Event Notification Report for June 11, 2003
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/10/2003 - 06/11/2003
** EVENT NUMBERS **
39855 39904 39906 39911 39912 39915 39916 39917
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39855 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOK REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2003|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:27[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/17/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:05[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRIAN BATES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/10/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: ARLON COSTA +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |SONIA BURGESS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |MICHAEL CASE NRR |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) DEGRADED CONDITION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Refueling Shutdow|0 Refueling Shutdow|
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO CRACK INDICATIONS ON VESSEL HEAD |
| |
| "At 18:00 on 5/15/03, craze cracking indications were found on a Reactor |
| Pressure Vessel Head Penetration. At 22:05 on 5/17/03, it was determined |
| that this condition was reportable as a prompt eight-hour report under 10 |
| CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). |
| |
| "During the Unit 2 reactor head inspection, five small, shallow indications |
| were found on the inside diameter of penetration #74. The indications are |
| closely spaced and are approximately 3/8 inch below the J-groove weld |
| region. Initial calculations showed a crack depth of 0.117 inches. All of |
| the indications are bounded within an area that is one inch wide by 2.6 |
| inches high. There was no through-wall leakage and the reactor coolant |
| pressure boundary remains intact. |
| |
| "These indications were previously identified during the last refueling |
| outage in February 2002. They were evaluated as acceptable to leave in |
| service for a full cycle at that time, and they have not shown any |
| significant growth since then. |
| |
| "The industry guidance on projected flaw growth rates has been revised since |
| these indications were discovered in 2002. As a result, the new projections |
| for these indications result in less than a full fuel cycle before reaching |
| the limit for remaining in service. Therefore, repairs will be needed. |
| Current plans are to perform an excavation of the affected area, under |
| existing code guidance." |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0811 EDT ON 6/10/03 FROM HACKMAN TO CROUCH * * * |
| |
| The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile: |
| |
| "Following evaluation of the condition reported in EN# 39855, it has been |
| determined that the craze cracking indications in penetration 74 of the Unit |
| 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head do not represent a seriously degraded |
| principal safety barrier of the nuclear power plant. |
| |
| "As stated in the initial ENS report, the flaw was on the inside diameter of |
| the penetration approximately 3/8 inch below the J-groove weld. The flaw |
| evaluation concluded that no growth occurred from the last inspection and at |
| least one effective full power year of operation would pass prior to the |
| crack growing to an unacceptable depth (75 percent through wall). |
| Accordingly, Cook Nuclear Plant withdraws EN# 39855. |
| |
| "Additionally, as part of the withdrawal, a correction to the information |
| contained in EN# 39855 is being made. EN# 39855 stated that repairs were |
| required this refueling outage due to changes in the industry guidance on |
| projected flaw growth rates. The flaw evaluation performed for the 2002 |
| refueling outage was based on growth charts in the flaw evaluation handbook |
| (WCAP 14118, Rev 5) using the depth of the cracking without considering the |
| length. The flaw evaluation for this outage was conservatively calculated |
| considering both depth and length, which resulted in less than a cycle of |
| operation prior to growing 75 percent through wall. The decision to repair |
| the penetration allows Unit 2 to operate for a full fuel cycle. There was |
| no change in industry guidance that compelled a repair for this outage." |
| |
| |
| The crack was repaired during the current refueling outage. The longest |
| crack length identified was 2.1 inches with a depth of .117 inches in the |
| penetration inside diameter of 2.75 inches. Wall thickness of penetration |
| is nominally 0.625 inches. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the retraction by the licensee. |
| |
| Notified R3DO (Hills) and NRR EO (Reis). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 39904 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: NEW MEXICO RAD CONTROL PROGRAM |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/05/2003|
|LICENSEE: SPECTRATEK SERVICES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:15[EDT]|
| CITY: ALBUQUERQUE REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 06/05/2003|
| COUNTY: STATE: NM |EVENT TIME: [MDT]|
|LICENSE#: TA-172-21 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/07/2003|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |DAVID LOVELESS R4 |
| |PATRICIA HOLAHAN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+STEWART BAILEY DOE |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BILL FLOYD |PO SCOTT BAUMGARTNER DOT |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A MISSING WELL LOGGING SOURCE SHIPMENT |
