United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2006 > September 7

Event Notification Report for September 7, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
09/06/2006 - 09/07/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42818 42821 42825 42826 42828 42829 42830 42831

To top of page
General Information or Other Event Number: 42818
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: GEOCON INC.
Region: 4
City: SAN DIEGO State: CA
County:
License #: 3924
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONELLE KRAJEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 08/31/2006
Notification Time: 14:06 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2006
Event Time: 09:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL ()
MEXICO (CNSNS) ()
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF A STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The licensee, GEOCON Inc., license number 3924, reports that a Troxler Moisture Density Gauge Model No. 3440, S/N 33526 was stolen on 8/31/06. The gauge was secured in its case in a locked storage container in the rear of a locked pickup truck parked in front of the employees residence. When the employee went to his vehicle this morning at approximately 0900, he discovered that the vehicle was missing. The gauge contained 8 milli curies of Cs-137 and 40 milli Curies of Am-241/Be. The employee filed a report with the City of San Diego Police Department. The case number is 0630914N and the incident number is 66956.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

To top of page
General Information or Other Event Number: 42821
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SALEM ENGINEERING GROUP, INC
Region: 4
City: FRESNO State: CA
County:
License #: 7245-10
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K. ARUNIKA HEWADIKAR
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 08/31/2006
Notification Time: 15:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/30/2006
Event Time: 15:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL ()
MEXICO (CNSNS) ()
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST OR STOLEN HUMBOLDT GAUGE

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"On 8/31/06 the licensee contacted the Radiological Health Branch (RHB) and the Operations Emergency Services (OES) to notify them that one of their Humboldt Scientific gauges, Model 5001C, S/N 1758 containing 10 milli Ci of Cs-137 and 40 milli Ci of [Am]-241 had fallen off from a truck during transportation. The RHB Richmond office contacted the ARSO on 08/31/06 and learned the following:

"On 8/30/06 the gauge operator finished a job in Tulare, CA, and left the jobsite around 3:00 p.m. to go to another jobsite in Fresno, CA. When he arrived at the jobsite in Fresno, the operator noticed that the gauge was missing. He had not made any stops on his way to Fresno from Tulare. According to the ARSO, the operator had placed the gauge in the back of the truck without storing it in a type A container and it was not blocked and braced during transportation. When the operator learned that the gauge was missing, he failed to notify the RSO/ARSO. The ARSO was notified of the incident by the operator around 7:30 am on 8/31/06. They immediately contacted the RHB and OES. The ARSO also notified the Fresno CHP and the police departments in the cities of Tulare, Visalia, Kingston, Selma, Sower, and Fresno. The Fresno CHP had notified Caltrans. The RHB advised him to post a reward for $1000.00 in local newspapers for safe return of the gauge. RHB will be investigating the items of non-compliance associated with this incident."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

To top of page
General Information or Other Event Number: 42825
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: GEOSYNTEC CONSULTANTS
Region: 4
City: SAN FRANCISCO State: CA
County:
License #: 6379-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K. ARUNIKA HEWADIKARAM
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 09/01/2006
Notification Time: 12:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2006
Event Time: 14:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"On 8/31/06, the Geosyntec RSO contacted the Radiologic Health Branch (RHB), Richmond office to notify that one of their Troxler gauges, Model 3430, S/N 28743 containing 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of [Am]-241 had been run over by a compactor at a job site in South San Francisco (333 Oyster Point Blvd.) around 2:00 pm. The RSO stated that the gauge operator tried to stop the compactor backing up towards the gauge but it was unsuccessful due to the noise. The gauge was severely damaged with the source rod in an unshielded position. The RSO contacted Troxler to have the unshielded source transported for disposal. Troxler was not able to provide transportation on 08/31/06. Per RSO, the gauge is secured on the job site inside a locked storage container and the unshielded rod is placed in a 5 gallon bucket of soil. They expect to transport the damaged gauge as soon as assistance from a local gauge manufacturer is received. The RHB will investigate this incident for any items of non-compliance."

The State has indicated that the licensee intends to contact Campbell Pacific Nuclear (CPN) to transport the damaged gauge.

To top of page
General Information or Other Event Number: 42826
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TERRA ASSOCIATES, INC.
Region: 4
City: KIRKLAND State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0246-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 09/01/2006
Notification Time: 13:51 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2006
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
CINDY FLANNERY (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - TEMPORARILY MISSING TROXLER

The State provided the following information via email:

"Washington State DOH was notified of a missing gauge 31 August 2006 by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO).

"A portable gauge (Troxler model 3440, serial number 14393), had been checked out by an authorized gauge user on 29 August for transport to a temporary job-site. The gauge user had secured the gauge in a personal vehicle that day. As of the morning of 31 August, the user had not been heard from or seen since 29 August. Phone calls were made to the user's emergency contact numbers by the company RSO on 29 & 30 August trying to locate the user and gauge. The calls were unsuccessful with locating the person or gauge.

"The licensee had issued the user a corporate cell phone upon hiring. Previous attempts to call the cell phone had failed. On 31 August, attempts to call the cell phone confirmed it was in service. The RSO was able to trace the location of the cell phone via its GPS (global positioning system) feature. Both the job supervisor and RSO went to the cell phone's location and found the vehicle, the gauge & the user. The gauge was locked inside the transport container, and had been locked, at all times, inside the vehicle's trunk. The gauge had been secured and in possession of the user at all times even though the user had been out of touch.

"Corrective actions can be difficult when personnel choose to disregard established policies / procedures. The user was properly trained, approved & had a satisfactory work-history. Corrective actions will include refresher training and discussions with all staff about following state and company rules.

"The incident was successfully concluded due to the powerful GPS resource in the cell phone. Decisive action by the licensee & the employee's job service supervisor allowed for the retrieval of the gauge. Requesting law enforcement involvement was done but played no part in recovery since the gauge was found relatively quickly.

"No known media attention.

"Notification Reporting Criteria: Immediate notification per WAC 246-221-240.

"Isotope and Activity involved: 1 portable gauge, containing 2 sealed sources: one gamma source containing 8 millicuries cesium-137, and one neutron source containing 40 millicuries americium-241 / beryllium."

Washington State event number WA-06-052

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 42828
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY PATRICK
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/06/2006
Notification Time: 05:33 [ET]
Event Date: 09/06/2006
Event Time: 02:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP ON LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM

"Observed degrading condenser pressure. Entered abnormal procedure DB-OP-02518, High Condenser Pressure and reduced reactor power. At <280 Mwe and > 5 inches Hg (mercury) A (absolute) , manually tripped the reactor at approximately 45% power in accordance with procedure. Normal post-trip response. Condenser pressure is slowly recovering. Still trying to determine the source of the condenser air in-leakage.

"Notified Ottawa County Sheriff of main steam safety / atmospheric vent valve operation at 0231 hours per procedure."

All control rods fully inserted on the trip. Decay heat is being removed using the turbine bypass valves and the motor driven feed pump. There is no steam generator tube leakage. The atmospheric vent valves / main steam safety valves lifted for a few seconds following the trip and fully reseated after the initial lifting. Plant electrical power if from the grid backfeeding to the station. The electric grid is stable.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 42829
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/06/2006
Notification Time: 12:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/06/2006
Event Time: 10:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

NON LICENSED SUPERVISOR FAILS A RANDOM FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST

A non- licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 42830
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL R MARVEL
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 09/06/2006
Notification Time: 16:23 [ET]
Event Date: 07/09/2006
Event Time: 18:49 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INVALID ACTUATION OF THE B ESW PUMP

"This 60-day ENS report is being made per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid automatic actuation of systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B), namely emergency service water (ESW).

"On Sunday July 9, 2006, at 18:49 hours, an invalid actuation of the B ESW pump occurred. The B ESW loop start was a partial actuation and the loop functioned successfully following the invalid actuation. The A ESW loop was not affected.

"An investigation identified that corrosion on the D12 emergency diesel generator (EDG) jacket water pump discharge pressure switch caused the invalid partial actuation. The cause of the pressure switch failure was due to a cracked supply tube, which allowed moisture to enter the cabinet causing the corrosion. EDG jacket water pump discharge pressure is utilized to initiate logic that starts the ESW pump when the EDG is running. ESW is the cooling medium for the EDG. The switch failure also caused inoperability of D12 EDG since it defeated the capability for the EDG to start. The failed pressure switch and associated tubing were replaced and successfully tested. D12 EDG was declared operable on Monday July 10, 2006 at 12:46 hours.

"An inspection of the other seven EDGs identified that the D11 EDG pressure switch was also corroded. The D11 EDG pressure switch was replaced. The inspection determined that the jacket water pressure switches on the other six EDGs were not degraded.

"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since B ESW pump automatically actuated on an invalid signal.

"Component data:

"Equipment number: PSH-GA-110B

"Manufacturer: A160 Allen-Bradley Co.

"Model number: 636-C3"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 42831
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUG GOMEZ
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 09/06/2006
Notification Time: 23:24 [ET]
Event Date: 09/06/2006
Event Time: 22:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HISTORICAL UNANALYZED CONDITION IDENTIFIED

"On September 6, 2006, an unanalyzed condition was identified during the review of a previous issue discovered on April 18, 2005. The current review was being performed in response to NRC inspection questions regarding the previous issue.

"On April 18, 2005, while at 100% power, both trains of standby auxiliary feed water (AFW) flow transmitters were found isolated. The plant had entered Mode 3 on April 8, 2005 for a routine startup after a refueling outage. The transmitters were restored to their normal operational alignment promptly when the condition was identified.

"These two standby AFW trains are in addition to the typical safety-related AFW motor driven pump trains and turbine driven pump train, for a total of five safety-related AFW pump trains at the site. The two standby AFW trains are designed to address a high energy line break (HELB) event which would disable the other three AFW pump trains.

"Both of the flow transmitters perform several functions including control room indication of standby AFW discharge flow and valve control functions for the pump discharge valve and pump recirculation valve.

"With the flow transmitters isolated in both trains of the standby AFW system, an unanalyzed condition existed due to the following: During a postulated HELB, the inoperable flow transmitters would result in the recirculation valve and the pump discharge valve being both full open. Under a steam generator low pressure condition, (as a result of the HELB) with flow through both the open discharge valve and the open recirculation valve, the pump would be in a high flow rate condition until the steam generator level was recovered. The operators would have no indication of flow through the discharge valves and would be operating the system based on steam generator level. During the time assumed for the intact steam generator level recovery, the breaker for the pump motor could be expected to exceed it's time delayed current protection setpoint and trip the motor, preventing delivery of feed water to the steam generator.

"Both trains of the standby AFW system are allowed by Technical Specifications to be concurrently inoperable for a period of up to 7 days. The actual inoperability occurred over 10 days while the flow transmitters were isolated.

"Ginna did not report the event at the time the isolated transmitters were discovered because the transmitters' control function was not recognized to interact in an unanalyzed manner with the resulting unavailable control room indication, concurrent with the low pressure steam generator condition associated with the HELB event."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 30, 2012