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Event Notification Report for February 17, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
02/16/2005 - 02/17/2005

** EVENT NUMBERS **


41327 41346 41409 41412 41413 41414

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 41327
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LANCE LANE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 01/12/2005
Notification Time: 22:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2005
Event Time: 19:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

24 HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT REGARDING HALON SYSTEM- ACTUATOR CONNECTION ERROR

The following information was received via facsimile from the licensee:

"Based upon information provided by Callaway on 1/12/05, it was determined that the manual pneumatic actuators on the Halon suppression systems are piped incorrectly which may result in the inability to actuate the Halon suppression systems manually or automatically.

"Each manual pneumatic actuator has clearly marked "A" and "B" ports. Per the M-658 vendor manual series & drawing M-658-00025, the "A" port shall be connected to the actuation pilot manifold or top of cylinder valve and the "B" port shall be connected to the solenoid valve. A field walk down was performed and in all but one case, the manual pneumatic actuator has been piped in the opposite configuration.

"This effects the Halon suppression system protecting the ESF switchgear rooms, the Rod Drive MG Set room, the North Electrical Penetration room, the South Electrical Penetration Room, the Switchgear & Switchboard rooms, and the Control Room cable trenches & chases.

"Based upon preliminary evaluation, it appears that the Halon suppression systems are inoperable."

Fire watches were implemented for the affected areas.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.






**** UPDATE AT 11:42 ON 02/16/05, E. TAYLOR TO J. KNOKE ****
This event report is retracted based on the following information provided from Wolf Creek by facsimile:

"Investigation - Informational tests conducted by the Vendor (Chemetron) and witnessed by Wolf Creek, Callaway, and NRC personnel on January 26, 2005 determined that the Halon systems would have properly actuated in the as-found incorrect configuration (port 'A' and 'B' connections reversed). The only identified difference in the actuation sequence between the tests conducted in the incorrect configuration versus the correct configuration is a delay of less than 2 seconds from the time the solenoid received the discharge signal until the first cylinder actuated. There is no regulatory or National Fire Protection Association standard or guideline that places a time requirement on this interval. This very slight time delay would have had no effect on the designed function of the Halon suppression system to extinguish a fire. Additional details are provided in the Chemetron report, "Report on Actuation Arrangements for Halon Extinguishing System Units," (Wolf Creek correspondence 05-00072) that includes the test procedure and results.

"Regulatory Evaluation - Guidance for reporting to the criterion of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) is provided in section 3.2.4 of NUREG 1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR50.72 and 50.73." This guidance states that an LER is required for a seriously degraded principal safety barrier or an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.

"Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a) states the following:
The Operating Corporation shall maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the SNUPPS Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility through Revision 17, the Wolf Creek site addendum through Revision 15, and as approved in the SER through Supplement 5, subject to provisions b & c below.

"Conclusion: - Based upon the information provided, the Halon suppression system would have operated to extinguish a fire. This condition is not considered reportable to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii), nor is it a violation of the Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). Consistent with this conclusion, ENS notification number 41327 for this event is to be retracted.

Notified R4DO (Whitten).
NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 41346
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK CRIM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/19/2005
Notification Time: 11:08 [ET]
Event Date: 01/18/2005
Event Time: 12:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

24-HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT FOR POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCE OF THE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM

"The notification is being made pursuant to Unit 2 Operating License for potential non-compliance of the Fire Protection Program.

"At 12:55 on January 18, 2005 following the review of Operating Experience for Wolf Creek (ENS 41327), it was discovered that the pilot lines to the manual pneumatic actuator pilot lines on the Halon bottles for the Halon System for the Auxiliary Equipment Room were incorrectly piped. In accordance with TRM 3.7.6.4 a continuous fire watch was established in the area.

"This event resulted in a condition that could have rendered the Halon System for the Unit 2 Auxiliary Equipment Room inoperable during a fire. The Unit 1 Auxiliary Equipment Room Halon System was not affected and remained operable.

"At this time the cause of this condition is not currently known, and an investigation is ongoing."


NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

HOO NOTE: See Ens # 41326 and 41327 for similar reports.

* * * UPDATE AT 1059 ON 02/16/05 FROM MARK CRIM TO W. GOTT * * *

"The notification is being made to retract the ENS 41346 Rev 0 reported on 1/19/05 pursuant to Unit 2 Operating License for a potential noncompliance of the Fire Protection Program.

"At 12:55 on January 18, 2005 following the review of Operating Experience for Wolf Crook (ENS 41327), it was discovered that the pilot lines to the manual pneumatic actuator on the main and reserve Halon cylinders for the Unit 2 Auxiliary Equipment Room Under Floor Halon System were incorrectly piped. In accordance with TRM 3.7.6.4, a continuous fire watch was established in the area.. Immediately following the event, it was believed that the condition could have rendered the Unit 2 Auxiliary Equipment Room Under Floor Halon System inoperable during a fire. On January 19, 2005 Limerick corrected the piping to meet the vendor design for the manual-pneumatic actuators associated with the Unit 2 Auxiliary Equipment Room Under Floor Halon System.

"On January 26, 2005 Chemetron performed a functional test of the Halon System for Callaway with the incorrect pilot line piping and discovered that Halon injected properly with a 2 second delay (See IEN 2005-001). Callaway had a similar Halon system configuration as Limerick Unit 2 Auxiliary Equipment Room Under Floor Halon System (same make and model number manual-pneumatic actuators and cylinder heads). An evaluation of the test report concluded that the Limerick Unit 2 Auxiliary Equipment Room Under Floor Halon System would have actuated in the event of a fire.

"In conclusion, despite the pilot line piping error, the Unit 2 Auxiliary Equipment Room Under Floor Halon System would have remained operable and would have completed it's suppression function during a fire. Therefore, there was no violation of the Unit 2 Operating License Section 2.C.(3) for the Fire Protection."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (E. Coby).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 41409
Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: SHAW INDUSTRIES
Region: 1
City: DALTON State: GA
County:
License #: GENERAL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LIZ SEALE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 02/14/2005
Notification Time: 15:13 [ET]
Event Date: 12/27/2004
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAYMOND LORSON (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)

Event Text

GEORGIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING RADIOACTIVE SOURCE

The following information was received from the State via facsimile:

"Description of Event: On December 27, 2004, Shaw Industries, a general licensee, contracted with Graves & Phillips Engineering & Maintenance (Alabama License Number 1291) to have four sources removed and returned to the supplier, Omhart. Upon arrival at Omhart on February 4, 2005, the package contained only three sources and one detector. Shaw Industries reported that the fourth source was possibly left on the line where it was used to measure thickness of carpet and that line was sent to a scrap metal yard on January 11, 2005. However, it is still undetermined what has happened to the missing source.

"The Environmental Radiation Staff and representatives from Shaw Industries have been dispatched to the scrap metal yard to investigate the incident. The source holder was Omhart Vega Model BAL and serial number 3781 BC. Isotope: Sr-90. Amount of activity: 25 milliCuries."

Georgia Event Report ID GA-05-05.

* * * UPDATE FROM C. SANDERS TO J. ROTTON AT 1549 ON 02/15/05 * * *

2 personnel from the Georgia Environmental Radiation Staff, 5 representatives from Shaw Industries, and 5 representatives from Regional Recycle are scheduled to physically dismantle the trash pile on 02/16/05 where the missing source is believed to be located and conduct a thorough search for the source. The pile is approximately 40' high, 35 yards wide, and 85 yards long.

Notified R1DO (Cobey) and NMSS EO (Moore).

* * * UPDATE FROM L. SEALE TO J. KNOKE AT 11:18 ON 02/16/05 * * *

"February 14, 2005
The Radioactive Materials Program notified the NRC Operations Center of the event. Attempts to find the source by Shaw Industries' representatives and Environmental Radiation Staff were unsuccessful. The scrap pile that may contain the source is approximately 75-100 yards long, 30-40 yards wide, and 40' to 50' high. Regional Recycling stated that there was a 99% chance that the material was destined for the steel mill across the street from their facility, that is, a 1% chance that the material would be sent to a scrap yard in Kentucky.

"February 15, 2005
Environmental Radiation Staff notified the state of Alabama of the event and ongoing investigation due to Graves & Phillips Engineering & Maintenance, an Alabama licensee. Shaw Industries forwarded to the Environmental Radiation Program dose profiles and pictures of the source device received from Ohmart. Regional Recycling reviewed its records and no shipments had been sent to the Kentucky facility since November 2004. All facilities were notified of the event and pictures and descriptions of the device were sent to the facilities that may receive scrap metal from Shaw Industries.

"Shaw Industries and the Radiation Program were informed by Regional Recycling (scrap yard) that they wanted to dismantle the scrap pile to try to locate the source. Shaw Industries, Regional Recycling and the Environmental Program will provide staff to facilitate the search. The search is to begin on February 16, 2005. Regional Recycling has halted their operations until the search is completed. The Radioactive Materials Program updated the NRC Operation Center on the status of the event.

"February 16, 2005
Shaw Industries and the Environmental Program are currently at Regional Recycling and are visually inspecting the scrap as it is sorted by a crane. The Radioactive Materials Program updated the NRC Operation Center on the status of the event."

Notified R1DO (Cobey) and NMSS EO (Essig).

