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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
04/24/2007 - 04/25/2007
** EVENT NUMBERS **
|
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 42962 |
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: PACIFIC ECOSOLUTIONS (PECOS)
Region: 4
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0393-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKEL J. ELSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON |
Notification Date: 11/03/2006
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 11/01/2006
Event Time: 10:20 [PST]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2007 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS) |
Event Text
WASHINGTON STATE AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
This event was received via e-mail
"On November 1, three workers were involved in separating sources, lead pigs (shielded containers) and trash from a barrel. Work was being conducted in a ventilated enclosure within a PEcoS waste processing building. Two workers inside the enclosure were wearing respirators and the supervisor (not wearing a respirator) was immediately outside the enclosure directing the work. At the end of the day, the supervisor noted he was contaminated. The supervisor was scheduled for whole-body counting at the Battelle facility early the next day. An uptake of approximately 11.7 nanocuries of Americium 241 was confirmed. The preliminary dose estimate to the individual's lung was 97.5 Rem CDE. The individual was started on chelation treatment. The other two workers were sent for whole body counting on November 3.
"The operation included opening one lead pig that contained three Am-241 sources. Contamination previously had not been detected outside the pig or in the trash. Sources were surveyed for dose rate and separated from the lead pig without contamination smears being taken. No release to the public or the environment occurred. Operations in this and adjacent areas were stopped once the situation was known. An investigation was initiated by PEcoS. The area was evacuated and is currently being ventilated. DOH has an inspector on-site performing an incident investigation.
"Media is aware of the incident.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-250(2) Notification of Incidents (24 hour notification)
"Isotope and Activity involved: Am-241 total activity from twelve drums was manifested at 6.8 GigaBq (184 millicuries). Only one drum was open at the time of the incident.
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Three workers were involved. One worker has an apparent over exposure of 97.5 Rem CDE to the Lung. No release to public or environment."
* * * UPDATE FROM WASHINGTON STATE (FRAZEE) TO HUFFMAN VIA E-MAIL AT 1746 ON 11/16/06 * * *
"On November 1, three workers were involved in separating sources, lead pigs (shielded containers) and trash from a barrel. Work was being conducted in a ventilated room, (previously reported as an enclosure within the room) within a PEcoS waste processing building. Two workers inside the room were wearing respirators and the supervisor (not wearing a respirator) was immediately outside the room directing the work. A very high contamination level was detected (greater than 2 million dpm/wipe) in the room at about 10:00, and the building was evacuated shortly after that. At about this time, an air sample that was in the area of the workers was counted and determined to have a very high alpha activity (10 E-9 µCi/ml). The supervisor and the workers were taken to a survey area and found to be contaminated on the face. Contamination was detected on the respirators. The workers were successfully decontaminated by the on site health physics department. The supervisor was scheduled for whole-body counting at the Battelle facility early the next day. An uptake of approximately 11.7 nanocuries of Americium 241 was confirmed. The preliminary dose estimate was 97.5 Rem CDE. The individual was started on chelation treatment. The other two workers were sent for whole body counting on November 3. Subsequent counts on the first individual were lower (about 9nCi), and the subsequent 2 workers follow-up counts decreased from about 6.9nCi to 3.2nCi and from 1.5nCi to 0.5nCi. The final dose received will depend on the efficiency of the chelate treatment and other factors. One additional person who was in the building was analyzed for internal Am-241 contamination, and was found to be <0.092nCi, below the detection limit of the instrument.
"The operation included opening one lead pig that contained three Am-241 sources. Contamination previously had not been detected outside the pig or in the trash. Sources were surveyed for dose rate and separated from the lead pig without contamination smears being taken. Operations in this and adjacent areas were stopped once the situation was known. An investigation was initiated by PEcoS. The area was evacuated and is currently being ventilated. DOH has an inspector on-site performing an incident investigation.
Update as of 14 November:
"The three employees are still being treated with a chelating agent. This week should be the last week. At this time, there is no update on the original activity or the activity left in the body, except that the amount of activity in the lung is decreasing. It will be several weeks before the final dose can be calculated by the licensee's consultants, which will be based on the initial lung count, the bioassay results (urine/fecal), and the effectiveness of the chelate at removing the americium from the body. At this point, we assume there are three individuals who may have exceeded their annual dose limit of 50 Rem to the bone. The final dose received by the three individuals will be calculated when sufficient information is accumulated. The three workers have returned to work exhibiting some emotional stress and slight effects from the medical treatments.
