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Event Notification Report for May 19, 2003








                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

                              Operations Center



                              Event Reports For

                           05/16/2003 - 05/19/2003



                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **



39849  39851  39853  39854  39855  39856  39857  



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39849       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: COMANCHE PEAK            REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/15/2003|

|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:27[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/15/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        02:52[CDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  HALL                         |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/16/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |WILLIAM JOHNSON      R4      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |MICHAEL CASE         NRR     |

|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|RICHARD WESSMAN      IRO     |

|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |

|2     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER ON BOTH UNITS DUE TO TURBINE TRIP ON BOTH       |

| UNITS                                                                        |

|                                                                              |

| The licensee reported that a loss of power on the 345KV grid caused a        |

| turbine trip on both units which resulted in a reactor trip from 100% on     |

| both units.  All rods fully inserted and no ECCS was actuated.  Both units   |

| are currently at Mode 3 in natural circulation and stable.  The auxiliary    |

| feed water systems started on both units to maintain steam generator levels. |

| The reactor coolant temperature is being controlled by using the steam       |

| generator atmospheric relief valves.  Since the safety systems were powered  |

| by an alternate offsite power supply, the 4 emergency diesels did not auto   |

| start, but they are operable.  The licensee is investigating why they lost   |

| the 345KV grid.                                                              |

|                                                                              |

|                                                                              |

| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |

|                                                                              |

| *****UPDATE ON 5/16/03 AT 1500 EST FROM D. BUTLER TO R. LAURA*****           |

|                                                                              |

| "Status as of 10:30, 05/16/03 - Sequence of Events                           |

|                                                                              |

| 1. Parker line experiences a `B' phase to ground fault at 02:52.             |

| 2. CPSES [Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station] Parker feeder breaker 8040   |

| fails to trip as required.                                                   |

|                                                                              |

| Primary and backup ground relaying do not actuate. No trip signal is sent to |

| the Parker breaker.                                                          |

| Should normal tripping have occurred, fault would likely have cleared and    |

| event ended.                                                                 |

|                                                                              |

| East Bus backup timers are not initiated due to lack of Parker Breaker 8040  |

| trip signal. Operation of the                                                |

| backup timers would have isolated the East bus. CPSES impact would likely    |

| have been lowering one unit to                                               |

| 50% power while operating the other unit at 100% power.                      |

|                                                                              |

| 3. Parker line remains faulted with fault current being supplied from the    |

| East bus, West bus and CPSES generation.                                     |

| 4. Approximately 30 cycles into the fault, 345 Kv offsite feeds began to     |

| trip via their own protective schemes.                                       |

| 5. At approximately 1.3 seconds, Unit 1 and 2 Main Generator breakers trip   |

| on generator backup Main transformer                                         |

| neutral ground relaying.                                                     |

| 6. Unit 1 and 2 Main Generator lockout relays actuate on Load Rejection      |

| protection.                                                                  |

| 7. Unit 1 and Unit 2 Normal 6.9KV busses trip on Generator lockout signals.  |

| 8. Unit 1 Normal busses slow transfer to Station Transformer 1 ST at         |

| approximately 5 seconds.                                                     |

| Unit 2 two normal bus alternate feed 2ST has been de-energized from the 8080 |

| breaker blocking slow                                                        |

| transfer operation.                                                          |

| 9. Station Transformer 1 ST `C' phase time over current relaying operates    |

| generating a 1 ST lockout signal.                                            |

| 10. Unit 1 normal 6.9Kv bus alternate feeder breakers are tripped via the 1  |

| ST lockout signal.                                                           |

| Unit 1 and Unit 2 normal 6.9Kv busses are now de-energized.                  |

| 11. East and West busses are inspected by ONCOR and CPSES Maintenance.       |

| Switchyard West bus is re-                                                   |

| energized from the Wolf Hollow Line.                                         |

| 12. Station transformers 1ST and 2ST are re-energized and power restored to  |

| Unit 1 and 2 Normal 6.9KV busses.                                            |

|                                                                              |

| "Troubleshooting                                                             |

|                                                                              |

| "Primary Fault detection relay is tested and is found failed. The Fault      |

| detector serves as a Supervisory relay during line faults. It serves as a    |

| trip permissive, placing the trip circuits of the ground detection relaying  |

| in service. Failure of the Fault Detector is the obvious cause of the        |

| Primary relay protection scheme failure to operate. Backup Fault detection   |

| relay is tested and is found to operate correctly. Failure of the backup     |

| protection scheme is likely caused by the inconsistent operation of the      |

| backup ground relay and failure of the CA unit of the Zone 1 relay."         |

|                                                                              |

| Notified R4DO (Johnson)                                                      |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   39851       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| REP ORG:  NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER             |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/15/2003|

|LICENSEE:  NORTH ANNA                           |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:45[EDT]|

|    CITY:  KINGMAN                  REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        05/14/2003|

|  COUNTY:  SUMNER                    STATE:  KS |EVENT TIME:        18:00[CDT]|

|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/16/2003|

|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+

|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|                                                |WILLIAM JOHNSON      R4      |

|                                                |DOUG BROADDUS        NMSS    |

+------------------------------------------------+TIM MCGINTY          DIRO    |

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  LYNN WARRICK                 |JANICE KROON         EPA     |

