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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
01/16/2004 - 01/20/2004
** EVENT NUMBERS **
|
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 40420 |
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: SIMPSON TACOMA KRAFT, LLC
Region: 4
City: TACOMA State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I014-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN C. SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON |
Notification Date: 12/31/2003
Notification Time: 15:50 [ET]
Event Date: 12/31/2003
Event Time: 12:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2004 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
Tom Farnholtz (R4)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT: DAMAGED GAUGE
"Licensee: Simpson Tacoma Kraft, LLC
"City and State: Tacoma, Washington
"License Number: WN-I014-1
"Type of License: Fixed Gauge
"Date of Event: 31 December 2003 (when discovered by licensee
"Location of Event: 801 Portland Avenue, Tacoma, Washington
"ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, Dept. of Health (department) on-site investigation; media attention):
"The licensed Radiation Safety Officer reported to the Department, on 31 December, he noticed that process fluids had eroded a ½ inch by 4 inch hole through the ½ inch thick gauge body where it attached to process piping. The damage was apparently confined to the device's body and the event is not considered to present an emergency at this time. The device had been in service for about 12 years and had reached the end of its useful service life. It was being removed to prepare it for disposal.
"The device is a Texas Nuclear Corp. Model 5176, Serial Number 2253, containing 7.4 gigabecquerels (200 millicuries) of Cesium 137.
"The licensee informed the department they would bolt a ½ inch metal plate to the device's attachment point, over the damaged area, to temporarily return the device to its normal level of shielding and integrity. After removal and the temporary repair, the licensee placed the device into secured storage, along with several other similar devices, in preparation for source removal and disposal in January 2004, by a service provider.
"The RSO, approved for device installation, relocation, removal from service, and surveys, reported that the device was reading 1.5 Mr/hr, contact at the damaged area, prior to the temporary repair. A similar, but undamaged, device read 1.2 Mr/hr at the same location. The RSO reported no activity from a wipe survey on the damaged device.
"The Department will perform an on-site investigation on 6 January 2004. No media attention has been attracted, yet.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: 10 CFR 31, General Domestic Licenses for Byproduct Material (damage to shielding)
"Isotope and Activity involved: Cesium 137, 7.4 gigabecquerels (200 millicuries)
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): N/A
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): damage confined to device body of a Texas Nuclear Corp, Model 5176 device, Serial Number 2253
"`Disposition/recovery: removed from service, temporarily repaired, secured for pending disposal
"Leak test? Wipe survey indicated no contamination, last leak test was negative
"Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number) N/A
"Release of activity? None
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: N/A
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: N/A
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: See above
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: N/A
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? N/A
"Was written report provided? Pending
"Was referring physician notified? N/A
"Consultant used? N/A for this event"
* * * UPDATE ON 1/16/04 AT 1315 EST FROM ARDEN SCROGGS TO GERRY WAIG * * *
The following information was received via email:
"This is an updated notification of an event in Washington State, reported to and investigated by, the WA Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection.
"STATUS: update
"Licensee: Simpson Tacoma Kraft, LLC
"City and State: Tacoma, Washington
"License Number: WN-I014-1
"Type of License: Fixed Gauge
"Date of Event: 31 December 2003 (when discovered by licensee)
"Location of Event: 801 Portland Avenue, Tacoma, Washington
"ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, Dept. of Health (department) on-site investigation; media attention):
"The licensed Radiation Safety Officer reported to the Department, on 31 December, that he had discovered that process fluids (green liquor [sodium sulfite]) had eroded a 3-inch by 6-inch hole through a 1/8 inch thick aluminum gauge cover-plate on the gauge where the gauge attached to process piping. The damage was confined to the device's cover-plate and the event was not considered an emergency. The device had been in service for about 30 years and had reached the end of its useful service life. It was being removed in preparation for disposal.
"The device is a Texas Nuclear Corp., Model 5176, Serial Number 2253, containing 7.4 gigabecquerels (200 millicuries) of Cesium 137.