| |
| On 6/5/03, the NM Rad Control Program Office was notified by SpectraTek that |
| one of four boxes in a shipment of well logging sources sent from SpectraTek |
| in Albuquerque via FEDEX on 6/2/03, airbill #791397943907, to Elite Air |
| Freight in Houston, TX was missing. The missing box contains a 40 |
| millicurie Scandium-46 source. The shipment which is enroute to Nigeria is |
| currently being held in Houston pending resolution of the missing source |
| issue. Elite Air Freight contacted FEDEX who believes that the package has |
| been located in the Houston area. NM State Report #NM-03-04. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1342EDT 6/6/03 FROM MIKE BREWER (SPECTRATEK) TO S. SANDIN |
| |
| The missing box containing the 40 millicurie Scandium-46 source was located |
| and delivered to Elite Air Freight in Houston, TX the morning of 6/6/03. |
| Notified R4DO(Loveless), NMSS(Broaddus), DOE(Bailey), and EPA |
| RegionVI(Hammack). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1540EDT 6/6/03 FROM PAUL PATRICK (FEDEX) TO S. SANDIN |
| |
| Due to an administrative oversight, the wrong airbill was updated showing |
| delivery. FEDEX is still investigating and attempting to locate this |
| shipment. Notified R4DO(Loveless), NMSS(Broaddus), DOE(Bailey), and EPA |
| RegionVI(Hammack). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1730EDT 6/7/03 FROM MARVIN SUDDUTH TO GERRY WAIG * * * |
| |
| The missing package was located at approximately 1645EDT at the |
| Houston-Hobby Satellite facility in the Dangerous Goods area with no |
| indication of damage or tampering. A FEDEX security specialist is currently |
| escorting the package to the main FEDEX facility for safe storage over the |
| weekend. FEDEX will make arrangements to have a management representive |
| deliver the package to the receipt on Monday morning and will inform |
| SpectraTek. Notified R4(Loveless, Maier ), R2(Landis), NMSS(Holahan, |
| Broaddus, Miller), EDO(Kane), OSTP(Lothaus), DOE(Turner), EPA |
| RegionVI(Hammack), and DHS(Svenningsen). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 39906 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/05/2003|
|LICENSEE: ABIOTIC ENTERPRISES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:50[EDT]|
| CITY: OKLAHOMA CITY REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 06/03/2003|
| COUNTY: STATE: OK |EVENT TIME: [CDT]|
|LICENSE#: OK-27607-01 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/05/2003|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |DAVID LOVELESS R4 |
| |PATRICIA HOLAHAN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE BRODERICK | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TWO TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGES DISCOVERED ABANDONED |
| |
| On 6/3/03 during a special inspection for non-payment of license fees, state |
| inspectors found the Abiotic Enterprises facility located at 2320 South |
| Portland in Oklahoma City closed and, by all appearances, defunct. The |
| landlord who is located in the same structure said that his tenant, i.e., |
| Abiotic Enterprises, was five (5) months in arrears on rent and that he had |
| not seen any activity for more than a month. The state inspectors entered |
| the business with the assistance of the landlord and found two (2) Troxler |
| Moisture Density Gauges, a model 3430 S/N 29405 and a model 3440 S/N 29452, |
| inside an unlocked caged area. The cases containing the gauges and the |
| source rods were also found unlocked. Oklahoma has revoked Adiotic |
| Enterprises license subject to administrative appeal. On 6/4/03, both |
| Troxlers were impounded by the state and are currently in storage within the |
| OK rad program vault. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39911 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: ROBINSON REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/10/2003|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:31[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/05/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:49[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CURTIS CASTELL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/10/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: HOWIE CROUCH +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FAILURE IN RADIOACTIVE GAS RELEASE MONITORING EQUIPMENT DEGRADES ACCIDENT |
| MITIGATION SYSTEM |
| |
| The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile: |
| |
| "At approximately 19:49 hours [EDT] on June 5, 2003, during a source check |
| of containment radiation monitor R-11 with containment pressure relief in |
| progress, the containment pressure relief isolation valves, V12-10 and |
| V12-11, would not close automatically. The valves were closed by use of the |
| control switch in the control room to stop the pressure relief of the |
| containment at the time of the source check failure. The source check |
| should have caused the valves to close automatically by the initiation of a |
| containment ventilation isolation signal. The penetration was isolated at |
| 20:47 hours by the use of closed and de-activated automatic isolation valve; |
| specifically valve V12-10 was closed and de-activated, in accordance with |
| Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) 3.6.3, |
| Containment Isolation Valves, Required Action B.1. Subsequent evaluation, |
| during review of the condition report for this failure, has determined that |