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  ERIC THOMAS                  |DAVID WHITFILL       STAT    |

+------------------------------------------------+                             |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|NINF                     INFORMATION ONLY       |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| TRANSPORTATION INCIDENT                                                      |

|                                                                              |

| The National Response Center sent a fax to the Operations Center regarding   |

| the following transportation incident:                                       |

|                                                                              |

| A tractor trailer carrying the reactor vessel head from North Anna power     |

| plant to EnviroCare in Clive, UT was sideswiped by a pickup truck being      |

| driven by a drunk driver near Kingman, KS on Route 42.  The pickup truck     |

| passed the tractor trailer at approximately 80 mph, and proceeded down the   |

| road, where it was involved in a traffic accident.  The incidental impact    |

| between the pickup and the tractor trailer caused a minor tear in the        |

| protective tarp and plastic container containing the vessel head, along with |

| depositing some paint on the head itself.  There was no apparent structural  |

| damage to the vessel head, and no apparent radioactive release into the      |

| atmosphere.                                                                  |

|                                                                              |

| The truck driver stopped his vehicle in Greensburg, Kansas to assess the     |

| condition of the vessel head.  The shipper is sending a representative to    |

| inspect the packing material integrity.  The state of Kansas will also be    |

| sending a representative out to the scene to assist.                         |

|                                                                              |

| *****UPDATE ON 5/16/03 AT 13:50 EST FROM CONNELLY TO LAURA*****              |

|                                                                              |

| Three independent radiological surveys conducted by the State of Kansas and  |

| North Anna determined there was no spread of contamination and only minor    |

| damage occurred to the shipping packaging for the vessel head. The minor     |

| damage was repaired and the truck was released.                              |

|                                                                              |

| Notified R4DO (W. Johnson), DIRO (McGinty) and NMSS (Essig).                 |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   39853       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/16/2003|

|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:04[EDT]|

| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/15/2003|

|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        14:00[EDT]|

|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/16/2003|

|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+

|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |SONIA BURGESS        R3      |

|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |TOM ESSIG            NMSS    |

+------------------------------------------------+                             |

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MCCLEERY                     |                             |

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |

+------------------------------------------------+                             |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|QSAF 72.75(c)(2)         SAFETY EQUIP DISABLED/F|                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATION                                                      |

|                                                                              |

| On 5/15/03 @1400 during pigtail disconnect, a small amount of particulate    |

| fell from the pigtail. This particulate began to smoke resulting in a see    |

| and flee.  During the see and flee the gas release alarm was activated.  The |

| alarm resulted in the actuation of a "Q" Safety system while in applicable   |

| mode (mode III).  The PSS Responded to the see and flee.  The affected       |

| cylinder was made inoperable.  No spread of contamination outside already    |

| posted area.   Air sampling results are less than MDA.                       |

|                                                                              |

| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39854       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: HARRIS                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/16/2003|

|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:53[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        05/16/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:56[EDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN YADUSKY                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/16/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  ERIC THOMAS                  +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |ROBERT HAAG          R2      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|1     N          N       0        Hot Standby      |0        Hot Standby      |

|                                                   |                          |

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION                                                   |

|                                                                              |

| "On 5/16/03 with the reactor shutdown in MODE 3, an unplanned actuation of   |

| Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system occurred during testing of the 'B' Main     |

| Feed Pump (MFP).  A trip of an uncoupled MFP generated a signal to start     |

| both motor-driven AFW pumps during testing following maintenance.  The 'A'   |

| motor-driven AFW pump was already in service, so the 'B' AFW pump started on |

| receipt of the signal.  Feed to the steam generators was always available,   |

| even without the additional actuation of the AFW system.  The purpose of the |

| actuation of AFW following a trip of the main feed system is to ensure       |

| adequate flow to the steam generator.  In this case, the main feed pump was  |

| being tested and was not being used to provide flow to the steam generator.  |

| Therefore the actuation was not required to provide any safety function.     |

| The 'B' motor-driven AFW pump was secured within approximately two minutes   |

| because the additional flow was not required.  This condition is being       |

| reported as an unplanned system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR          |

| 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).                                                          |

|                                                                              |

| "10 CFR 50.72 requires an 8-hour report for, 'Any event or condition that    |

| results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph         |

| (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section except when the actuation results from and is  |

