| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/12/2006 - 06/13/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Hospital | Event Number: 42564 | Rep Org: JAMESON HOSPITAL
Licensee: JAMESON HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: NEW CASTLE State: PA
County:
License #: 37-01146-03
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOUG DANKO
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 05/10/2006
Notification Time: 10:57 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2006
Event Time: 08:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/12/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
| Event Text POTENTIAL PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE
Jameson Hospital in New Castle, PA. reported that one of its physicians had a film badge reading of 9,218 mrem deep dose. The film badge was issued to the physician on 11/5/05 and processed by Global Dosimetry approximately four months after being issued. According to the radiation safety officer, the physician is a licensed anesthesiologist and was exposed to radioactive sources for approximately 3 hours per day providing fluoroscopy imaging procedures to patients spinal cords in a laboratory environment over the four month period. The only recorded dose for the physician this calendar year is 45 mrem from March 2006 to April 2006. There are no other individuals who worked in the same area as the affected physician reporting any high film badge readings. Jameson Hospital has notified the physician, initiated a root cause investigation, and is reprocessing the film badge to determine the root cause.
* * * RETRACTION ON 6/12/06 AT 1300 EDT FROM ROBERT ONDO TO A. COSTA * * *
The root cause investigation for this incident has been completed and it has been determined that the potential overexposure related to this individual is not from NRC related activities. Furthermore, the potential dose from the overexposure was not determined since the film badge was mishandled.
Notified NMSS EO (G. Morell) and RDO (D. Silk). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42623 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: PATHFINDER ENERGY SERVICES, INC.
Region: 4
City: LAFAYETTE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-9089-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 06/07/2006
Notification Time: 07:31 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2006
Event Time: 04:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
|
| This material event contains a "Category 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ABANDONMENT OF WELL LOGGING SOURCE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"[Pathfinder Energy Services (licensee) notified the State of LA that] during drilling operations on 17 May 2006 the drill string became stuck while making a connection. The hole had packed off around the drill string not allowing circulation, up and down movement or rotation of the drill pipe. All reasonable effort was used to attempt to free the drill string.
"[LADEQ Emergency & Radiological Services Division] was notified on 19 May 2006 that there might be a possibility of needing to abandon the sources over the weekend. He gave a verbal approval to abandon the sources and referred me [licensee] to [LADEQ] to follow up on Monday with the status of the abandonment. [LADEQ] was notified Monday 22 May 2006 that the sources were abandoned at 4:00 AM, 22 May 2006 and given details of the abandonment with the agreement that a formal report would be filed within 30 days of the abandonment. E-mail notification was also sent to Mr. Noble.
"It became apparent on Sunday 21 May 2006 that the drill string would be lost. A 370 foot cement plug was set above the sources. A total of 22 joints of HWDP (675 feet) were left on top of the radioactive sources to act as a mechanical deflection device to prevent inadvertent intrusion on the sources.
"A sidetrack well is planned to be drilled after 7 5/8" casing is set at 10,237' from the shoe to the original depth of 10,265 ft TVD. The sidetrack well is planned not to come within 15 ft of the sources. A liner (casing) will be set at completion of the bypass well and cemented in place.
"Description of Sources:
One 1.5 Curie, Cs-137, Doubly Encapsulated, Special Form,
Well Logging Sealed Source
Serial Number, 5080GW
AEAT Model CDC.CY6
"One 8 Curie, Am-241/Be, Doubly Encapsulated, Special Form,
Well Logging Sealed Source
Serial Number: DNS 013
Gammatron Model AN-HP"
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example, level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42624 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH
Region: 4
City: SHREVEPORT State: LA
County:
License #: LA-10217-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 06/07/2006
Notification Time: 08:54 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNSECURED DELIVERY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"On May 22, 2006, a package containing 300 [microcuries] of I-123 in two (2) capsules was prepared for shipment at the Cardinal Health Nuclear Pharmacy Services ('Cardinal Health') facility in Dallas, TX. This package was a Type 7A container and was given a Yellow II label. This package was consigned to a contract courier, Tradewind, Inc., for delivery to Cardinal Health in Shreveport, LA.