Plant Status
"The plant is being restarted incrementally after a safety shutdown imposed by the company. After DOH approval, two process lines have been restarted: the super compactor on the mixed waste side of operations and an inspection and sorting process, also on the mixed waste side. The licensee is completing items identified on the mixed waste thermal systems safety evaluation, and expects to restart those processes in the next few days. In addition, they are completing items identified on the low level thermal systems, but a restart date is pending. The low level processes that were affected by this accident are not being restarted, until the contamination in the building is controlled. The building that the material is in is being decontaminated, and continues to be a respirator area. The contaminated room is still inaccessible, however, a plan was completed to re-enter the room to assess the extent of the contamination. This initial entry was conducted on 11-14-06 by senior members of the Health Physics staff. As a result of the surveys conducted during the reentry, the extent of the problem they face is better understood. A plan is being developed to decontaminate the room.
"The investigation is continuing, and the actual cause of the event does not appear to be a single cause, but rather compounding mistakes, errors in judgment and complacency for the seriousness of this type material. Corrective actions that are being taken by the licensee at this time, are primarily based on self evaluation, using the workers and technical staff. In addition, at this time DOH is requiring the company to retrain the radiological technicians as well as the workers in the different waste processes prior to restart of any process. DOH is working with the company to identify the root causes of this incident.
"No release to public or environment. Air sample analysis results for a particulate sample in the building exhaust stack was 9.2E-3 µCi/ml gross alpha.
"The building is being decontaminated, and additional containment tents are being installed around the contaminated room.
"Media is aware of the incident. Tri-City Herald (Kennewick Washington) article was published November 4, 2006.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-250(2) Notification of Incidents (24 hour notification)
"Isotope and Activity involved: Am-241 total activity from twelve drums was manifested at 6.8 GigaBq (184 millicuries). Only one drum was open at the time of the incident.
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Three workers were involved. The first worker had an initial internal deposition result of 11.7 nCi. Two additional workers have been confirmed as having an internal deposition: initial results were 6.9 nCi and 1.5 nCi. Subsequent counts of all three involved personnel were lower. All three workers were given chelating treatment. The final dose will be calculated by the Battelle internal dosimetry program, following extensive testing. Other workers who were in the area are being tested. The estimated dose to the endosteal (white bone matter) from 11.7nCi is about 95 rem CDE."
R4DO (Johnson) and NMSS EO (Camper) notified.
Washington State Report # WA-06-063.
* * * UPDATE ON 02/06/07 AT 1600 EST VIA E-MAIL FROM MIKEL ELSEN TO MACKINNON * * *
"Update as of 5 February, 2007
"From the Department of Health's investigation into this incident, it appears that the root cause of the event was failure to adhere to procedures and plans set forth for the project, and inadequate training. Preliminary corrective actions taken by the licensee to prevent recurrence are disciplinary action to the employees involved for procedure and policy violations, a functional Alpha CAM was put in service, training performed for all staff working with radioactive material, with follow-up testing. Additionally, a reorganization of the facility which relieves the RSO of numerous tasks not related to Radiation Safety has taken place, and the facility has made a new position Special Project Lead who is assigned to work with HP and Operations Staff on special projects and compile lessons etc. The final exposure to the individuals has not yet been assigned. When the DTPA treatments have been determined done then exposures will be able to be assigned. Currently it is anticipated that the final dose calculation will be assigned by the end of February 2007. The amount of Am-241 activity in the involved drum was manifested as 71 millicuries Am-241."
R4DO (Nease) & NMSS (Greg Morell) notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 04/24/07 AT 1525 EDT VIA E-MAIL FROM MIKE ELSEN TO MACKINNON * * *
"Update as of April 23, 2007
"The final intake and internal dose evaluation of the PEcoS employees have been completed. The results are presented below, along with the anticipated dose they would have received if the employees did not receive the DTPA chelating treatments.
