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Event Notification Report for June 11, 2003






                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

                              Operations Center



                              Event Reports For

                           06/10/2003 - 06/11/2003



                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **



39855  39904  39906  39911  39912  39915  39916  39917  



!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39855       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: COOK                     REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2003|

|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:27[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/17/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        22:05[EDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRIAN BATES                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/10/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  ARLON COSTA                  +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |SONIA BURGESS        R3      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |MICHAEL CASE         NRR     |

|ADEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)  DEGRADED CONDITION     |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|                                                   |                          |

|2     N          N       0        Refueling Shutdow|0        Refueling Shutdow|

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO CRACK INDICATIONS ON VESSEL HEAD                   |

|                                                                              |

| "At 18:00 on 5/15/03, craze cracking indications were found on a Reactor     |

| Pressure Vessel Head Penetration.  At 22:05 on 5/17/03, it was determined    |

| that this condition was reportable as a prompt eight-hour report under 10    |

| CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).                                                      |

|                                                                              |

| "During the Unit 2 reactor head inspection, five small, shallow indications  |

| were found on the inside diameter of penetration #74.  The indications are   |

| closely spaced and are approximately 3/8 inch below the J-groove weld        |

| region.  Initial calculations showed a crack depth of 0.117 inches.  All of  |

| the indications are bounded within an area that is one inch wide by 2.6      |

| inches high. There was no through-wall leakage and the reactor coolant       |

| pressure boundary remains intact.                                            |

|                                                                              |

| "These indications were previously identified during the last refueling      |

| outage in February 2002.  They were evaluated as acceptable to leave in      |

| service for a full cycle at that time, and they have not shown any           |

| significant growth since then.                                               |

|                                                                              |

| "The industry guidance on projected flaw growth rates has been revised since |

| these indications were discovered in 2002.  As a result, the new projections |

| for these indications result in less than a full fuel cycle before reaching  |

| the limit for remaining in service.  Therefore, repairs will be needed.      |

| Current plans are to perform an excavation of the affected area, under       |

| existing code guidance."                                                     |

|                                                                              |

| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.                                |

|                                                                              |

| * * * UPDATE AT 0811 EDT ON 6/10/03 FROM HACKMAN TO CROUCH * * *             |

|                                                                              |

| The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:      |

|                                                                              |

| "Following evaluation of the condition reported in EN# 39855, it has been    |

| determined that the craze cracking indications in penetration 74 of the Unit |

| 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head do not represent a seriously degraded         |

| principal safety barrier of the nuclear power plant.                         |

|                                                                              |

| "As stated in the initial ENS report, the flaw was on the inside diameter of |

| the penetration approximately 3/8 inch below the J-groove weld.  The flaw    |

| evaluation concluded that no growth occurred from the last inspection and at |

| least one effective full power year of operation would pass prior to the     |

| crack growing to an unacceptable depth (75 percent through wall).            |

| Accordingly, Cook Nuclear Plant withdraws EN# 39855.                         |

|                                                                              |

| "Additionally, as part of the withdrawal, a correction to the information    |

| contained in EN# 39855 is being made.  EN# 39855 stated that repairs were    |

| required this refueling outage due to changes in the industry guidance on    |

| projected flaw growth rates.  The flaw evaluation performed for the 2002     |

| refueling outage was based on growth charts in the flaw evaluation handbook  |

| (WCAP 14118, Rev 5) using the depth of the cracking without considering the  |

| length.  The flaw evaluation for this outage was conservatively calculated   |

| considering both depth and length, which resulted in less than a cycle of    |

| operation prior to growing 75 percent through wall.  The decision to repair  |

| the penetration allows Unit 2 to operate for a full fuel cycle.  There was   |

| no change in industry guidance that compelled a repair for this outage."     |

|                                                                              |

|                                                                              |

| The crack was repaired during the current refueling outage.  The longest     |

| crack length identified was 2.1 inches with a depth of .117 inches in the    |

| penetration inside diameter of 2.75 inches.  Wall thickness of penetration   |

| is nominally 0.625 inches.                                                   |

|                                                                              |

| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the retraction by the licensee.   |

