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Event Notification Report for February 7, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
02/04/2005 - 02/07/2005

** EVENT NUMBERS **


41364 41369 41370 41371 41372 41373 41374 41375 41377 41378 41379

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General Information or Other Event Number: 41364
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee:
Region: 1
City: MIAMI State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE FURNACE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 02/01/2005
Notification Time: 17:57 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2005
Event Time: 17:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
CREWS (NRC)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NONLICENSED RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA CONFISCATED BY US CUSTOMS IN FLORIDA

A private plane landed at the Tamiami airport in Miami, FL and US Customs discovered a Model 802 radiography camera with an Iridium 192 source measuring approximately 11 curies aboard. The camera belonged to a Guatemala company by the name of S.I.E. Limitada located in Guatemala City. The company was doing work in the Grand Cayman Islands for a Florida company by the name of Tampa Tank. The contract company was returning from the Grand Cayman Islands to Guatemala via Miami. US Customs has confiscated the camera and has it under their control until the State can get their people in place to take control of the device. As soon as a State representative can transport the camera to the Miami Airport it will be flown back to Guatemala City via Arrow transport.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41369
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TERRY GALLENTINE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/03/2005
Notification Time: 23:48 [ET]
Event Date: 02/03/2005
Event Time: 18:19 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 85 Power Operation 85 Power Operation
2 N Y 85 Power Operation 85 Power Operation

Event Text

4160 VOLT RELAYING AND METERING SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY

The licensee provided the following report via facsimile:

"On February 3, 2005 at 1819 hours, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (QCNPS) confirmed a vulnerability with a 4160 VAC relaying and metering current transformer (CT) associated with the Unit and Reserve Auxiliary Transformers (i.e., the UAT and RAT) on both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Although the CT is currently fully operable, failure of the CT circuitry could cause the neutral overcurrent relay to trip and lockout the circuit breakers supplying feeds to safety related buses 13 (23) and 14 (24), isolating them from their normal and emergency power sources. Emergency power (i.e., the emergency diesel generator) would still be available to supply power to safety related buses 13-1 (23-1) and 14-1 (24-1), but the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) system may be without a source of power. If this failure occurred during a LOCA, then the RHRSW pumps may not be started within the ten minute requirement. A modification is in progress to eliminate this vulnerability. This event is being reported as a potential loss of safety function (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)) and as a degraded or unanalyzed condition (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B))."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

See similar events #41362 (Crystal River), #41366 (LaSalle), and #41370 (Dresden).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41370
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PAUL SALGADO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 00:23 [ET]
Event Date: 02/03/2005
Event Time: 19:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 95 Power Operation 95 Power Operation
3 N Y 96 Power Operation 96 Power Operation

Event Text

4160 VOLT RELAYING AND METERING SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY

The licensee provided the following report via facsimile:

"On February 3, 2005 at 1915 hours, DNPS confirmed a vulnerability with a 4160 VAC relaying and metering current transformer (CT) associated with the Unit and Reserve Auxiliary Transformers (i.e., the UAT and RAT) on both Units. Although the CT is currently fully operable, failure of the CT circuitry will cause the neutral overcurrent relay to trip (and lockout) the main, reserve and tie feed breakers. These combined protective relay trips will act to trip and lock out the circuit breakers supplying feeds to buses 23 (33) and 24 (34), essentially isolating them from their normal and emergency power sources. Emergency power (i.e., the emergency diesel generator) would still be available to safety related buses 23-1 (33-1) and 24-1 (34-1), but the Containment Cooling Service Water (CCSW) system would remain without a power source. If this failure occurred during a LOCA, then the CCSW pumps may not be able to be started within ten minutes. A modification is in progress to eliminate this vulnerability. This event is being reported as a potential loss of safety function (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)) and a degraded or unanalyzed condition (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B))."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

See similar events #41362 (Crystal River), #41366 (LaSalle), and #41369 (Quad Cities).