| part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'  In     |

| this case, the AFW pump start signal due to trip of the last running MFP is  |

| only applicable in MODES 1 and 2, and is not required in the current MODE of |

| plant operation (MODE 3).                                                    |

|                                                                              |

| "The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."                                   |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39855       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: COOK                     REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2003|

|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:27[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/17/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        22:05[EDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRIAN BATES                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/18/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  ARLON COSTA                  +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |SONIA BURGESS        R3      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |MICHAEL CASE         NRR     |

|ADEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)  DEGRADED CONDITION     |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|                                                   |                          |

|2     N          N       0        Refueling Shutdow|0        Refueling Shutdow|

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO CRACK INDICATIONS ON VESSEL HEAD                   |

|                                                                              |

| "At 18:00 on 5/15/03, craze cracking indications were found on a Reactor     |

| Pressure Vessel Head Penetration.  At 22:05 on 5/17/03, it was determined    |

| that this condition was reportable as a prompt eight-hour report under 10    |

| CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).                                                      |

|                                                                              |

| "During the Unit 2 reactor head inspection, five small, shallow indications  |

| were found on the inside diameter of penetration #74.  The indications are   |

| closely spaced and are approximately 3/8 inch below the J-groove weld        |

| region.  Initial calculations showed a crack depth of 0.117 inches.  All of  |

| the indications are bounded within an area that is one inch wide by 2.6      |

| inches high. There was no through-wall leakage and the reactor coolant       |

| pressure boundary remains intact.                                            |

|                                                                              |

| "These indications were previously identified during the last refueling      |

| outage in February 2002.  They were evaluated as acceptable to leave in      |

| service for a full cycle at that time, and they have not shown any           |

| significant growth since then.                                               |

|                                                                              |

| "The industry guidance on projected flaw growth rates has been revised since |

| these indications were discovered in 2002.  As a result, the new projections |

| for these indications result in less than a full fuel cycle before reaching  |

| the limit for remaining in service.  Therefore, repairs will be needed.      |

| Current plans are to perform an excavation of the affected area, under       |

| existing code guidance."                                                     |

|                                                                              |

| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.                                |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39856       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: HARRIS                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2003|

|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:58[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        05/18/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:07[EDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RANDY WILSON                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/18/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  ERIC THOMAS                  +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |ROBERT HAAG          R2      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |

|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|1     A/R        Y       28       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |

|                                                   |                          |

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| RPS ACTUATION WHILE CRITICAL                                                 |

|                                                                              |

| "On 5/18/03 with the reactor at 28 percent power in MODE 1, an unplanned     |

| actuation of the reactor protection system occurred.  At 1807 the reactor    |

| was automatically tripped from a turbine trip - reactor trip signal.  All    |

| systems functioned as required and no other safety systems were actuated.    |

| The operations staff responded to the event in accordance with applicable    |

| plant procedures.  The plant stabilized at normal operating no-load Reactor  |

| Coolant System temperature and pressure following the reactor trip.  The     |

| cause of the turbine trip is under investigation.                            |

|                                                                              |

| "This condition is being reported as an unplanned reactor protection system  |

| actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(IV)(B) and 10 CFR            |

| 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."                                                         |

|                                                                              |

| All rods fully inserted and decay heat is being removed via the PORV's.      |

|                                                                              |

| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39857       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: PILGRIM                  REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/19/2003|

|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:57[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        05/19/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:24[EDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARTIN MANPENFEL             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/19/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  HOWIE CROUCH                 +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |BRIAN MCDERMOTT      R1      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |TERRY REIS           NRR     |

|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|RICHARD WESSMAN      IRO     |

|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|1     A/R        Y       3        Startup          |0        Startup          |

|                                                   |                          |

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM RESULTING IN  PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR        |

| BUILDING ISOLATIONS                                                          |

|                                                                              |

| At 0424 EDT, during startup operations, the Main Turbine Bypass valves       |

| unexpectedly opened and depressurized the reactor vessel.  After             |

| depressurization, the reactor level increased due to swell and caused an     |

| automatic reactor scram.  Additionally, there was a Reactor Building         |

| Isolation Signal and Group I, II, and VI Primary Containment Isolation       |

| Signal generated.  Immediately after the automatic scram,  five control rods |

| failed to insert into the core.  Plant operations personnel performed        |

| actions in accordance with their Emergency Operating Procedures to drive the |

| control rods into the core.  According to the licensee,  adequate shutdown   |

| margin was always maintained.                                                |

|                                                                              |

| The plant electrical system is stable with plant equipment being powered     |

| from offsite and the startup transformer.  Reactor pressure and level are    |

| being maintained via steam line drains to the main condenser.                |

|                                                                              |

| Troubleshooting of the Main Turbine Bypass valves/control system is in       |

| progress.                                                                    |

|                                                                              |

| The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.                   |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+





                    

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