|                                                                              |

| Notified R3DO (Hills) and NRR EO (Reis).                                     |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   39904       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| REP ORG:  NEW MEXICO RAD CONTROL PROGRAM       |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/05/2003|

|LICENSEE:  SPECTRATEK SERVICES                  |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:15[EDT]|

|    CITY:  ALBUQUERQUE              REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        06/05/2003|

|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NM |EVENT TIME:             [MDT]|

|LICENSE#:  TA-172-21             AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/07/2003|

|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+

|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|                                                |DAVID LOVELESS       R4      |

|                                                |PATRICIA HOLAHAN     NMSS    |

+------------------------------------------------+STEWART BAILEY       DOE     |

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BILL FLOYD                   |PO SCOTT BAUMGARTNER DOT     |

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |

+------------------------------------------------+                             |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A MISSING WELL LOGGING SOURCE SHIPMENT      |

|                                                                              |

| On 6/5/03, the NM Rad Control Program Office was notified by SpectraTek that |

| one of four boxes in a shipment of well logging sources sent from SpectraTek |

| in Albuquerque via FEDEX on 6/2/03, airbill #791397943907, to Elite Air      |

| Freight in Houston, TX was missing.  The missing box contains a 40           |

| millicurie Scandium-46 source.  The shipment which is enroute to Nigeria is  |

| currently being held in Houston pending resolution of the missing source     |

| issue.  Elite Air Freight contacted FEDEX who believes that the package has  |

| been located in the Houston area.  NM State Report #NM-03-04.                |

|                                                                              |

| * * * UPDATE 1342EDT 6/6/03 FROM MIKE BREWER (SPECTRATEK) TO S. SANDIN       |

|                                                                              |

| The missing box containing the 40 millicurie Scandium-46 source was located  |

| and delivered to Elite Air Freight in Houston, TX the morning of 6/6/03.     |

| Notified R4DO(Loveless), NMSS(Broaddus), DOE(Bailey), and EPA                |

| RegionVI(Hammack).                                                           |

|                                                                              |

| * * * UPDATE 1540EDT 6/6/03 FROM PAUL PATRICK (FEDEX) TO S. SANDIN           |

|                                                                              |

| Due to an administrative oversight, the wrong airbill was updated showing    |

| delivery.  FEDEX is still investigating and attempting to locate this        |

| shipment.  Notified R4DO(Loveless), NMSS(Broaddus), DOE(Bailey), and EPA     |

| RegionVI(Hammack).                                                           |

|                                                                              |

| * * * UPDATE 1730EDT 6/7/03 FROM MARVIN SUDDUTH TO GERRY WAIG * * *          |

|                                                                              |

| The missing package was located at approximately 1645EDT at the              |

| Houston-Hobby Satellite facility in the Dangerous Goods area with no         |

| indication of damage or tampering.  A FEDEX security specialist is currently |

| escorting the package to the main FEDEX facility for safe storage over the   |

| weekend.  FEDEX  will make arrangements to have a management representive    |

| deliver the package to the receipt on Monday morning and will inform         |

| SpectraTek.  Notified R4(Loveless, Maier ), R2(Landis), NMSS(Holahan,        |

| Broaddus, Miller), EDO(Kane), OSTP(Lothaus), DOE(Turner), EPA                |

| RegionVI(Hammack), and DHS(Svenningsen).                                     |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   39906       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| REP ORG:  OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT                |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/05/2003|

|LICENSEE:  ABIOTIC ENTERPRISES                  |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:50[EDT]|

|    CITY:  OKLAHOMA CITY            REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        06/03/2003|

|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  OK |EVENT TIME:             [CDT]|

|LICENSE#:  OK-27607-01           AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/05/2003|

|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+

|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|                                                |DAVID LOVELESS       R4      |

|                                                |PATRICIA HOLAHAN     NMSS    |

+------------------------------------------------+                             |

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE BRODERICK               |                             |