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 41371
Rep Org: VA NATIONAL HEALTH PHYSICS PROGRAM
Licensee: VA MEDICAL CTR BATTLE CREEK MI
Region: 3
City: BATTLE CREEK State: MI
County:
License #: 03-23853-01VA
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH WISSING
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 13:38 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2005
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
LINDA GERSEY (NMSS)

Event Text

LOST SEALED SOURCE

The Department of Veterans Affairs reported the loss of licensed material.

"The loss occurred at a medical limited-scope permittee authorized under the master materials license issued to the Department of Veterans Affairs, NRC License 03-23853-01 VA. The permittee is VA Medical Center, Battle Creek, Michigan.

"The loss was discovered by the permittee Nuclear Medicine Technologist on January 10, 2005. The Nuclear Medicine Technologist discovered that the Cs-137 sealed source [Serial number S356010-022] used for the dose calibrator calibrations and daily constancy measurements was missing.

"The basis for reporting the loss is under 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(ii) in that the permittee lost permitted material in a quantity greater than 10 times the quantity specified in 10 CFR 20, Appendix C, and is still missing at this time. The actual activity was approximately 137 microCuries.

"The permittee investigated the loss and concluded the radioactive material most likely ended up in a local landfill. Permittee staff performed radiation surveys of the medical center and at the landfill which did not locate the missing radioactive sealed source.

"The [VHA National Health Physics Program] NHPP performed a reactive inspection on January 13, 2005, 4 days after the loss was discovered. Additional surveys performed by NHPP also failed to locate the source at the medical center. In accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(b), a thirty-day report is pending and will be forwarded to NRC when completed."

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 41372
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
                   COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: COLUMBIA State: SC
County: RICHLAND
License #: SNM-1107
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001151
NRC Notified By: M. OWEN CONNELLY
HQ OPS Officer: JANELLE BATTISTE
Notification Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 14:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2005
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)

Event Text

24-HOUR NOTIFICATION-BULLETIN 91-01 CRITICALITY CONTROL

The following information was obtained from the licensee via email :

"Facility:
Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia SC,
low enriched ([DELETED]) PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors. License: SNM-1107.

"Time and Date of Event:
February 4, 2005, 0900 hours:

"Reason for Notification:
Double contingency protection for non-favorable geometry (NFG) bulk containers is based on preventing moderation from entering the bulk powder blending room and by then preventing the moderator from entering the bulk containers.

"Prevention of moderation from entering the bulk powder room is assured by controls such as a double roof, restrictions on firefighting combined with limits on combustible materials, limits on moderators for maintenance and cleaning, and rigorous control over powder moisture to ensure that no carts enter the bulk room that have polypaks with moisture above 0.3 wt%.

"Prevention of moderator from entering the bulk container is assured by controls such as procedure requirements to ensure visual inspection of all powder before it is dumped into a bulk container and the polypak dump hood interlock system.

"In order to dump a polypak into a bulk container, the operator must scan the polypak's unique barcode and place the polypak into the polypak dump hood mechanism. After the barcode is scanned, the interlock function checks the moisture data associated with the polypak to ensure it is <0.3 wt%. If the moisture results are not <0.3 wt%, the dump hood locks up, preventing further dumping of powder until the discrepancy is resolved.

"During routine dumping operations, an infrared [s]ensor became misaligned in the polypak dump hood in bulk powder blending room. This resulted in a failure of the polypak dump hood interlock to finish its 'cycle' for that pack. It was expected that this sort of problem would be promptly self revealing, i.e. that the scanning of the next pack would result in an error indicating that the previous pack had not been 'consumed.' While the errors were generated, they were not readily apparent, except to an attentive operator. The barcode scanner sounded the same, the visual cues were subtle, and the dump [hood] interlock did not lock up. The operator was able to scan additional paks and dump them. The moisture database would not have been consulted for any of these paks.

"In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification, specifically, 'Any nuclear criticality safety incident, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented double contingency protection remains (multi-parameter control or single-parameter control) and less than a safe mass is involved.' and 10CFR70, specifically Appendix A.b.2 'Loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that results in failure to meet performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.'

"As Found Condition:
An operator found the problem after dumping the first polypak of a blend.

"Summary of Activity:
The affected equipment has been shut down.
New programming and other improvements are being developed.

"Conclusions:
There was less than a critical mass of SNM involved.
At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
The Incident Review Committee (IRC) has determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
A causal analysis will be performed."

The licensee will be notifying NRC Region II of this incident.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41373
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GARRISON
HQ OPS Officer: JANELLE BATTISTE
Notification Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2005
Event Time: 07:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION

The following information was obtained from the licensee via fax:

"At approximately 0730 on 2/4/05, a radiography safety officer notified the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SC DHEC) of a violation of a radiography boundary. The violation occurred sometime between the hours of 2230 on 2/3/05 and 0030 on 2/4/05. At the time of the breech, the radiography source was stored, so no overexposure of personnel is suspected. However, the individual seen by the radiographers has not been identified to ascertain whether or not they were wearing dosimetry while within the boundary. This requires notification to the offsite agency SC DHEC since it is unknown whether or not they were monitored. The radiation safety officer was unaware and his administrative procedure did not inform him of the need for a 10 CFR 50.72 (b) 2 notification. Thus, licensed personnel did not discover that the notification had been made until 1300 on 2/4/05. At this time, licensed personnel began gathering information on the nature of the call to determine reportability.

The site has assembled an event investigation team in response to the radiography boundary violation."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified as well as the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. State and local authorities will be notified of this event.

The licensee will notify the NRC of any further information obtained from the investigation.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41374
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRETT WELLER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 17:25 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2005
Event Time: 13:37 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 98 Power Operation 98 Power Operation

Event Text

4160 VOLT RELAYING AND METERING SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:

"On February 4, 2005, at 1337 hours, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant discovered a potential vulnerability with 4160 VAC current sensing and protective relaying circuitry that could result in bus lockouts of both safeguards buses (#15 and #16) if a specific equipment fault were to occur. The 1AR Auxiliary Reserve Transformer source to each of the safeguards buses have current transformers used for over-current protective relaying that have common connections to facilitate a single watt-hour meter. The lack of neutral over-current trip relaying limits the event vulnerability to a case (most likely fire) of an outside voltage source contacting one or more CT phase legs that forces current through the over-current trip relays. If this forced current is of sufficient magnitude through both division over-current relays, both safeguards buses will receive lockout signals. This would make both safeguards buses unavailable. Since the 1AR transformer is not required at this time, it has been isolated from the safeguards buses, and their associated over-current relaying isolated to preclude occurrence of this event.

"This event is being reported as a potential loss of safety function (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A, B, C, and D)) and as a degraded or unanalyzed condition (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)),

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

See similar events #41362 (Crystal River), #41366 (LaSalle) #41369 (Quad Cities) and #41370 (Dresden).

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Hospital Event Number: 41375
Rep Org: UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT HEALTH CT
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT MEDICAL CTR
Region: 1
City: FARMINGTON State: CT
County:
License #: 06-13022-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEN PRICE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2005
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)

Event Text

MEDICAL EVENT

"At 0900 hours on 2/4/05, a Nuclear Medicine Technician attempted to inject 32.7 milliCuries of Tc-99m into an implanted single lumen port located near the left breast of a female patient. The patient was scheduled for a red blood cell study. After injecting 21.1 mCi, the Tech noticed resistance and could not deliver the rest of the dose. A scan of the patient indicated the material was not metabolizing, and a localized spot was identified near the port. The Nuclear Medicine Physician, after reading the scan, determined that the dose had been delivered to a volume of 15-30 cubic centimeters of tissue around the port. The Radiation Safety Officer estimated that the committed absorbed dose to this tissue volume is on the order of 52.7 to 83.2 Rad, using MIRD dosimetry. The patient was notified by the Nuclear Medicine Physician, and the physician has indicated that there will be no deleterious effects on the patient. The NRC Operations Center was called at 1800 hours on 2/4/05, as of this time it is not certain if the internal line was crimped by the patient or the event was caused by failure of the port."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41377
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: WARNER ANDREWS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 02/06/2005
Notification Time: 00:43 [ET]
Event Date: 02/05/2005
Event Time: 20:46 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 88 Power Operation 88 Power Operation

Event Text

4160 VOLT RELAYING AND METERING SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY


"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At 20:46 on 02/05/05 while reviewing Operation Experience from another Nuclear Site, it was discovered that the design of the AC Auxiliary Power System incorporates a common circuit which could result in a bus lockout preventing the re-energization of both unit one safeguards buses from either onsite or offsite power sources due to a single failure in the common portion of the circuitry. This common circuit includes various metering circuits and is also connected to overcurrent devices that feed breaker lockout relays. Should a failure occur on these common circuits, all breakers supplying power to these buses would be opened, locked out, and prevented from reclosure onto the buses.

"Due to the loss of the ability to accommodate a single failure, one offsite power source ( CT11 ) has been declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.8.1 Condition A, entered. Corrective actions are in progress to isolate the common circuit and eliminate the single point vulnerability."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

See similar events #41362 (Crystal River), #41366 (LaSalle), #41369 (Quad Cities) ,#41370 (Dresden) and #41377 (Monticello).

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 41378
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: TONY HUDSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/06/2005
Notification Time: 17:28 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2005
Event Time: 10:08 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)

Event Text

24 HOUR REPORT OF A SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE

The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:

"At 1008, on 2-06-05, the Plant Shift Superintendent [PSS] was notified that at the C-360 Toll and Transfer Facility on autoclave 4, the vent line block valve, XV-434, failed to close when the control switch was operated to the closed position. A check of the valve indicator showed that the valve moved to approximately 75% of the closed position. This valve is a single isolation point (no redundant valve) for two TSR [Technical and Safety Requirements] systems: (1) The Autoclave Steam Pressure Control System and (2) The Autoclave Water Inventory Control System. The autoclave was in mode 5, an applicable TSR mode for both systems. The PSS declared the systems inoperable and TSR LCOs 2.1.3.3 and 2.1.4.3 were implemented to remove the autoclave from service and place it in mode 2 within one hour.

"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120.c.2.i. It was an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a) The equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b) The equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should be operated on demand, and, c) No redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41379
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: STEVE SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 02/07/2005
Notification Time: 04:41 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2005
Event Time: 22:19 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/07/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
CORNELIUS HOLDEN (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

EMERGENCY DIESEL START DUE TO BUS DEENERGIZATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile:

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"On February 6, 2005, at approximately 22:19 Mountain Standard Time (MST) a valid actuation of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Train `B' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) occurred as a result of undervoltage on its respective safety bus (PBB-S04). EDG 'B' started and loaded as designed to energize PBB-S04.

"The loss of power to the safety bus was the result of a fault associated with 13.8KV breaker NAN-SO6J which caused breakers NAN-SO6H (normal power supply), NAN-S06K (alternate power supply), and NAN-SO6J (EOF & TSC Bldg power supply) to all trip open on Overcurrent. This action resulted in the deenergization of NAN-S06, NAN-S04, and PBB-S04. The PVNGS Fire Department and Auxiliary Operators responded to a report of smoke and upon arrival found no fire. The Fire Department verified the fire was completely extinguished and there were no extensions (secondary fires).

"Unit 1 entered Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, Condition 'A', for one (of two) required offsite circuits inoperable. Various other Technical Specifications LCO's were momentarily entered and exited for PBB-S04 being deenergized for approximately 7 seconds. No Emergency Plan declaration was made and none was required.

"Unit 1 was at approximately 100% power, at normal operating temperature and pressure prior to and following the EDG actuation. No other ESF actuations occurred and none were required. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event. The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the ESF actuation and this ENS notification."

The B EDG is providing power to PBB-S04. Due to loss of power to the TSC, the TSC Diesel started and is providing power to the TSC. The Backup EOF located in Buckeye, AZ will be used in the case of an emergency event. There were no reported injuries. There was damage to the NAN-S06J breaker and it has been isolated. The event has been entered into the site's corrective action program for determining the cause of the breaker trip and damage. This event has no effect on the operation of the other site units.

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