Employee 1: Intake was estimated at 17 nCi of Am241 The estimate of the actual 50-year committed internal dose equivalents for the respective organs and tissues
"Actual 50-year Committed Anticipated Dose
"Organ / Tissue Dose Equivalent (rem) Without Therapy (rem)
"Effective 3.8 7.3
"Bone Surface 78 150
"Liver 4.6 8.9
"Red Bone Marrow 6.2 12
"Gonads 1.1 2.1
"Lungs 1.7 1.7
"Employee 2: Intake was estimated at 4 nCi of Am241 The estimate of the actual 50-year committed internal dose equivalents for the respective organs and tissues
"Actual 50-year Committed Anticipated Dose
"Organ / Tissue Dose Equivalent (rem) Without Therapy (rem)
"Effective 1.0 1.7
"Bone Surface 22 36
"Liver 1.3 2.1
"Red Bone Marrow 1.7 2.8
"Gonads 0.29 0.48
"Lungs 0.39 0.39
"Employee 3: Intake was estimated at 48 nCi of Am241 The estimate of the actual 50-year committed internal dose equivalents for the respective organs and tissues
"Actual 50-year Committed Anticipated Dose
"Organ / Tissue Dose Equivalent (rem) Without Therapy (rem)
"Effective 4.9 21
'Bone Surface 95 430
"Liver 5.5 25
"Red Bone Marrow 7.5 34
"Gonads 1.3 5.8
"Lungs 4.7 4.7
"The licensee has taken the following corrective actions to help prevent reoccurrence:
"A Re-distribution of the RSO's work to other onsite personnel and hiring additional people to ensure adequate coverage.
"Management reorganization, to increase the oversight given to the radiation protection program.
"Increased training on procedures.
'Increased management interaction and surveillance by the RSO and other health physics staff.
'Inclusion of the engineering staff on all facility changes, such as ventilation changes.'Changes to the procedures for operation of the ventilation system in buildings 1 and 2.
"Hazard analysis on the ventilation system in buildings 1 and 2, and the changes that were discussed in the hazard analysis.
"Careful analysis of the internal dose received by the affected workers.
"Assurance PEcoS personnel will follow all of your procedures.
"Disciplinary action for culpable employees.
"Greater emphases to ensure that orders and instructions to the workers are clear and understood.
"Plant Status
"The plant is being restarted incrementally after a safety shutdown imposed by the company. After DOH approval, two process lines have been restarted: the super compactor on the mixed waste side of operations and an inspection and sorting process, also on the mixed waste side. The licensee is completing items identified on the mixed waste thermal systems safety evaluation, and expects to restart those processes in the next few days. In addition, they are completing items identified on the low level thermal systems, but a restart date is pending. The low level processes that were affected by this accident are not being restarted, until the contamination in the building is controlled. The building that the material is in is being decontaminated, and continues to be a respirator area. The contaminated room is still inaccessible, however, a plan was completed to re-enter the room to assess the extent of the contamination. This initial entry was conducted on 11-14-06 by senior members of the Health Physics staff. As a result of the surveys conducted during the reentry, the extent of the problem they face is better understood. A plan is being developed to decontaminate the room.
"The investigation is continuing, and the actual cause of the event does not appear to be a single cause, but rather compounding mistakes, errors in judgment and complacency for the seriousness of this type material. Corrective actions that are being taken by the licensee at this time, are primarily based on self evaluation, using the workers and technical staff. In addition, at this time DOH is requiring the company to retrain the radiological technicians as well as the workers in the different waste processes prior to restart of any process. DOH is working with the company to identify the root causes of this incident.
"No release to public or environment. Air sample analysis results for a particulate sample in the building exhaust stack was 9.2E-3 µCi/ml gross alpha.
"The building is being decontaminated, and additional containment tents are being installed around the contaminated room.
"Media is aware of the incident. Tri-City Herald (Kennewick Washington) article was published November 4, 2006.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-250(2) Notification of Incidents (24 hour notification)
"Isotope and Activity involved: Am-241 total activity from twelve drums was manifested at 6.8 GigaBq (184 millicuries). Only one drum was open at the time of the incident.
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Three workers were involved. The first worker had an initial internal deposition result of 11.7 nCi. Two additional workers have been confirmed as having an internal deposition: initial results were 6.9 nCi and 1.5 nCi. Subsequent counts of all three involved personnel were lower. All three workers were given chelating treatment. The final dose will be calculated by the Battelle internal dosimetry program, following extensive testing. Other workers who were in the area are being tested. The estimated dose to the endosteal (white bone matter) from 11.7nCi is about 95 rem CDE.
