| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/10/2005 - 11/14/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 42013 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: CURT ARNDT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 09/25/2005
Notification Time: 19:49 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2005
Event Time: 14:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/11/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DEGRADATION IN FIRE BARRIER DISCOVERED DURING AN INSPECTION
"During an inspection of structural steel in the Emergency Filtration Train (EFT) building, it was determined that a portion of the steel did not have adequate fire retardant material protecting the steel. This condition would have compromised the 3 hour-fire barrier between the 2 divisions of the Emergency Service Water (ESW) System, impacting # 11 Emergency Diesel Generator ESW Pumps, # 13 and # 14 ESW Pumps. This condition could have resulted in the inability to establish and maintain cold shutdown conditions in the event of a fire in this area. A fire impairment was entered and an hourly fire watch was established to address this condition. All ESW divisions are presently operable."
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION FROM SCHREIFELS TO HUFFMAN AT 15:45 EST ON 11/11/05 * * *
"Monticello is retracting the event notification based on further investigation of the issue. The station has completed calculations that confirm the affected steel beams are not required to maintain fire barrier integrity. Further, the fire severity in the zone will not cause the steel beams to fail. Therefore, the ability of the station to establish and maintain cold shutdown conditions in the event of a fire in this area was not impacted. Based on this information, Monticello has determined there was no unanalyzed condition as reported in Event Notification # 42013. The degraded fire retardant material has been replaced."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42121 | Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
Region: 4
City: SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #: UT1800001
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GWYN GALLOWAY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 11/05/2005
Notification Time: 16:18 [ET]
Event Date: 11/05/2005
Event Time: 12:50 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/11/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
DONNA-MARIE PEREZ (TAS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - MISSING Am-241 SOURCE
The University of Utah moved its Radiation Health Department between buildings. An Am-241 source on a disk in a glass vial was last inventoried and leak checked on May 12, 2005 i.e. prior to the move. The inventory on November 3, 2005 (Thursday) found one source missing. The sources are kept in a locked room and stored in a locked pig. The university is performing an inventory on November 5, 2005 (Saturday) and may perform additional inventories. This information will be placed in NMED on Monday, November 7, 2005.
Source: Am-241, 477 milliCuries
* * * UPDATE AT 19:37 ON 11/5/2005 FROM GALLOWAY TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The Source is model # SWA-259, purchased January 1977 and is the size of a nickel.
* * * UPDATE AT 13:18 ON 11/7/2005 FROM GALLOWAY TO KNOKE * * *
Received notification from the licensee that a Radiation Safety Analyst found the missing Am-241 source at 11:07 MST on 11/07/05. An updated description was given as 1.5 inches long and wrapped in a sheet of lead. The RSO was present when the source was found.
Notified R4DO (Shaffer), NMSS (Morell), and TAS email (Perez).
* * * UPDATE FROM GALLOWAY TO HUFFMAN AT 19:17 EST ON 11/9/2005 * * *
The State of Utah has determined that the update on 11/7/05 reporting that the missing source had been located was incorrect. Further investigation by the University of Utah authorities has determined that the original source description was correct. The source is a nickel-sized slug in a glass vial and not the 1.5 inch source discussed in the 11/7/05 update. Recollection by individuals that had used the source confirmed the source appearance and the discolored "darkened" vial that held the source. The source number was also corrected to SNA-259 The licensee has informed both campus police and the FBI of the missing material.
Notified R4DO (Whitten), NMSS (Collins), and TAS (Perez) via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM GALLOWAY TO HUFFMAN AT 14:38 EST ON 11/11/2005 * * *
The State provided the following information via email:
The State of Utah reports that the source has been found. This time verified and sure. It was found in a secure facility. It had rolled under a pallet in the secured waste facility. The investigation as to how it got there is continuing.
Notified R4DO (Shaffer), NMSS (Collins), and TAS (Whitney) via email.
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 42123 | Rep Org: INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATIO
Licensee: INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATIO
Region: 3
City: LAPORTE State: IN
County:
License #: 132634001
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM KONIECZNY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 11/07/2005
Notification Time: 08:02 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2005
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
DONNA-MARIE PEREZ (TAS)
| Event Text STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
Sometime between 11/05/05 and 11/07/05 a Troxler Model 3440, Serial Number 15460, moisture density gauge was stolen from the licensee's field office in Rensselaer, Indiana. The licensee discovered that the office at that location was broken into and the gauge was stolen along with several other items. The gauge was kept inside the locked office and was chained to the floor. The police were notified and a police report will be made.
The item contained a 8 millicuries Cesium-137 source and a 40 millicuries Americium-241/Beryllium source.
The licensee will notify the NRC Region 3 office.
* * * UPDATE FROM KONIECZNY TO HUFFMAN AT 13:53 EST ON 11/10/05 * * *
The licensee reports that the gauge was returned to the field office location sometime during the night by individuals unknown. It was discovered in front of the field office door by the first person reporting to the office around 7:00 am CST on 11/10/05. The gauge has been examined and appears to be undamaged.
R3DO (Madera), NMSS EO (Morell), and TAS (Whitney via e-mail) notified.
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42126 | Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: MALLINCKRODT, INC
Region: 1
City: BELTSVILLE State: MD
County:
License #: MD33-088-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAYMOND MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 11/08/2005
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2005
Event Time: 04:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1)
M. BURGESS (NMSS)
| Event Text MARYLAND AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TECHNETIUM-99m
At 0400 EST on 11/08/05 a delivery person left Mallinckrodt, Inc., located in Beltsville, MD to make deliveries. When he arrived at Cardiology Associates of Frederick, Maryland license MD21-039-01, he was missing the 5 doses of Technetium-99m that were supposed to be delivered to them. The delivery person had made 6 delivery stops before arriving at Cardiology Associates of Frederick. Mallinckrodt, Inc., is calling and sending personnel to the first 6 delivery stops to try to find the missing 5 doses of Technetium-99m. The 5 doses were divided into 2 lots. Lot 1 number is 95143 which contained 4 doses of Tc-99m for cardiolite studies. Activity of each one of the doses as of 0400 hours was 61 millicuries, 73 millicuries, 78 millicuries, and 82 millicuries. The second lot number is 95138 it had one dose with an activity of 62 millicuries (as of 0400 hours) of Tc-99m.
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42130 | Rep Org: NEW MEXICO RAD CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: SPECTRATEK SERVICES
Region: 4
City: KILGORE State: TX
County:
License #: TA 172
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WALTER MEDINA
HQ OPS Officer: RONALD HARRINGTON | Notification Date: 11/09/2005
Notification Time: 10:56 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2005
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
DONNA-MARIE PEREZ (TAS)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
MEXICO (email) ()
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE NOTIFICATON - MISSING SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
On November 3, 2005, reported that a radioactive shipment was missing its contents.
On November 3, 2005, at approximately 2:30 pm, Spectratek Services received a call from Protechnics in Kilgore, TX. They stated a seven piece shipment of four (4) fiberboard boxes and three (3) 20-gallon drums had been received. The contents of one of the 20-gallon drums were not in the drum. The drum was to have contained an ammo box with two 25 pound lead shipping containers, each containing 40 millicuries of Antimony-124 used in oil and gas well completion studies. All packages had security seals in place when they arrived at the Protechnics facility in Kilgore. Notification was made to the Protechnics corporate office, the freight company, and the NM Radiation Control Bureau. Interviewing all employees involved in packaging the shipment resulted in written statements from them. The inventory has been double-checked and it appears the material balance is correct.
Security camera tapes have been reviewed showing the packaging area for 10/31/2005 (the day of the shipment). The tapes show the radioactive material being loaded into the containers and the containers being closed and they also show the shipment being loaded onto the freight carrier's trailer.