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |

+------------------------------------------------+                             |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| TWO TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGES DISCOVERED ABANDONED                     |

|                                                                              |

| On 6/3/03 during a special inspection for non-payment of license fees, state |

| inspectors found the Abiotic Enterprises facility located at 2320 South      |

| Portland in Oklahoma City closed and, by all appearances, defunct.  The      |

| landlord who is located in the same structure said that his tenant, i.e.,    |

| Abiotic Enterprises,  was five (5) months in arrears on rent and that he had |

| not seen any activity for more than a month.  The state inspectors entered   |

| the business with the assistance of the landlord and found two (2) Troxler   |

| Moisture Density Gauges, a model 3430 S/N 29405 and a model 3440 S/N 29452,  |

| inside an unlocked caged area.  The cases containing the gauges and the      |

| source rods were also found unlocked.  Oklahoma has revoked Adiotic          |

| Enterprises license subject to administrative appeal.  On 6/4/03, both       |

| Troxlers were impounded by the state and are currently in storage within the |

| OK rad program vault.                                                        |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39911       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: ROBINSON                 REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/10/2003|

|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:31[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [2] W-3-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        06/05/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        19:49[EDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CURTIS CASTELL               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/10/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  HOWIE CROUCH                 +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|AINC 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)   POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |

|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |

|                                                   |                          |

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FAILURE IN RADIOACTIVE GAS RELEASE MONITORING EQUIPMENT DEGRADES ACCIDENT    |

| MITIGATION SYSTEM                                                            |

|                                                                              |

| The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:      |

|                                                                              |

| "At approximately 19:49 hours [EDT] on June 5, 2003, during a source check   |

| of containment radiation monitor R-11 with containment pressure relief in    |

| progress, the containment pressure relief isolation valves, V12-10 and       |

| V12-11, would not close automatically.  The valves were closed by use of the |

| control switch in the control room to stop the pressure relief of the        |

| containment at the time of the source check failure.  The source check       |

| should have caused the valves to close automatically by the initiation of a  |

| containment ventilation isolation signal. The penetration was isolated at    |

| 20:47 hours by the use of closed and de-activated automatic isolation valve; |

| specifically valve V12-10 was closed and de-activated, in accordance with    |

| Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) 3.6.3,      |

| Containment Isolation Valves, Required Action B.1.  Subsequent evaluation,   |

| during review of the condition report for this failure, has determined that  |

| the failure, which was caused by a faulty control switch, would have         |

| prevented the automatic closure of these valves as required for a            |

| containment isolation or a containment high radiation signal.  Therefore,    |

| this event is being reported as a condition that alone could have prevented  |

| the fulfillment of a safety function of a structure, system, or component    |

| that is needed to control the release of radioactivity or mitigate the       |

| consequences of accident, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and    |