"The licensee informed the department they would bolt a ½ inch thick metal plate to the device's attachment point, over the damaged area, to cover the whole. After removal and temporary repair, the licensee placed the device into secured storage, along with several other similar devices, in preparation for source removal and disposal. A service provider, is scheduled to remove the devices from the licensee's facility in about April, 2004.
"The RSO, approved for device installation, relocation, removal from service, and surveys, reported that the device was reading 1.5 Mr/hr, contact at the damaged area, prior to the temporary repair. A similar, but undamaged device, read 1.2 Mr/hr at the same point. A Ludlum Model 3, SN 104500, calibrated 19 November 2003, was used for stated measurements. The RSO took a leak test inside the opened area. The RSO sent the leak test sample for analysis and subsequently reported the test indicated less then detectable activity.
"The Department performed an on-site investigation on 9 January 2004, resulting in this updated report. No media attention has been attracted, yet.
"Initial Notification Reporting Criteria was: 10 CFR 31, General Domestic Licenses for Byproduct Material (damage to shielding) but now we understand that shielding was not compromised.
"Isotope and Activity involved: Cesium 137, 7.4 gigabecquerels (200 millicuries)
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): N/A
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): damage confined to device cover-plate, of a Texas Nuclear Corp, Model 5176 device, Serial Number 2253
"Disposition/recovery: removed from service, temporarily repaired, secured for pending disposal
"Leak test? Wipe survey indicated no contamination, leak test was negative
"Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number) N/A
"Release of activity? None
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: N/A
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: N/A
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: See above
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: N/A
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? N/A
"Was written report provided? Pending
"Was referring physician notified? N/A
"Consultant used? N/A for this event"
Notified R4DO (Jeffery Clark), NMSS (Thomas Essig) |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! |
| Fuel Cycle Facility |
Event Number: 40438 |
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: CALVIN PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON |
Notification Date: 01/12/2004
Notification Time: 14:17 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2004
Event Time: 18:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2004 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE |
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
SUSAN FRANT (IRO) |
Event Text
SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILS TO FUNCTION
"At 1810 [CST] on 01-11-04 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a failure of the C-360 #4 Autoclave High Pressure Isolation System. Water was observed leaking from the autoclave head-to-shell interface near the six o'clock position shortly after initiating a cylinder heat cycle. At the time of discovery, the autoclave was in TSR mode 5 and the High Pressure Isolation System was required to be operable while in this mode. This system is designed to provide containment of the autoclave and prevent an external release of UF6 during a system breach while heating a UF6 cylinder. The PSS declared the system inoperable and TSR LCO 2.1.3.1 .C1 actions were implemented to remove the autoclave from service and place it in Mode 2, 'Out of Service.' The event is reportable as a 24 hour event, as required by 10 CFR 76.120 (c)(2)(i); An event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a preestablished safe condition after an accident. The equipment was required by TSR to be available and operable and no redundant equipment was available to perform the required safety function."
"PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-04-0095; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-02; Event Worksheet Responsible Division; Operations"
Operations has notified the Senior NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 1/16/04 AT 1536 EST FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TO GERRY WAIG * * *
This event has been retracted and the following update information provided:
"Subsequent to the report, plant engineers inspected the autoclave sealing surfaces and O-ring. The O-ring and autoclave sealing surfaces were found to be in good condition with no problems noted that would cause the water leak observed by the operators. The autoclave was subjected to a head-to-shell alignment (pinch) test. The test determined that the autoclave sealing surfaces were within acceptable alignment tolerances and no adjustments were made. To determine the autoclave's ability to perform its containment function, the TSR surveillance (pressure decay test) was performed with the autoclave In the as-found condition, i.e., without any maintenance or changes in the autoclave condition. The autoclave passed this test with approximately half the maximum allowable leak rate. The successful performance of the autoclave pressure decay test indicates that the autoclave HPIS [High Pressure Isolation System] would have been able to perform its designed containment function on January 11, 2004, had it been necessary. Thus, the 10CFR76.120 reporting criteria were not met.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction."
PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-04-0095; PGDP Event Report No. PAP-2004-02; Event Worksheet 40438
Responsible Division: Operations
Notified R2DO (Robert Haag), NMSS (Tom Essig), DIRO (Richard Wessman). |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 40445 |
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORP
Region: 4
City: OILDALE State: CA
County:
License #: 0144-15
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON |
Notification Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 23:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2004
Event Time: 18:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2004 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
Jeffrey Clark (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING PERSONNEL RADIATION EXPOSURE
On 01/12/04, the State of California received a report from Schlumberger Technology of an incident that occurred about 1800 PST on 01/10/04. A 1.3 curie Cs-137 source fell off of its tool. A rig hand picked up the source with his fingertips thinking it was the base of a lightbulb. A Schlumberger crew member told the worker to leave it on the deck. The source was recovered with the source handling tool, and returned it to the shielded container.
Touching exposure was estimated to be 20 mrem with calculations based on maximum touching time of 10 seconds. Whole body exposure was estimated to be 2.9 mrem with calculation exposure based on beginning at 6 feet from the source and closest distance at 2.5 feet for maximum of 2 minutes. The source has exposure characteristics of 2 mrem/hr at 200 inches (min) from shielded (dovetail) end, and 2 mrem/hr at 680 inches (max) from the non-shielded end. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40451 |
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF BRADLEY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH |
Notification Date: 01/15/2004
Notification Time: 23:39 [ET]
Event Date: 01/15/2004
Event Time: 18:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/19/2004 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION |
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
POTENTIAL GAS BINDING OF CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"During routine 31-day ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] venting per SR [Surveillance Requirement] 3.5.2.3 on January 7, 2004, a higher than normal amount of gas was vented from a location on a line off the common suction line for both charging pumps (NV pumps) for Unit 1. The amount of gas vented was not initially considered to be an operability concern. As a conservative measure the frequency of venting was increased from monthly to weekly. Follow-up venting on January 14 indicated the amount of gas vented from this location had increased. Gas was also collecting at a second location at a high point in the NV system. The second location was near the normally-closed valve 1ND-28A. 1ND-28A completes the lineup for 'piggy-back' flow from the Train 'A' decay heat removal system (ND) into the NV system. The type of gas from both locations was determined to be hydrogen. The increased presence of gas was considered a potential operability concern and an operability evaluation was initiated. Venting was increased to once per shift. The source of the hydrogen gas intrusion is unknown and is being investigated. On January 15 at 1850 [EST] it was determined that the amount of gas discovered on January 14 at both locations was greater than what is bounded by current analysis to ensure gas binding of both NV pumps would not have occurred.
"Since January 14, subsequent venting at the first location (NV pump common suction line) has resulted in gas volumes within the analysis limits. The amount of gas at the second location (Train 'A' piggy-back tie in) initially decreased but increased again on January 15. As a result, the power was removed from 1ND-28A to prevent the transfer of gas into the NV pump suction line. This action results in Unit 1 Train 'A' of ECCS being inoperable and entry into TS [Technical Specification] 3.5.2 Action A1 on January 15 at 1857[hrs]. Train 'B' of ECCS is considered currently operable with 1ND-28A closed and continued increased venting.
"Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
This places Unit 1 in a 72-hr Limiting Condition for Operation [LCO]. Unit 2 is not affected.
* * * UPDATE ON 1/19/04 @ 1123 BY S CHRISTOPHER TO C GOULD * * *
UPDATE ON POTENTIAL FOR GAS BINDING CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMPS
"On January 15, 2004, Catawba reported potential for gas binding Unit 1 centrifugal charging pumps (Refer to Event Number 40451).
"Normally-closed valve 1ND-28A completes the lineup for 'piggy-back' flow from the Train 'A' decay heat removal system (ND) for Train 'A' of ECCS. Gas accumulation near 1ND-28A became an operability concern on January 15 for both centrifugal charging pumps. On January 15, 1ND-28A was deenergized (power removed) to prevent the potential transfer of gas into ECCS suction piping. Deenergizing this valve placed Unit 1 into the 72 hour action statement of TS 3.5.2 (ECCS) and 3.6.6 (containment spray). Subsequent ultrasonic testing (UT) of several ECCS vent locations, including the one at 1ND-28A, revealed the piping to be essentially full of water. Based on the UT results, Catawba concluded the gas intrusion was a discrete event and that a current gas production mechanism did not exist. Based on the ECCS piping remaining essentially full of water over a period of approximately 60 hours, power was restored to 1ND28A and Catawba exited TS 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 at 1725 on January 18. Catawba continued with UT a several ECCS locations every six hours as a prudent measure.
"At 0350 on January 19, UT revealed a void at the 1ND-28A location that was larger than the currently established acceptance criteria. The gas was vented and water solid conditions established at 0506. TS 3.0.3 was entered from 0350 until 0506 due to the discovery of the gas at 1ND-28A. The cause of the gas intrusion into the ECCS piping continues to be investigated. Frequent UT and venting (if necessary) continues while the root cause evaluation is in progress. Power was removed from 1ND-28A and the 72 hour action statements of TS 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 entered at 0715 on January 19."
Licensee notified the NRC Resident inspector.
The Reg 2 RDO(Haag) was informed |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40452 |
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES BAPTIST
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH |
Notification Date: 01/16/2004
Notification Time: 02:01 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2004
Event Time: 00:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2004 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION |
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO BOTH TRAINS OF SAFETY INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"Inspections of the 'A' SI [Safety Injection] Pump lube oil cooler today per PMP [Plant Maintenance Procedure] 33-01 revealed silt and lake weed accumulation at tube pass inlets. Calculation C11423 Rev. 0, Addendum A was recently performed to determine service water flow and temperature requirements for the safety injection pump lube oil coolers. The calculation provides the required service water flow rate based on number of tubes blocked and SW [Service Water] temperature. At 1640 [hrs][CST], 1/15/04, it was reported that a visual inspection was performed on the 'A' SI Pump HX [Heat Exchanger] tube inlet and 17 of 20 tubes were found to be blocked. The flow for the 'A' HX was 3 - 3.8 gpm and after cleaning elevated to 5.95 - 6.05 gpm. This concern prompted an investigation into 'B' SI Pump HX and a flow test was performed at 1951 [hrs] on 1/15/04. The results from this test was no flow from 17 of the 20 tubes as seen from the outlet of the HX and a similar flow rate as seen in HX 'A'. The determination was made that this had potentially made both trains of SI Pump HX inoperable and that this needed to be reported under GNP 11.08.04 -'Reportability Determinations'. The Calculation (C11423) used data that was contradictory to current Surveillance Procedure acceptance criteria and used values that may not be indicative of post accident conditions. In a teleconference with Senior Plant Management, it was determined that future operability of the SI Pump lube oil HX cannot be verified and that both trains would be declared inoperable at time 0020 [hrs] [on] 1/16/04. This is in contradiction with the plant Technical Specification,3.3.b Emergency Core Cooling, and placed the plant in the standard shutdown sequence."
The plant shutdown will commence at 0120 hrs CST.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40453 |
Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE OKEETH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD |
Notification Date: 01/16/2004
Notification Time: 08:06 [ET]
Event Date: 01/15/2004
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2004 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
JACK FOSTER () |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING AN UNDERSIZED EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP SHAFT
FPL Energy Seabrook has determined that a Substantial Safety Hazard could exist regarding an undersized Emergency Feedwater Pump shaft in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR21. Therefore, FPL Energy Seabrook is reporting this deficiency to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR21. This Part 21 evaluation documents a deficiency in a rotating assembly for an Emergency Feedwater Pump refurbished at the Flowserve Charlotte Service Center - Charlotte, NC.
The defect was an undersized shaft that was .001 inches smaller than the minimum diameter specified by the vendor. The shaft dimensions are considered to be proprietary by the vendor, so the undersized condition could not be identified by FPL Energy Seabrook personnel prior to installation.
The undersized shaft was discovered during post-maintenance testing following shaft replacement.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40454 |
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG |
Notification Date: 01/16/2004
Notification Time: 13:48 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2004
Event Time: 11:37 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2004 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION |
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
A/R |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Standby |
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP
"At 1137 hours EST on January 16, 2004, with Watts Bar Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 % power, a turbine trip and reactor trip occurred. This is reportable as a 4-hour notification under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8-hour notification under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). In addition, per design, there was auto start of the Auxiliary Feedwater system which is reportable as an 8-hour notification under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). Plant safety systems performed as designed and the reactor is currently stable in mode 3.
"At the time of the trip, plant personnel were performing scheduled Solid State Protection System (SSPS) surveillance testing on the B Train Reactor Trip Breaker. Plant personnel are currently investigating the cause of the event."
The licensee also reported that all control rods inserted on the reactor trip, no primary or secondary system relief valves operated, and that reactor temperature is being maintained using steam dump to the condenser. Steam generator water levels are being maintained using auxiliary feedwater. The station electrical system is available and in a normal configuration. All ECCS equipment is available. The reactor is currently stable at 2230 psig, 559 degrees Fahrenheit.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility |
Event Number: 40455 |
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: TOM E. WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG |
Notification Date: 01/16/2004
Notification Time: 21:42 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2004
Event Time: 15:27 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2004 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN |
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS) |
Event Text
24 HOUR NOTIFICATION FOR BULLETIN 91-01 LOSS OF CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVING WASTE DRUM
"At 1526 on 1-16-04, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a waste drum was not characterized and handled properly and handled as fissile waste. This is a continuation of PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-003, NRC Event Report 40447.
"During the investigation of ATRC-03-4095, container RFD# 215759-20, which had been characterized as NCS [nuclear criticality safety] spacing exempt based on the drum being heterogeneous material, it was identified that this waste drum contained spent alumina material violating NCSA (nuclear criticality spacing analysis] WM0-001. The purpose of this NCSA requirement is to determine if the waste drum requires two independent characterization results. Two independent characterization methods were not utilized for characterization of this drum.
"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR 04-0166; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-004.
NRC Event Worksheet 40455
Responsible Division: Production Support
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The control for performing two independent analysis for determining the U235 mass was violated but one drum monitor analysis determined that the drum did contain less than the safe mass for spacing exempt waste drums. Since the process condition was maintained, the safety significance is low but double contingency was not maintained.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIOS) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: In order for a criticality to be possible, two or more waste drums would have to contain greater than 120 grams U235 and not have the proper spacing maintained between the waste drum.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC
The process condition relied upon for double contingency for this scenario is mass.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): The drum has been characterized to show that Uranium mass is less than 120g U235.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency is based on the requirement that uranium waste material must be characterized to show that the U235 mass of the waste drum is less than 120 grams. This control was not violated and the process condition of mass was maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency is based on the requirement that high density uranium homogeneous waste material be characterized using an independent analysis. Since the waste drum material was mistakenly identified as heterogeneous material, only one analysis was performed. Therefore, this control was violated. One drum monitor analysis determining that the waste drum contained less than 120 grams U235. Although the control was violated, the process condition was maintained. Since this scenario relies on two controls on one parameter and this control was violated, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
Access to the area has been flagged off and access controlled until drums retagged and properly stored.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40456 |
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: ROBERT BABEU
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG |
Notification Date: 01/16/2004
Notification Time: 23:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2004
Event Time: 23:16 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/17/2004 |
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED |
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
DAVID MATTHEWS (NRR)
HO NIEH (IRO)
EACHES (FEMA)
MARTIN HYMAN (DHS) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
NOUE DECLARED AT OYSTER CREEK DUE TO INTAKE LOW WATER LEVEL
The licensee declared a NOUE due to intake water level less than or equal to minus 2.0 feet on the staff. The Oyster Creek EAL table classification used to classify this event is 02. There is no radioactive release in progress. The intake low water level condition is worsened by wind conditions (301 degrees at 26.1 MPH) and low tide. The licensee expects that after low tide (~2330 EST) the intake water level condition will improve.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New Jersey.