Members of the FBI and Homeland Security made visits while conducting their investigation. The investigation is ongoing. Notification was made to the inspector with the Environmental Monitoring Program, Radiation Branch, Department of State Health Services in Texas.
State of Texas also notified NRC. See EN-42118. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42134 | Facility: BIG ROCK POINT
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-1
NRC Notified By: LINDA CASTIGLIONI
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 11/10/2005
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 11/10/2005
Event Time: 13:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
ELMO COLLINS (NMSS)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO THE EPA
The licensee notified the EPA that it had inadvertently made some demolition cuts on the steel containment shell coated with paint containing PCBs (Polychlorinated Biphenyls). This was not in accordance with the general conditions of the demolition agreement with the EPA. The steel was being cut with a torch and the paint along the cut line had been abated by the licensee to prevent burning paint with PCBs. However, some cuts were inadvertently not made along the abated lines. The amount of paint involved has been characterized as in the range of grams.
The licensee has notified both the NRC regional inspector and headquarters project manager. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42135 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 11/10/2005
Notification Time: 15:28 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2005
Event Time: 17:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
WILLIAM BECKNER (NRR)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text MATERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY DISCREPANCY AT PLANT HATCH
"This is a non-emergency Event Notification made in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) to inform the NRC of a nuclear material accountability discrepancy amounting to, in the aggregate, a portion of a spent fuel rod used at Plant Hatch (HNP). In the process of reviewing records and physically verifying the contents of the spent fuel pool (SFP) as a part of activities associated with SNC's [Southern Nuclear Company] response to Bulletin 2005-01, SNC has identified discrepancies between fuel segments located in the SFP and segments indicated in plant records.
"The segments originated in the early 1980s during fuel reconstitution and inspection activities. The discrepancies call into question the location of segments of single spent fuel rods in each of three bundles. Characterization of three segments located in the SFP provided rod serial numbers which, in turn, were used to determine the bundles from which these segments originated. These bundles were then inspected, and the length of fuel in the location corresponding to each rod segment's intended location was determined. The aggregate in-bundle length found in these rod locations was combined with the lengths of the segments located in the SFP and compared to the design active fuel length of the three rods. This comparison results in a material discrepancy of approximately 55 inches, based on the length measurements. In addition to this discrepancy, historical records indicate two segments (totaling 13 inches of fuel length), which may not be within the inventory of segments identified to date in the SFP. When this amount is added to the length associated with the three rod locations, a discrepancy of approximately 68 inches results. When the planned supplemental inspection of select bundles and SFP locations is completed and photographs are evaluated to aid in the determination of special nuclear material present, this 68 inch estimate may increase or decrease.
"On June 16, 2005 SNC formed a team to identify and characterize material in the SFPs at Hatch in order to account for special nuclear material (SNM) at the level of detail requested by Bulletin 2005-01. A work scope was established and specialized resources were contracted to support the work activities. During the performance of these work activities, a number of items of interest were characterized as being either SNM or non-SNM items. On October 28, 2005, SNC submitted the interim status report to NRC.
"On November 4, 2005 the Hatch Plant Review Board (PRB) reviewed the SNM Issue Resolution Team's assessment of data produced by the records searches and physical cataloging of SNM in the SFPs. Based on that review, the PRB concurred that a discrepancy exists in material accounting for a portion of a spent fuel rod in each of three bundles and records, as noted above, which in the aggregate approximates 68 inches of fuel rod length. This length is equivalent to about 45% of the length of one intact fuel rod. Further physical examination of the SFP will include additional examination of SFP floor areas that have not been examined to date and selected fuel bundle inspections. The SFP floor areas are limited to a small number of locations that are under equipment or objects stored on the SFP floor. This expanded work scope is expected to be completed by December 15, 2005.
