana.

* * * UPDATE ON 5/19/2008 AT 1039 FROM W. JOHNSTON TO M. ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"On 4/23/2008, we [Louisiana Global X-ray and Testing] reported an exposure in excess of 1000 rads. Investigation proved that the individual did not receive the exposure, that the TLD received the exposure. This was determined through blood tests to the individual that was assigned the exposed TLD.

"The Doctor here [Louisiana Global X-ray and Testing] and a Doctor at ReACT( ORNL) reviewed the lab results and both concurred that the individual did not receive the exposure.

"During the investigation it finally came to light that the individual had found his TLD at the end of a work shift in a pipe yard here in south Louisiana. The individual finally confessed that he failed to report the incident to anyone. He figured he had just dropped it when he found it."

Notified the R4DO (Proulx) and FSME (Burgess).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44212
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: SOLO CUP COMPANY
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: G-02174
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/14/2008
Notification Time: 11:32 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2008
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO AM-241 STATIC ELIMINATOR SOURCES MISSING

The Solo Cup Company contacted the State of Texas concerning two 20.25 milliCurie Am-241 static eliminator sources that are missing. The Solo Cup company was unable to locate the sources following a request by the manufacturer (NRD) to return them as part of a source recall. The source serial numbers are SA-3232 and SA-3242. Model A-2003.

The State investigation of the missing sources is in progress.

TX Report I-8511


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44214
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: BOSTON UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: BOSTON State: MA
County:
License #: GL - 0671
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/15/2008
Notification Time: 09:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/25/2008
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1)
RON ZELAC (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - MASSACHUSETTS - LEAKING CS-137 CHECK SOURCE

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"This facsimile serves as initial notification of an event of a leaking Cs-137 check source found inside a generally licensed device - Beckman Coulter Model 3801 LSC - at Boston University, Boston, MA. The event was reported by Beckman Coulter to the Massachusetts Radiation via letter dated April 25, 2008. The preliminary information of this event [ is as follows:]

"On March 25, 2008, a Field Service Engineer (FSE) for Beckman Coulter performed a service call on a Beckman Coulter LS 3801 liquid scintillation counter (LSC) at Boston University in Boston, MA. At the time the service was performed, the FSE discovered an elevated radiation reading inside the LSC. Upon further investigation, the FSE discovered elevated radiation reading originated from a metal base plate used to support lead shielding inside the LSC. A wipe test of this base plate revealed removable contamination of ~ 0.03 microcuries. Upon discovery of the contamination, the FSE immediately notified Beckman Coulter's RSO and Boston University personnel. The contamination was limited to the metal base plate inside the LSC and no personnel were contaminated. Due to the position of the base plate, directly beneath lead shielding, no additional exposure to the user of the LSC would have resulted. The LSC was being decommissioned at the time and it is out of service. The dislodged Cs-137 source (currently 18 microcuries) was recovered from the LSC by the FSE and it is currently being held by Boston University. Beckman Coulter is investigating how the source holder may have been damaged. No contamination was found outside of the LSC, thus no additional decontamination measures were necessary as a result of this event."

MA Report 05 - 7780

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 44215
Facility: BWX TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: CHERYL GOFF
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/15/2008
Notification Time: 10:51 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2008
Event Time: 06:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION/NEWS REL
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2)
BRITTAIN HILL (NMSS)
FUELS FOUO (EMAIL) ()

Event Text

CONCURRENT REPORT DUE TO OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

"On May 14, 2008 at approximately 6:00 am, personnel discovered a tote of acid being stored in excess of 90 days allowed by Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) regulations. The tote of acid was generated on February 8, 2008 and in order to meet the regulations it should have been shipped on May 8, 2008. An inquiry into the issue was made and the personnel responsible for scheduling shipments believed the generation date was the same as another tote in storage, February 18, 2008. The waste is scheduled to be shipped for disposal on May 16, 2008. A corrective action has been written for this event and an investigation will occur.

