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Event Notification Report for June 11, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/10/2004 - 06/11/2004

** EVENT NUMBERS **


40794 40796 40802 40804 40805

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General Information or Other Event Number: 40794
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TERRACON
Region: 4
City: FORT COLLINS State: CO
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES S. JARVIS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 06/07/2004
Notification Time: 13:28 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2004
Event Time: 11:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)

Event Text

COLORADO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was received by facsimile:

"At approximately 11 am on 6/5/04, a watering truck on a housing development construction project near Fort Collins, Colorado (County Roads 11, and 52), ran over a Troxler moisture density gauge (Troxler model 3430; Serial # 28846) owned by Terracon (Colorado Specific License #664-02). The gauge was being used for soil compaction measurements but was in the safe (up) position when it was run over. The technician responsible for using the gauge was reported to be in close proximity to the gauge at the time of the incident but may have had the gauge to his right and not in direct frontal view. As a result of the incident, the index rod was knocked off and the source rod above the unit casing was bent at a 90 degree angle but remained attached to the unit. The gauge casing was described to be mostly intact (i.e. not fully crushed) with the exception of damage to the display. Discussions with the RSO indicated that the gauge source was believed to have remained within the internal shielding following the incident.

"The RSO for Terracon reported to the scene at approximately 11:50 am (6/5/04) and performed initial radiation measurements of the gauge. The initial radiation measurements on scene indicated values of approximately 1.0. millirem/hour on/near the surface of the gauge and 0.2 [millirem/hr] at 1 meter. The gauge was placed in the transport case and returned to the Terracon main offices located at 301 North Howes, Fort Collins, CO, 80521. The damaged gauge (in the case) was placed in an outbuilding located near the main office and was secured and the area posted per the RSO. The Department mandated that a leak test be performed prior to shipment of the gauge to a repair facility - results are pending.

"Based upon the nature of the incident and the position of the source and rod as, described by the RSO, the source is believed to be intact with no release to the environment or personnel or public exposure. A written report from the licensee is expected within 30 days."

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General Information or Other Event Number: 40796
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: WALTER O. BOSWELL HOSPITAL
Region: 4
City: SUN CITY WEST State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ-07-138
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 06/08/2004
Notification Time: 12:33 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2004
Event Time: 13:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
LINDA PSYK (NMSS)

Event Text

ARIZONA STATE LICENSEE REPORTED A MISSING I-125 SEED

The State of Arizona has been informed of a missing source by two State Licensees (Walter O. Boswell Hospital lic # AZ-07-138 and Amersham Health lic # AZ-07-346). The missing source is an Iodine-125 seed containing 0.225 millicuries of Iodine-125. The seed was loaded into a shipping container by two employees of Licensee 1. Both employees independently described and certified the loading of the seed into the shipping container. Licensee 2 received the package but did not locate the seed that was supposed to be inside. This is information from the 30 day report, pursuant to Arizona rules equivalent to 10CFR20.2201(a)(ii). The seed was first detected missing April, 18, 2004.
The Agency has opened an active investigation into the circumstances of the loss of this seed. Initial surveys at each Licensee failed to locate the missing seed.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40802
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM HACKLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 06/10/2004
Notification Time: 05:36 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2004
Event Time: 02:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 96 Power Operation 96 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE DUE TO INADVERTENT EMERGENCY SIREN ACTUATION

"One emergency response siren (Number 10 Brunswick County) located in Southport, NC inadvertently actuated at 0205, apparently due to a lightning strike, and was silenced at 0312. The Brunswick County, New Hanover County and North Carolina State Emergency Operation Centers (EOC) were notified of the inadvertent actuation. The Brunswick County 911 Center received calls from local residents reporting the siren actuation.

"Initial Safety Significance Evaluation: Minimal safety significance. The loss of the single siren will not significantly impact the public notification system. The remaining sirens in both Brunswick and New Hanover Counties have been verified to be operable.

"Corrective Actions: The siren was silenced at 0312 on June 10, 2004. The cause of the inadvertent actuation will be determined and repaired."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40804
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BRAD BROWN
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 06/10/2004
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 06/10/2004
Event Time: 13:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
BILL BATEMAN (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP WHILE PERFORMING SCHEDULED SOLID STATE PROTECTION TESTING

A Unit 2 automatic reactor trip occurred while the licensee was performing planned periodic testing on train "A" solid state protection. All control rods fully inserted into the reactor core. The Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps automatically started as expected immediately following the reactor trip due to low-low level in the steam generators. The unit is being maintained stable in mode 3 and heat sink is being performed via steam dump to the condensers. All other systems functioned as required. The cause of the reactor trip is under investigation.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 40805
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: CALVIN PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 06/10/2004
Notification Time: 16:37 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2004
Event Time: 05:53 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)

Event Text

PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFfUSSION PLANT - RESPONSE BULLETIN 91-01 24 - HOUR REPORT

"At 1550 on 6-09-04, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of a failure of a Safety Related Item (SRI) relied upon in Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) 052 'Enrichment Cascade During Normal Operations at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.' At 0553 hours on 4-23-04, when responding to alarms on Cell 6 in Building C-310, the second bank of motors could not be shut down using the manual motor trip system. Operators opened the Transformer Secondary Breaker (TSB) as an alternate means to shut down the motors. The manual motor trip system is credited to mitigate/minimize the consequences or extent of a Hot Metal Reaction (HMR).

"PGDP Problem Report No, ATRC-04-2299; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-17; Event Worksheet [NRC Event Number]: # 40805, Responsible Division: Operations.

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Minimal. There are multiple methods capable of shutting down equipment suspected of undergoing a HMR. The compressor motors were shut down using one of these methods. The shutdown was accomplished within 2 minutes.

"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIOS) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
In order for a criticality to occur, the equipment would have had to be involved In the initiating event of a HMR. There were no indications of a HMR. Additionally, the HMR event would need to have occurred with a significant inventory of UF6 present. The event was in the purge cascade having UF6 concentrations in the ppm range. Therefore, there is no credible pathway to criticality for this incident.

"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):
This scenario is singly contingent based on moderation control.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
The event was in the purge cascade having UF6 concentrations in the ppm range at an enrichment of less than [DELETED] wt % 235U.

"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
This scenario is singly contingent based on moderation control. The scenario indicates that it is unlikely for a significant HMR to occur resulting in a cooler/cascade breach with subsequent sprinkler activation based on historical operations. The manual motor trip system is credited to mitigate/minimize the consequences or extent of a HMR. The credited trip failed to perform its intended function. Although the credited trip failed, alternative methods were used to shutdown the cell, thereby satisfying the intent of the administrative portion of the control. Also, no HMR, cell breach, or sprinkler activation occurred. Although the SRI failed, the moderation parameter was maintained.

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
The cell was shut down using alternate means within 2 minutes. The manual motor trip system was declared inoperable at 0700 on 4-23-04 and repaired.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 30, 2012