"Based on the nature of the fuel rod segments and radiation monitoring, a high degree of confidence exists that the segments are in a restricted area of the plant or otherwise under the control of a licensed facility such that the public health and safety has not been adversely affected. In addition, there is no evidence of theft or diversion.
"This notification satisfies the 30-day notification requirement of 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii). A subsequent written report will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(b).
"The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector regarding the discrepancies.
"SNC will be making a press release describing the current status of this issue. Accordingly, this notification also satisfies the 4-hour notification requirement of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) with respect to issuance of the press release associated with this issue." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42136 | Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES WELSCH
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 11/11/2005
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2005
Event Time: 12:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/11/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
MARK SHAFFER (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text REPORT OF DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO DEFECTIVE STEAM GENERATOR TUBES
"This is a 4-hour report as required by Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.9, Table 5.5.9-2, reported via the ENS in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant, including its principal barriers, being seriously degraded'.
"Greater than one percent of steam generator (SG) 1-1 and SG 1-2 tubes were determined to be defective and require plugging. Diablo Canyon performs 100% bobbin inspection of SG tubes, thus, no expanded bobbin inspection scope was required.
"On November 11, 2005, during the Unit 1 thirteenth refueling outage (1R13), final analysis of eddy current data of SG 1-1 and SG 1-2 indicated that greater than one percent of the total tubes inspected in two SGs were defective placing them in Category C-3. Thirty seven (37) defective tubes in SG 1-1 and forty one (41) defective tubes in SG 1-2 were detected and are being plugged. Most of the pluggable indications are due to circumferential outside diameter stress corrosion cracking at the hot leg tube support plates and at the hot leg top of tubesheet. Results of SG tube inspections that fall into Category C-3, requires a 4-hour non-emergency report to accordance with Diablo Canyon TS 5.5.9, Table 5.5.9-2 and 'Notification to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)' (a 4-hour requirement, replaced by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), now an 8-hour requirement).
"An NRC teleconference in accordance with TS 5.6.10.d to report the preliminary SG tube inspection results was conducted on November 9, 2005, at 1100 PST.
"A Special Report in accordance with TS 5.6.10.a to report the number of tubes plugged in each SG, and TS 5.6.10.c describing the cause of the tube degradation and corrective measures taken to prevent recurrence will be submitted prior to returning Diablo Canyon Unit 1 to power operation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42137 | Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [4] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PAUL REIMERS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 11/11/2005
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2005
Event Time: 15:02 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/11/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 4 | M/R | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING STARTUP FOLLOWING FAILURE OF ROD CONTROL POWER CABINET
"During a reactor startup, while withdrawing the second shutdown bank, a failure of the 2BD rod control power cabinet occurred. Shutdown Bank B group 2 rods failed to withdraw. After gathering data and indications for troubleshooting, a manual reactor trip was initiated. All rods fully inserted. The Unit was and remains in mode 3. There were no other required or actual ESF actuations."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42138 | Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: PAUL WOOD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 11/12/2005
Notification Time: 04:48 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2005
Event Time: 20:34 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MARK SHAFFER (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AFTER LOSS OF ALL CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS
"Waterford 3 manually tripped the reactor at 20:34 [CST] on 11/11/05 due to lowering main condenser vacuum caused by a loss of all circ water pumps. Subsequently an Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) was received due to low steam generator levels. The plant is currently being maintained in mode 3 with both Steam Generators being fed from the Auxiliary Feedwater system with Steam Generator levels in the normal operational band for mode 3. The EFAS has been reset. The plant will be maintained in Mode 3 while a Post Trip Review is performed. This report is submitted as required by 10CFR50.72."
All control rods fully inserted on the manual trip. The main steam isolation valves are shut and the heat sink is through the atmospheric dump valves. The electrical grid is stable and plant power is from the startup transformer. No primary or secondary relief valves or safety valves lifted. The site was able to restart the B & D circ water pumps. There is no significant steam generator tube leakage.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |