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Event Notification Report for June 7, 2004
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/04/2004 - 06/07/2004
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40791 |
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: LEE BOERNEKE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
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Notification Date: 06/04/2004
Notification Time: 08:21 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2004
Event Time: 04:45 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
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Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 3 |
M/R |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Standby |
Event Text
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO INTAKE STRUCTURE SEAWEED FOULING
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) experienced a large influx of seaweed that required securing one of the four running Circulating Water (CW) pumps. When conditions continued to degrade, the Operations Department decided to manually trip the unit.
During the trip, all control rods inserted into the core. No manual or power-operated relief valves lifted during the transient. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric dump valves. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. The Operations staff is maintaining the unit at normal operating pressure and temperature. The electrical grid is stable. Currently, only one CW pump is running. Unit 2 is unaffected and is not experiencing a seaweed influx at this time.
The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector |
| Fuel Cycle Facility |
Event Number: 40793 |
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: COLUMBIA State: SC
County: RICHLAND
License #: SNM-1107
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001151
NRC Notified By: OWEN CONNELLY
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
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Notification Date: 06/04/2004
Notification Time: 20:14 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2004
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2004
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
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Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
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Event Text
LICENSEE REPORTED A 4 HOUR 91-01 RESPONSE BULLETIN
Material accumulation discovered in a 55-gallon drum. The 55-gallon drum was used as a knock-out pot for moisture condensate during high-pressure nitrogen drying of clean UF6 cylinders undergoing re-certification.
In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (b.2), this event satisfies the criteria for a 4-hour notification. Specifically, any determination that a criticality safety analysis or evaluation was deficient, or that a particular system was not previously analyzed; and that less than two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions would be required before a criticality accident would be possible.
During a normal process hazards assessment an NCS Engineer was informed of a 55-gallon drum in the cylinder re-certification process. The drum was found to contain approximately 28 kilograms of dry material. Laboratory analyses determined a maximum concentration of 53.5 weight percent uranium in the form of uranyl fluoride. This corresponds to a uranium mass of approximately 15 kilograms.
UF6 cylinders contain virtually no uranium at the time they undergo drying in the cylinder re-certification process. Preliminary investigation has revealed that the drum was inspected from 1993 to 1996 and repeatedly found to contain no solid accumulation before the inspections were discontinued.
Cylinder re-certification was not in operation at the time of discovery.
NCS formally notified Operations not to operate cylinder re-certification.
The drum was removed from the system and inspected.
The material was removed from the drum, sampled, and analyzed.
This particular system was not previously analyzed for criticality safety.
Much less than a critical mass was involved.
At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
The Incident Review Committee (IRC) has determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
A causal analysis will be performed. |
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