"This concurrent report is being made because the event was reported to the following government agency, Virginia DEQ"

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 44218
Facility: BWX TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: KENNY KIRBY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/16/2008
Notification Time: 09:17 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2008
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION/NEWS REL
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2)
BRITTAIN HILL (NMSS)
FUELS OUO (E-MAIL) ()

Event Text

CONCURRENT REPORT DUE TO RESPONSE TO A PRESS INQUIRY

"Below are the responses to questions BWXT received from [deleted] the News &
Advance of Lynchburg, VA, regarding NRC Inspection Report No. 70-27/2008-001 and Notice of Violation:

"Q: Is Babcock & Wilcox contesting the notice of violation?

"A: B&W has 30 days from the notice of the violation, which was issued on April 21, to contest it. A decision has not been made.

"Q: Other than losing 'personal effects' and undergoing first aid, has the splashed
employee experienced any other consequences from the splashing?

"A: We do not comment on the health status of employees.

"Q: What happens next in this citation procedure with the NRC?

"A: B&W will make the decision to contest the notice or accept the violation. No fine has been charged to the facility. Corrective actions were implemented immediately following this event."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 44223
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: CALVIN PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/19/2008
Notification Time: 17:20 [ET]
Event Date: 05/18/2008
Event Time: 17:21 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/19/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2)
BRITTAIN HILL (NMSS)

Event Text

VIOLATION OF A NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL - 24-HOUR REPORT

"At 1721 hours on 5-18-08 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that violation of a nuclear criticality safety approval (NCSA) had occurred.

"At 1720 hours on 5-17-08, the coolant system for [DELETED] was evacuated using an R-114 evacuation pump. The recirculating cooling water (RCW) condenser for that cell had not been disconnected or vented before evacuation of coolant system vapor or air, in violation of NCSA CAS-21 Rev. 01, 'Operation and Shutdown of the Diffusion Cascade,' Control 3.2.3. That control states: 'The RCW condenser shall be disconnected or vented before coolant vapor is evacuated.'

"This control minimizes the amount of water that is available to moderate fissile material that might be present in the UF6 region of the process gas cooler.

"Coolant system leak rate testing results were logged as of 2100 hours on 5-18-08 showing the coolant system to be evacuated to 30" vacuum and holding. At that pressure the system would be below the vapor pressure of water. Therefore, the coolant system being evacuated to that level and holding would indicate that no liquid water was present in the coolant system. The system being evacuated and holding proves that not only was the condenser free of any significant RCW to coolant leaks, but the process gas cooler was also essentially leak-tight.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-08-1471: PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2008-18; NRC Worksheet No. 44223

"This violation represents a significant breach of NCS administrative controls for this operation: however, the safety significance of the as-found condition was quite low. The worst case enrichment [DELETED] at this location was just above the minimum fissile enrichment, so that a very large mass of optimally moderated uranium (more than [DELETED]) would have been needed for a criticality to be possible. Moderation would have required excessive water intrusion into the coolant system through condenser tube leaks, and subsequent water intrusion into the process gas region of the cooler/converter through a concurrent process gas cooler lube leak. Even though NCS Control 3.2.3 was violated, no significant water intrusion occurred. Although the as-found condition of the coolant system did not contain water, the parameter is considered lost since the typical condition of condenser tubes would be expect to result in water intrusion and would not represent a reliable barrier to in-leakage.

"Double contingency was re-established within four hours of discovery by confirming the coolant system was drained of any possible liquid. At 1615 hours on 5-18-08 the air evacuation pumps were isolated from [DELETED] coolant system, which is the last point at which any potential liquid would have been drained from the coolant system. The condenser venting was completed at 2050 hours on 5-18-08. Coolant system leak rate completed at 2100 hours on 5-18-08 confirmed 30" vacuum and holding to show the condenser and process cooler were leak-tight."

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