| the failure, which was caused by a faulty control switch, would have |
| prevented the automatic closure of these valves as required for a |
| containment isolation or a containment high radiation signal. Therefore, |
| this event is being reported as a condition that alone could have prevented |
| the fulfillment of a safety function of a structure, system, or component |
| that is needed to control the release of radioactivity or mitigate the |
| consequences of accident, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and |
| (D). The control switch was repaired at approximately 14:13 hours on June |
| 6, 2003, and the system was restored to operable status at that time. A |
| planned and monitored gaseous release from the containment was in progress |
| at the time of this event using the containment pressure relief system. No |
| release limits were exceeded. If plant conditions had required isolation of |
| the penetration, alarms and indications in the Control Room would have |
| alerted the operators to the condition and the applicable operating |
| procedures direct the operators to manually isolate the penetration. |
| |
| "(The following information is system description information for the |
| Containment Pressure and Vacuum Relief System copied from the H. B. Robinson |
| Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report): |
| |
| "Normal power operation is conducted with the closed containment building at |
| essentially atmospheric pressure. The Containment Pressure and Vacuum Relief |
| System is provided to control variations in containment pressure with |
| respect to atmospheric pressure. These variations are due to changes in |
| atmospheric pressure and leakage from the Instrument Air and Penetration |
| Pressurization Systems. The containment pressure and vacuum relief system |
| includes separate 6 inch lines penetrating the containment, each equipped |
| with two quick-closing, tight-seating, 125 psi air operated butterfly |
| valves, one inside and one outside containment. These valves are designed |
| to fail closed on loss of control signal or control air, and are closed |
| during normal plant operation, except as required for pressure control. |
| |
| "The butterfly valves are protected by debris screens, located inside |
| containment and attached to the inboard pressure and vacuum relief valves, |
| which will ensure that airborne debris will not interfere with their tight |
| closure. The pressure relief line discharges to the plant vent through a |
| HEPA filter and charcoal filters. These filters are provided for removal of |
| particulate and halogen radioactivity from the vented air. Operation of the |
| pressure and vacuum relief lines is manually controlled by the plant |
| operator. A narrow range pressure transmitter continuously indicates |
| containment pressure in the Control Room. Separate high and low pressure |
| alarms are actuated by this transmitter to alert the operator to |
| overpressure and vacuum conditions. These alarms are tentatively set for |
| actuation at plus and minus 0.3 psig. Vacuum relief can be accomplished |
| without regard to atmospheric conditions. In the event of pressure buildup, |
| the operator will be guided by atmospheric conditions, and by the |
| containment particulate and radiogas monitor in relieving the overpressure. |
| Manual operation of both these lines is overridden by automatic containment |
| isolation and containment high radioactivity signals." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39912 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/10/2003|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:36[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 06/10/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: FRANK CLIFFORD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/10/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |CHRISTOPHER CAHILL R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ACOM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INABILITY TO ACTIVATE EMERGENCY SIRENS DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURE |
| |
| "On June 10, 2003 at 0930 hours, the control room was notified that all 112 |
| Prompt Alert and Notification System (PANS) sirens were inoperable by |
| maintenance personnel. All necessary notifications to local towns and MEMA |
| (Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency) have been made. A backup plan |
| (route altering) is in place in the event of an emergency at Pilgrim |
| station. It was determined that one of the 112 sirens was transmitting a |
| continuous radio signal to the remaining sirens, preventing actuation. The |
| faulty siren was isolated from the system at 1040 [hours], and the remaining |
| 111 sirens are now operational." |
| |
| The licensee informed both state and local agencies and the NRC resident |
| inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39915 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MCGUIRE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/10/2003|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:50[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/10/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:11[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RANDY TRACEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/10/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |MARK LESSER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) UNANALYZED CONDITION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INADEQUATE I & C CABLE SEPARATION DISCOVERED DURING APPENDIX "R" REVIEW |
