Event Notification Report for March 04, 2004

RCIC STEAM SUPPLY FAILED LLRT

"Appendix J Local Leak Rate Testing [LLRT] of the RCIC Steam Supply failed the Combined Main Steam Isolation Valves leakage limit of 300 scfh. The Combined MSIV leakage limit includes MSIV'S, MSL Drains, HPCI Steam Supply and RCIC Steam Supply. The volume between RCIC Steam Supply valves could not be pressurized therefore, the Minimum Pathway leakage limit is considered to be exceeded.

"This is also considered a failure of the Primary Containment Air Leakage Minimum Pathway leakage limit of 1.0 La.

"The identified degraded condition is reportable as a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers being seriously degraded per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) requiring an 8-hr ENS notification."

The RCIC Steam Supply line was tested successfully approximately two years ago during the last refueling outage. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.

******RETRACTED ON 4/14/2004 AT 1610 EST FROM FRY TO HEISSERER*****

"At the time the original 8-hour ENS notification was made, it was declared that the Appendix J Local Leak Rate Test of the RCIC Steam Supply had failed the combined Main Steam Isolation Valves Minimum Pathway leakage limit of 300 scfh. The combined MSIV leakage limit includes MSIVs, MSL Drains, HPCI Steam Supply and the RCIC Steam Supply. The volume between the inboard and outboard RCIC Steam Supply valves could not be pressurized, therefore the Minimum Pathway leakage limit was considered to be exceeded.

"Subsequent to this event, during performance of an additional Local Leak Rate Test of the RCIC Steam Supply Penetration, it was demonstrated that the as-found Appendix J and combined MSIV Minimum Pathway leakage and the Primary Containment Air Leakage Minimum Pathway of 1.0 La were not exceeded as previously reported.

"The original Local Leak Rate Test was performed between the combination of two parallel inboard valves and the outboard valve. The subsequent test determined that the outboard isolation valve did not exceed Minimum Pathway criteria. The majority of the leakage was from the smaller inboard RCIC warm-up line isolation valve of the three RCIC Steam Supply valves. The post-maintenance test of the penetration measured leakage that was within acceptable limits.

"As such, the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle barriers, was not significantly degraded."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R1DO (B. McDermott).

24-HOUR NOTIFICATION - BULLETIN 91-01 CRITICALITY CONTROL

"A review of incinerator data indicated higher than expected accumulations and concentrations of uranium bearing material in the incinerator off-gas system. Criticality was not possible because the mass corresponding to each concentration was below the minimum critical mass.

"Controlled Parameters: The safety basis for the incinerator off gas-system states that criticality is not credible. This was based on minimal expected carryover and low concentrations of uranium from the incinerator to the off -gas system. The uranium concentrations in the off-gas system were expected to be well below the [deleted] concentration criticality limit for an infinite mass.

"A criticality would be possible in the off-gas system only if a minimum critical mass for a corresponding uranium concentration accumulated in a critical configuration with sufficient moderator.

"Because higher than expected accumulation and concentration of uranium bearing material was detected in the incinerator off gas system, this 24-hour notification is being made.

"Summary of Activity: 1) Incinerator was shut down; 2) The off-gas system is being inspected; 3) Samples from the off-gas system are being obtained for analysis.

"Conclusions: 1). The bounding assumptions for concentration and carryover were exceeded; 2). At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved & 3). The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A formal causal analysis will be performed.

The licensee will be notifying NRC Region III.

* * * UPDATE AT 1346 EST ON 3/9/04 SNYDER TO GOTT * * *

The licensee sent the following addendum via facsimile:

"Reason for Addendum:
Higher than expected concentration of uranium bearing material detected in the incinerator ash. The ash from the lower chamber of the incinerator is lifted via a bucket elevator and dumped into a mill feed hopper and then into a fitzmill.

"As Found Condition:
A review of incinerator data indicated higher than expected concentrations of uranium in the incinerator ash.

"Controlled Parameters:
The safety basis for the ash handling system (elevator and fitzmill) states that criticality is not credible based on the ash remaining below 21.6 weight percent uranium.

"Summary of Activity:
-In addition to the previous activities, the formal root cause team has initiated their investigation.
-The incinerator ash elevator and fitzmill safety basis is being re-evaluated.

"Conclusions:
-The bounding assumption for concentration was exceeded.
-At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or member of the public.
-No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
-The ash handling aspect will be incorporated into the formal causal analysis."

Notified NMSS (Psyk) and R2DO (Ayres).

THE CLEVELAND CLINIC FOUNDATION ADMINISTERED AN UNDERDOSE DURING A THERAPEUTIC TREATMENT

During a therapeutic procedure using I-125 Gliasite from 2/28 - 3/1, the state licensee administered an under dose of 24%. The therapist calculated a dwell time of only 97 hours when the prescribed dwell time was 120 hrs for treating a brain tumor. This resulted in the patient receiving 5,300 rads instead of the prescribed 7,000 rads. Both the patient and the referring physician were notified. The licensee will make up for the under dosage by using a linear accelerator.