"Delivery of this package to Cardinal Health Shreveport was attempted sometime after it closed at 5:00 PM. It was discovered by a parking lot cleaning crew at approximately 11:30 PM that evening. The package had been left behind a dumpster outside the pharmacy and covered with a Tradewind jacket. The cleaning crew contacted the police, who arrived at the scene shortly afterwards and contacted the fire department, who dispatched a HazMat team. The police also contacted our pharmacist on call by using the emergency contact number posted on the outer vestibule door to our pharmacy. The fire and/or police departments took control of the material until a representative from Cardinal Health arrived on site. All radioactive material listed on the shipping paper was present and accounted for.
"Root Causes: The cause of this event was a failure by the courier, Tradewind, to properly perform their contracted duties. The package in question was left unsecured behind a dumpster. This is not how Tradewind has been instructed to deliver packages to our pharmacy. They have been instructed to deliver radioactive material packages in a designated area (that is appropriately marked) inside the vestibule, in the rear of our building. Tradewind was issued a vestibule key for this sole purpose.
"The driver who originally arrived to deliver the package did not have the vestibule key. An interview with him revealed that his intent was for another Tradewind driver to arrive later with the key and deliver the package into [licensee's] secured vestibule.
"Actions Taken to Prevent a Recurrence: Cardinal Health will be working with Tradewind to review training documents required by the DOT and to formulate corrective measures taken to prevent reoccurrence of this type of event."
LA Event Report ID No.: LA060008 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42626 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: ALPHA TESTING AND INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: METAIRIE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-5856-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 06/07/2006
Notification Time: 09:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"The density/moisture gauge was stolen from the West Gate Tavern's parking lot located at 2725 Mississippi in Metairie, Louisiana, which is in Jefferson Parish. The gauge was stolen sometime between the evening of May 27, 2006 and the morning of May 28, 2006. The theft was reported to the Jefferson Police Department on May 28, 2006.
"The gauge was a Troxler Model T3440, Serial Number-20980, Source Activity: Cs-137 (8 millicuries, serial # 75-2404; Am-241:Be (40 millicuries), serial # 47-16481. Last leak test was March 17, 2006.
"[The gauge operator] stopped to have a drink at the tavern on Saturday after performing a job at the Michoud Canal. He did not return the gauge to the Hahnville storage location before visiting the tavern. [The gauge operator] had to have someone pick him up from the tavern and bring him home; leaving the truck and the chained container with gauge in the Tavern's parking lot. When [the gauge operator] returned to the truck on Sunday, May 28, 2006, the gauge container (with the gauge in it) was cut from its chains and was gone.
"The gauge container was chained and locked, and the gauge itself was locked at the time of the theft. The gauge was properly labeled with caution signs and contact phone numbers. The Department was notified immediately after the discovery of the stolen source. The facility spent countless hours trying to find the gauge.
"More training was provided to the operator. The facility ordered eight new bolt-in containers to secure the gauges in the bed of the trucks to deter theft. The Radiation Safety Officer stated that he will probably have it put in the newspaper as well. He also stated that he will write a letter to the Department within 30 days with description of the incident including corrective actions."
The state generated report number LA060009 for this event.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42627 | Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: AUBURN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: AUBURN State: WA
County:
License #: WN-M0149-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 06/08/2006
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2006
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED SOURCES
The State provided the information via e-mail:
"This is notification of an event in Washington State as reported to or investigated by the WA Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection.
"ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, Dept. of Health (DOH) on-site investigation; media attention): A patient received a total of 89 sealed Iodine-125 (half-life of 60 days) seeds implanted on a permanent basis in the prostate, for a total activity of 33.84 millicuries. This was done at Auburn Regional Medical Center (ARMC), Auburn, Washington, on 25 May 2006.
"The patient was seen / rechecked by ARMC personnel on 26 May 2006. Sometime after that visit, on the same day, he was taken by family members to Good Samaritan Hospital (GSH) in Puyallup, Washington, where he subsequently died of a myocardial infarction.
"The body was released to a funeral home in Buckley, Washington where it was cremated on 30 May 2006 (about 31 millicuries). The cremains were then boxed up on 31 May 2006 and buried that same day.
"Although it was reported the patient and the patient's family were given appropriate verbal and written instructions by ARMC; when the patient was treated at GSH it was for the MI only, and had nothing to do with the prior surgical prostate procedure. The family did not, for whatever reason, inform the staff at GSH. The urologists who had treated the patient for the prostate cancer did not work at GSH and had no connection there.
