| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
02/02/2006 - 02/03/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 42295 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: CHALMETTE REFINERY
Region: 4
City: CHALMETTE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2247-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 01/30/2006
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2006
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- MISSING SOURCES FOLLOWING HURRICANE KATRINA
A representative from the State of Louisiana reported that an X-Ray Fluorescence (XRF) Unit used by the Chalmette Refinery is missing following the devastation from Hurricane Katrina. The building housing the XRF Unit was under 20 feet of water from storm related flooding. The building was gutted in post Katrina restoration without first locating the XRF Unit. The licensee has searched for the unit and declared it missing on 1/30/06. It is believed that the Unit was sent to a landfill with other building wastes.
The XRF Unit was a model TN-927 with a 45 mCi Fe-55 source and a 5 mCi Cd-109 source.
State Report Number: Pending
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42296 | Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: KUMAR AND ASSOCIATES
Region: 4
City: WESTMINSTER State: CO
County:
License #: 778-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ED STROUD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 01/31/2006
Notification Time: 09:19 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2006
Event Time: 15:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
TAS (email) ()
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST AND RECOVERED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"The Department received notification at 3:00 pm on 1/30/06, from the RSO at Kumar and Associates, Colorado License # 778-01, that one of their Troxler Model 3430 moisture/density gauges had been stolen from a construction site in Westminster, Colorado. Apparently the technician, who was using the gauge at the construction site, left it unattended for 5 minutes, and discovered it missing when he returned. Local police were notified and responded to the scene. The gauge was found, undamaged, in a field at the construction site a short time later. No public exposures are expected from this incident. The Department is investigating."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42299 | Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM CLARK
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 02/01/2006
Notification Time: 21:33 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2006
Event Time: 18:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2006 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
MARK SATORIUS (R3)
MEL LEACH (IRD)
TOM MARTIN (NRR)
GOMEZ-RIOS (DHS)
AUSTIN (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF SITE EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS
At approximately 18:55 CST, the site lost external communications. At 1937 CST, Duane Arnold declared an Unusual Event due to loss of communications to most offsite agencies. Communications with the county were operating via microwave however, other external communications were not working. The site believed that the loss was due to a "single microwave tower malfunction." The county was contacted directly and other offsite communications (including this event) were being made using a cell phone. The Headquarters Operation Officer was able to contact the Control Room using a commercial phone number. The plant is currently in day 2 of a 14 day RCIC LCO.
At 22:35 EST, the site verified that they now have intermittent communications using commercial phone lines. The licensee will not exit the Unusual Event until they have restored communications and know the reason for losing communications.
The NRC Resident Inspector is at the site.
* * * UPDATE FROM GORDON TO KNOKE AT 02:23 EST ON 02/02/06 * * *
Duane Arnold terminated the Unusual Event at 01:00 CST. The licensee restored site communications by correcting the microwave tower malfunction. The ENS line became operable at 03:32 EST.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Riemer), NRR EO (Martin), IRD MOC (Leach), FEMA (Dunker), DHS (Christenson). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42300 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DENNIS FRANCIS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 02/02/2006
Notification Time: 01:43 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2006
Event Time: 19:43 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation | Event Text INOPERABLE ISOLATION CONDENSER
"While performing DIS 1300-02, Unit 2 ISO COND Steam/Condensate Line High Flow Calibration, workers attempted to valve in DPIS 2-1349-8, U2 Isolation Condenser Return Line Hi Flow. While opening the low isolation valve the technician noticed a vibration in the sensing line. He proceeded to close the equalizer and open the high isolation. As he opened the high side isolation the DPIS indication started to ramp high. As the indication ramped above about 9 inches the technician closed the high side isolation valve.
"The Isolation Condenser has been isolated to comply with Technical Specification entered TS 3.3.6.1 C.1 and F.1, Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation and TS 3.5.3. A.1 & A.2, Isolation Condenser. A prompt investigation has been initiated to determine the cause. A troubleshooting plan is being developed.