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): N/A
"Disposition/recovery: N/A
"Leak test? N/A
"Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number) N/A
"Release of activity? N/A
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: N/A
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: N/A
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: N/A
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: N/A
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? N/A
"Was written report provided to patient? N/A
"Was referring physician notified? N/A
"Consultant used? (deleted) at Battelle in vivo counter facility, (deleted) at Advanced Medical, and (deleted) at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory."
FSME (Greg Morell) & R4DO (Linda Smith). |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 43120 |
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 4
City: TACOMA State: WA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN C. SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON |
Notification Date: 01/25/2007
Notification Time: 19:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/24/2007
Event Time: 12:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2007 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT FROM WASHINGTON - RADIATION MONITORS AT A RECYCLING FACILITY DETECTED RADIOACTIVITY COMING FROM AN INCOMING LOAD OF SCRAP METAL
This event was received via e-mail from the Washington State Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection.
"Licensee: Unknown & under investigation.
"City and State: Tacoma, Washington
"License Number: Unknown & under investigation.
"Type of License: Unknown & under investigation.
"Date and time of Event: Washington DOH responded to event site 24 January 2007, ~ 11:30 am).
"Location of Event: Tacoma, Washington
"ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, Dept. of Health (DOH) on-site investigation; media attention):
"WA DOH was notified on 24 January 2007 that radiation monitors at Schnitzer Steel (a metal recycling facility) detected radioactive sources in a load of scrap. The readings referenced by a Schnitzer's representative seemed unusually high so WA DOH staff were immediately sent to do a site investigation. Numerous meter & wipe surveys by WA DOH & Schnitzer's health physics consultant identified no site or source contamination. Four items of various materials, configurations and sizes were separated from the load. Some pieces had been wrapped in sheet lead. WA DOH staff measured from 0.6 to 80 mr/hr with an open beta window, ion-chamber survey meter. A waste disposal company had also been called to assure control of the materials for disposal. The nuclides, origins of the materials, and other details of the event remain under investigation.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: Unknown & under investigation; possibly 10 CFR 20.2201 and WAC 246-221-240 'Reports of stolen, lost or missing radiation sources.'
"Isotope and Activity involved: Unknown & under investigation.
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Unknown & under investigation (none known at this time).
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): Unknown & under investigation (none known at this time).
"Disposition/recovery: Unknown & under investigation (none known at this time). Orphan unknown radioactive sources are secured and not a radiation hazard.
"Leak test? Unknown & under investigation (none known at this time).
"Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number) NA
"Release of activity? Unknown & under investigation (none known at this time). Numerous meter & wipe surveys identified no contamination.
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: NA
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: NA
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: NA
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: NA
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? NA
"Was written report provided to patient? NA
"Was referring physician notified? NA
"Consultant used? Yes."
Washington State Report Number WA-07-005
* * * UPDATE ON 04/24/07 AT 1500 EDT VIA E-MAIL FROM ARDEN C. SCROGGS TO MACKINNON * * *
Status: Updated and Closed
"Licensee: Unable to determine after extensive investigation. There are many rumors of possible origin, including military. The military asserted that they did not lose control of these items, there is no proof of military origin, and they have established radiation safety programs / procedures / training to prevent these items from being released into the public domain. Even if these items had been used by the military years ago, does not mean that the military last possessed them and released them to the public. Many natural radium items continue to circulate through the public domain through no fault of the military / manufacturers."
License Number: Unable to determine after extensive investigation.
Type of License: Unable to determine after extensive investigation.
"WA DOH was notified on 24 January 2007 that radiation monitors at Schnitzer Steel (a metal recycling facility) detected radioactive sources in a load of scrap. The readings referenced by a Schnitzer's representative seemed unusually high so WA DOH staff was immediately sent on 24 January 2007 to do a site investigation. Numerous meter & wipe surveys by WA DOH & Schnitzer's health physics consultant identified no site or source contamination, and only minor contamination inside the yard box that contained the various items.
"Schnizter deserves recognition for their detectors & staff that flagged & separated the unknown abandoned radioactive materials on their way to the shredder feed. It would have been a terrible mess and a serious health hazard if they had reached the shredder. A waste disposal company worked closely with WA DOH to immediately secure the abandoned unknown radioactive materials, to ensure absence of contamination, assess the nuclide and activities, and to promptly arrange for proper disposal.
"Four distinct groups of unknown, abandoned radioactive materials, of various configurations and sizes were separated from the load. The estimated total maximum activity was 81 microcuries natural radium (radium-226). There were four distinct groups: group 1, a black coil, ~ 36 microcuries (~ 40 milliR / hr max @ ~ 1 inch, beta window closed); group 2, a hook & cable & 4 guides & cylinder ~ 4 microcuries (~ 400 microrem / hr max @ ~ 1 inch, 4 guides the highest); group 3, a folded steel sheet ~ 1 microcurie (~ 28 microrem / hr max @ ~ 1 inch); & group 4, a large sandwich of asbestos / wood / thick & heavy metal, ~ 40 microcuries (~ 44 microrem / hr max @ ~ 1 inch). All activities were overestimated due to the complicated nature of the materials and inability to directly access the sandwich and the folded sheet interiors. The radium coil was wrapped in sheet lead by Schnitzer Steel staff when separated from the non-radioactive scrap.
"The coil has been recognized as one used by military decades ago; but it is not believed to have come recently from a military site. In 1977 all radium items were removed from military use, & all remaining radium items (mainly museum items) are inventoried & tracked by the military (at levels as low as 1 microcurie). Sad news is that many items still remain in public domain (we routinely receive calls / requests for help with such items). Per military scrap metal recycling contract conditions, all military scrap metal sent to recycling is separated from the other non-metal building scrap / debris, so the sandwich would not have left the military site as a sandwich; all metal would have been separated from the non-metal. All metal shipments leaving the military sites are surveyed by their military rad detectors / radiation safety staff. All military staff interviewed had an awareness of asbestos, would recognize that the asbestos needed proper sampling & handling & disposal, & would stop a shipment containing asbestos & follow their procedures to contact their hazmat asbestos abatement team.
"The many manufacturers / vendors / service reps / users / radiation professionals contacted were unable to identify these items. The general reply is that radium is not an application used in this country, & has not been for many decades. The orphans look industrial in nature, & the presence of asbestos / acoustical board / heavy metal plates / wood suggests a high-temperature use, possibly steel / metal processing. It is possible that the sandwich radium sources were used with a fill level gauge. However, radium has not been used by most manufacturers in the US, & the last time it was used was decades ago. It is possible that these are not items that originated in the United States; that is consistent with the blatant disregard for proper asbestos handling. There is a small comfort in that current vendors / users are not tossing this mess. It is troubling that there is no definite answer as to origin / generator, & that the owner / generator possibly knowingly shipped these radioactive / asbestos items to a recycling center. It appears that someone knew they were removing the non-radioactive construction sections from around the radioactive sources section. Someone must have known that they were folding the steel plate to cover/ surround the source buried inside the fold. Someone also disregarded the proper asbestos disposal procedures. This indicates a willful disregard for the asbestos / radiation safety regulations, or a lack of awareness that they exist.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: Yes, per WAC 246-221-240 Reports of stolen, lost or missing radiation sources . Notification is required immediately for 100 microcuries or more of lost, stolen or missing radium-226. Notification is required within 30 days for 1 microcurie or more of radium-226 that is still lost, stolen or missing. It is unclear whether federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 CFR 20.2201 Reports of theft or loss of licensed material applies, because natural radium is not considered licensed material and is not regulated until very recently.
"Isotope and Activity involved: Natural radium (radium-226), 81 microcuries total maximum estimate. Actual activity probably less due to conservative overestimating.
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Extensive investigation identified no overexposures. Prompt identification & action by Schnitzer staff prevented the unknown abandoned radioactive / asbestos materials from entering the shredder feed. It would have been a terrible mess & a serious health hazard if they had reached the shredder.
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): Extensive investigation identified no licensee /owner / generator.
"Disposition/recovery: These abandoned unknown radioactive materials were immediately secured and not a radiation hazard. These abandoned radioactive materials were properly disposed of via a licensed radioactive waste disposal vendor on 28 February 2007.
"Leak test? Wipe tests of the abandoned unknown radioactive materials confirmed absence of contamination in public areas of the site, and identified slightly elevated contamination in the yard box (maximum 98 disintegrations per minute per ~ 1,000 square centimeters composite wipe), and on the abandoned radioactive materials (maximum 784 disintegrations per minute per wipe). Because wipe & meter surveys identified contamination levels below regulatory limits (WAC 246-232-140, Schedule D) and not considered a health risk, the Department of Health did not have the site decontaminated. Per its commitment to ALARA, Schnitzer also arranged for proper disposal of the slightly contaminated yard box.
"Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number) NA
"Release of activity? Numerous meter & wipe surveys confirmed absence of contamination in public areas of the site, and identified slightly elevated contamination in the yard box, and on the abandoned radioactive materials (please see Leak tests above).
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: NA
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: NA
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: NA
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: NA
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? NA
"Was written report provided to patient? NA
"Was referring physician notified? NA
"Consultant used? Yes."
FSME (Greg Morell) & R4DO (Linda Smith) notified. E-mailed to ILTAB. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 43311 |
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH, INC.
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County:
License #: 0600794-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LEE COX
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 04/20/2007
Notification Time: 09:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2007
Event Time: 03:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2007 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
ILTAB via email () |
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING THEFT OF RADIOPHARMACEUTICALS FROM DELIVERY VEHICLE
At 0345 hours on 4/20/07 a Cardinal Health, Inc. delivery vehicle (Ranger Pickup) parked at the Presbyterian Hospital located at 200 Hawthorne Lane in Charlotte, NC was broken into and had six (6) Type-7A ammo cans stolen. The ammo cans contained forty-nine (49) unit doses of Tc-99m (total activity 1.669 Curies) used for diagnostic work. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department was notified of the theft. NC plans on issuing a press release regarding this incident.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 43315 |
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NED DENNIN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 04/24/2007
Notification Time: 04:04 [ET]
Event Date: 04/24/2007
Event Time: 02:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2007 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION |
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
A/R |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Shutdown |
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM WITH ECCS INJECTION ON LOWERING REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL
"Limerick Unit 2 automatically shutdown on low reactor water level (+12.5 inches) at 0210 on 4/24/07. The cause is under investigation at this time.
"All control rods inserted as required. HPCI and RCIC initiated, injected and restored reactor water level. Lowest reactor water level noted was -73 inches.
"Primary containment isolation signals on +12.5 inches and -38 inches occurred. All isolations completed as required."
"The plant is currently in hot shutdown maintaining normal reactor level with feedwater in service."
Approximately 16000 gallons was injected in 4 minutes. There was no indication of RCS leakage. The licensee is investigating whether a feedwater runback had occurred. No SRVs lifted with the highest pressure observed at 1050 psi. The main condenser remains in service for decay heat removal. All EDGs are available, if needed.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and will inform both the State and Local authorities. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 43317 |
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN OSBORNE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 04/25/2007
Notification Time: 01:33 [ET]
Event Date: 04/24/2007
Event Time: 22:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2007 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL |
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
M/R |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Standby |
Event Text
MANUAL TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF CIRCULATORS
"A manual trip of Salem Unit 1 was initiated due to a loss of circulators from heavy grassing at the circulating water intake. All rods fully inserted on the trip and all systems responded as designed with decay heat being removed via the steam dump system. All Auxiliary Feedwater pumps automatically started as expected on low steam generator levels from the trip.
"The unit had previously entered the abnormal operating procedure for circulating water due to two circulators being out of service; one had previously emergency tripped due to high traveling water screen differential pressure and a second had been out of service for condenser waterbox cleaning. Alarms were received indicating rapid rising differential pressure on the remaining four in-service circulators' traveling water screens.
"In accordance with the abnormal procedure, the Control Room Supervisor directed the tripping of the circulators and the reactor. There were no complications encountered as a result of the trip and all equipment operated as expected. The operating crew stabilized the plant at no load conditions. Salem Unit 1 is currently in Mode 3 with RCS at normal operating temperature and pressure. Actions are being taken to return the circulators to service."
Unit 2 was not affected at this time and is operating at 100% power.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the local township Licensee will be issuing a press release. |
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