"Therefore, once the patient died, personnel at GSH had no idea they were also dealing with a radioactive source problem. Personnel at ARMC had no way of knowing of the treatment or death of the patient since it did not occur at their facility or in their city.
"The RSO for Tacoma Radiation Oncology Center (who provides medical physics support and treatment planning for sealed source therapy to clients such as ARMC and GSH) visited the funeral home on 7 June 2006 and surveyed the crematorium using a meter with a NaI probe. Background was noted at approximately 0.4 Mr/hr. Readings of approximately 3.0 Mr/hr were noted at the entrance to the retort. A filter in the air exhaust system was noted to be reading approximately 1.0 Mr/hr so it was removed for decay and ultimate disposal by GSH.
"It appears that most retorts operate at 1600 degrees Fahrenheit, or more, and the titanium capsule would melt a few hundred degrees lower than that. The manufacturer confirmed that all seeds had most likely been melted and would not be recovered whole. The crematorium is at this time on standby until the crematorium is declared clean for further use. It appears the most reasonable way to safely handle this cleaning chore is to have a commercial cleaning company, properly informed and equipped, clean and vacuum the retort with ARMC physics personnel in constant attendance to protect workers from any potential radiation hazards and to remove any contaminated material for decay and disposal. This is scheduled to happen 8 June 2006.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-240
"Isotope and Activity involved: Iodine 125 / 31 millicuries (at time of cremation)
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): to be determined, likely none.
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): melted I-125 seeds.
"Disposition/recovery: clean and hold material for decay
"Leak test? NA
"Vehicle: NA
"Release of activity? Yes
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: NA
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: NA
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: I-125 seeds
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: minimal, likely no consequences
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? Yes
"Was written report provided to patient? Yes
"Was referring physician notified? Yes
"Consultant used? Yes"
Event Report No.: WA-06-042 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42628 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: NATIONAL INSPECTIONS SERVICES
Region: 4
City: LAFAYETTE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-11160-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD PENROD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 06/08/2006
Notification Time: 18:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
| Event Text LOUISIANA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EXCESSIVE EXPOSURE
Louisiana Agreement State Report was faxed to the NRC Operation Center.
"National Inspection Services reported on June 6, 2006 that a trainee, [deleted], received an excessive exposure. The film badge for [deleted] had an exposure of 5.879 Rem for the March 2006 wear period. This individual is no longer working for National Inspection Services. His employment ran from February 23, 2006 to April 26, 2006. The facility is performing an investigation and will report their findings to the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality. [Deleted], Radiation Safety Officer, stated that the daily pocket dosimeter records do not reflect an excessive exposure."
Event Report ID No.: LA060011 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42631 | Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DEWAYNE BAGLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 06/12/2006
Notification Time: 02:35 [ET]
Event Date: 06/11/2006
Event Time: 22:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/12/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF 20% OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY SIRENS DUE TO SEVERE WEATHER
"As of 10:56 P.M. EDT, [on 06/11/06] more than 20% of the offsite emergency sirens were inoperable for greater than one hour due to loss of power caused by severe weather/thunderstorms passing through the area. At 10:56 P.M. 21 of 81 sirens were out of service. At this time, the Harris Plant cannot estimate the time of siren recovery. However, crews are currently in the field surveying the damage and restoring power. This requires an 8-hour non-Emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of a significant portion of the offsite notification system. As of 01:40 A.M. 6/12/06, 16 of 81 sirens are out of service."
The state and local emergency response organizations will implement compensatory measure of route alerting in the areas of the siren malfunction if needed during an emergency.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee also notified the North Carolina State EOC and the local counties of Chatham, Lee, Harnett, and Wake. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42632 | Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: MARTIN WOLF
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 06/12/2006
Notification Time: 11:38 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2006
Event Time: 10:56 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/12/2006 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2)
THOMAS BLOUNT (IRD)
MARY JANE ROSS-LEE (NRR)
MIKE INZER (DHS)
JIM DUNKER (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO A POSTING OF HURRICANE WARNING AT THE SITE
"Crystal River 3 is in a Hurricane Warning area. The site is evaluating the need for a plant shutdown at this time."
