Event Notification Report for April 04, 2008

ACCIDENT MITIGATION - COMMON CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM

"Salem Unit 1 was placed in a configuration that affected the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident due to an inadvertent actuation of the common control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACS). CREACS was actuated as a result of an invalid Control Room air intake duct radiation monitor initiated on April 4, 2008 at 1259 hours. Salem Unit-2 is currently defueled. Salem Unit 1 is in Mode 1 at 100% power. Unit 1 has two shutdown LCOs in effect. The first is for the CREACS system, which is shared between Unit 1 & 2, being aligned for single train operation with the Unit 2 CREACS train out of service per LCO 3.7.6. The second shutdown LCO is for two outside air intake dampers being inoperable for scheduled maintenance. With Unit 2 having an invalid Radiation Monitor signal, the CREACS system actuates in accident pressurized mode. This mode of actuation starts the CREACS fans, isolates the Control Room Envelope from the normal control room ventilation system and aligns the two sets of CREACS outside air intake dampers. With a Unit 2 Radiation Monitor signal, the Unit 2 CREACS intake dampers close and the Unit 1 CREACS intake dampers open. These damper positions are locked in until manually reset. With only one train of CREACS operable, the dose analysis indicates that the requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 19 can only be met during the worst case design basis accident if the Unit 1 CREACS intake dampers are closed and the Unit 2 CREACS intake dampers open. Therefore, until the CREACS intake dampers were reset and realigned, Salem Unit 1 would not have been able to mitigate the consequences of an accident and is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The CREACS system actuation was reset after the failed radiation monitor (1R1B ch II) was removed from service and the dampers were re-aligned to their pre actuation alignment at 1316 hours, restoring Salem Unit 1 to within the assumptions of the dose analysis. Total duration in the condition was 17 minutes.

"The only piece of major equipment out of service on Salem Unit 1 is the 15 Service water pump which is out of service for scheduled maintenance."

The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY ERIC POWELL TO JASON KOZAL ON 04/17/08 AT 2113 * * *

"On April 4, 2008 Salem Unit 1 was placed in a configuration that was contrary to the current dose analysis of record due to an inadvertent actuation of the common control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACS). CREACS was initiated as a result of an invalid actuation of a Control Room air intake duct radiation monitoring channel (1R1B ch II). At the time of the actuation, the Unit 2 train of CREACS was out of service due to scheduled maintenance leaving only the Unit 1 CREACS train operable. Unit 1 was at 100% power and Unit 2 was defueled. With one train of CREACS out of service at the start of an accident the dose analysis of record requires that the CREACS emergency intake dampers for the unit having the accident to close and for the opposite units emergency intake dampers to open. The actuation of the radiation monitoring channel 1R1B channel II caused the Unit 1 emergency intake dampers to open which was contrary to the dose analysis of record.

"Subsequent to this event, an evaluation was performed utilizing the assumptions of the dose analysis of record with the exception of the actual measured engineered safety feature system leakage outside containment and the atmospheric dispersion factors (x/Q) associated with the Unit 1 CREACS intake. Based upon this evaluation, the CREACS system with one filtration train operable and the emergency intakes open on Unit 1 would have been able to maintain doses to the Control Room operators below the limits of GDC-19 and the dose analysis of record. Since the CREACS system was capable of performing its accident mitigation function, this event is being retracted."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Schmidt)

MISSING DEPLETED URANIUM SOURCE

"On April 4, 2008, a condition was identified at the Hematite Decommissioning Project that potentially involves missing licensed material in a quantity greater than 10 times the quantity specified in 10 CFR 20, Appendix C. Specifically, although it cannot yet be determined with certainty, it appears that a small depleted uranium pellet used as a detector source is missing. The radioactive source was one of several installed and used in Eberline, Model DA-1, gamma detectors to provide an indication of continuous operability. From the available documentation, it appears that the detectors were installed in 1993, well before Westinghouse acquired the facility in 2000.

"If it is confirmed that the radioactive source indeed is missing and is of the type, quantity, and form of other similar detector sources present at the facility, the source is a depleted uranium pellet in a solid oxide form, with a total mass of approximately 5.5 grams. The total uranium mass of the source is approximately 4.85 grams. The uranium-235 (U-235) activity in the source is approximately 0.037 microcuries, which is a quantity greater than ten (10) times the 10 CFR 20, Appendix C, limit for U-235 of 0.001 microcuries.

"For reasons discussed further below, the circumstances under which the apparent loss of licensed material may have occurred cannot be determined with certainty. With the facility in a decommissioning status, it is possible that the source was separated from its detector during decommissioning activities performed since the site ceased fuel fabrication activities in 2001. Subsequently, the probable disposition of the source may have been its having been packaged and shipped either as Special Nuclear Material inventory removed from the site or as radioactive waste. Either situation is credible since significant decommissioning activities in the site Process Buildings has involved the removal of remaining Special Nuclear Material inventory and contaminated process equipment.

"As of the date of this report, immediate actions have included the following:

"(1) Similar detector sources from gamma detectors that no longer are needed/used have been removed and properly stored.

"(2) On April 7, 2008, a physical search and radiological surveys were conducted in an attempt to determine if the potentially missing radioactive source remains in the Process Building area. The source was not found.

"(3) An investigation is ongoing to confirm whether the licensed material is indeed missing. This investigation includes searching through Radiation Protection records for additional information regarding the source and any potential evidence of its disposition. It is noted that the ongoing investigation is challenged by: (1) the subject source and similar radioactive sources have not been formally tracked within an inventory and tracking system; (2) a change in facility ownership in 2000; and (3) site management and staff turnover since decommissioning started, such that individuals who may have had first hand knowledge of the cause and/or disposition of the subject radioactive source are no longer at the facility.

"The investigation into this event is continuing, and any further details will be provided in the written report that Westinghouse will submit within 30 days of this telephone report pursuant to 10 CFR 20.2201 (b)."

The licensee informed NRC Region 3 and the NRC Headquarters Program Manager.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source