| (D).  The control switch was repaired at approximately 14:13 hours on June   |

| 6, 2003, and the system was restored to operable status at that time.  A     |

| planned and monitored gaseous release from the containment was in progress   |

| at the time of this event using the containment pressure relief system.  No  |

| release limits were exceeded.  If plant conditions had required isolation of |

| the penetration, alarms and indications in the Control Room would have       |

| alerted the operators to the condition and the applicable operating          |

| procedures direct the operators to manually isolate the  penetration.        |

|                                                                              |

| "(The following information is system description information for the        |

| Containment Pressure and Vacuum Relief System copied from the H. B. Robinson |

| Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report):     |

|                                                                              |

| "Normal power operation is conducted with the closed containment building at |

| essentially atmospheric pressure. The Containment Pressure and Vacuum Relief |

| System is provided to control variations in containment pressure with        |

| respect to atmospheric pressure.  These variations are due to changes in     |

| atmospheric pressure and leakage from the Instrument Air and Penetration     |

| Pressurization Systems.  The containment pressure and vacuum relief system   |

| includes separate 6 inch lines penetrating the containment, each equipped    |

| with two quick-closing, tight-seating, 125 psi air operated butterfly        |

| valves, one inside and one outside containment.  These valves are designed   |

| to fail closed on loss of control signal or control air, and are closed      |

| during normal plant operation, except as required for pressure control.      |

|                                                                              |

| "The butterfly valves are protected by debris screens, located inside        |

| containment and attached to the inboard pressure and vacuum relief valves,   |

| which will ensure that airborne debris will not interfere with their tight   |

| closure.  The pressure relief line discharges to the plant vent through a    |

| HEPA filter and charcoal filters.  These filters are provided for removal of |

| particulate and halogen radioactivity from the vented air.  Operation of the |

| pressure and vacuum relief lines is manually controlled by the plant         |

| operator.  A narrow range pressure transmitter continuously indicates        |

| containment pressure in the Control Room.  Separate high and low pressure    |

| alarms are actuated by this transmitter to alert the operator to             |

| overpressure and vacuum conditions.  These alarms are tentatively set for    |

| actuation at plus and minus 0.3 psig.  Vacuum relief can be accomplished     |

| without regard to atmospheric conditions.  In the event of pressure buildup, |

| the operator will be guided by atmospheric conditions, and by the            |

| containment particulate and radiogas monitor in relieving the overpressure.  |

| Manual operation of both these lines is overridden by automatic containment  |

| isolation and containment high radioactivity signals."                       |

|                                                                              |

| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39912       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: PILGRIM                  REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/10/2003|

|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:36[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        06/10/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:30[EDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  FRANK CLIFFORD               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/10/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |CHRISTOPHER CAHILL   R1      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|ACOM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)   LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |

|                                                   |                          |

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| INABILITY TO ACTIVATE EMERGENCY SIRENS DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURE              |

|                                                                              |

| "On June 10, 2003 at 0930 hours, the control room was notified that all 112  |

| Prompt Alert and Notification System (PANS) sirens were inoperable by        |

| maintenance personnel.  All necessary notifications to local towns and MEMA  |

| (Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency) have been made. A backup plan    |

| (route altering) is in place in the event of an emergency at Pilgrim         |

| station. It was determined that one of the 112 sirens was transmitting a     |

| continuous radio signal to the remaining sirens, preventing actuation. The   |

| faulty siren was isolated from the system at 1040 [hours], and the remaining |

| 111 sirens are now operational."                                             |

|                                                                              |

| The licensee informed both state and local agencies and the NRC resident     |

| inspector.                                                                   |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39915       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: MCGUIRE                  REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/10/2003|

|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:50[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        06/10/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:11[EDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RANDY TRACEY                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/10/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |MARK LESSER          R2      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)  UNANALYZED CONDITION   |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |

|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| INADEQUATE I & C CABLE SEPARATION DISCOVERED DURING APPENDIX "R" REVIEW      |

|                                                                              |

| "McGuire has identified that Unit 1 and Unit 2 electrical cables associated  |

| with redundant safe shutdown trains do not meet the separation criteria of   |

| Appendix R.  Specifically, cables for all four channels of a Unit's Reactor  |

| Protection System (RPS) are routed together through the respective Unit's    |

| ETA Switchgear Room.  This room has no fire detection or suppression         |

| capabilities in the area containing the cables.  Consequently, in the event  |

| of a postulated Appendix R fire in the ETA Switchgear Room, all four         |

| channels of the respective Unit's RPS could be susceptible to fire damage.   |

| Upon discovery of this condition, a fire watch was established in the Unit 1 |

| and Unit 2 ETA Switchgear Rooms.                                             |

|                                                                              |

| "McGuire has not yet determined whether this condition would result in the   |

| loss of a safety function significantly degrading plant safety.  However,    |

| since this condition is similar to an example provided in NUREG 1022 Section |

| 3.2.4, McGuire is conservatively reporting this as an unanalyzed condition   |

| significantly degrading plant safety."                                       |

|                                                                              |

| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.                            |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39916       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: CALLAWAY                 REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/10/2003|

|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:28[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        06/10/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:20[CDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  J. R. WEEKLEY                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/10/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  ARLON COSTA                  +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |DAVID GRAVES         R4      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|ACOM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)   LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |

|                                                   |                          |

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| LOSS OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY DUE TO DAMAGED POWER LINE      |

|                                                                              |

| Power to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was unavailable for         |

| approximately two and a half hours due to a severe thunderstorm and a downed |

| power line feeding the facility.  An Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) is     |

| running, supplying power to the EOF.                                         |

|                                                                              |

| The licensee notified the  NRC Resident Inspector.                           |

|                                                                              |

| *** UPDATE AT 2311 EDT ON 6/10/03 FROM J.R. WEEKLEY TO A. COSTA ***          |

|                                                                              |

| The downed power line to the EOF has been repaired and electricity to the    |

| facility has been restored.  The licensee terminated use of the EDG.         |

|                                                                              |

| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee.                 |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39917       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE              REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/11/2003|

|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:26[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        06/11/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        01:30[EDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOE HESSLING                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/11/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |MARK LESSER          R2      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|                                                   |                          |

|2     A/R        Y       22       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP DUE TO HIGH HIGH STEAM GENERATOR WATER   |

| LEVEL                                                                        |

|                                                                              |

| "On 06/11/03,  Unit 2 Reactor tripped via Turbine Trip due to high-high      |

| Steam Generator level.  All Control Rods fully inserted.  Unit stable in     |

| Mode 3 (Hot Standby).  Auxiliary Feedwater system was manually started and   |

| currently maintaining steam generator levels.  Investigation is in progress  |

| to determine initial cause for loss of feed to the 2A Steam Generator from   |

| its associated low power feedwater regulating valve."                        |

|                                                                              |

|                                                                              |

| Coming out of a refueling outage reactor power was at 30% when it was        |

| noticed that main feedwater regulating valves were oscillating.  Reactor     |

| power was reduced to 20% and the low power feedwater regulating valves were  |

| placed in service so testing of the main feedwater regulating valves could   |

| be performed.  During testing of the main feedwater regulating valves at     |

| approximately 22% reactor power low power feedwater flow to the 2A Steam     |

| Generator ceased.  The duel indications for the low power feedwater          |

| regulating valve indicated that the valve was open but Steam Generator 2A    |

| water level was decreasing.  Since main feedwater regulating valve was being |

| tested the 100% bypass low power feedwater regulating valve was opened.      |

| Steam Generator water level began to increase rapidly so the valve was       |

| closed.  2A Steam Generator level began to decrease so the 100% bypass low   |

| power feedwater regulating valve was reopened.  This time 2A Steam Generator |

| water level increase above 88% narrow range which caused an automatic        |

| turbine trip. Since reactor power was greater than 15% the reactor           |

| automatically tripped due to the turbine trip. All rods fully inserted into  |

| the core.  Since the reactor core had very little decay heat the main steam  |

| isolation valves were closed and both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps |

| were manually started. Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and  Steam     |

| Generator PORVs  operation is maintaining the plant in a Hot Standby         |

| condition.  All emergency core cooling systems are fully operable and the    |

| emergency diesel generators are fully operable if needed.  The electrical    |

| grid is stable.  The licensee believes that the stem of the low power        |

| feedwater regulating valve separated from the valve which in turn caused the |

| valve to close while still having duel indication that the low power         |

| feedwater valve was open.                                                    |

|                                                                              |

| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |

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