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 41412
Rep Org: ALCO CORPORATION
Licensee: ALCO CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: GUAYNABO State: PR
County:
License #: 52-24843-01
Agreement: N
Docket: 030-2920
NRC Notified By: DAVID ROHE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 02/16/2005
Notification Time: 14:59 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2005
Event Time: 14:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
DONNA-MARIE PEREZ (TAS)

Event Text

CPN NUCLEAR GAUGE STOLEN FROM THE JOBSITE

An employee of the ALCO Corporation was working at a jobsite on Highway PR83 in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico with a CPN nuclear gauge. About 14:55 on 2/16/05 he had walked 40 feet away from the nuclear gauge and when he returned to the area he noticed the gauge missing. The gauge contain two sources, 50 millicuries Am-241and 10 millicuries of Cs-137. A police report was being taken and that information will be provided as a later update.

No reward for the return of the gauge is being offered at this time.

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 41413
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: PHILIP NORTH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 02/16/2005
Notification Time: 21:20 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2005
Event Time: 13:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RUDOLPH BERNHARD (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 18 Power Operation

Event Text

DEGRADED CONDITION - REACTOR BUILDING NORMAL SUMP LEVEL INCREASING

The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:

"Event:
"On February 16, 2005 at 1331 hours EST, Operations discovered that the Oconee Unit 3 Reactor Building Normal Sump (RBNS) level was increasing. Chemistry sampled the containment normal sump to determine the water source and could not conclusively rule out Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW). The leak rate into the sump is approximately 1.9 gpm. LPSW is the cooling medium used for the Reactor Cooling Pump (RCP) motor coolers, the Reactor Building Cooling Units (RBCU), and the Reactor Building Auxiliary Cooling Units (RBACU).

"Unit 3 entered Technical Specification 3.6.1.A at 1331. This requires restoring containment to Operable status within 1 hour. The approximately 1.9 gpm leakage is above the leakage allowed in calculation OSC-7005 "LPSW Allowable Leakage Inside Containment". At 1431 Unit 3 entered Technical Specification 3.6.1 B which requires being in mode 3 in 12 hours.

"Initial Safety Significance:
"By limiting the amount of LPSW leakage inside containment then containment operability is ensured. Above the calculated LPSW leakage as stated in OSC-7005, containment operability is in question. The LPSW system pressure could be less than containment LOCA peak pressure. Therefore containment atmosphere has the potential to leak through the LPSW system, during a LOCA, and out the return line resulting in a containment leak path.

"Collective Action(s):
"Additional sampling and process indications suggest that the cause of the Reactor Building Normal Sump rate increase is feedwater or main steam. A power reduction to 18% has been completed and a reactor building entry is in progress to confirm the source of the leakage. If the source is confirmed to be feedwater or main steam, Technical Specification 3.6.1 will be exited."

The turbine is still loaded and the electrical grid was not affected by the power decrease to 18%. All systems functioned as required and other units at Oconee were not affected by this event.

NRC Resident Inspector was notified.


* * * UPDATE ON 2/17/05 @ 0018 BY JOHN COLLINS TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * * UPDATE

They entered the containment and verified a steam leak off the impulse line for the "3B" steam generator main steam pressure transmitters. They are currently at 18% power and making a decisions on repair options.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed. The Reg 2 RDO(Bernhard) was notified.


* * * UPDATE ON 2/17/05 @ 0139 BY JOHN COLLINS TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * * RETRACTION

At 0012 on February 17, 2005 entry into the Unit 3 reactor building confirmed that the source of leakage into the reactor building normal sump was the Main Steam system. Specifically, the location of the leak appears to be a fitting downstream of an instrument root valve off the 3B Main Steam line. Based on this information, Technical Specification 3.6.1 was exited and this event is not reportable per 10CFR50.72. and therefore being retracted.

A shutdown to MODE 3 will be conducted to facilitate repair the leak.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed. Reg 2 RDO(Bernhard) was notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41414
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: PETER BRAMFORD
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 02/17/2005
Notification Time: 00:18 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2005
Event Time: 21:12 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP AS A RESULT OF FAILED POWER SUPPLY

"Ginna Station received a reactor trip from Turbine Trip at 2112 hrs on 02/16/05. The Turbine Trip signal was generated from the ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) related to a failed power supply in the Advanced Digital Feedwater Control System. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3, RCS Pressure 2235 psig, Temperature 540 deg F. AFW [Auxiliary Feed Water] did actuate as designed after the trip.

"For the transient, min & max Temperatures, Pressures & Levels are:
RCS Temperature: Max - 561 deg F Min - 538 deg F
RCS Pressure: Max - 2250 psig Min - 2218 psig
Pressurizer Level: Max - 50% Min - 28%"

The electrical grid is stable. Decay heat is being rejected to the Main Condenser. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State Public Service Commission.

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