The declaration of NOUE is per the licensee's Emergency Action Guidelines due to posting of the hurricane warning. There are currently no significant equipment problems or LCOs that might be impacted by the impending weather conditions. The licensee will provide updates as appropriate if weather conditions change or a decision to shutdown is made.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and Local authorities. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42633 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BRIAN FINCH
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 06/12/2006
Notification Time: 17:25 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2006
Event Time: 13:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/12/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DAVID SILK (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Startup | 0 | Startup | Event Text HPCI INITITATION SIGNAL DUE TO TURBINE TRIP SIGNAL DURING STARTUP
"Feedwater was being place into long path recirculation mode in accordance with N1-OP-16 to support a chemistry sample. During this evolution, reactor water level rose high enough such that the High Level Annunciator (92.2") was received, the turbine tripped [off of the turning gear] and a HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] initiation signal was received as per design. HPCI system did not initiate flow and no pumps started because the Feedwater Booster Pumps were not in service (pull-to-lock). HPCI was reset and Reactor Water level [was] restored to the operating band 65" - 83".
"A copy of this Notification Worksheet will be provided to the Resident Inspector.
"This event has been captured on Condition Report 2006-2703. A prompt investigation has been performed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Hospital | Event Number: 42634 | Rep Org: BAYHEALTH MEDICAL CENTER
Licensee: BAYHEALTH MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: DOVER State: DE
County:
License #: 07-14850-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAJI SUBRAMANYAM
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 06/12/2006
Notification Time: 17:20 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2006
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/12/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID SILK (R1)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
| Event Text MEDICAL EVENT - HIGHER DOSE THAN PLANNED ADMINISTERED DURING BRACHYTHERAPY TREATMENT
A brachytherapy dose for prostate cancer treatment included a planned 145 Gy dose to be accomplished using permanently implanted I-125 seeds. A computer is used as part of the hospital's procedures for determining the quantity of seeds to implant to arrive at the total prescribed dose using the dose per seed. Hospital staff incorrectly entered the dose per seed as 0.27 millicuries instead of 0.34 millicuries into the computer. This resulted in the computer calculating a quantity of 100 seeds to be used and resulted in a 26% higher dose than intended. The error in the calculation was not discovered until after the actual implant was accomplished.
The medical consequences of the overdose include possible rectal complications in the future. Remedial actions could include removal of the prostate. The doctors are investigating other treatment options. The patient was being informed of the overdose and treatment options at the time of this report. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42635 | Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: EDWIN TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 06/12/2006
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2006
Event Time: 15:56 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/12/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF SPDS DURING PLANNED COMPUTER MAINTENANCE
"On 6/12/06 at 07:54 am CDT, the Wolf Creek Generating Station removed the Nuclear Plant Information System (NPIS) computer from service for planned maintenance. Following this maintenance, one of the NPIS multiplexers (MTJX 'D') failed to re-establish communications with the computer, and efforts to restore the computer to service have been unsuccessful. The failure to restore the NPIS computer has resulted in a loss of functionality of the Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS). Efforts continue to restore the NPIS computer to service, which will restore SPDS functionality. Due to SPDS being lost for longer than a short period of time, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation is making this ENS notification pursuant to the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There is no other loss of emergency assessment capability concurrent with the ongoing loss of SPDS. Plant personnel have entered the appropriate Off-Normal procedure and are obtaining local readings for the equipment that is normally monitored by SPDS and NPIS. It is unknown at this time when NPIS/SPDS will be restored."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42636 | Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: OSCAR PIPKINS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 06/12/2006
Notification Time: 21:33 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2006
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/12/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text MANUAL ACTIONS DETERMINED UNTIMELY FOR FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN
"As part of an analysis to determine feasibility of manual actions, it was identified that three actions for Fire Area RAB 7 could not be performed within the times prescribed in the Post Shutdown Analysis. The subject fire area is subdivided by part height fire walls. Waterford 3 has an approved Appendix R deviation for the part height fire wall configuration.
"Assuming a fire in Fire Area RAB 7 Operator entry into that same fire area is required. Results of the analysis indicate that the conditions in Fire Zone RAB 7B rapidly exceed the habitability threshold and do not moderate before ten minutes, the time at which one of the three manual actions is required, given a fire in Fire Zone RAB 7A. Because the space becomes uninhabitable, the manual action in Fire Zone RAB 7A is not feasible.
"A continuous fire watch has been established within Fire Area RAB 7 as a compensatory measure. This condition is reportable within 8 hours pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |