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Event Notification Report for May 3, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/02/2006 - 05/03/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42532 42535 42542

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42532
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ROBERTSON, INC
Region: 4
City: JONESBORO State: AR
County:
License #: AR-987BP0512
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JARED THOMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/27/2006
Notification Time: 10:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
ILTAB (EMAIL) (NSIR)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TROXLER GAUGE

The licensee provided the following information via email:

"Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, announced today that one radioactive gauge is missing from a job site in Jonesboro, Arkansas. The gauge may pose a health risk to persons if handled or carried for an extended period of time. The missing gauge is in a yellow plastic transport case and weighs approximately 90 pounds.

"The gauge is described as a Troxler Electronic Laboratory Model 3440 (Serial #36212) soil moisture/density gauge containing 9 millicuries of Cesium-137 and 44 millicuries of Americium-241/ Beryllium.

"State police, local government officials and law enforcement agencies, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Arkansas Department of Emergency Management have also been notified."

The gauge appears to have been missing for at least a week.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42535
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: ARCO ENGINEERING & TESTING CONSULTANTS, INC.
Region: 1
City: HIALEAH State: FL
County:
License #: 3093-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES E. ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 04/28/2006
Notification Time: 15:05 [ET]
Event Date: 04/28/2006
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
ILTAB (E-MAILED) (NSIR)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

Event was received at the NRC Operation Center via e-mail.

"This office was notified of the theft of a soil moisture density gauge at a temporary job site. While the tech was inside a building, which is under construction, drilling holes, the locked transportation box was forced open and the gauge was stolen. They did not get the keys to the gauge. The licensee is considering offering a reward for the return the gauge. Florida is investigating." Incident occurred at 3251 NW 103rd Street, Miami, FL.

Troxler Model Number 3430, Serial Number 26593. Contains 8 milliCuries of Cesium-137 and 40 millicuries of Am-241/Be.

Florida Incident Number: FL06-055

* * * UPDATE VIA E-MAIL FROM CHARLES E. ADAMS TO MACKINNON ON 04/28/06 AT 1610 EDT * * *

"Florida Investigator has determined that the transportation case was not locked and was not in view of the tech when the gauge was taken." R1DO (Barkley) & NMSS (Morell) notified and NSIR (ILTAB) e-mailed.


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42542
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: R. P. TODD
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 05/02/2006
Notification Time: 02:15 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2006
Event Time: 20:29 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION (LTOP) TRAINS INOPERABLE

"Event: At 2029 hours, Oconee Unit 3 was in Mode 5 for a refueling outage. The administrative controls which comprise one train of Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) were not yet in service, but a dedicated LTOP operator was in place as a Tech Spec required compensatory measure. Instrument Technicians performing a procedure erroneously isolated the low range RCS pressure indication, which removed the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) from service while required for LTOP. This placed Unit 3 in a one-hour action statement per Technical Specification 3.4.12, Condition H.

"Initial Safety Significance: This is potentially a condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (LTOP). Both the automatic PORV train and the Admin Control train were inoperable per Technical Specifications. However, a dedicated LTOP operator was in place meeting the compensatory measures requirement for continued operation per TS 3.4.12, Condition F related to the Admin Control requirement. No event occurred while in this condition which would challenge the LTOP function.

"Corrective Action(s): Operator at the controls recognized the loss of indication and contacted the Instrument Technicians. They verified their error and returned the instrument to service within one hour."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 30, 2012