* * * UPDATE ON 01/17/04 BY R. BABEU TO C GOULD * * *
The licensee has terminated the NOUE @ 0130 based on the level being less than -2ft (actual level is -1.5ft) The level is stable and the tide is incoming. The reactor is still at 100% power. The licensee has notified the state and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The HOO notified FEMA(David Barton), DHS(Justin Abold), Reg1 RDO(James Noggle), EO(David Matthews) and DIRO Manager(Ho Nieh) |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40457 |
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: AUTHOR LEWIS
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG |
Notification Date: 01/19/2004
Notification Time: 15:31 [ET]
Event Date: 01/19/2004
Event Time: 11:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/19/2004 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION |
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
DAVID MATTHEWS (NRR) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Hot Shutdown |
0 |
Hot Shutdown |
Event Text
CERTAIN PLANT DOORS MAY NOT BE ABLE TO WITHSTAND PRESSURE CREATED BY MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK
"On January 19, 2004, during on-going analysis of the effects of a Main Steam Line Break using new computer models, an issue was raised involving the capability of plant doors. Specifically, the preliminary analysis for a Main Steam Line Break in the Turbine Building determined that certain doors may not be able to withstand the initial pressure wave caused by a guillotine break of the main steam line.
"The preliminary analysis indicates that a pressure wave of approximately 2.7 psi is generated from such a main steam line break, which is more than the capability of several doors isolating safety-related equipment from the Turbine Building. The forces generated from this pressure wave could cause failure of the doors leading to both trains of low voltage switchgear, and the resultant steam environment could potentially render all low voltage AC equipment as well the station batteries inoperable. One train of the high voltage switchgear equipment could also be affected due to failure of the door leading to this room.
"Due to the potential loss of both trains of low voltage electrical distribution as a result of a steam line break, this issue is being reported as a non-emergency, 8-hour report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), a condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Current steam line pressures are low enough such that all doors are capable of withstanding any forces resulting from a steam line break. Engineering evaluation of the issue is continuing."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this issue by the licensee. The licensee also plans to make a media/press release regarding this issue. |
| Other Nuclear Material |
Event Number: 40458 |
Rep Org: DOE RUN COMPANY
Licensee: DOE RUN COMPANY
Region: 3
City: BUNKER State: MO
County:
License #: 24-24815-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL REED
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA |
Notification Date: 01/19/2004
Notification Time: 16:38 [ET]
Event Date: 01/19/2004
Event Time: 10:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/19/2004 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
INFORMATION ONLY |
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS) |
Event Text
DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
At approximately 10:30 CSTon 1/19/04, the Doe Run Company, located in Bunker, MO, reported that the source head of a moisture density gauge broke and fell to the floor. The gauge was being used in a slurry density line for mining and milling operations. The gauge is a Texas Nuclear, model SG-5191, gauge containing 500 millicuries of CS-137. The source serial number is B-1319. The licensee indicated that the area was isolated and the gauge manufacturer was contacted for corrective action. The source remained within the gauge head. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 40459 |
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY CASPERSON
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA |
Notification Date: 01/19/2004
Notification Time: 20:07 [ET]
Event Date: 01/19/2004
Event Time: 14:16 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/19/2004 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY |
Person (Organization):
JEFFERY CLARK (R4) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
FITNESS FOR DUTY 24 HOUR REPORT FROM COMMANCHE PEAK
A non-licensed contract supervisor refused to take a fitness-for-duty test resulting in the termination of his site access. Contact the HOO for additional details.
The licensee indicated they will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
|