| |
| "McGuire has identified that Unit 1 and Unit 2 electrical cables associated |
| with redundant safe shutdown trains do not meet the separation criteria of |
| Appendix R. Specifically, cables for all four channels of a Unit's Reactor |
| Protection System (RPS) are routed together through the respective Unit's |
| ETA Switchgear Room. This room has no fire detection or suppression |
| capabilities in the area containing the cables. Consequently, in the event |
| of a postulated Appendix R fire in the ETA Switchgear Room, all four |
| channels of the respective Unit's RPS could be susceptible to fire damage. |
| Upon discovery of this condition, a fire watch was established in the Unit 1 |
| and Unit 2 ETA Switchgear Rooms. |
| |
| "McGuire has not yet determined whether this condition would result in the |
| loss of a safety function significantly degrading plant safety. However, |
| since this condition is similar to an example provided in NUREG 1022 Section |
| 3.2.4, McGuire is conservatively reporting this as an unanalyzed condition |
| significantly degrading plant safety." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39916 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALLAWAY REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/10/2003|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:28[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/10/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:20[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: J. R. WEEKLEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/10/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: ARLON COSTA +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |DAVID GRAVES R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ACOM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY DUE TO DAMAGED POWER LINE |
| |
| Power to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was unavailable for |
| approximately two and a half hours due to a severe thunderstorm and a downed |
| power line feeding the facility. An Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) is |
| running, supplying power to the EOF. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| *** UPDATE AT 2311 EDT ON 6/10/03 FROM J.R. WEEKLEY TO A. COSTA *** |
| |
| The downed power line to the EOF has been repaired and electricity to the |
| facility has been restored. The licensee terminated use of the EDG. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39917 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/11/2003|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:26[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 06/11/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOE HESSLING |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/11/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |MARK LESSER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 A/R Y 22 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP DUE TO HIGH HIGH STEAM GENERATOR WATER |
| LEVEL |
| |
| "On 06/11/03, Unit 2 Reactor tripped via Turbine Trip due to high-high |
| Steam Generator level. All Control Rods fully inserted. Unit stable in |
| Mode 3 (Hot Standby). Auxiliary Feedwater system was manually started and |
| currently maintaining steam generator levels. Investigation is in progress |
| to determine initial cause for loss of feed to the 2A Steam Generator from |
| its associated low power feedwater regulating valve." |
| |
| |
| Coming out of a refueling outage reactor power was at 30% when it was |
| noticed that main feedwater regulating valves were oscillating. Reactor |
| power was reduced to 20% and the low power feedwater regulating valves were |
| placed in service so testing of the main feedwater regulating valves could |
| be performed. During testing of the main feedwater regulating valves at |
| approximately 22% reactor power low power feedwater flow to the 2A Steam |
| Generator ceased. The duel indications for the low power feedwater |
| regulating valve indicated that the valve was open but Steam Generator 2A |
| water level was decreasing. Since main feedwater regulating valve was being |
| tested the 100% bypass low power feedwater regulating valve was opened. |
| Steam Generator water level began to increase rapidly so the valve was |
| closed. 2A Steam Generator level began to decrease so the 100% bypass low |
| power feedwater regulating valve was reopened. This time 2A Steam Generator |
| water level increase above 88% narrow range which caused an automatic |
| turbine trip. Since reactor power was greater than 15% the reactor |
| automatically tripped due to the turbine trip. All rods fully inserted into |
| the core. Since the reactor core had very little decay heat the main steam |
| isolation valves were closed and both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps |
| were manually started. Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and Steam |
| Generator PORVs operation is maintaining the plant in a Hot Standby |
| condition. All emergency core cooling systems are fully operable and the |
| emergency diesel generators are fully operable if needed. The electrical |
| grid is stable. The licensee believes that the stem of the low power |
| feedwater regulating valve separated from the valve which in turn caused the |
| valve to close while still having duel indication that the low power |
| feedwater valve was open. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021