"Per Tech Spec Bases Section 3.5.3, Applicable Safety Analysis, credit is taken for the Isolation Condenser in the loss of Feedwater Transient Analysis. Therefore the event is reportable under 10CFR 50.72.(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42301 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDY SANDS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 02/02/2006
Notification Time: 04:51 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2006
Event Time: 23:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY FILTRATION TRAIN FAN DECLARED INOPERABLE
Train "A" of the Emergency Filtration Train (EFT) Unit, which services the control room ventilation system, tripped off line due to a low flow condition. The cause was determined to be a rip in the rubber boot at the suction of the fan, thus causing an automatic trip of the EFT system from a low flow condition through the filter where flow is sensed. Both the "A" and "B" trains were declared inoperable due to the amount of leakage the "B" EFT was having through the ripped boot in the "A" EFT, and the condition found on "B" EFT rubber boot. Upon further evaluation of the "B" EFT boot condition, the "B" train was declared operable at 03:02 CST on 02/02/06. The "A" EFT will remain in a 7 day LCO until the rubber boot is replaced. The 8 hour notification was issued due to both EFT Units being declared inoperable.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Hospital | Event Number: 42304 | Rep Org: WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL
Licensee: WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: PITTSBURGH State: PA
County:
License #: 37-02136-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARGARET BLACKWELL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 02/02/2006
Notification Time: 17:19 [ET]
Event Date: 11/18/2005
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
GLENN MEYER (R1)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
| Event Text PROBLEM WITH A VARIAN HIGH DOSE RATE (HDR) AFTERLOADER
The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:
"On December 1, 2005, [an NRC Region 1 inspector] conducted an inspection of our facility. During the inspection [the inspector was told] about a problem [the hospital was] having with [its] HDR unit [Varian Model VS-200] . On November 18, 2005, during a patient treatment the unit reported a fault during source retraction which reported as a source path constriction. However, the source retracted fully and the error was cleared. The patient received the treatment as prescribed; there was no unintended radiation exposure to the patient. During the following treatment, on November 21, 2005, the error recurred and Varian was contacted to service the unit. The source again retracted fully; the patient received the treatment as prescribed. Varian arrived on November 26, 2005. The engineer repaired that fault, but after the repair, a new problem arose. During post-repair testing by Varian, the inactive wire failed to move from the shielded safe position. [The NRC inspector] requested [..] a report of the findings of the manufacturer after the repair was completed.
"Varian subsequently sent a new loaner HDR to [the] West Penn [hospital], and [the] HDR unit was returned to the [Varian] factory in England for repair. [The hospital] immediately forwarded the Varian Troubleshooting Report to [the NRC inspector] upon receipt on January 31, 2006. The report from the factory indicated that the cause of the wire not moving was a signal wire that had been improperly stripped at the time of assembly. Over time, this connection oxidized causing a loss of contact for that signal, which was for the drive mechanism. This caused the inactive source wire not to drive out of the safe.
"Although [the West Penn Hospital is] reporting this as requested, [it] respectfully disagree[s] with the NRC interpretation of the 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) reporting requirement. 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) states that a 24 hour report is required when 'An event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: (i) The equipment is required by regulation or license condition to prevent releases exceeding regulatory limits, to prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding regulatory limits, or to mitigate the consequences of an accident; (ii) The equipment is required to be available and operable when it is disabled or fails to function; and (iii) No redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.' [The West Penn Hospital] believe[s] the safety systems of the HDR unit functioned appropriately by reporting the fault. [The hospital] notified the vendor and requested repair when the fault repeated and discontinued using the HDR unit until it was repaired and tested. No regulatory limits were exceeded; the source did not stick; the safety systems did not fail. [The hospital] also do[es] not believe this to be a manufacturing defect requiring reporting under 10 CFR 21.21 but defer[s] to the manufacturer and the NRC interpretation." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42305 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL POTTER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 02/03/2006
Notification Time: 04:59 [ET]
Event Date: 02/02/2006
Event Time: 23:36 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
RUDOLPH BERNHARD (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO ONE HPCI TURBINE EXHAUST VACUUM BREAKER ISOLATION VALVE FAILURE
"On February 2, 2006 at 23:36 [EST], during testing of the HPCI System per OPT-09.7, HPCI System Valve Operability Test, 1-E41-F079, Turbine Exhaust Vacuum Breaker valve, was given a closed signal and failed in the intermediate position. The 1-E41F079 is one of the two HPCI Turbine Exhaust Line Vacuum Breaker isolation valves. When 1-E41-FO79 failed in the intermediate position, the HPCI system was considered inoperable. HPCI is a single-train, safety function system. Approximately two minutes later, the valve was reopened and HPCI was restored to operable status (1-E41-F079 remains inoperable).
"The cause of the 1-E41-F079 failing to stroke is being investigated and will be repaired."
HPCI will be inoperable after 1-E41-F079 is isolated for maintenance.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |